Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth of Australia
(2010) 243 CLR 319 · [2010] HCA 41
Summary updated 11 November 2026
Overview
Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth of Australia and Plaintiff M69 of 2010 v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 41 are two matters decided together by the High Court of Australia on 11 November 2010. French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ gave one set of joint reasons. [1] Each plaintiff, a Sri Lankan citizen who arrived at Christmas Island by boat and could not validly apply for a visa, sued in the Court's original jurisdiction over an assessment and review which concluded that Australia did not owe him protection obligations. [2]–[3], [5] The Court held that the challenge to the validity of s 46A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) failed, that the assessment and review were steps taken under and for the purposes of that Act, and that each reviewer made an error of law and failed to observe the requirements of procedural fairness. [7], [9], [105] It refused certiorari and mandamus, made a declaration of those errors in each matter, ordered the Commonwealth and the Minister to pay the plaintiffs' costs, and otherwise dismissed each application. [100]–[101], [105]
Facts
The Territory of Christmas Island is what the Migration Act calls an "excised offshore place". [1] Each plaintiff entered Australian territory at Christmas Island by boat, neither is an Australian citizen, neither held a valid visa to enter Australia, and on arrival each was detained under s 189(3) of the Migration Act. [1]–[2] Each is a citizen of Sri Lanka and claims to be a non-citizen to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. [2] Because each became an unlawful non-citizen by entering at an excised offshore place, he cannot make a valid visa application, and so cannot engage the provisions that would oblige the Minister to consider an application and, if satisfied of the criteria, grant the visa. [2]
Section 46A(2) lets the Minister, if the Minister thinks it is in the public interest, determine that the bar in s 46A(1) does not apply to an application by an offshore entry person, which the Court noted is commonly called a decision to "lift the bar". [11], [13] Section 195A(2) lets the Minister, on the same public interest footing, grant a visa to a person in detention under s 189 whether or not the person has applied. [12]–[13] Both powers may only be exercised by the Minister personally, and both sections say that the Minister has no duty to consider whether to exercise the power. [13]
In 2001 the Parliament enacted six Acts affecting the entry into, and remaining in, Australia by aliens, which among other things excised Christmas Island and other territory from the migration zone and inserted s 46A. [29]–[30] Section 198A, inserted as a consequential provision, allowed offshore entry persons to be taken from Australia to a declared country, a procedure the Department called the "Pacific Strategy"; Nauru and Papua New Guinea were declared, and removals to those countries began in 2001 and ceased in 2008. [31]–[32]
On 29 July 2008 the Minister announced that the Government had decided to strengthen and enhance the Refugee Status Assessment (RSA) process, and the Department then developed two manuals, the RSA Manual and a manual for Independent Merits Reviews (IMR), the IMR Manual. [37]–[38] Both manuals emphasised that the processes were, in the manuals' word, "non-statutory", without identifying the power being exercised. [42], [47] The RSA Manual said that the Migration Act, the regulations and Australian case law on the definition of a refugee and protection obligations did not apply, though officers should be guided by them as a matter of policy. [42] The IMR Manual said that reviewers might be guided by the legislated interpretations and Australian case law, but that these were not binding authorities. [47] A favourable outcome led to a departmental submission to the Minister about exercising power, while after a negative review no submission was made and, subject to consideration of any other international obligation, removal processes began. [44], [49]
In each case a departmental officer concluded in an RSA that the plaintiff was not a person to whom Australia had protection obligations, and on the review each plaintiff asked for, the IMR reviewer reached the same conclusion. [3] The reviewers were not officers of the Department but were engaged by a contractor, Wizard People Pty Ltd, and their only function was to make a recommendation about whether protection obligations were owed. [3], [50]
Plaintiff M61's reviewer said that the review was not bound by Australian law and was non-statutory, but that it was appropriate to have regard to Australian legislation and case law as an aid to interpreting the Refugees Convention. [82] Plaintiff M61's adviser put two claims: feared persecution or discrimination at the hands of Sri Lankan authorities or pro-government paramilitary groups, and a separate risk of harm linked to his profile as a shop owner and membership of particular social groups such as Tamil business owners. [83] The reviewer considered the first set of claims but did not examine or refer to the second. [84] An important basis for the reviewer's conclusion was country information supplied by the Department, none of which was put to Plaintiff M61 in his interview. [85]
