casewise

Perpetual Trustees Victoria Limited v English

[2010] NSWCA 32

NSW Court of Appeal · NSW

Summary updated 11 November 2026

Overview

Perpetual Trustees Victoria Limited v English [2010] NSWCA 32 is a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Allsop P, Campbell JA and Sackville AJA), delivered on 12 March 2010, about a registered Torrens system mortgage on which one joint proprietor forged the signature of the other. The question was which of two innocent parties, the institutional lender or the wife whose signature was forged, should bear the loss caused by the husband's dishonesty [3]. Sackville AJA, with whom Allsop P and Campbell JA agreed, held that the Mortgage, on its proper construction, did not provide security for the payment of any "Secured Money", so that Perpetual could not enforce its power of sale against Ms English's interest [1]–[2], [90]. The Court dismissed Perpetual's appeal against Ms English, with costs, and allowed its appeal against Mr English, the forger, giving Perpetual leave to amend its pleadings to claim relief against him [111].

Facts

Mr and Ms English are husband and wife but have been separated for many years [18]. In 1985 they bought the Property, at Castle Hill, as the matrimonial home, with the help of a bank loan secured by a registered first mortgage, and in due course they became joint registered proprietors [18]. After they separated, Mr English stayed in sole occupation and Ms English made no claim to the Property under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) or otherwise [19].

In March 2003 Mr English applied to an entity apparently associated in some way with Perpetual for a loan of $536,000 in connection with his earthmoving business [20]. The application was made in the names of both spouses, and Mr English forged Ms English's signature on the form [20]. The form disclosed that Ms English lived at a different address and had apparently done so for 10 years, and that $250,000 was currently owing on the Property [21].

On 24 April 2003 Perpetual made a Loan Offer addressed to both Mr and Ms English [22]. Clause 5 of the Loan Offer stated that by accepting the offer the offerees agreed that a registered first mortgage by both of them over the Property was to be provided as security for the loan [23]. Clause 10 provided that to accept the offer "You and, if there is more than one person all of You, must sign and return" the original copy to the lender's solicitors within 21 days [24]. Mr English purported to accept the Loan Offer by signing it, and he forged Ms English's signature to indicate her acceptance, without any authority to accept on her behalf [27].

Perpetual prepared a one page form of Mortgage, which expressly incorporated a Memorandum filed by Perpetual with the Registrar-General under s 80A of the Real Property Act 1900 (RP Act) but made no explicit reference to the Loan Offer [28]. The Mortgage named both spouses as the "Mortgagor" [29]. Mr English signed it and forged Ms English's signature on it [23], and it became a registered mortgage held by Perpetual [4]. Ms English knew nothing of the forgery [5].

Under the Memorandum, "I" meant "the person or persons named and described as the Mortgagor in the Mortgage Form" [30]. Clause 2.2 of the Memorandum made the Mortgage security for payment of the "Secured Money" and for performance of the mortgagor's obligations under the Mortgage [30]. "Secured Money" meant, relevantly, amounts payable to Perpetual under a "Secured Agreement" [75]. A "Secured Agreement" included "any present or future agreement between me or us, or any one of us, and you which I acknowledge in writing to be an agreement secured by the Mortgage" [30]. Clause 1.2 of the Memorandum provided that, unless the context otherwise required, "a reference to a group of things or persons is a reference to any one or more of them" [30].

After Mr English failed to comply with the obligations specified in the Mortgage, Perpetual took the preliminary steps needed to enforce its rights under cl 8.1 of the Memorandum [31]. Sackville AJA noted a possible inference that part of the advance was used to discharge a pre-existing first mortgage on which about $250,000 was owing, but Perpetual made no claim against Ms English for any benefit she may have obtained from that discharge [36]. Mr English is bankrupt, although still the registered proprietor of a joint interest in the Property [6].

Procedural history

Perpetual sued Mr and Ms English in the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court, seeking an order for possession of the Property and judgment for $626,370.91, the amount said to be due under the Mortgage and the Loan Agreement [31]. Ms English denied signing the Loan Offer or the Mortgage and denied being obliged to pay Perpetual, and she filed no cross-claim [32]. Mr English filed a defence containing a number of admissions, although he did not admit default, and he did not appear at the hearing [32]–[33]. He had been made bankrupt before the hearing, his trustee in bankruptcy declined to appear, and Perpetual had not sought leave under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) to claim relief against him other than the order for possession [34].

