Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
(2011) 244 CLR 144 · [2011] HCA 32
Summary updated 11 November 2026
Overview
Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, heard with Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, is a High Court of Australia case in the Court's original jurisdiction about whether two asylum seekers who arrived at Christmas Island could lawfully be taken to Malaysia under an arrangement between the Australian and Malaysian governments [3], [8]. A majority (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) held that the Minister's declaration of Malaysia under s 198A(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was invalid and that neither plaintiff could lawfully be taken to Malaysia [68], [136], [255], [258]. Heydon J dissented and would have dismissed both applications [200]. The Court declared that the Minister's declaration of 25 July 2011 was made without power and is invalid, restrained the Minister from taking either plaintiff to Malaysia, further restrained him from taking the second plaintiff from Australia without a written consent of the Minister under s 6A(1) of the Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946 (Cth) (the IGOC Act), and ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs' costs [148].
Facts
The plaintiffs, both citizens of Afghanistan, arrived by boat at Christmas Island on 4 August 2011 [70]. The plaintiff in the second matter, M106, was 16 years old and arrived without his parents, any other adult relative or any person having guardianship of him [70]. Each claimed a well-founded fear of persecution in Afghanistan on grounds that would, if established, make him a refugee to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Refugees Convention [3]. Having entered Australia without visas at Christmas Island, an excised offshore place, they were unlawful non-citizens and offshore entry persons, and they were detained on arrival under s 189(3) of the Migration Act [5]. Because of s 46A, neither could make a valid visa application unless the Minister decided it was in the public interest to let him do so, and the Minister has no duty to consider doing so [6].
On 25 July 2011 the Minister and the Malaysian Minister of Home Affairs signed an Arrangement under which Australia would transfer to Malaysia, for refugee status determination, up to 800 people who travelled irregularly by sea to Australia [22]. Under the Arrangement their claims were to be assessed in Malaysia by the UNHCR [8]. In return Australia was to resettle 4,000 people in Malaysia who held UNHCR cards [206]. Clause 16 stated that the Arrangement recorded the participants' intentions and political commitments but was not legally binding on them [103].
Before the declaration, a departmental submission advised the Minister that it was open to him to be satisfied that Malaysia met the s 198A(3) criteria, drawing on the Arrangement, advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and consultation with the UNHCR [25]–[26]. It was an agreed fact that Malaysia does not recognise the status of refugees in its domestic law [30].
On 25 July 2011 the Minister declared Malaysia under s 198A(3) and directed the Secretary of his Department that, until further notice, no asylum claims of offshore entry persons arriving after that date were to be processed, stating his expectation that they would be removed to Malaysia [27]. In his affidavit the Minister said he took into account the departmental submission, in particular the DFAT advice, and relied on the Arrangement, and that from his discussions with the Malaysian Minister of Home Affairs and other Malaysian officials he believed the Malaysian Government had made what he called "a significant conceptual shift" in its thinking about refugees and asylum seekers [29]. On 7 August 2011 a departmental officer determined that M70 should be taken to Malaysia under the Arrangement [8]. No determination had been made that M106 should be taken to Malaysia, and the Minister had not given written consent under the IGOC Act for him to leave Australia [142].
Procedural history
On 7 August 2011 the plaintiffs began proceedings in the Court's original jurisdiction under ss 75(iii) and 75(v) of the Constitution and obtained an interim order restraining the Minister from removing them [3], [14], [71]. On 8 August 2011 Hayne J made an interlocutory order restraining their removal from Australia until the hearing and determination of their applications [15]. The proceedings were reconstituted as separate applications for M70 and M106, which Hayne J referred to the Full Court, and they were heard together on an agreed statement of facts and an affidavit of the Minister [15], [74]. The Australian Human Rights Commission intervened in support of the second plaintiff [150].
Issues
The first issue was whether s 198A was the only source of power to take the plaintiffs to Malaysia, or whether s 198(2) also gave that power [76], [81]. The second was whether the declaration of Malaysia was valid, which turned on whether the criteria in s 198A(3)(a)(i) to (iv) are jurisdictional facts and whether they require the declared country to provide access and protections that it is legally bound to provide [105], [107]. The plaintiffs argued in the alternative that the Minister had misconstrued the criteria [16]. They also argued that the officers' discretion under s 198A(1) had been fettered by the Minister's direction of 25 July 2011, and that M70's liability to prosecution in Malaysia for an immigration offence had not been considered [16]. A further issue was whether the second plaintiff, an unaccompanied minor of whom the Minister is guardian, could lawfully be taken from Australia without the Minister's consent [76].
