Oris Funds Management Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd
(2005) 14 VR 189 · [2005] VSCA 148
Summary updated 11 November 2026
Overview
Oris Funds Management Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2005] VSCA 148 is a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Chernov, Vincent and Eames JJA), given on 10 June 2005. Oris Funds Management Ltd (OFM) appealed against a Trial Division judge's dismissal of its claim for damages against National Australia Bank Ltd (NAB) over three cheques payable to OFM, which OFM's officers had endorsed to other parties and which NAB collected for the endorsees to reduce their debts to the bank [1]. OFM's case was that by collecting the cheques NAB wrongfully converted them or breached its duty of care to OFM as their true owner [1]. The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal, Vincent and Eames JJA agreeing with the reasons of Chernov JA [33]–[35].
Facts
OFS Pty Ltd (OFS), whose shares were all held by Paul Stanley and Anthony Ponting and of which Stanley was managing director, provided superannuation services to the client base of OAMPS Ltd [2]. OFM was incorporated in October 1999, and Stanley, Ponting and Jack Cygler were at all relevant times its shareholders and directors, Stanley and Ponting each holding 45 per cent through their family trust companies and Cygler holding 10 per cent [2]. OFM had no bank account during the relevant period and conducted its business through OFS, which paid wages and other costs incurred on OFM's behalf [2]. NAB was banker to OFS and two Tasvinum companies in which Stanley and Ponting held interests, and these companies were in financial difficulty, with Stanley and Ponting under increasing pressure from NAB to reduce their debts [2]. Lawrence Cooper was NAB's accounts manager for that group of companies [2].
OFM was set up to service OFS's superannuation business through a new master trust fund, with capital to be raised by selling OFM shares to a financial institution [3]. In November 1999 Stanley and Cygler approached Tower Life Australia Ltd (Tower) with a proposal to sell it 40 per cent of OFM's capital for $960,000 [3]. Heads of Agreement signed on 7 March 2000 by Tower, OFM, OFS and Cygler, among others, provided for Tower to make an initial payment to OFM to show its good faith, to be treated as part payment of the price if the transaction was completed, with OFS guaranteeing repayment if it was not [5]. The agreement was later amended twice so that Tower would make three such payments to OFM, one of $100,000 and two of $150,000 each [6].
On 6 March 2000 Tower delivered to OFM a cheque for $100,000 payable to OFM and crossed not negotiable, bank account payee only (the March cheque) [6]. Stanley and Ponting endorsed it to one of the Tasvinum companies, purportedly on behalf of OFM, affixing OFM's seal and their signatures, and NAB collected the proceeds and credited them to that company [6]. On 10 May 2000 Tower delivered a second cheque, for $150,000 and crossed in the same way (the May cheque), which Stanley endorsed to OFS, purportedly as a director of OFM, and deposited in OFS's account with NAB, which collected the proceeds [6]. On 7 June 2000 Tower drew a third cheque for $150,000 (the June cheque), which was dealt with in the same way as the May cheque [6].
By May 2000 the OFS Group was under considerable pressure from NAB to reduce its debt, and on 5 May 2000 Cygler, as OFM's company secretary, asked Tower to advance OFM a further $150,000, after which the parties increased the agreed initial payment to $250,000 on 11 May 2000 [9]. On 7 June 2000, probably as a result of NAB's continuing pressure, the initial payment was increased again to $400,000 [11].
Procedural history
At trial OFM's principal case was that neither Stanley nor Ponting was authorised to endorse the cheques, so that OFM remained their true owner and NAB converted them, and it claimed in the alternative for money had and received, unjust enrichment and negligence [7]. NAB denied this and said that in any event it collected the cheques in good faith and without negligence and so had the protection of s 95 of the Cheques Act 1986 (Cth) [7].
The trial judge rejected the claim that the March cheque was endorsed without OFM's authority, finding that it was approved by the only directors and shareholders at the time, Stanley, Ponting and Cygler, the other directors not being appointed until after 2 May 2000 [8]. He also found that the endorsement complied on its face with clause 17.1 of OFM's constitution, which allowed any two directors to endorse a negotiable instrument [8]. He found the endorsement explicable as a payment made at the direction of Stanley and Ponting, who were owed directors' fees, and rejected the claim that it was made fraudulently or in breach of the directors' fiduciary duty to OFM [8].
