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PT Bayan Resources TBK v BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd

(2015) 258 CLR 1 · [2015] HCA 36

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

PT Bayan Resources TBK v BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd [2015] HCA 36 is a decision of the High Court of Australia, given on 14 October 2015 on appeal from the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The question was whether the Supreme Court of Western Australia has power to make a freezing order in relation to a prospective judgment of a foreign court which would be registrable by order of that Court under the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) [1]. French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Gordon JJ held that the Supreme Court has that inherent power [2]. Keane and Nettle JJ agreed with their conclusion and reasons and added observations of their own on Bayan's principal argument [57]. The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs [56], [83].

Facts

PT Bayan Resources TBK (Bayan), a company incorporated in Indonesia, owns shares in Kangaroo Resources Limited (KRL), a company incorporated in Australia, and BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd (BCBC) is a company incorporated in Singapore [4]. Between them, Bayan and BCBC own all of the shares in PT Kaltim Supacoal (KSC), an Indonesian company, and their rights and obligations as KSC's shareholders are the subject of a joint venture agreement governed by the law of Singapore [5]. BCBC commenced a proceeding against Bayan in the High Court of Singapore claiming, among other things, damages for breach of that agreement, and the joint reasons record that the proceeding remains pending [6].

In the Supreme Court of Western Australia, Le Miere J found that BCBC had a good arguable case on an accrued cause of action justiciable in the High Court of Singapore, giving rise to a sufficient prospect of a money judgment in its favour there for at least $US138 million [14]. Noting BCBC's stated intention to register any such judgment in the Supreme Court and to enforce it against Bayan's assets in Australia, he found a sufficient prospect that the judgment would be registered in or enforced by the Supreme Court [14]. Apart from its shareholding in KRL, all of Bayan's assets were located in Indonesia, and Le Miere J found that, subject to irrelevant exceptions, the law of Indonesia precludes execution of a money judgment of the High Court of Singapore [14]. Against that background, the joint reasons record a real and sensible risk that the Singapore judgment would remain unsatisfied [14]. Relevant to the discharge of the interim order against KRL, Le Miere J found that KRL had no control over assets of Bayan [15].

Procedural history

After commencing the Singapore proceeding, BCBC applied ex parte to the Supreme Court of Western Australia, under O 52A of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), for freezing orders against Bayan and KRL in respect of Bayan's shares in KRL [7]. Pritchard J made interim freezing orders against both Bayan and KRL [11]. Bayan and KRL soon afterwards commenced a separate proceeding against BCBC in the original jurisdiction of the High Court, seeking declaratory relief and contending that the interim orders were beyond power [12]. That proceeding was remitted to the Supreme Court, where Le Miere J heard it concurrently with BCBC's application to continue the interim orders [12].

In BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd v PT Bayan Resources TBK (No 3) (2013) 276 FLR 273, Le Miere J dismissed the remitted proceeding, discharged the interim order against KRL and continued the freezing order against Bayan [13]. As continued, the order prohibits Bayan until further order from transferring any of its shares in KRL to a related entity, from further encumbering those shares, or from in any way disposing of, dealing with or otherwise diminishing the value of those shares without first giving written notification to BCBC and its Australian solicitors [13].

The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia (McLure P, Buss and Murphy JJA) unanimously dismissed Bayan's appeal from Le Miere J's orders, in PT Bayan Resources TBK v BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd (2014) 320 ALR 289 [16]. Bayan appealed to the High Court by special leave, accepting that Le Miere J's findings establish a factual foundation for continuing the freezing order in accordance with the criteria in O 52A r 5 [17].

Issues

The question in the appeal was whether the Supreme Court has power to make a freezing order in relation to a prospective judgment of a foreign court which would be registrable by order of the Supreme Court under the Foreign Judgments Act [1]. Bayan argued that making such an order is beyond the Supreme Court's inherent jurisdiction, is authorised by neither the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) nor the Foreign Judgments Act and is inconsistent with the scheme of the Foreign Judgments Act, and that O 52A r 5, in its application to a prospective judgment of a foreign court, is authorised by neither Act and is invalid [18]. Bayan also argued that because no application under s 6(1) of the Foreign Judgments Act can be made until a foreign judgment exists, Pt 2 of that Act impliedly excludes any power to make a freezing order in anticipation of one [28]. It further argued that the inherent jurisdiction to make a freezing order is always limited to circumstances in which a substantive proceeding in that Court has commenced or is imminent, so that the O 52A r 5 criteria are too wide [44].

