Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs
(2022) 276 CLR 80 · [2022] HCA 26 · (2022) 403 ALR 398 · (2022) 96 ALJR 737
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26 is a High Court of Australia decision on when a tribunal's denial of procedural fairness is material, and so involves jurisdictional error [1]. Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Edelman and Gleeson JJ sat. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), reviewing a decision not to revoke the cancellation of Mr Nathanson's visa, did not give him an opportunity to give or adduce evidence or make submissions on how two domestic violence incidents should affect a primary consideration [60]. The Court allowed his appeal, set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court and of the primary judge, set aside the Tribunal's decision and remitted the application to the Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law, with the first respondent to pay costs [40]. No judge dissented: Gageler J agreed with the reasoning and orders of Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ, and Gordon J and Edelman J agreed with the orders and gave separate reasons [59], [87], [128].
Facts
Mr Nathanson, a citizen of New Zealand born in Zimbabwe, arrived in Australia in 2010 when he was 26 years old and was granted a Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category visa in 2013 [3]. In 2018 a delegate of the Minister cancelled the visa under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) [3]. That provision required cancellation because the Minister was satisfied that he did not pass the character test in s 501(6) and because he was serving a sentence of imprisonment for offences against Northern Territory law [3]. The offences were depriving a person of personal liberty, aggravated assault, stealing and driving a vehicle in a dangerous manner, for which he received a total effective period of imprisonment of two years and six months [3]. The victim was a seventy year old man who was attacked without provocation and deprived of his liberty for almost 12 hours, during which Mr Nathanson threatened his life [3].
On 10 January 2019 a delegate decided under s 501CA(4) not to revoke the cancellation, and the delegate's reasons did not mention domestic or family violence [4], [9]. The delegate had to comply with Ministerial Direction 65, made under s 499, whose primary considerations were protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct, the best interests of minor children in Australia and expectations of the Australian community [4]. Mr Nathanson applied to the Tribunal for review under s 500(1)(ba), and s 39(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) required that he be given a reasonable opportunity to present his case [7].
On 28 February 2019 Ministerial Direction 79 replaced Direction 65 [8]. Direction 79 added para 13.1.1(1)(b), which made it a factor in assessing the nature and seriousness of a non-citizen's conduct that, in the Direction's words, "crimes of a violent nature against women or children are viewed very seriously, regardless of the sentence imposed" [8]. There was no suggestion that Mr Nathanson had ever been charged with or convicted of any domestic violence offence [9].
The Minister obtained under summons two police reports of family violence involving him, from 2012 and 2016, and he knew of them before the hearing [10]. He gave the Tribunal a letter of support from his wife dated 5 March 2019, which referred to two occasions on which she had reported him to police but said nothing specific about the incidents [10]. The Minister's Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions did not address para 13.1.1(1)(b), although it referred to domestic violence in relation to the best interests of his children and the expectations of the Australian community [11].
Mr Nathanson represented himself at the hearing on 21 March 2019 [9], [12]. Early in the hearing the Tribunal member gave him a marked copy of Direction 79 and told him, in her words, that there were "only minor changes to the direction", which she thought were "of minor relevance" given his conviction history [12]. The Minister's solicitor did not raise any issue about those observations and, in opening, did not say anything to indicate that the new language meant domestic or family violence was to be viewed very seriously [12], [13]. In questioning by the solicitor about the two police reports, Mr Nathanson made several admissions, although he gave evidence to the effect that he had no real recollection of either incident [14]. In closing, the solicitor submitted that his violent conduct against his wife was, in the solicitor's words, "extremely serious conduct", especially having regard to Direction 79 [14]. It was common ground that he was not put on notice of the significance of the new principle until those closing submissions [9]. The Tribunal took no steps to draw the new issue to his attention or to give him an opportunity to address it, and he did not address it in his closing submissions [15].
On 4 April 2019 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision [16]. It found that he had been involved in two incidents of violent conduct against his wife in the family home, in 2012 and 2016, and, having regard to the general principles in Direction 79, that the conduct was to be regarded seriously [16]. It concluded that the nature of his offending was very serious and strongly weighed against revoking the cancellation [16]. It formed the opinion that protection of the Australian community and the expectations of the Australian community outweighed the considerations favouring revocation, namely the best interests of minor children, his ties to Australia and the impediments he would face if removed [17].