Held
French CJ
French CJ held that an offshore entry person who claims to be a refugee and is detained under s 189(3) cannot be taken from Australia other than under s 198A unless his or her claim for protection is assessed within Australia [54]. Absent any assessment of their claims, the plaintiffs could be taken to Malaysia only under s 198A and only if a valid declaration had been made in relation to Malaysia under s 198A(3) [55]. He held that the invocation of s 198A in 2001 to support a declaration of Nauru could not determine the section's construction, which depends on its text, context and purpose [13].
French CJ did not accept the plaintiffs' primary contention that the matters in s 198A(3)(a)(i) to (iv) are jurisdictional facts, because their language indicates the need for ministerial evaluative judgment and, absent clear words, the subsection should not be read as allowing courts to substitute their judgment for the Minister's [58]. But the Minister must form, in good faith, an evaluative judgment based on those matters properly construed, and a declaration made on a misconstrued criterion involves jurisdictional error and is invalid [59]. He added that the power could also be treated as conditioned, by necessary implication, on an opinion or belief that each matter is true, that opinion or belief being a jurisdictional fact [59].
Because a declaration enlivens a power to take people to the country in future, the criteria call for a judgment that the circumstances are present and continuing [61]. A declaration therefore cannot rest on a hope, belief or expectation that the country will meet the criteria at some future time [62]. His Honour said it was a misconstruction of the criteria to base a declaration on an understanding that the other country's government wished to improve its treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, and that the Minister's affidavit suggested he had approached the questions at least in part in that way [62].
In his view, whether the relevant access and protection are provided and human rights standards met cannot be answered without reference to the country's domestic laws, including its Constitution and statutes, and the international legal obligations by which it has bound itself [66]. The Minister had conceded that, if he was required to focus on the laws in effect in Malaysia rather than on what his submissions called the "practical reality", he would have erred, and French CJ held that the Minister was so required and did so err [65]. He found that the Minister did not look to, and did not find, any basis for the declaration in Malaysia's international obligations or relevant domestic laws, and that important elements of his decision were the non-binding Arrangement, his conversations with his Malaysian counterpart and DFAT's observations about current practices [66]. A legal framework that answers the criteria on paper is not always sufficient, because the Minister must also consider how far the country adheres to its relevant international obligations, constitutional guarantees and statutes [67].
French CJ concluded that the declaration was affected by jurisdictional error, that the plaintiffs could not be taken to Malaysia under s 198A(1), and that no officer could remove them to Malaysia under s 198(2) without first assessing their claims to protection [68]. On the second plaintiff, he agreed, for the reasons in the joint judgment, that M106 cannot be removed from Australia without the Minister's prior written consent under the IGOC Act, and he agreed with the orders the joint judgment proposed [69].
Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ
Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ held that s 198(2) should not be read as giving power to remove the plaintiffs, because that would allow the Minister to remove a person claiming protection whose claims had not been assessed to any country willing to receive him, and would give s 198A(1) no separate work to do [97]. Removing a person without first deciding whether he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason may put Australia in breach of its non-refoulement obligations under Art 33(1) of the Refugees Convention [94]. Applying the principle of construction associated with Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia, they held that the Act confers only one power to take persons seeking asylum to another country before their refugee status is determined, the power in s 198A, and that the generality of s 198 must be confined by the restrictions in s 198A [84], [95]. They concluded that s 198A is the only legislative source of power for the Minister to take persons seeking asylum to another country for determination of their refugee status [99].
Their Honours noted that s 198A(3)(a) does not refer to the Minister being satisfied of the criteria, but gives a power to declare that a country has the stated characteristics [106]. They rejected the submission of the Minister and the Commonwealth that the criteria are not jurisdictional facts, since reading the provision as engaged whenever the Minister bona fide believed the criteria were met would pay insufficient regard to its text, context and evident purpose [109]. They emphasised that, as it was unnecessary to decide whether the criteria contain any factual element, they expressed no view on whether Malaysia in fact meets relevant human rights standards [114].
Their Honours held that the matters in s 198A(3)(a)(i) to (iii) are not established only by examining what has happened, is happening or may be expected to happen in the country, and that the access and protections there referred to "must be provided as a matter of legal obligation" [116]. Those sub-paragraphs refer to access and protections of the kinds Australia undertook to provide under the Refugees Convention and the Refugees Protocol, and are "a reflex of Australia's obligations" [118]. This was clearest in sub-par (iii), where protection for persons given refugee status refers to all the protections parties to the Convention must give refugees, including but not limited to protection against refoulement, provided under a legal obligation to provide them [119].
