Osland v The Queen
(1998) 197 CLR 316 · [1998] HCA 75 · (1998) 159 ALR 170 · (1998) 73 ALJR 173
Summary updated 3 November 2026
Overview
Osland v The Queen [1998] HCA 75 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ), given on 10 December 1998 on appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria. Mrs Heather Osland and her son, David Albion, were tried together for murdering her husband, Frank Osland, and the jury convicted her but could not reach a verdict on her son [1]. It was not disputed that Mr Albion struck the blow or blows that killed Mr Osland [4]. The Court dismissed Mrs Osland's appeal, so her conviction stands. McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ would each dismiss the appeal [153], [179], [258], while Gaudron and Gummow JJ dissented and would have quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial [62].
Facts
The prosecution case was that Mrs Osland and Mr Albion together planned to murder Mr Osland and, in furtherance of that plan, dug a grave for him on 30 July 1991, and that Mrs Osland mixed sedatives into his dinner that evening [3]. Neither accused disputed that they dug a grave, which they called a hole, that Mrs Osland mixed sedatives into her husband's dinner, that Mr Albion struck the blow or blows that killed him, and that they buried him in the hole [4]. Mr Albion said they dug the hole without any intention at that stage of killing Mr Osland, Mrs Osland's evidence was to the same effect although less clear, and she said she mixed in the sedatives to quieten him down [7].
Both gave evidence that when Mr Osland went to bed they feared what he would do in the morning when he realised he had been drugged, and feared they would both be killed [9]. Mr Albion got a piece of pipe, told his mother she was not strong enough to do it, and struck the fatal blow or blows in her presence [9]. They then took steps to make it appear that Mr Osland had left the area, and Mrs Osland reported him as a missing person [4]. In a police interview in January 1995 Mrs Osland acknowledged that she raised the plan to kill with Mr Albion, helped dig the hole, crushed tablets into Mr Osland's meal, and held him down after Mr Albion hit him [175].
Each accused relied on self-defence and provocation, against evidence of tyrannical and violent behaviour by Mr Osland over many years [5]. Mrs Osland gave evidence that he became violent and abusive soon after they began living together in 1977, that he struck her or one of the children as often as once a week, that he frequently imposed anal intercourse on her against her wishes, and that he threatened to kill her and the children if she tried to leave [185]. She said that in the period before his death his violence was building up and that she thought an attempt by him to kill her was certainly imminent [192]. Mr Albion gave evidence that on the evening of the killing Mr Osland stood over his mother yelling at her and, when he intervened, threatened to kill him and felled him with a punch to the head [197].
The prosecution accepted that Mr Osland had been violent and abusive in the past but contended that this had ceased well before the killing, relying on intercepted telephone conversations in which Mrs Osland made statements to that effect [5]. The Crown also relied on evidence from her son Paul and from Robert Dalziel that, well before the killing, she had sought to solicit each of them to kill Mr Osland [200], which she denied in her evidence [191]. Dr Kenneth Byrne, a clinical and forensic psychologist, gave evidence without objection about what Gaudron and Gummow JJ call the battered wife syndrome, and expressed the opinion that Mrs Osland fitted within it [50].
Procedural history
The joint trial took place in the Supreme Court of Victoria in October 1996, lasted 22 days, and ended with Mrs Osland's conviction for murder and a disagreement by the jury on Mr Albion [182]. She was sentenced to 14 years and 6 months' imprisonment, with a minimum of 9 years and 6 months before she was eligible for parole [183]. On a retrial on 12 December 1996 Mr Albion was acquitted of both murder and manslaughter [182].
The Court of Appeal of Victoria (Winneke P, Hayne and Charles JJA), in R v Osland [1998] 2 VR 636, dismissed her application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence [154]. Mr Albion's acquittal was already known, but no ground complaining of inconsistency was argued in that Court [155]. McHugh J records that the inconsistency issue arose only shortly before the special leave hearing, when this Court told her counsel it wished to hear argument on it [142]. Mrs Osland appealed to the High Court by special leave [154].