Procedural history
On 18 October 2019 Colvin J in the Federal Court of Australia dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the Tribunal's course was procedurally unfair but did not constitute jurisdictional error (Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1709) [18]. Colvin J found that the Tribunal's characterisation of the offending as very serious derived from its consideration of the domestic violence evidence [20]. His Honour nonetheless concluded that the breach was not shown to be material, because Mr Nathanson did not identify any particular evidence or submission that might have been presented and might have caused a different outcome [21].
A Full Court of the Federal Court (Steward and Jackson JJ, Wigney J dissenting) dismissed his appeal (Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs (2020) 281 FCR 23) [22]. The majority relied on three circumstances: the general importance of the domestic violence allegations, the letter from his wife, and his admissions about the two incidents [24]–[26]. In the majority's words, he "did at least need to articulate ... a specific course of action which could realistically have changed the result", and they concluded that he had not done so [27]. They also rejected three things he said he could have done: adduce evidence from his wife, submit that the domestic violence should not be viewed very seriously because he had not been charged or convicted, and submit that it should not diminish the weight given to his children's best interests [28].
In dissent, Wigney J was satisfied that a fair hearing may have allowed Mr Nathanson to persuade the Tribunal to decide in his favour, and readily inferred that he would have addressed the new issue if given the opportunity [29]. Wigney J identified further evidence from Mr Nathanson or his wife, and submissions about why para 13.1.1(1)(b) was not relevantly engaged, as ways he may have done so [29]. The High Court heard the appeal on 10 March 2022 and gave judgment on 17 August 2022.
Issues
It was not in dispute in the High Court that the Tribunal denied Mr Nathanson procedural fairness [60], [105]. The issue was whether that unfairness involved jurisdictional error, which depended on whether it was material to the Tribunal's decision [1]. The Minister's argument raised whether Mr Nathanson had to adduce evidence of how the question of domestic violence could have been addressed by him or his wife in further material [35]. The appeal proceeded on the basis that the Tribunal had to act under Direction 79, and the joint reasons did not consider whether he had any accrued right to consideration under Direction 65 [9]. Gordon J and Edelman J each also addressed who should bear the onus of proving materiality [64], [91].
Held
Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ (joint reasons)
Their Honours said the Tribunal's failure would involve jurisdictional error only if it was material, which is established if the error deprived the appellant of a realistic possibility of a different outcome, and that the appellant bore the onus of demonstrating this [1]. They referred to Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123, in which they said a majority of Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ enunciated the principle that a statute conferring decision-making authority is "ordinarily to be interpreted as incorporating a threshold of materiality in the event of non-compliance" [30].
Following MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 95 ALJR 441; 390 ALR 590, they said materiality first requires the question of how the decision was in fact made to be determined by proof of historical facts on the balance of probabilities [32]. It is then necessary to consider, in words taken from MZAPC, whether the decision could have been different "as a matter of reasonable conjecture within the parameters set by the historical facts that have been determined" [32]. The burden falls on the plaintiff to prove the historical facts needed for the court to be satisfied of that realistic possibility [32].
Their Honours said there will generally be a realistic possibility of a different outcome if a party was denied an opportunity to present evidence or make submissions on an issue that required consideration [33]. They described the standard of reasonable conjecture as "undemanding" [33]. Where a tribunal denies a party a reasonable opportunity to present their case, they said, reasonable conjecture "does not require demonstration of how that party might have taken advantage of that lost opportunity", and nothing in MZAPC denies this [33]. The standard proceeds on the assumptions that a party given a fair opportunity will take advantage of it and could, by doing so, achieve a favourable outcome [33].
They treated the case as analogous to Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141, where the appellate record showed a realistic possibility of a different outcome without any evidence of what counsel could have said had he been allowed to complete his submission [34]. Similarly, the only historical facts Mr Nathanson had to prove appeared from the Tribunal's reasons [34].