For the May cheque, by which time the other directors had been appointed, the trial judge was satisfied that Stanley was not authorised to endorse it [9]. He held that NAB would therefore be treated as having converted the cheque unless it satisfied s 128 or s 129 of the Corporations Act 2001 or was protected by s 95(1) of the Cheques Act because it collected the cheque in good faith and without negligence [10]. OFM did not allege that NAB lacked good faith, and the trial judge found that NAB collected the May cheque without negligence even though the crossing had put it on enquiry [10]. For much the same reason, he found that NAB had not been negligent in collecting the June cheque, although it had not established Stanley's authority to endorse it [11]. OFM therefore failed in its claims on all three cheques [12].
For completeness, the trial judge also held that ss 128 and 129 of the Corporations Act gave NAB a good defence, being satisfied that NAB, in particular through Cooper, did not know or suspect that Stanley was not authorised to endorse the May and June cheques [13]. He rejected OFM's argument that s 128(4) was concerned with constructive knowledge or suspicion, and found that in any event no grounds were shown for concluding that NAB ought reasonably to have known or suspected the lack of authority [13]. He rejected OFM's complaint that NAB had not pleaded those sections, finding that OFM would suffer no prejudice from the late reliance [14]. OFM's notice of appeal contained eight grounds, but its counsel, Mr Nash, argued only some of them and reformulated the challenge [15].
Issues
The first issue was whether, even if Stanley and Ponting had authority to endorse the March cheque, the trial judge erred in not finding that the endorsement was a fraud on OFM or a breach of fiduciary duty, so that the cheque was misappropriated and NAB was liable in conversion [16]. The second was whether the trial judge failed to consider whether Stanley and Ponting wrongfully appropriated the March cheque even though they may have had authority to negotiate it [19]. The third was whether the trial judge erred in finding that NAB had established that it was not negligent, for the purposes of s 95(1) of the Cheques Act, in collecting the May and June cheques [23]. A further question was whether the trial judge's views on ss 128 and 129 of the Corporations Act, and his allowing NAB to rely on them although unpleaded, were in error [32].
Held
Chernov JA (Vincent and Eames JJA agreeing)
OFM relied on the minority decision of Brooking J in R v Roffel, which its counsel said the High Court had approved in MacLeod v The Queen, to argue that a director's negotiation in favour of his own business of an account payee cheque made out to the company is prima facie evidence of breach of duty [16]. Chernov JA accepted, for present purposes, that a director with authority to negotiate a company's cheque may nevertheless do so fraudulently or otherwise in breach of fiduciary duty [17]. But in his view neither MacLeod nor Roffel, nor any other authority as far as he knew, supports the contention that a mere endorsement by a director of the company's cheque in his own favour is prima facie evidence of breach, so that the director bears the burden of showing that the endorsement was not a breach of duty [17]. He considered that a cheque crossed in that manner puts the bank on enquiry, but that going as far as OFM did would "reverse, impermissibly, the onus of proof" [17].
Chernov JA also noted that MacLeod and Roffel dealt with materially different circumstances [18]. MacLeod concerned a sole director and shareholder convicted under the New South Wales Crimes Act after applying money deposited by the public for investment in a film production scheme to his personal expenses, including the purchase of his home [18]. In Roffel the majority overturned the applicant's theft convictions because the company, through its directing mind, had consented to his drawing the cheques, while Brooking J considered that there was still a series of appropriations, a view Chernov JA described as endorsed by MacLeod [18]. Chernov JA observed that neither the judgments in MacLeod nor Brooking J's dissent in Roffel suggest that mere endorsement of cheques by a director is prima facie evidence of breach of duty to the company [18].