The primary Judge was Simpson J, whose decision of 3 June 2009 has the citation [2009] NSWSC 478. Her Honour dismissed Perpetual's statement of claim [53]. She treated the outcome as depending purely on the proper construction of the documents [42]. It was not in dispute that registration conferred an indefeasible title on Perpetual, and in her Honour's words "The crucial issue is the identification of the 'estate or interest' that, upon registration, is made indefeasible" [43]. She relied on a passage from Giles J in PT Ltd v Maradona Pty Ltd (1992) 25 NSWLR 643 at 679, including his statement that registration "does not validate all the terms and conditions of the instrument which is registered" [44]. She accepted, on the authority of Small v Tomassetti [2001] NSWSC 1112, that a mortgage expressed to secure a specified sum owed by the mortgagor achieves indefeasibility, even if the debt is created by a forgery [45]. But she considered that where the mortgage adopts the debt by reference to a separate document not incorporated in the mortgage, that does not confer indefeasibility, because what the separate document contains is merely a personal covenant [45].

She rejected Perpetual's argument that each spouse was individually a Mortgagor, saying that "I" indicated that they were to be regarded as "a single entity, or a composite" [48]. She thought that reading "I" as any or either of several mortgagors would lead to surprising results, because one borrower could further encumber the property without the knowledge or consent of another [49]. She concluded that there was no Secured Agreement and that "the mortgage secures nothing, including Mr English's interest in the property", while recognising the unfairness to Perpetual [49]. She held that Perpetual also failed because the purported acknowledgement was no acknowledgement at all: no Mortgage Form had been executed by both spouses, and cl 5 acknowledged a "Loan" rather than a "Loan Agreement" [52]. She considered that moneys were owing by Mr English under the Loan Agreement and treated the requirement that both borrowers sign the loan offer as "severable", although that issue was "peripheral" because Perpetual had abandoned any claim against him independently of the Mortgage [46], [50]–[51].

Perpetual's notice of appeal sought an order for possession or, in the alternative, a declaration that the Mortgage is of full force and effect against Mr English's interest and an order appointing trustees for sale [5]. Mr English's trustee in bankruptcy filed a submitting appearance, and Mr English was served but did not appear [35]. Ms English did not wish to be heard in support of the conclusion that the Mortgage was unenforceable against Mr English's interest, which Sackville AJA said did not relieve Perpetual from demonstrating error on that aspect [65]. The parties were given leave to file, and did file, supplementary written submissions, in particular on the "group of … persons" provision in cl 1.2 of the Memorandum and on cl 10 of the Loan Agreement, a matter that had escaped attention in argument [66]–[67].

Issues

It was common ground that Perpetual's entitlement to exercise its power of sale over Ms English's interest depended on the proper construction of the Mortgage, given that she had never signed the Loan Offer or the Mortgage [54]. Neither party submitted that the primary Judge had misstated the general principles she drew from the authorities [54]. The questions were:

  1. Whether "I" in the definition of Secured Agreement could mean either Mr or Ms English, so that an acknowledgement by Mr English alone was enough, as Perpetual contended [57].
  2. Whether any Secured Agreement existed at all, given the requirement in cl 10 of the Loan Offer that both offerees accept [74], [77].
  3. Whether cl 5 of the Loan Offer was a written acknowledgement satisfying that definition [86]–[87].
  4. Whether, regardless of the result against Ms English, Perpetual was entitled to relief against Mr English, including, in the alternative and with leave to amend, on the basis of an equitable mortgage over his interest [55]–[56], [99].

Held

Sackville AJA (Allsop P and Campbell JA agreeing)

Allsop P agreed with the orders proposed by Sackville AJA and with his Honour's reasons [1]. Campbell JA agreed with Sackville AJA [2]. Neither wrote further reasons and no judge dissented [1]–[2].

Sackville AJA noted that whichever innocent party lost might have an action against a third party, such as a claim by Ms English on the Torrens Assurance Fund established by s 134 of the RP Act or a claim by either against the estate of the apparently deceased solicitor who purported to witness her signature, but that it was unclear whether either had any such remedy [6].