Issues
Kirby J sets out the issues raised by the amended notice of appeal, which in summary were [155]:
- whether the conviction was inconsistent with the jury's failure to convict Mr Albion or with his later acquittal, and whether those outcomes showed that the directions on the part each played in the acts causing death were inadequate or inaccurate [155];
- whether the jury should have been directed in accordance with Edwards v The Queen on the use of Mrs Osland's lies [155];
- whether intercepted telephone conversations with her daughter should have been excluded [155];
- whether the directions on provocation and self-defence were wrong, including by failing to connect the evidence of battered woman syndrome to those defences [155];
- whether the judge erred in suggesting that her interest in the outcome might make her evidence partial or less than frank, whether hearsay evidence about the violence was wrongly refused, whether the errors in aggregate caused the trial to miscarry, and whether the case was suitable for the proviso to s 568(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) [155].
Gaudron and Gummow JJ framed the question to be determined on inconsistency as whether it was open to the jury to find that Mr Albion killed pursuant to an understanding or arrangement with his mother even though it could not decide whether he may have acted in self-defence or under provocation [28].
Held
Gaudron and Gummow JJ (dissenting)
Gaudron and Gummow JJ would have allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial [62]. They said Mrs Osland was tried not as an accessory but, with Mr Albion, as a principal or joint perpetrator [14]. They accepted that a person may be guilty of murder as principal where, with the necessary state of mind, she does an act that substantially contributes to death, even if another person's act is the immediate cause [15].
They said the conviction could not rest on that basis, because the only act of Mrs Osland that might have contributed was mixing the sedatives, the jury was never asked whether it did, and the trial judge directed that "it [could] only be a blow with the instrument" that was the operative and substantial cause [18], [21]. Nor, they said, was the trial conducted on the basis that Mr Albion was her innocent agent [19]. Where a trial has miscarried, they said, a guilty verdict cannot be upheld on a basis not left to the jury, because that would be to "trespass on the constitutional function of the jury" [20]. So the conviction could stand only on the basis left to the jury, namely that Mr Albion killed Mr Osland pursuant to an understanding or arrangement with his mother that together they would kill him [21].
They rejected an argument, relying on a passage in R v Demirian, about whether a person present when the crime is committed under such an arrangement is guilty as principal or as accessory: those who form a common purpose to commit a crime together are liable as principals if present when it is committed by one or more of them, regardless of the part each played [25]–[27]. They added that the reasoning in McAuliffe v The Queen "would appear not to require presence at the scene of all parties" to the continuing common purpose if its criteria are otherwise met [27].
In their view, a person who did not actively participate in the act causing death is guilty of murder as principal only if the person whose acts caused death acted pursuant to an understanding or arrangement with the first person that together they would kill the deceased [33]. They then said: "A person cannot act pursuant to an understanding or arrangement with another that, together, they will kill a third person and, at the same time, act under provocation" [34]. Their reason was that provocation arises only where an act of the deceased results in loss of self-control, so the accused cannot also be taken to be giving effect to a prior arrangement, and they said that applies all the more to self-defence in response to a threat or attack by the deceased [34].
Taking the jury's failure to convict Mr Albion as an inability to decide whether the prosecution had negatived self-defence and provocation, they reasoned that unless both were negatived there was no basis for finding that he acted under the arrangement, and that only with that finding could the jury convict Mrs Osland [35]. They concluded that the failure to convict him "reveals a flaw in reasoning which requires that Mrs Osland's conviction be set aside" [35].
They would not enter an acquittal [39]. Had the jury at the joint trial acquitted Mr Albion or found him guilty of manslaughter, they said, consistency "may have required" an acquittal of Mrs Osland, but the jury simply failed to convict him [36]. His later acquittal gave no basis for entering an acquittal because, applying the approach taken to conspiracy in R v Darby, there would be no necessary inconsistency between a conviction of Mrs Osland at a further trial and that acquittal [38]–[39]. On a retrial, they said, the jury should be told she could be convicted on the basis of a joint enterprise only if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Albion killed under the arrangement and not while acting under provocation or in self-defence [40].