A country provides access to effective procedures if its domestic law provides for them or it is bound, as a matter of international obligation, to allow a third party such as the UNHCR to undertake them, but not where, having no such obligation, it merely permits a body such as the UNHCR to carry out its own procedures [125]. A country does not provide the protections in sub-pars (ii) or (iii) unless its domestic law deals expressly with the classes of persons mentioned or it is internationally obliged to provide them [126]. Their Honours found that the Arrangement did not oblige Malaysia to provide any of the rights refugees have under the Convention, and made no provision that would provide any of them [126].
They regarded any analogy with the Act's safe third country provisions in subdivs AI and AK as at best tenuous and remote, because those provisions require an assessment under the Act of whether a person can obtain protection in a third country, while s 198A concerns taking people to another country for assessment there [122]–[123]. They also held that what those who promoted the legislation hoped to achieve in relation to Nauru did not bear on its construction, and that in any event the Nauru arrangements were very different because Australia, not Nauru, was to provide or secure the assessment and other steps, and so the access and protections in question [127]–[128].
Since it was agreed that Malaysia does not recognise refugee status in its domestic law, is not party to the Refugees Convention or Protocol, and has made no legally binding arrangement with Australia obliging it to accord the required protections, it was not open to the Minister to conclude that Malaysia provides the access or protections in s 198A(3)(a)(i) to (iii) [135]. The jurisdictional facts necessary for a valid declaration were not and could not be established, so the declaration was made beyond power and s 198A(1) could not be engaged to take either plaintiff to Malaysia [135]–[136].
On the second plaintiff, their Honours noted that under s 6 of the IGOC Act the Minister is the guardian of every non-citizen child who arrives in Australia, and that s 6A(1) provides that such a child shall not leave Australia except with the Minister's written consent [138], [140]. A determination that an unaccompanied minor be taken to a declared country is not a written consent under s 6A, and s 198A is not a law regulating the departure of persons from Australia within s 6A(4), because a law giving power to remove persons from Australia is different from a law regulating their departure [143]–[144]. They held that a non-citizen child cannot lawfully be taken to another country under s 198A without the Minister's written consent, and since none had been given, removing the second plaintiff without it would be unlawful [146]–[147].
Heydon J (dissenting)
Heydon J would have dismissed each amended application with costs [200]. He said that whatever obligation Art 33 of the Refugees Convention imposes on Australia stems from a treaty, which has no force in Australian law until enacted, so the only obligations on the Minister in Australian law are those found in the Act [150]. Assuming but not deciding that return to a third country does not breach Art 33 if that country can be expected to give effective protection, he said that whether Malaysia could be expected to do so went to Australia's compliance with the Refugees Convention, not to the legality of the Minister's conduct in domestic law unless an enactment provided otherwise [152]–[153].
He held that the plaintiffs' primary submission, that the conditions in s 198A(3)(a) must be shown to exist as matters of fact, was wrong, and, reserving the defendants' more extreme submission, that at least their less extreme submission was correct: the Minister must form in good faith an evaluative judgment that what he declares is true, and a failure to ask the correct question would vitiate the declaration [158]–[159]. He reasoned that s 198A(3)(a) does not expressly make a declaration's validity depend on proof of the conditions, and that the statutory word "declare" points to a task for the Minister's personal assessment, which the courts do not examine further once satisfied the conditions were taken into account [161]. In his view the references to providing access and protection and meeting human rights standards suggest practical access, practical protections and standards met in practice, not legal obligations or courts of law [162]. Heydon J said that reading the language as calling for legal obligations enforced by courts would be "to add a fifth wheel to the coach" [162].
He also reasoned that a declaration pertains to Australia's external affairs and dealings with friendly foreign states, for which the Minister is accountable to Parliament, and not to the courts unless he has not formed the evaluative judgment after asking the correct questions [163]. He drew support from Federal Court decisions which, before s 198A was enacted, had applied a test of practical reality and fact to safe third countries, inferring that s 198A(3) turns on the same test [165]. He regarded it as extremely improbable that the statutory language picks up all the Convention rights the plaintiffs relied on, since those rights are expressed to belong to refugees and not to people whose claims have not been approved [167]. He also relied on the declaration of Nauru made under s 198A(3) days after the section was enacted in 2001, when Nauru was not party to the Refugees Convention and its domestic law had no specific protections for refugees or asylum seekers, as showing that the section's meaning contradicted the plaintiffs' construction [169].