Held

French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Gordon JJ

Their Honours answered that the Supreme Court has the power as an inherent power within the authority to adjudicate conferred by s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) [2]. Its exercise is regulated by O 52A r 5, which is validly made under s 167(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) and relevantly applied by s 79 of the Judiciary Act, and there is no inconsistency with the Foreign Judgments Act [2]. Order 52A r 5, although expressed not to affect the power to make a freezing order if the Supreme Court considers it is in the interests of justice to do so, sets out criteria which in substance are relevantly a good arguable case on an accrued or prospective cause of action justiciable in a court outside Australia, a sufficient prospect of judgment for the applicant in that court, a sufficient prospect that the judgment will be registered in or enforced by the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court's satisfaction, having regard to all the circumstances, of a danger that a prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because assets are removed, disposed of, dealt with or diminished in value [9].

Part 2 of the Foreign Judgments Act establishes a regime for registering and enforcing judgments of foreign courts, and it applies to a particular judgment of a particular foreign court only if regulations give the judgment that status [20]–[21]. The regulations apply Pt 2 to a money judgment but not to a non-money judgment of the High Court of Singapore, so that, as Bayan pointed out, a freezing order of that court could not be registered and enforced under Pt 2 [22]. Their Honours said that result "has no bearing" on the power to make a freezing order in relation to a prospective money judgment of the High Court of Singapore, because what matters is that the money judgment, when given, would be a judgment to which Pt 2 would apply [23]. Section 6(1) allows a judgment creditor to apply to have the judgment registered in the appropriate court, which relevantly includes the Supreme Court of a State, and read with s 15C(a) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) it invests that court with federal jurisdiction under s 77(iii) of the Constitution in the matter to which the application relates [24]–[25].

Accepting that no application can be made under s 6(1) until a foreign judgment to which Pt 2 applies comes into existence, their Honours applied the general principle, taken from Shergold v Tanner (2002) 209 CLR 126, that a Commonwealth law is not to be interpreted as withdrawing or limiting a conferral of jurisdiction unless the implication appears clearly and unmistakably [28]-[29]. Section 10(1) does expressly affect the jurisdiction to enforce a foreign money judgment to which Pt 2 applies, by barring proceedings to recover an amount payable under it other than by registration, but their Honours said no further exclusion of any jurisdiction or power of a State Supreme Court is expressed in the Foreign Judgments Act "and none should be implied" [29]. The Pt 2 regime relies on the ordinary processes of the Supreme Court once a foreign judgment is registered, and it "would be self-defeating" if read as impliedly excluding such jurisdiction and power as the Supreme Court otherwise has to safeguard the efficacy of those processes [30].

Their Honours rejected Bayan's arguments that ss 17 and 20 of the Foreign Judgments Act exclude rules of the kind in O 52A, and said s 20 is a transitional provision which did not contradict s 17(2) and whose operation is now spent [31], [36]. They found it unnecessary to consider whether s 17(1) might authorise O 52A r 5, or to rule on the merits of Bayan's argument, first made in the High Court, that rules made under s 17(1) would be ineffective unless registered under the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth), because s 17(2) makes plain that s 17(1) has no effect on the separate rule-making power in s 167(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act, against which the validity of O 52A r 5 is to be tested [33]–[34].

The Supreme Court is continued in existence as a superior court of record administering law and equity, and that status alone implies that it has inherent jurisdiction, a term their Honours used for present purposes interchangeably with inherent power [37]–[38]. The rule-making power in s 167(1)(a) can regulate the range of orders the Supreme Court can make in exercising its inherent jurisdiction but cannot expand that range [40]. So the Supreme Court can have power to make a freezing order under the O 52A r 5 criteria only if and to the extent that such an order is one it can make in the exercise of its inherent power [41].

Their Honours said it is well established by decisions of the High Court, citing Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612, that the inherent power includes power to make orders the Supreme Court determines to be appropriate to prevent the abuse or frustration of its process in relation to matters within its jurisdiction [43]. They added that a freezing order has been noted more than once in the High Court to be, in words from Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1, "the paradigm example of an order to prevent the frustration of a court's process" [43]. Bayan relied on statements of the High Court linking a freezing order to the capacity of a superior court to protect the integrity of its processes once set in motion, but their Honours said the proposed limitation does not flow from those statements, which were not exhaustive of that capacity [44]–[45].

Their Honours identified "a critical point which Bayan's argument misses": even where a substantive proceeding in the court has commenced or is imminent, the process the order is designed to protect is a prospective enforcement process [46]. That description is drawn from Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead's explanation of a freezing order in Mercedes Benz AG v Leiduck [1996] AC 284, which five members of the High Court cited with approval in Patrick Stevedores, in a passage that four members of the Court, subject to presently immaterial qualifications, adopted as a correct statement of principle in Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380 [46]. Lord Nicholls explained, in a passage their Honours quoted, that a freezing order is "not so much relief appurtenant to a money claim as relief appurtenant to a prospective money judgment", granted to facilitate the process of execution or enforcement which arises only when the judgment has been obtained [46].