He said that, to judge from the number of decided cases, the registration of forged mortgages under the Torrens system is "a surprisingly common phenomenon" [7]. Subject to any specific statutory provisions, he took as the starting point in Australia the principle of immediate indefeasibility formulated by the Privy Council in Frazer v Walker [1967] 1 AC 569 and endorsed by the High Court in Breskvar v Wall [1971] HCA 70; 126 CLR 376 [7]. He quoted Barwick CJ in Breskvar v Wall, who described the Torrens system as "not a system of registration of title but a system of title by registration" [7].

He said later authorities in Australia and New Zealand, while acknowledging that registration of a forged mortgage confers an indefeasible title unless the mortgagee has been guilty of fraud, raise a further question, at least between the innocent proprietor and the mortgagee [11]. That question is whether indefeasibility effectively validates all the terms of what otherwise would be a void instrument and, if not, what test identifies the provisions enforceable against the innocent proprietor's estate or interest [11]. Courts have generally answered it as a question of construction of the mortgage, which he said has often involved minute analysis of complex documents unlikely to have been read by a mortgagor and which the innocent proprietor will not even have had a chance to read [12].

He said that "all moneys" clauses compound the problem, because they may depend on antecedent instruments that have not been and cannot be registered, and that since forgery renders such instruments void under the general law, the indefeasibility provisions "may not protect the mortgagee" [13]. In his words, "as lenders draft ever-wider clauses they make themselves more vulnerable to the effects of forgery" [13]. He described the authorities as not always entirely consistent, and the recent trend, particularly in New South Wales and New Zealand, as unfavourable to mortgagees, with courts tending to hold that a forged but registered mortgage, as a matter of construction, creates no security interest enforceable against the innocent proprietor [14]. He cited for that trend Westpac New Zealand Limited v Clark [2009] NZSC 73, Provident Capital Ltd v Printy [2008] NSWCA 131 and Yazgi v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2007] NSWCA 240 [14]. He contrasted Queensland, where a mortgagee who fails to take reasonable steps to check the identity of the person signing as mortgagor is denied the benefits of indefeasibility if the signature is forged (Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), s 185(1A)), and Ontario, where the courts adopted deferred indefeasibility (Lawrence v Maple Trust Co [2007] ONCA 74) [15].

Sackville AJA then listed principles that, as the submissions implied, the parties did not take issue with [68]. These included that registration of a forged mortgage confers an indefeasible title on the mortgagee, provided that the mortgagee has not been party or privy to the fraud and no other exception applies [68]. They also included that registration does not necessarily ensure the validity of every term, so that a personal right created by a covenant in a mortgage, such as a guarantee, is not rendered indefeasible [68]. In New South Wales, he noted, "the view has been taken" that a personal covenant to pay in a registered but forged mortgage, where the debt exceeds the value of the property, is not protected by the indefeasibility provisions, although a different view "may have been taken" in Pyramid Building Society v Scorpion Hotels [68]. Registration of a forged mortgage validates those terms that delimit or qualify the mortgagee's estate or interest or are otherwise necessary to assure it [68]. It is necessary to construe the mortgage to determine the scope of the estate or interest made indefeasible, and whether the mortgagee can enforce its security for a debt arising under a separate agreement is itself a question of construction [68]. Generally speaking, a mortgage specifying a sum of money (plus interest) as the amount secured will secure that amount even if the document creating the indebtedness is void under general law principles [68]. However, if as a matter of construction the mortgage does not take effect as a security for a claimed debt, registration will not entitle the mortgagee to exercise remedies such as the power of sale to enforce it [68]. He added that the question may be particularly difficult where the registered mortgage refers to antecedent documents which are not on the Torrens register and may be invalid [68].

On the meaning of "I", Sackville AJA accepted Perpetual's submission and not Ms English's submission that the definition in cl 1.1 should be read independently of cl 1.2 [70]-[71]. He reasoned that the definition refers to a group, namely Mr and Ms English, and that a rule of interpretation in cl 1.2 is quite capable of being applied to a definition in cl 1.1 provided the context does not otherwise require [71]. So "I" meant Mr and Ms English and either of them [73].