The Minister submitted that he had to adduce evidence because the topic of domestic violence had already been addressed in the evidence to some degree, albeit on a different issue [35]. Their Honours said it may be accepted that he had strong reasons to answer the domestic violence material on his children's best interests, that he addressed that issue through his wife's letter, and that it was extremely unlikely he could have avoided findings that the two incidents occurred [37]. They still rejected the Minister's argument, because the Tribunal's decision was made by weighing the considerations in Direction 79, and in that context further evidence and submissions directed to mitigating the significance of the domestic violence evidence could realistically have affected its evaluative fact finding and the outcome [39]. There was no need for Mr Nathanson to establish the nature of any additional evidence or submissions that might have been presented [39]. As a matter of reasonable conjecture, and as Wigney J reasoned, he may have been able to present evidence from himself or his wife and make submissions that could have led to a different characterisation of his offending [39]. What was already before the Tribunal could not foreclose the possibility that he could have presented more about how the incidents were to be evaluated [39].
Gageler J (agreeing with the joint reasons)
Gageler J agreed with the reasoning and orders of Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ and added further observations [59]. Gageler J began with a statement made with Gordon J in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326, that where an administrator's procedure itself fails to afford a fair opportunity to be heard, a denial of procedural fairness is established by nothing more than that failure [41]. Gageler J described the Minister's argument, that an applicant must sometimes demonstrate by evidence how an opportunity to be heard would have been used, as an argument rejected in WZARH re-emerging in a mutated form [42], [43].
On Gageler J's reading, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421 and MZAPC are authority that a denial of procedural fairness is jurisdictional error only if the applicant shows that it was material, and that materiality is shown by a realistic possibility that the decision could have been different [45]. Those cases do not require an applicant to establish on the balance of probabilities any part of what would have occurred, and the onus is no greater than to show, as a matter of reasonable conjecture within the parameters set by the historical facts, that the decision could have been different [46]. Gageler J said establishing that threshold "is not onerous", and that the approach shown in Stead and by the majority in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 has been informed by curial experience [47], [50]. Gageler J explained that the applicant in SZMTA failed because the information there was too marginal for it to be reasonable to conjecture a different decision, and that the applicant in MZAPC failed because no inference could be drawn that the Tribunal in fact took the information into account [53], [54]. Unless the historical facts support an inference that the decision could not have been different, Gageler J said, establishing the reasonableness of the conjecture "will not be difficult" [55].
Here, the Tribunal's reasons showed that the criterion on which Mr Nathanson was not fairly heard bore centrally on its evaluative and discretionary decision [56]. Nothing in the historical facts cast doubt on the conjecture that he would have taken up the opportunity, at least by further submissions on the evidence already adduced, as senior counsel for the Minister conceded [57]. Nor did anything cast doubt on the conjecture that the Tribunal may have been influenced to form a different evaluative judgment and so arrive at a different decision [58].
Gordon J (agreeing in the orders)
Gordon J agreed with the orders proposed by Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ and gave separate reasons [87]. Gordon J's primary ground was that the fundamental nature of the error meant there was "no additional or separate onus" on Mr Nathanson to demonstrate that it could realistically have resulted in a different decision [63]. Gordon J described the case as "a very important opportunity", foreshadowed by a majority in MZAPC, for revisiting and modifying the principle that an applicant must prove the historical facts needed to show a realistic possibility of a different decision [64].
Gordon J said the Tribunal misled Mr Nathanson by telling him the changes in Direction 79 were minor [62], [66]. The Minister first indicated the new issue in oral closing submissions, after the delegate's decision, the Minister's Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions and the oral opening had given no notice of it [67]–[69]. The Tribunal then did not explain that what it had told him was wrong, explain the potential relevance of para 13.1.1(1)(b) or give him any opportunity to respond [70]. In Gordon J's words, the Tribunal's finding on the seriousness of the incidents "infected" both its finding on protection of the Australian community and its ultimate conclusion not to revoke [72]–[74].