Plaintiff M69's reviewer also relied on country information, and did not put to him the information she had about the treatment of failed asylum seekers returning to Sri Lanka. [95], [98]
Procedural history
Each plaintiff started proceedings in the High Court's original jurisdiction against the Commonwealth, the Minister and the person who conducted the review, with a fourth defendant in each matter: the assessing officer for Plaintiff M61 and the Secretary of the Department for Plaintiff M69. [5] Each alleged that he was not afforded procedural fairness and that the assessor and the reviewer made errors of law by not treating themselves as bound to apply the Migration Act and what Australian courts have held. [5] Plaintiff M69 further alleged that s 46A is invalid. [6] Each claimed an injunction, certiorari and mandamus, and Plaintiff M69 also claimed declarations. [7] The Court found its jurisdiction in s 75(iii) and s 75(v) of the Constitution and "even, perhaps" s 75(i). [51]
Issues
The lawfulness of the detention was not itself in issue, but the plaintiffs said the inquiries were being made under and for the purposes of the Migration Act, while the Commonwealth and the Minister said the inquiries had no statutory foundation. [4] The first question was whether s 46A is invalid, which in substance asked whether there can be a valid grant of power on terms that consideration of its exercise cannot be enforced. [52], [55] The second was what power was exercised in the RSA and IMR: a non-statutory executive power to inquire, as the Commonwealth and the Minister submitted, or power under s 46A or s 195A, as Plaintiff M61 submitted and Plaintiff M69 adopted in the alternative. [61] The third was what limits applied to the way the assessment and review were conducted, including any duty to afford procedural fairness and to apply the law correctly. [15], [72] The fourth was whether what was done in each case was procedurally unfair or attended by legal error, and the fifth was what relief should follow. [79]
Held
French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ
All seven judges joined in these reasons, so there was no separate concurrence and no dissent. [1] The Court focused on the IMR because what was done in the RSA was overtaken by the review. [8]
On detention, s 196(1) requires each plaintiff to be kept in detention until he is removed from Australia or granted a visa, and s 198(2) in its own words requires removal "as soon as reasonably practicable". [19]–[20] If attention were confined to those words, the Court said, prolonging detention for departmental inquiries might at first sight appear unlawful. [21] But it held that reading s 198(2) as not permitting detention for the RSA and IMR would "impermissibly divorce it from its text and its context". [23] The textual reason was that s 198(2)(c) contemplates a valid application by a person covered by s 193(1)(c), yet the only power permitting an offshore entry person in Australia to make one is s 46A(2). [25] The main contextual reason was that the Act, read as a whole, contains an interconnected set of provisions directed to responding to Australia's obligations under the Refugees Convention and Refugees Protocol and proceeds, in important respects, from the assumption that Australia has protection obligations to individuals. [27] Inserting ss 46A and 198A was seen as reflecting a legislative intention to adhere to that understanding of Australia's obligations. [34] So s 198(2) was read as accommodating steps taken to inform the Minister of matters relevant to the possible exercise of power under s 46A or s 195A, and, assuming the steps were taken promptly, detention during the inquiries would be lawful. [35]
On validity, Plaintiff M69 argued that a power its holder need not consider exercising is an arbitrary power, which s 75(v) of the Constitution is meant to prevent. [54] The Court did not examine the broader proposition that there cannot be a valid grant of power without enforceable limits, because the argument necessarily focused on the narrower question. [55] It held that s 46A is not of so little content as to fail to be a law, its relevant content being "the Minister may ... but need not consider whether to ...". [56] The grant does not clash with s 75(v), because maintaining the capacity to enforce limits on power "does not entail that consideration of the exercise of a power must always be amenable to enforcement, whether by mandamus or otherwise". [57] The rule of law argument also failed, because s 46A(7) does not prevent any exercise of jurisdiction under s 75(v). [58] If the power is exercised, s 75(v) can be engaged to enforce its limits, so the Court said no "island of power" is created, answering the reference in argument to Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW). [54], [59] Section 46A(7) only denies that the grant of power entails a duty to consider its exercise. [59] The challenge to s 46A(7) was not made good, so no question arose about the other provisions of s 46A. [60]