On the other grounds they found it unnecessary to say whether any could have amounted to a miscarriage of justice [41]. On lies, they said the jury was not directed as Edwards v The Queen requires, and that the preferable course is to find out what use the prosecution makes of the evidence and then either give that direction or instruct the jury that the evidence goes only to credit [42], [44]. They said it was "difficult, if not impossible" to conclude that a miscarriage resulted here, as counsel sought no direction, while adding that it was not necessary to express a view [45]. They said the intercepted statements about violence against her son Paul if he gave evidence were capable of showing consciousness of guilt and should have attracted a direction like that for lies, and that the failure to direct "would ordinarily constitute a miscarriage of justice", but they did not decide that issue [47]–[48].
They said that "it must now be accepted that the battered wife syndrome is a proper matter for expert evidence", because the ordinary person is likely to approach a battered woman's evidence without knowing of her heightened perception of danger, the impact of fear on her thinking, her fear of telling others and her belief that she cannot escape [57]. Such evidence may bear on provocation, including its gravity, and on self-defence, particularly on whether she believed she was at risk of death or serious bodily harm and that her actions were necessary to avoid it [55]–[56]. They said the issue is not simply whether the accused is a battered woman but usually whether she acted in self-defence or under provocation, and that the evidence should be related to those issues if its use is not otherwise obvious [58]. They found no error here, because much of Dr Byrne's evidence was general and not linked to Mrs Osland's actions or the issues, and no specific direction was sought [59]–[60].
McHugh J
McHugh J agreed with Kirby J's reasons and proposed order, subject to his own comments on inconsistency [63], and said the appeal must be dismissed [153]. He recorded that all members of the Court agree that the appeal must fail except on the issue of inconsistency, and that the conviction is not inconsistent with Mr Albion's later acquittal [64].
He distinguished accessories before the fact and principals in the second degree, whose liability is derivative [71], from a person present at the scene by reason of a pre-concert or agreement to commit the crime, whose liability he said is "not derivative but primary" and who is a principal in the first degree [72]. He said those acting in concert are equally liable for the acts that constitute the actus reus, correcting the statement by Smith J in R v Lowery and King (No 2) that they are equally guilty of the crime [73].
He said Lord Mackay's statement in R v Howe was conclusive in England, at all events, in showing that "it is the acts, and not the crime, of the actual perpetrator which are attributed to the person acting in concert" [75]. On that view a person with the relevant mens rea is guilty of the principal offence, and it is irrelevant that the actual perpetrator has a defence such as lack of mens rea, self-defence, provocation, duress or insanity [75]. He relied also on Matusevich v The Queen, where this Court decided that the legal insanity of the actual perpetrator does not necessarily mean that the conviction of the other person, present at the scene, should be quashed [79]. He said the idea of an innocent agent does not explain all the cases, and that it is more accurate to call a person who escapes liability in a concert case a "non-responsible agent" [85], [89].
He said the general proposition in R v Demirian, on which counsel relied, is "not an accurate statement of the modern law" [91], and should not be followed in the common law jurisdictions of this country, although it may accurately reflect the early common law [94]. Once parties have agreed to the acts and are present acting in concert, he said, the criminal liability of each should depend on the existence of mens rea or a lawful justification, not on the criminal liability of the actual perpetrator [93].
He said the trial was conducted from beginning to end on the basis that the two were jointly responsible and that the only issues were self-defence and provocation, and that her counsel never sought a direction that she could not be convicted unless her son was convicted [97]–[98]. Much evidence admissible against Mrs Osland, including intercepted conversations, was not admissible against Mr Albion [108]. He thought the most likely reason for the disagreement was that one or more jurors were not satisfied that the Crown had negatived Mr Albion's claimed justification [67].
On inconsistency, he said that where there is no legal or technical inconsistency, a conviction can be set aside only where the inconsistency shows that no reasonable jury who applied their minds to the evidence could have reached the two different verdicts [120]. To hold that a conviction should be set aside because verdicts are inconsistent with a standard or principle the jury were never told to apply was, he said, "insupportable in principle" [117]. In his view Gaudron and Gummow JJ tested the jury's reasoning against an abstract principle of law the jury were never asked to apply [122], and "There can be no 'flaw in reasoning' by the jury when they do what the judge's directions require or permit them to do" [123]. If the directions were wrong, he said, the question is whether that requires the conviction to be set aside, which turns on how the case was conducted and whether there was a miscarriage of justice, and he referred to s 568 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) [124].