Gordon J noted that a majority in MZAPC acknowledged categories of error needing no additional threshold of materiality, and concluded that a serious denial of an opportunity to be heard on an important issue in an evaluative decision, as here, falls into such a category [76]. It was unnecessary, Gordon J said, to chart the bounds of that category, and not all denials of procedural fairness fall within it [78]. Where an error is not fundamental in that sense but the procedure itself failed to afford a fair opportunity to be heard, Gordon J's view was that jurisdictional error is made out unless a respondent shows that the failure did not deprive the person of the possibility of a successful outcome [81].
In the alternative, even if an applicant bore an onus to establish materiality, Gordon J said Mr Nathanson was not required to demonstrate what submissions or evidence he would or could have put, the question being, as Gageler J states, whether the conjecture that the decision could have been different is reasonable [83]. Gordon J warned that requiring such proof risks courts assuming the function of the decision-maker, and would lead applicants to run before the court the case they say they would have run before the decision-maker [84], [85].
Edelman J (agreeing in the orders)
Edelman J adopted the facts set out by Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ, agreed with the orders they proposed and gave separate reasons [92], [128]. Edelman J described the implication concerning materiality as based on weaker values of efficiency than the natural justice and human dignity behind procedural fairness, and said a decision made without procedural fairness should remain valid only in an exceptional case [89], [90]. Edelman J favoured two approaches in combination: recognising serious denials of procedural fairness that will always be material, and placing the onus of proof on the party asserting that an error is immaterial [91].
Edelman J called the requirement in the primary joint judgment in MZAPC that an applicant bear the onus of proving materiality a "regrettable premise", and said that on that premise what is required to discharge the onus must be "almost nothing" [93]. Edelman J set out three questions: whether there was an irregularity capable of producing practical injustice (question 1), whether the unfairness was so serious that it was material without more (question 2), and, if not, whether it had been established that the denial could not have made any difference to the result (question 3) [95]. Edelman J said courts, including the High Court, have not always kept these questions separate, which has led to confusion and error [96].
Edelman J answered question 1 "yes", said that for the reasons given by Gordon J it was "strongly arguable" that question 2 was also "yes", and focused on question 3 because the appeal had done so [105]. Edelman J said placing the onus for question 3 on an applicant is inconsistent with Stead and Aala [107]. Numerous other cases, Edelman J said, including Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596 and Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 169 CLR 648, might have been decided differently if the party had also had to prove that the result might otherwise have been different [110]-[112]. Edelman J said Colvin J and the Full Court majority did what MZAPC appeared to require, and that if the onus were truly a substantive onus their reasoning on onus would be impeccable [116], [119].
Edelman J said question 3 might be thought to present a choice between injustice if the appeal were dismissed and incoherence if it were allowed, and that if it were necessary to choose, Edelman J would choose incoherence [124], [127]. Edelman J's resolution "for the present" was to treat the onus, where it arises, as so slight that it can be met by a "quadruple might" at a high level of generality: there might have been things Mr Nathanson or his wife might have said that might have assisted his case in a manner that might have led to a different result [127]. Edelman J added that there "may come a point" at which the implication concerning materiality should be abandoned, but said it sufficed at present to separate the three questions [123].
Orders. The Court ordered that the appeal be allowed [40]. It set aside the orders of the Full Court made on 9 October 2020, which the joint reasons identify as orders 1 to 4 of that date, and in their place ordered that the appeal to the Full Court be allowed [40]. The orders of Colvin J made on 18 October 2019 were set aside, and in their place it was ordered that the application for review be allowed, the Tribunal's decision dated 4 April 2019 be set aside, the application be remitted to the Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law, and the first respondent pay the applicant's costs [40]. The first respondent was also ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to the Full Court and of the appeal to the High Court [40].
Why it matters
The joint reasons and Gageler J keep the onus of showing materiality on the applicant, as in SZMTA and MZAPC, while describing the standard as undemanding (the joint reasons) and the threshold as not onerous (Gageler J) [1], [33], [45], [47]. Each set of reasons rejects the view that Mr Nathanson had to establish what he would have put to the Tribunal at a fair hearing [39], [46], [83], [127]. Gordon J and Edelman J each questioned placing that onus on the applicant, which continues a division in MZAPC, where Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ held that the onus lay on the applicant and Gordon and Steward JJ, with Edelman J agreeing, held that it lay on the Minister [64], [93], [106].
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