Police v Dunstall
(2015) 256 CLR 403 · [2015] HCA 26 · (2015) 322 ALR 440 · (2015) 89 ALJR 677 · (2015) 243 A Crim R 573
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Police v Dunstall [2015] HCA 26 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ), delivered on 5 August 2015, on an appeal by the police from the Supreme Court of South Australia. The question was whether a court may exclude evidence of a breath analysis reading that engages a statutory presumption, on the ground that admitting it would make the trial unfair, where the medical practitioner who took the driver's blood sample did not take it in accordance with the prescribed procedures [2]. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the courts below, including the magistrate's dismissal of the drink-driving charge, and remitted the matter to the Magistrates Court for further hearing [21], [50]. French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ gave joint reasons, and Nettle J, in separate reasons, agreed that the appeal should be allowed and that the orders proposed in the joint judgment should be made [85].
Facts
Mr Dunstall was stopped by police while driving in suburban Adelaide, returned a positive alcotest and, at a police station, gave a breath analysis reading of 0.155 grams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood [12]. He was told of his right to have a blood sample taken for analysis, was given a blood test kit, and was driven by police to the Noarlunga Hospital, where a medical practitioner took a sample of his blood [12]. Later attempts to analyse the sample failed because the blood was denatured [12].
Section 47B(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) makes it an offence to drive with the prescribed concentration of alcohol (0.05 grams or more in 100 millilitres of blood) present in the blood, and a concentration of 0.15 grams or more is a category three offence [3]. Under s 47K(1), the concentration indicated by a breath analysing instrument is presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to be the concentration in the driver's blood at the time of the analysis and throughout the preceding two hours [6]. The only evidence that may be adduced in rebuttal of the presumption is evidence based on analysis of a blood sample taken and dealt with in accordance with the prescribed procedures, and it must show that the instrument gave an exaggerated reading [7]. Regulation 11(c) of the Road Traffic (Miscellaneous) Regulations 1999 (SA) requires each container to hold enough blood for an accurate evaluation of any concentration of alcohol [11].
At the hearing in the Magistrates Court, the certificate of the breath analysis reading was admitted over Mr Dunstall's objection, and the medical practitioner who took the sample had no memory of doing so and no knowledge of how it came to be denatured [13]. A forensic pathologist called for the defence, Mr Collins, considered that the likely explanation was that too little blood had been taken, and the magistrate found that the sample was unsuitable for analysis because the medical practitioner had not taken a sufficiently large quantity [14].
Procedural history
Magistrate Dixon, referring among other authorities to R v Lobban, held that Mr Dunstall had been deprived of his ability to rebut the presumption despite doing all he could, through the medical practitioner's apparent failure to comply with reg 11(c) [16]. He held that the trial was unfair, disregarded the breath analysis evidence and dismissed the charge [16]. The joint reasons treated this as a decision to exclude the evidence in the exercise of the discretion identified in Lobban [17].
The police appealed to a single judge of the Supreme Court, Kelly J, who held that a proper basis for the residual discretion to exclude the prosecution evidence on the ground of unfairness had been established, and dismissed the appeal [18]. Kelly J agreed that the unfairness was the product of the medical practitioner's failure to comply with reg 11(c), which, in her Honour's words, had "effectively placed [Mr Dunstall] in the same position as if no blood sample had ever been taken" [18].
On a further appeal by leave, the Full Court (Kourakis CJ, Gray and Sulan JJ) dismissed the appeal by majority, Gray and Sulan JJ holding that it had been open to the magistrate to exclude the certificate in the exercise of what the South Australian courts called the "general unfairness discretion" [15], [19]. The Full Court's decision is reported as Police v Dunstall (2014) 120 SASR 88 [22]. Kourakis CJ, dissenting, was critical of deploying what he called "subjective discretions" to deny the prosecution the proofs which the Act provides for drink-driving offences [20]. He observed that the scheme confers no procedural right to adduce evidence of blood analysis and that the failure to obtain a usable sample was not caused by police misconduct, and said that, although some circumstances could make such a prosecution an abuse of process, this was not such a case [20].
Bell and Keane JJ granted special leave on 13 March 2015, on the ground that the Full Court majority erred in holding that breath analysis evidence obtained lawfully and without police impropriety should be excluded under a common law general unfairness discretion [21]. The Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth and of Western Australia intervened.
Issues
The issue was whether, where a medical practitioner fails to take the blood sample in accordance with the prescribed procedures, the court has a discretion to exclude evidence engaging the presumption because its admission would render the trial of the defendant unfair [2]. The Solicitor-General for South Australia, for the police, did not dispute that a common law general unfairness discretion exists, but submitted that, since the High Court had previously considered it only in dicta, its source and rationale should be considered to determine its proper ambit [28]. A further question was whether admitting the breath analysis reading made Mr Dunstall's trial unfair [47].