Chernov JA found no relevant error in the trial judge's statement that, once OFM had not established that the endorsement was unauthorised, it could not be concluded that the endorsement was a fraud on OFM or a breach of fiduciary duty [19]. First, read in context, OFM had run its misappropriation case at trial on the basis that the unlawful conduct was the endorsement without authority, so that authority was essentially the sole issue, and implicit in the trial judge's rejection of that case was a recognition that mere endorsement of the cheque was not misappropriation [20]. Secondly, the trial judge's finding that the endorsement was explicable as a proper commercial transaction implied that he had considered and rejected the claim that the directors acted fraudulently [21]. Thirdly, nothing turned on the point in any event, because OFM adduced no evidence that Stanley and Ponting acted fraudulently [21]. OFM's argument based on misappropriation of the March cheque therefore failed [22]. Because OFM had not shown error in the findings that the March cheque was lawfully endorsed and not fraudulently, the question whether NAB was negligent in dealing with that cheque did not arise [23].
It was common ground that NAB acted in good faith in collecting the May and June cheques, so the primary issue was whether it acted without negligence, a matter on which NAB bore the onus of proof [23]. Mr Nash accepted that the trial judge correctly stated the law but argued that he misapplied it, submitting that NAB was interested only in clearing OFS's excess debt and relied on Stanley's assertions without having them independently confirmed [23]. Counsel also pointed to Cooper's limited recollection of the May cheque, which was deposited at a different branch, and argued that the two signatures on the March cheque should have alerted NAB that OFM's constitution might require two directors to endorse [23].
OFM also challenged the trial judge's implicit finding that Tower's money essentially went to pay expenses OFS incurred on OFM's behalf, arguing that OFS had spent only about $50,000 for OFM, far less than the $300,000 paid by the May and June cheques [24]. Chernov JA held that other evidence showed OFS spending amounts for OFM that were not insubstantial, including office facilities and the salaries of Cygler, Belnick and Norman [25]. He held that it was open and appropriate for the trial judge to treat the total OFS paid for OFM as not inconsiderable and significantly greater than $54,000 [25].
Mr Nash relied on a passage in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Flannagan that, as a rule, a bank should not receive for collection a non-negotiable cheque made payable to other than the payee if anything in the cheque or the circumstances suggested that the person lodging it lacked good title [26]. Chernov JA treated that passage as a general observation about what banks should do when a company's servants pay its cheque into their own account, and held that Flannagan was materially different because fraud was established as a fact there but was not present here [26]. He added that there would have been no point in NAB asking Stanley about the propriety of the transaction from OFM's point of view [26].
Much of OFM's argument was that the trial judge erred in holding that NAB was not negligent because further enquiries of OFM would have been fruitless, relying on the decision of Giles J in Hunter BNZ Finance Ltd v C.G. Moloney Pty Ltd (1989) 18 N.S.W.L.R. 420 [27]. In that case Giles J held that cheques crossed and marked not negotiable put the bank on enquiry even though they were apparently regularly endorsed, and that the bank, having made no enquiry of the true owner, was negligent because appropriate enquiries would probably have revealed the true position [27]. By contrast, the trial judge here found that further enquiries would have been non-productive [27]. Giles J had added that he would have held the bank negligent even if a proper enquiry would not have revealed the true position, and Chernov JA said that, if this meant that a mere failure to enquire is negligence even where the enquiry would be fruitless, it "was not part of the ratio decidendi" of that decision [28]. Chernov JA found it unnecessary to analyse Hunter BNZ further or the apparent conflict in the authorities to which Giles J referred [29]. That was because the trial judge's finding did not rest solely on the futility of further enquiry but on NAB being entitled to assume that the initial payments were being applied to further OFM's business as the Heads of Agreement contemplated, and because the finding that enquiries of OFM through Stanley would have been non-productive was clearly open on the evidence [29].