He rejected the proposition of Gaudron and Gummow JJ, saying that neither in law nor in logic is there any inconsistency in finding that Mr Albion acted in self-defence or under provocation and at the same time pursuant to an understanding or arrangement [128]. He pointed out that the whole basis of their case was that they agreed to kill because that was the only way they could defend themselves, and added: "Instant retaliation is no longer part of the law of provocation" [128].
He accepted that a direction is ordinarily necessary if there is any possibility in a joint trial that the accused whose acts caused death was not acting pursuant to the understanding [66]. But he held the judge was not bound to give it here, because even on Mr Albion's evidence of violence that night it was not a possible view of the evidence that he was "on a venture of his own" [134].
He added that there was ample evidence on which a reasonable jury could find that Mrs Osland's own acts substantially caused the death [147], and that she could be regarded as "a principal in the first degree in her own right" [144]. That alternative case, he said, helps explain why her counsel did not raise the point, and to claim that she was not jointly responsible would have been "forensically preposterous" [148]–[149]. Even if Demirian had correctly stated the law, he said, the failure to give the direction would not have been a miscarriage of justice, given how the trial was conducted [150]. He concluded that there was no inconsistency in the jury's findings and no miscarriage of justice [152].
Kirby J
Kirby J said the appeal should be dismissed [179]. He rejected the complaints about lies, the intercepts and the direction on the accused's interest for the reasons given both by Gaudron and Gummow JJ and by Callinan J [157]. He agreed with them that the complaints about provocation and self-defence should not be upheld, but added his own comments on battered woman syndrome [157].
He said the law should, as far as possible, avoid categories expressed in sex specific or otherwise discriminatory terms [158]. He called the expression battered wife syndrome "a complete misnomer" that should not be used, because many women subjected to long-term battering are not wives [160]. What matters in each case, he said, is the relevance to the particular accused's conduct of evidence explaining commonly observed responses of people living in an abusive relationship of dependency [162].
He warned of the need for caution in receiving such testimony, saying of the syndrome: "It is not a universally accepted and empirically established scientific phenomenon" [165]. There is, he said, "no legal carte blanche, including for people in abusive relationships, to engage in premeditated homicide" [165]. Judges must keep the jury to the limited use of such evidence, which is only as it bears on legal issues such as self-defence and provocation [165]. He noted considerable agreement that expert testimony about the general dynamics of abusive relationships is admissible if relevant and proved by a qualified expert [167]. He did not read Malott, a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, as endorsing an entirely new and discrete defence [169]. He said such evidence might be relevant to why a person stays in an abusive relationship, the nature and extent of the violence, the accused's ability to perceive danger, and whether the accused believed on reasonable grounds that there was no other way to avoid death or grievous bodily harm [169].
He found no substance in the complaints about provocation: read as a whole, the directions told the jury to ask what an ordinary person might have done, and the direction about a relatively minor act of abuse as the last straw was correct [170]. He said evidence of a long-term abusive relationship did not give a person in her position "a blank cheque to plan and execute the homicide of her abuser" [170]. On self-defence, he said such evidence may help a jury understand as self-defensive conduct where no attack was under way but there was a genuinely apprehended threat of imminent danger sufficient to warrant a pre-emptive strike [172]. He said that must be separated from a response that is simply a deliberate desire for revenge, which does not attract self-defence [172]. He found no error in the directions on self-defence, and said the verdict was fully explained by a conclusion, plainly open to the jury, that her conduct was premeditated [173].
On the point of difference in the Court, he agreed with McHugh J's analysis of the liability of persons acting in concert and present at the scene, but said he need only address causation [174]. He said there was "an air of unreality" about the argument, because at no stage before the matter reached this Court did Mrs Osland suggest any dispute about her active contribution to the acts causing death [175]. He held that the directions met the judge's duty to explain the offence: the judge told the jury that the Crown had to prove the accused were a cause of death, that her actions need not be the sole cause, and that a substantial cause was enough [176]–[177]. He read the reference to the blow with the instrument as meaning the immediate cause of death, not as telling the jury to exclude the causative conduct alleged against her, which she had never disputed [177]. Gaudron and Gummow JJ had read that direction as excluding any contribution by her act of mixing the sedatives [18].