Heydon J rejected the argument that the Minister asked the wrong questions, finding that his affidavit, fairly read as a whole, showed he did not apply a wrong test [172]. He held that the relevant time for the state of affairs is when transferees arrive in the declared country, so the Minister's references to shifts in Malaysian thinking were directed to that time [173]. He held that the officer deciding to take M70 was not obliged to consider whether M70 had committed offences against Malaysian immigration law, and was entitled to treat the Arrangement and its Guidelines as a solid basis for inferring what would actually happen [178], [180]. He held that the Minister's letter of 25 July 2011 did not fetter the officers' discretion under s 198A(1), as it expressed only an expectation about the outcome, and was not evidence that the Minister had fettered his own powers under ss 46A and 195A [188]–[189]. On the second plaintiff, he held that s 198A is a law regulating the departure of persons from Australia within s 6A(4) of the IGOC Act, so s 6A did not override it [198]. He found it unnecessary to deal with the defendants' alternative argument based on s 198 [199].
Kiefel J
Kiefel J, applying Anthony Hordern and Nystrom, treated s 198(2) as the general power of removal and s 198A(1) as a particular power directed to particular circumstances, and held that s 198(2) could not have been intended to be a source of power to remove asylum seekers to a country without any assessment of the protections that country would give them [236]–[237]. It followed that removal under s 198(2) was not an option unless each plaintiff's refugee status was considered and rejected, and the pre-removal assessments of the plaintiffs did not determine that status [239].
Her Honour held that s 198A(3)(a) requires, at the least, that the declared country provide for determining the asylum seeker's refugee status and protect that person while an asylum seeker and, if that status is accorded, as a refugee, the protection being at least against persecution and refoulement [240]. Sub-paragraph (i) is not satisfied merely by access to an assessment of refugee status by a non-government agency, because the paragraph contemplates determination of refugee status by the declared country itself [242]. In her view s 198A(3)(a) must be taken to require that a country provide the necessary recognition and protection pursuant to its laws, since it is by its laws that a country may be under an obligation to provide them [244]. A country's practices may also be relevant, but a positive assessment of practical provisions cannot replace the requirement that the country has obliged itself, through its laws, to provide the necessary recognition and protection, which is the minimum requirement [245]. She preferred this construction as most closely according with Australia's Convention obligations, noting the rule that a statute is interpreted, so far as its language permits, in conformity with international law [246]–[247].
Kiefel J noted that, as DFAT advised, Malaysia is not a party to the Convention, does not recognise refugees in its domestic law, provides no procedures for determining refugee status, and does not bind itself in its immigration legislation to non-refoulement [249]. The Arrangement's commitments were political rather than legally binding [251]. Neither the good faith of the parties to the Arrangement nor their commitment to it was in question, but the Arrangement could not alter the fact that Malaysia does not have laws which recognise and protect refugees from refoulement and persecution [254]. The facts necessary for a declaration did not exist, so there was no power to make it and it is invalid [255]. Kiefel J added, as a ground the plaintiffs' claims to relief did not require, that it may also be concluded that the Minister misconceived the enquiry by relying on the Arrangement's assurances about the future, when the enquiry is into the state of the country's laws at the date of the declaration, so that his decision was attended by jurisdictional error [256]. She agreed, for the reasons in the joint judgment, that removing M106 from Australia without the Minister's consent as his guardian would be unlawful, and she agreed with the orders the joint judgment proposed [257]–[259].
Orders. In each matter the Court declared that the Minister's declaration of Malaysia under s 198A(3) of the Migration Act, dated 25 July 2011, was made without power and is invalid [148]. In each matter the Court restrained the Minister, by his officers or otherwise, from taking the plaintiff from Australia to Malaysia, and ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings to date before Hayne J and the Full Court [148]. In M106/2011 the Court further restrained the Minister from taking the plaintiff from Australia without a consent in writing of the Minister given under s 6A(1) of the IGOC Act [148]. French CJ and Kiefel J agreed with the orders proposed in the joint judgment, while Heydon J would have dismissed each application with costs [69], [259], [200].
Why it matters
For the majority, an offshore entry person seeking asylum whose claims had not been assessed could be taken from Australia to another country only under s 198A, and so only to a country validly declared under s 198A(3) [55], [99], [235], [239]. Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ and Kiefel J held that the declared country must provide the access and protections as a matter of legal obligation, while French CJ held the declaration invalid because the Minister misconstrued the criteria by not looking to Malaysia's laws and international obligations [116], [244]–[245], [65]–[66]. The joint judgment treated the criteria as jurisdictional facts, whereas French CJ held that they call for the Minister's evaluative judgment and should not be characterised as jurisdictional facts [109], [135], [58]. The joint judgment, with which French CJ and Kiefel J agreed on this point, held that an unaccompanied non-citizen child cannot lawfully be taken from Australia under s 198A without the Minister's written consent under s 6A of the IGOC Act, while Heydon J held that s 6A did not override s 198A [146], [69], [257], [198].
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