Held
French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ
Their Honours explained that in R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24 the Full Court held that the general unfairness discretion permits a court to exclude probative evidence untainted by impropriety or risk of prejudice where its reception would make the trial of the accused unfair, although Martin J found no genuine unfairness on the facts of that case [15], [23]-[24]. A five-judge Full Court in Police v Hall (2006) 95 SASR 482 unanimously affirmed the discretion's existence, but a majority held that it was not enlivened [25]. Their Honours identified the settled bases for discretionary exclusion: the Lee discretion for confessional statements, the Christie discretion where probative value is outweighed by the risk of prejudice, and the Bunning v Cross discretion where the evidence is tainted by illegality or impropriety on the part of law enforcement authorities [26]. They observed that the discretion applied in this case had excluded probative real evidence obtained without taint of impropriety or risk of prejudicial misuse [27].
The High Court's earlier references to a general unfairness discretion trace to Gibbs J's statement in Driscoll v The Queen, itself taken from Lord Goddard CJ in Kuruma v The Queen, and their Honours said that Lord Diplock's suggestion in R v Sang, that Lord Goddard was unlikely to have intended a wider discretion than the Christie discretion, may apply equally to Gibbs J [29]–[30]. Mr Dunstall relied on the possibility, suggested in Cross on Evidence and in Gaudron J's discussion in Dietrich v The Queen, of excluding evidence whose weight and credibility cannot be effectively tested [31]–[32]. Their Honours noted that Gaudron J's analysis was made in the context of the power to stay proceedings, and that Professor Pattenden treats evidence of this kind as subject to the Christie discretion [33]. They said that the loss of evidence would not ordinarily enliven the Christie discretion or make the trial unfair, and questioned a wider discretion to exclude prosecution evidence where the loss of defence evidence engages neither the Christie discretion nor the power to stay proceedings [34].
Mr Dunstall's Christie argument, that blood analysis has superior probative value to breath analysis, failed to come to terms with the legislative scheme, because Parliament chose to give the prosecution an aid to proof and to confine closely the circumstances in which rebuttal evidence may be adduced [35]–[36]. Subject to the defence adducing opinion evidence based on a complying blood sample, the reliability of the breath analysis reading is not an issue in the trial [36]. The Full Court majority's reliance on King CJ's statements in French v Scarman was misplaced, because that case was decided when the Act obliged police to facilitate the taking of the blood sample, the police had deliberately refrained from doing so, and the exclusion there was justified under the Bunning v Cross discretion [37].
Police v Hall bore similarity to this case: there, hospital staff did not take Mr Hall's blood until it was too late for analysis to be of forensic use [38]. Their Honours found Doyle CJ's analysis in Hall instructive: the Act treats the breath analysis reading as reliable, there had been no police misconduct, the Act confers no enforceable right to have a blood sample taken, and unfairness in only the most general sense did not enliven the discretion [39]. Hall could not be distinguished by attributing fault to Mr Hall, since in each case the inability to challenge the presumption arose from factors outside the defendant's control [40]. As explained in R v Edwards, the loss of evidence whose contents are unknown is not rightly characterised as a prejudice to the defendant, because it cannot be known whether it would have undermined or supported the prosecution case [41].
The medical practitioner acts on the defendant's request and is in no sense an agent of the law enforcement authorities, so a failure to follow the prescribed procedures does not engage the public policy considerations behind the Bunning v Cross discretion [42]. A defendant has no statutory right to have a blood sample taken and dealt with in accordance with the prescribed procedures; s 47K(1a) states a rule of exclusion, and the onus is on the defendant to come within it, which a defendant may fail to do without personal fault [43]. No principled distinction could be drawn between this case and any other in which a defendant, without fault, fails to obtain an analysis of a complying sample, so the posited discretion would invariably exclude the prosecution evidence in every such case [44]. The unfairness asserted was the product of the Act's scheme, and s 47K(8), which deals with deficient blood test kits, does not show otherwise, because its work is to let the prosecution rely on the presumption despite a possible failure to comply with s 47K(2a) [45]–[46].
Their Honours held that Kourakis CJ was right to conclude that admitting the breath analysis reading did not make the trial unfair [47]. Because of that conclusion, and because neither party contested the existence of the general unfairness discretion, they held it inappropriate to determine the scope, if any, of a residual discretion to exclude lawfully obtained, probative, non-confessional evidence unaffected by impropriety or risk of prejudice on the ground that its admission would make the trial unfair [47]. They added that where the evidence is critical to the prosecution case and the complaint is that its admission would make the trial unfair, the remedy lies in deciding whether a permanent stay is justified, under a test that balances the interests of the defendant and of the community, and not in circumventing that inquiry by excluding the evidence [48]. It was an error to exclude the evidence, so the appeal had to be allowed and the matter remitted to the Magistrates Court for further hearing [49].