On the power exercised, the Commonwealth and the Minister submitted that the RSA and IMR were undertaken in exercise of non-statutory executive power under s 61 of the Constitution, so that there was no obligation to afford procedural fairness and it did not matter whether the inquirers misunderstood or misapplied the law. [15] The Court identified six relevant considerations and treated as most important that the powers may only be exercised by the Minister personally, that the assessment and review were made in consequence of a ministerial direction, and that continued detention during them was lawful only because they were directed to whether those powers could or should be exercised. [62]–[63] The first and third appeared to be in tension, inviting the question how detention could be lawful if what prolonged it had no statutory footing. [63] The Court said: "It is not readily to be supposed that a statutory power to detain a person permits continuation of that detention at the unconstrained discretion of the Executive". [64] It would not adopt the construction put by the Commonwealth and the Minister, under which the duty to remove was suspended while there remained a possibility of the powers being exercised, because that would leave the period of detention wholly within the Executive's control and make its lawfulness depend on predicting the exercise of a personal non-compellable power, a very uncertain basis. [64]–[65]
The firmer foundation was to understand the decision announced in July 2008 not just as a direction to provide advice, but as a decision by the Minister to consider whether to exercise s 46A or s 195A in respect of any offshore entry person who claims that Australia owes protection obligations. [65]–[66] Exercise of those powers has two distinct steps, the decision to consider exercising the power and the decision whether to lift the bar or grant a visa, and the Minister is not obliged to take either step. [70] With the Pacific Strategy no longer to be pursued, ss 46A and 195A were the only statutory powers available to avoid breaching Australia's international obligations. [40], [70] The Court found it unnecessary to identify the limits of the Carltona principle or to decide whether the analogy the Commonwealth and the Minister drew with provisions of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) considered in Margarula v Minister for Environment was apt, because what the Department did was done in consequence of a ministerial decision, by which the Minister delegated no power. [68]–[69] On this footing the assumption that detention during the processes was lawful was soundly based. [71]
On the limits of the inquiries, because they had this statutory foundation the Court found it unnecessary to examine whether exercise of non-statutory executive power is or may be limited by a requirement to afford procedural fairness. [73] It applied the statement in Annetts v McCann that, when a statute confers power to destroy, defeat or prejudice a person's rights, interests or legitimate expectations, the principles of natural justice generally regulate the exercise of that power, and that they may be excluded only by, in the words it took from Annetts, "plain words of necessary intendment". [74] It was unnecessary to consider whether identifying the root of the obligation remains an open question after the different views expressed in Kioa v West, or whether those views would lead to a different result. [74] The Commonwealth and the Minister submitted that s 46A(2) was a discretionary power to confer a right rather than a power to destroy, defeat or prejudice one, but the Court said this proceeded from "too narrow a conception" of when the obligation might arise, relying on Mason J's statement in FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke that the obligation extends to a power affecting an interest or a privilege. [75] The Minister's decision to consider exercising the powers directly affected claimants' rights and interests because, with the consequential need for inquiries, it prolonged their detention. [76] A claimant had no right to have the Minister exercise either power, even after a favourable assessment or review, but because of the consequence for liberty the assessment and review must be procedurally fair and must address the relevant legal questions. [77] There being no exclusion by plain words of necessary intendment, the powers, including the power to decide to consider their exercise, are understood as "conditioned on the observance of the principles of natural justice", a phrase the Court took from Brennan J in Kioa v West, and the consideration must proceed by reference to correct legal principles, correctly applied. [78]