That did not decide the appeal, because it did not necessarily mean that cl 2.2 created a security allowing Perpetual to exercise a power of sale over Ms English's interest by reason of Mr English's failure to comply with the Loan Offer [74]. Clause 2.2 had to be construed having regard to the terms of the Loan Offer, including the term prescribing how the offerees could accept it [74]. The words "Secured Money" led to the definition of "Secured Agreement", which had two cumulative components: a present agreement, and a written acknowledgement that the agreement was secured by the Mortgage [75]–[76]. Perpetual identified the present agreement as the Loan Offer [77].

Sackville AJA held that the statement in the Offer that it could be accepted only if all the offerees signed "was plainly never complied with", so that no enforceable agreement ever came into force between Perpetual and the husband and wife, or between Perpetual and the husband [78]. Mr English's signature alone could not be an acceptance, and Perpetual never made an offer to him alone [78]. It followed that the first limb of the definition was not satisfied, no money was payable under a Secured Agreement, and the undertaking to pay in cl 2.2 "had nothing to operate on" [79]. It was therefore irrelevant whether "I" meant husband or wife or both, because there was no Secured Money for the Mortgage to secure [80].

He rejected Perpetual's contention that cl 10 had no application where only Mr English knew of the offer and had admitted liability in his pleadings [81]–[82]. The offer on its face required acceptance by both, Ms English's lack of awareness of it did not alter that, and Mr English's admissions could not alter the fact that she never accepted it [82].

He said the absence of a concluded agreement did not leave Perpetual without remedies against Mr English, since it "might well have" an action for money had and received, of little value given his bankruptcy, and the Mortgage might take effect as an equitable mortgage of his interest [83]. He raised as another possibility that Mr English might be estopped, in proceedings between himself and Perpetual, from denying that an agreement on the terms of the Loan Offer had come into force, although Perpetual had never pleaded estoppel [84]. Whether any such estoppel could assist Perpetual against Ms English was not argued, but he said it was "far from obvious" that "present agreement" covers an agreement a fraudulent party is estopped from denying, and he doubted that the definition should be given such an expansive interpretation [85]. He added that the contra proferentem principle "would seem to have particular force" for an instrument drawn up by an institutional lender and sought to be enforced against someone who is neither a party to it nor aware of the circumstances giving rise to the estoppel [85].

A further difficulty for Perpetual lay in the second component of the definition [86]. Perpetual relied on cl 5 of the Loan Offer as the written acknowledgement, but since the offer was never accepted the terms of cl 5 were never satisfied [87]–[89]. Even if "I" meant either spouse, he found it difficult to see how Mr English's signing of the Loan Offer could be the required acknowledgement, which "must be one that is effective according to the terms of the instrument in which it appears" [89].

He concluded that the Mortgage, on its proper construction, does not provide security for the payment of any Secured Money, including any moneys that might have been due under the Loan Offer had it been validly accepted, and that Perpetual is not entitled to enforce its power of sale against Ms English's interest [90]. Perpetual's appeal against the rejection of its claim against Ms English therefore had to be dismissed [91].

Sackville AJA added a comment on the integrity of the register, beginning with the paramount importance of a publicly accessible register containing the terms of registered dealings, citing Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [2007] HCA 45; 233 CLR 528 [92]. He noted the High Court's point in that case that a third party who inspects the register cannot be expected to look further for extrinsic material [92]. He said that if a registered mortgage, properly construed, does not secure an obligation created by an antecedent void instrument, it is "unlikely" that a transferee of the mortgage would be better placed than the transferor to enforce it against an innocent joint proprietor [95]. That did not necessarily mean that the register lacks integrity or cannot be relied upon, provided the reliance recognises the limits of indefeasibility [96]. Where the extent of the security depends on the efficacy of antecedent documents outside the register, a transferee must, to protect itself against the risk of fraud, be satisfied as to their validity [96]. If they turn out to be void, he said, the difficulty comes from the invalidity of documents "as to the validity of which the register says nothing" [96]. He compared a registered mortgage that secures no debt with a mortgage left undischarged after the mortgagor has repaid the debt [97]. Perhaps, he said, this suggests that unless the effect of the registered instrument is abundantly clear, caution should be exercised before assuming that it will validate an otherwise void antecedent transaction that forms no part of the register [98]. It also suggests, he said, that Parliament might give careful attention to legislation of the kind enacted in Queensland [98].