Nettle J
Nettle J agreed that the appeal should be allowed, for the reasons Kourakis CJ gave, which his Honour summarised, and for his own reasons [57]–[58]. He noted that Gray J had not referred to Police v Hall, in which it was held that the fact that a blood sample is not taken through no fault of the driver does not make police reliance on a breath analysis test certificate unfair [55]. Nettle J said that "there should be no doubt" that there is a discretion to exclude evidence on the ground that its reception would be unfair, as the necessary concomitant of the trial judge's obligation to ensure a fair trial according to law, and that the real question is its nature and extent [59]. He said it would be preferable to call the discretion recognised in R v Lee "the Lee discretion" and to regard the fairness discretion as a residual discretion to exclude evidence which, though not attracting the Christie, Bunning v Cross or Lee discretions, would be productive of an unacceptable risk of miscarriage of justice [60].
His Honour preferred that residual conception to the alternative view, proposed by Lord Scarman in R v Sang, of a general fairness discretion of which the recognised discretions are instances, which he found attractive in some respects but subject to conceptual and systemic difficulties [61], [67]. The conceptual difficulty is that the recognised discretions rest on different bases: the risk of wrongful conviction for Christie, the public policy against sanctioning serious official impropriety for Bunning v Cross, and reliability and the accusatorial process for Lee [62]–[64]. The systemic difficulty is that an open-textured general fairness discretion is more likely to invite idiosyncratic notions of what is just and fair and has been criticised as inimical to the rule of law, whereas the residual discretion is directed to what Kourakis CJ termed "forensic" fairness [66]. New applications of the discretion are to be approached by legal reasoning and ultimately by analogy with decided cases [69].
Nettle J held that the Christie discretion was not engaged because nothing suggested the breath analysis reading was inaccurate and the undisputed evidence was that the equipment was working correctly [71]. The Bunning v Cross discretion was not engaged because neither the police nor any other authority acted unlawfully or improperly, the respondent chose the doctor, and there was no suggestion that the doctor's error was deliberate [72]. The Lee discretion did not apply because there was no confession and no trick or other unfair practice [73]. Agreeing with Kourakis CJ, he held that French v Scarman was distinguishable because it was decided on the public policy discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence, where police had failed to comply with a statutory obligation to facilitate the taking of the sample that had since been repealed [75].
His Honour gave several reasons for rejecting the respondent's contention that the doctor's breach of reg 11(c) deprived him of a statutory right to adduce blood test evidence to contradict the certificate [76]–[83]. Section 47K(1a) conferred no right but restricted the rebuttal evidence, and it remained open to the respondent to adduce evidence that the breath analysis equipment was not functioning correctly, which he did not attempt [77]. Regulation 11(c) imposed no statutory duty on the doctor, any duty being a common law or possibly contractual duty as between the doctor and the respondent [78]. The respondent had all the opportunity the legislation afforded, and it was impossible to say that the lost blood test would have produced an injustice, since it may have corroborated the breath analysis reading [79]–[80].
By parity with the principle that a stay for lost evidence requires it to be established that the absence of the evidence would, not merely could, cause unacceptable injustice or unfairness, a merely conceivable injustice is not a sufficient basis for excluding the certificate [81]. Although a stay is the ultimate and last resort and exclusion is likely to prevail where the choice lies between them, Nettle J said that unless the loss of evidence warrants a stay it is unlikely to warrant exclusion, and in this case it did not [81]. Adopting Kourakis CJ's description of the presumption as "Parliament's response to the notorious difficulties which beset the common law means of proof", he held that where Parliament gives a means of proof a specified evidential effect it must, subject to very limited exceptions not engaged here, be given that effect [82]. Most importantly, the fairness discretion exists to ensure a fair trial according to law, including law as modified by statute, and not to give effect to idiosyncratic notions of fair play or to deny effect to statutory modifications of common law means of proof of which a judge may disapprove [83]. He concluded that it was not open to find that admitting the certificate would produce an unacceptable risk of miscarriage of justice, so it was not open to exclude it, and that orders should be made as proposed in the joint judgment [84]–[85].
Orders. The appeal was allowed [50]. Order 1 of the Full Court's orders of 25 July 2014 was set aside and replaced with orders allowing the appeal to the Full Court and setting aside order 1 of Kelly J's orders of 5 December 2013 [50]. In place of Kelly J's order, the appeal to her Honour was allowed, the Magistrates Court's order of 20 August 2013 dismissing the charge was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Magistrates Court for further hearing [50]. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs in the High Court, which had been a condition of the grant of special leave [49]–[50]. Nettle J agreed with these orders [85].
Why it matters
On the South Australian Solicitor-General's submission, this was the first occasion on which the High Court had been asked to determine directly whether a general unfairness discretion exists [28]. The joint reasons did not decide the scope, if any, of a residual discretion to exclude lawfully obtained, probative, non-confessional evidence on unfair trial grounds, but held that admitting the breath analysis reading did not make this trial unfair [47]. They indicated that where critical prosecution evidence is challenged on the ground that its admission would make the trial unfair, the proper inquiry is whether a permanent stay is justified [48]. Nettle J accepted that a residual fairness discretion exists, directed to evidence whose admission would produce an unacceptable risk of miscarriage of justice and to a fair trial according to law as modified by statute [59]–[60], [67], [83].
Cited in 73 later casesRelies on 38 casesSee every one in casewise