For Plaintiff M61, the Court held that each of three noted aspects of the reviewer's reasons revealed error. [86] First, the legislation and case law had to be treated as binding and not just as aids to interpretation, because exercising s 46A on the footing that protection obligations were owed would be pointless unless that determination was made according to the criteria and principles in the Migration Act as construed and applied by Australian courts. [88] The fundamental question was whether the s 36(2) criterion for the grant of a protection visa was met, and the Court did not need to consider whether a different question about the Convention could be relevant to s 195A. [89] Second, failing to address one of the claimed bases for fear of persecution left the Minister uninformed on a matter bearing on the question the Minister had asked to be considered, and was a denial of procedural fairness. [90] Third, the reviewer should have put to the plaintiff for comment the aspects of country information known to him that he considered may bear on the claims, and the provisions of the Act that relieve the Refugee Review Tribunal from drawing such information to an applicant's attention were not engaged in an IMR or an RSA. [91]
For Plaintiff M69, the Court said that, for the reasons given for Plaintiff M61, it was sufficient that his first and second complaints were made good, and unnecessary to consider the other ways he put his case. [96] His reviewer made an error of law by treating the Migration Act and decided cases as no more than guides to decision making. [97] It may well be, the Court said, that some country information was sufficiently put, but not putting to him the substance of the information about failed asylum seekers returning to Sri Lanka denied him procedural fairness. [98]
On relief, because ss 46A and 195A say that the Minister has no duty to consider exercising the power, mandamus will not issue to compel the Minister to consider or reconsider, even if the inquiry the Minister directed miscarried. [99] Following Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicants S134/2002, the unavailability of mandamus meant there was no utility in certiorari to quash the recommendations, and the claims for both were refused. [100] It observed that in many cases the conclusion that certiorari and mandamus do not lie would require the further conclusion that no declaration should be made. [101] A declaration was appropriate here because it could not be said that it would produce no foreseeable consequences, it was directed to a legal controversy and not an abstract or hypothetical question, and each plaintiff had a real interest in the questions. [103] The Court also pointed to the importance the legislative and executive branches attached to the international obligations, and to the considerable public interest in observing procedural fairness in the exercise of the powers. [103] Each declaration was moulded in terms similar to the one made in Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission. [104] An injunction did not need to be considered, as there was no present threat to remove either plaintiff without a further RSA in which the law would be correctly applied and procedural fairness afforded. [8] The Court accepted for present purposes that the reviewers were not officers of the Commonwealth, and left for another day whether an independent contractor may fall within the expression "an officer of the Commonwealth" in s 75(v) where an aspect of Commonwealth authority has been contracted out. [51]
Orders. In each matter the Court declared that, in recommending to the Minister that the plaintiff was not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations, the third defendant made an error of law, in that the third defendant did not treat the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the decisions of Australian courts as binding, and, further, failed to observe the requirements of procedural fairness. [105] The Court ordered the Commonwealth and the Minister, the first and second defendants, to pay the plaintiff's costs in each matter. [105] Each application was otherwise dismissed, so no certiorari, mandamus or injunction was granted. [8], [100], [105]
Why it matters
The reasons hold that a provision saying a Minister has no duty to consider exercising a power does not clash with s 75(v) of the Constitution, because if the power is exercised s 75(v) can be engaged to enforce its limits. [57], [59] They also hold that where the Minister has decided to consider exercising such a power, inquiries that prolong a person's detention are steps towards the exercise of statutory power, so they must be procedurally fair and apply correct legal principles, even though the departmental manuals described them as non-statutory. [42], [78] On relief, they show a declaration being made although mandamus and certiorari were unavailable, while recording that in many cases no declaration would follow. [101], [103] The Court left open whether the exercise of non-statutory executive power is or may be limited by a requirement of procedural fairness, the limits of the Carltona principle, the place of legitimate expectations, and whether an independent contractor can be an officer of the Commonwealth under s 75(v). [51], [69], [73], [75]
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