The conclusion on the Mortgage left open whether Perpetual had an enforceable security over Mr English's interest, and Sackville AJA said his position differed from Ms English's for two reasons [99]. First, he made admissions in pleadings that were never withdrawn, and secondly, he forged his wife's signature to the Loan Offer and Mortgage and presented both documents to Perpetual as bearing her genuine signature [100]. In Sackville AJA's words, "It is hardly to be supposed that the perpetrator of a forgery should be able to escape liability to a mortgagee on the ground that the forgery rendered the mortgage documentation void or otherwise ineffective" [100]. For that reason, he said, where a mortgage is purportedly executed by both spouses but one has forged the other's signature, the mortgagee obtains an equitable mortgage enforceable against the forger's interest, citing Sansom v Westpac Banking Corporation (1996) 7 BPR 14,615 [100]. He referred to Hodgson J's explanation in National Commercial Banking Corporation of Australia Ltd v Hedley (1984) 3 BPR 9477 that the principle rests on two independent bases: an implied agreement by the forger to mortgage his or her interest, and an estoppel arising from the forger's representation that the spouse's signature is genuine [100].

Mr English's defence admitted, among other things, that by the Mortgage he and Ms English mortgaged the Property to Perpetual to secure the $536,000 advanced plus interest, and that they were obliged to repay it [101]. His defence did not admit default, but the evidence established it and the primary Judge so found [102]. In view of the admissions and that finding, Sackville AJA held that, subject to one matter, Perpetual is entitled to relief against Mr English on the basis that the Mortgage secures the loan of $536,000, plus associated interest and charges, against his interest in the Property [103]. The matter was that the relief claimed at trial was in substance limited to possession and judgment for $626,370.91, and the pleadings had not been amended to claim the alternative relief in the notice of appeal [104]. Given the form of the notice of appeal and the absence of Mr English and his trustee from the appeal, he would allow Perpetual to file a further amended statement of claim seeking that relief and would also make a declaration in the terms sought in the notice of appeal [105]. Because an order appointing trustees for sale affects Ms English's interest, he said she should have an opportunity to consider whether she objects to it [105]–[106]. He added that, had it been necessary, he would have been prepared to grant leave, on notice to Mr English and his trustee, to plead an equitable mortgage of Mr English's interest, but on his conclusions that was not necessary [107].

Orders. The Court dismissed Perpetual's appeal as against Ms English and allowed it as against Mr English [111]. The orders were:

  1. Perpetual's appeal against the dismissal of its claim against Ms English is dismissed [111].
  2. Perpetual is to pay Ms English's costs of the appeal [111].
  3. Perpetual's appeal against the dismissal of its claim against Mr English is allowed [111].
  4. Perpetual has leave to further amend its amended statement of claim to claim the relief against Mr English identified in the notice of appeal [111].
  5. The further amended statement of claim is to be filed within 14 days [111].
  6. Perpetual is to file within 14 days short minutes of order giving effect to the judgment to the extent that additional orders are required because the appeal was allowed [111].
  7. If Ms English disputes the proposed minutes, Perpetual is to file brief written submissions with them supporting its proposed orders, and Ms English is to file within 14 days alternative short minutes with brief written submissions supporting hers [111].
  8. Mr English is to pay the costs of Perpetual's appeal against the dismissal of its claim against him [111].
  9. Perpetual, if otherwise qualified, is to have a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951 [111].

The orders as listed do not separately set out the declaration that Sackville AJA said he would make; order 6 deals with any additional orders by short minutes [105], [111].

Why it matters

The case shows that, even where registration of a forged mortgage confers an indefeasible title, the mortgagee may be unable to enforce its power of sale against the innocent proprietor if the mortgage, as a matter of construction, does not take effect as a security for the claimed debt [68], [90]. Here the result against Ms English rested on an acceptance clause, never satisfied, in a document that forms no part of the register, cl 10 of the Loan Offer [74], [78]–[79], [88]. It also separates the innocent joint proprietor from the forger, against whose interest relief remained available [99]–[100], [103]. Sackville AJA's comment on the register says that a transferee of a mortgage whose security depends on antecedent documents outside the register must be satisfied as to their validity, and suggests Parliament might give careful attention to legislation of the Queensland kind [96], [98].

Cited in 19 later casesRelies on 13 casesSee every one in casewise

All case summaries