He said the evidence left it open to the jury to find that she was the leading participant, and that a possible reason for the disagreement on Mr Albion was whether he should be found guilty of murder or of manslaughter [178]. This Court had no way of judging why the second jury acquitted him, he said, and "the fact that a different jury acquitted Mr Albion cannot impugn the verdict of the jury that convicted the appellant" [178].
Callinan J
Callinan J would dismiss the appeal [258]. He said that in "a case of actual participation in all phases of the crime" it was not necessary to resort to decisions drawing the distinction between principals and accessories [204]. He said the passage in R v Demirian overlooks that concert does not depend on derivative liability, because those who act in concert are to be treated as "causatively jointly responsible" for the crime [217]. "If it were necessary to decide the point", he said, he would be inclined to hold that the practical effect of s 323 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) is to make it irrelevant whether the accused actually struck the blow or did a final act to complete a crime [220].
He applied the test of sufficient significant contribution, which he took from Brennan J and McHugh J in Royall v The Queen [221]. He listed Mrs Osland's contribution as including preparing the grave, planning the killing with her son, drugging the food, discussing the choice of weapon, being present, holding the deceased, and planning the burial, the concealment of the grave and the disposal of the car [221]. She made a significant contribution to the killing [222], and there was abundant evidence entitling the jury to convict her as a principal, or as one of two persons who together directly caused or at least significantly contributed to the death [225]. He rejected a complaint that the judge did not distinguish the states of mind of the two accused, saying the direction was an appropriate response to how the case was conducted and the summing up sufficiently referred to considering each separately [227].
On inconsistency, he said R v Darby does not mean that identical verdicts must be reached in a joint trial, or that separate trials of co-defendants must be viewed in the same way as joint trials [230]. Distinguishing King v The Queen, he said "There is an important distinction between an acquittal and a disagreement by a jury", and he did not accept that a disagreement can be equated with an acquittal in determining inconsistency [232]. The jury may simply have been immovably divided, he said, on whether Mr Albion should be convicted of manslaughter or murder, having regard to his lesser involvement in conceiving, planning and executing the death [232]. Nothing, he said, turned on Mr Albion's acquittal at the second trial, the record of which was not before the Court [236].
He rejected the submission that the Court should adopt a new and separate defence of battered woman syndrome, saying "There is no such separate defence in Australia" [239]. He said Dr Byrne's evidence was given in the context of Mrs Osland's own evidence, and that the summing up on these matters was appropriate and adequate [240]. He said the trial judge treated the lies as going to credibility, not consciousness of guilt, because the Crown did not rely on them in that way, so no further direction was required [248]–[252]. He agreed with the Court of Appeal that the intercepted conversations were highly relevant and probative [253], and said the hearsay evidence, mainly of prior consistent complaints, was rightly rejected [255]. He found no aggregation of errors, and his own review of the evidence led him to agree with the Court of Appeal that the verdict was not unsafe and unsatisfactory [256]. Having read McHugh J's judgment, he agreed with his reasoning and conclusion that "those acting in concert and present at the scene are liable for the acts of each other" [257].
Orders. The Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed. Mrs Osland's conviction for murder therefore stands, and no new trial was ordered. Gaudron and Gummow JJ would instead have allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Court of Appeal and, in its place, allowed the appeal to that court, quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial [62].
Why it matters
McHugh J, with whose analysis Kirby and Callinan JJ agreed, treated a person who acts in concert and is present at the scene as responsible for the acts of the actual perpetrator and, if that person has the relevant mens rea, as guilty of the principal crime even if the perpetrator is acquitted [79], [174], [257]. The catchwords record R v Demirian [1989] VR 97 at 123-124 as disapproved. McHugh J's reasons also set out an approach to inconsistency under which the appellate court must consider the evidence, the issues and the directions given to the jury [121].
Kirby J said this appeal was the first time this Court had been asked to consider the relevance of battered woman syndrome [159]. On that topic Kirby J, with whose reasons McHugh J agreed outside the issue of inconsistency [63], and Callinan J did not accept that it is a separate defence [169], [239], while Gaudron and Gummow JJ treated it as a proper matter for expert evidence, with the issue usually remaining self-defence or provocation [57]–[58].
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