Chernov JA said that "negligence" in s 95(1) is equivalent to carelessness and, citing Weaver and Craigie, is not the same concept as that underlying the tort of negligence [30]. The test is formulated by reference to the ordinary practice of bankers, and Lord Dunedin in Commissioners of Taxation v English, Scottish & Australian Bank Ltd stated it as whether the paying in of a cheque "was so out of the ordinary course that it ought to have aroused doubts in the bankers' mind, and caused them to make enquiry" [30]. Regard is had to the practice of the banking industry as a whole, not only that of the individual bank, although mere concurrence with banking practice does not establish a lack of negligence [30]. Chernov JA noted that Isaacs and Rich JJ effectively adopted Lord Dunedin's test in The London Bank of Australia Ltd v Kendall, measuring the inquiry needed, once doubt is aroused, by what a fair-minded banker would consider prudent to protect the interests of the true owner [30].
Chernov JA framed the critical question as whether the trial judge erred in effectively concluding that a fair-minded banker would consider it prudent to do no more than Cooper did, and in particular whether such a banker would have made further enquiries of OFM [31]. He accepted that Cooper was pressing Stanley to put OFS's account in order, thereby advancing NAB's interests, and that it must have been apparent to NAB that Tower was the only source of funds for that purpose, but held that it was inaccurate to say that Cooper showed no interest in whether the cheques were applied in accordance with OFM's directions [31]. Cooper knew that Tower's money had to be applied in accordance with the Heads of Agreement and the Shareholders' Sale and Subscription Agreement, whose draft terms he had been given before the May cheque, and these documents, part of what the trial judge called the "basic contractual documentation", showed that the cheques were to be applied to OFM's business [31]. NAB also knew that OFM conducted its business through OFS and was therefore required to reimburse OFS for the costs of doing so [31]. Chernov JA held that it was "well open, and appropriate" to conclude, as the trial judge did, that a prudent banker would have considered the cheques properly applied in furtherance of OFM's business and in its interests, so that there was nothing out of the ordinary in paying the money into OFS's account [31]. Because Stanley was the effective spokesman for both OFM and OFS, there would have been no point in Cooper asking him whether OFM agreed to the transaction [31].
Accepting a submission of NAB's counsel, Chernov JA held that the crossing did not prohibit the cheques being negotiated, as s 95 of the Cheques Act recognises, and merely put the bank on enquiry as to the endorsee's title [31]. NAB fulfilled its duty to OFM by satisfying itself through the contractual documentation that the payments were being made consistently with its terms [31]. Chernov JA noted that the trial judge had seen and heard Cooper give evidence and formed the view that he was an experienced bank officer who acted in accordance with prudent banking practice [31]. The trial judge's ultimate conclusion did not turn on the finding that further enquiries would have been fruitless, although it may have been a factor [31]. It was therefore appropriate for the trial judge to conclude that NAB satisfied s 95(1) of the Cheques Act and was not liable to OFM for the May and June cheques [31].
Given that conclusion, Chernov JA found it unnecessary to consider the correctness of the trial judge's dicta on ss 128 and 129 of the Corporations Act, but said for completeness that he found no relevant error in those views or in the exercise of the discretion to allow NAB to rely on those sections although it had not pleaded them [32]. He would dismiss the appeal [33].
Vincent JA
Vincent JA agreed in the disposition proposed by Chernov JA, for the reasons Chernov JA gave [34].
Eames JA
Eames JA, having read Chernov JA's reasons in draft, agreed for those reasons that the appeal should be dismissed [35].
Orders. The Court of Appeal dismissed OFM's appeal, all three judges agreeing [33]–[35]. The reasons set out no separate formal orders and say nothing about costs.
Why it matters
The decision holds that a director's mere endorsement of a company's crossed cheque in favour of himself or his business is not prima facie evidence of fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, because treating it so would reverse the onus of proof [17]–[18]. It also applies the test of negligence for a collecting bank under s 95(1) of the Cheques Act 1986 (Cth), on which the bank bears the onus, asking what a fair-minded banker, having regard to ordinary banking practice, would consider prudent to protect the true owner [23], [30]–[31]. On the facts, a bank put on enquiry by a not negotiable crossing discharged its duty by satisfying itself from the transaction documents that the payments were being applied consistently with their terms [31]. Chernov JA did not decide whether a failure to make an enquiry that would have been fruitless is itself negligence, saying only that Giles J's broader view in Hunter BNZ was not part of that case's ratio and that the apparent conflict in the authorities need not be analysed [28]–[29].
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