Their Honours said the holding in Cardile illustrates that the process protected can be contingent on factors in addition to the outcome of a substantive proceeding in that court, because a freezing order can be made against a third party against whom no present cause of action exists and no present proceeding has commenced, if some future legal process may be available under which the third party may be obliged to contribute to the judgment debtor's funds [47]. The earlier and frequently applied holding of Clarke J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Construction Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd v Tambel (Australasia) Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 274, that the Supreme Court has inherent power to make a freezing order against a party to arbitration, is a further illustration [48]. Their Honours noted that Lord Nicholls also said in Mercedes Benz that there was "nothing exorbitant" about a Hong Kong court making a freezing order in aid of a prospective judgment of a foreign court, given the prerequisite that the anticipated judgment be recognised and enforceable in Hong Kong, and they said he "fairly observed" that the alternative result would be deeply regrettable [49].

Their Honours held that the power to make a freezing order in relation to an anticipated judgment of a foreign court, which when made would be registrable by order of the Supreme Court under the Foreign Judgments Act, "is within the inherent power of the Supreme Court" [50]. That is because the order is made "to protect a process of registration and enforcement in the Supreme Court which is in prospect of being invoked" [50]. The O 52A r 5 criteria "are appropriately tailored to the exercise of that inherent power", and such issues of principle or degree as might arise in working them out go to the exercise of the power, not to its existence [50].

The parties agreed that BCBC's application was from its inception a proceeding in a matter within the Supreme Court's federal jurisdiction, and that O 52A, to the extent not inconsistent with the Foreign Judgments Act, was picked up and applied in that jurisdiction by s 79 of the Judiciary Act [51]. Although no party or intervener argued that it made any difference to the outcome, their Honours recorded how that jurisdiction arises: under s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act a State court is invested with federal jurisdiction, to the exclusion of State jurisdiction under s 109 of the Constitution, in a matter otherwise within its jurisdiction that answers the description of a matter within s 75 or s 76 of the Constitution [52]–[53]. A justiciable controversy sufficiently answers the description of a matter arising under a law of the Commonwealth, within s 76(ii), where a claim in issue depends for its existence on a Commonwealth law, even if the form of relief claimed does not [54]. An application for such a freezing order is sufficiently characterised as a matter arising under a law of the Commonwealth, on the basis that the prospective enforcement process to be protected depends on the present existence of the Foreign Judgments Act [55].

Keane and Nettle JJ (concurring)

Keane and Nettle JJ adopted the joint reasons' summary of the legislation, the findings below and the issues, agreed with their Honours' conclusion and reasons, and addressed additional observations to Bayan's principal argument [57]. Bayan contended that the power cannot be enlivened until the High Court of Singapore gives judgment in BCBC's favour, and Keane and Nettle JJ said this view of the inherent power "is too narrow" [58]–[59]. Quite apart from O 52A, they said, the freezing order would be sustainable as an exercise of the inherent power to ensure that the Supreme Court's own processes of enforcement are not set at nought by a disposition of assets undertaken for that purpose [59].

They stated Bayan's argument as a syllogism whose major premise was that superior courts in Australia have an inherent power to make a freezing order only to protect a cause of action pending in, or at least immediately justiciable in, an Australian court, with O 52A, to the extent it provides otherwise, inconsistent with the Foreign Judgments Act and inoperative under s 109 of the Constitution [60]. They held the major premise unsustainable because it takes too broad a view of the scope of the Foreign Judgments Act and too narrow a view of the inherent power [61].

They accepted that the Act establishes a comprehensive scheme for enforcing in Australia the judgments of countries specified in the regulations, but said it does not address itself to the limits of a superior court's inherent power to ensure that its own processes are not frustrated [62]. They also found no inconsistency, within the meaning of s 109 of the Constitution, between the Act and the rule-making power in s 167(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act as applied by s 79 of the Judiciary Act [62]. They said nothing in the Act manifests an intention to exclude the power to grant a freezing order in anticipation of proceedings to enforce a prospective foreign judgment, and they treated s 6(7), under which a registered judgment has for the purposes of enforcement the same force and effect as if given by the registering court, as "a positive indication" that the Act proceeds on the assumption that the registering court "is expected to deploy the full range of powers which might be deployed to vindicate its own judgments" [63].

In their view, the doctrinal basis of the inherent power is not confined to protecting a pending action or an immediately justiciable cause of action, and a superior court may grant a freezing order "proleptically to ensure the efficacy of its exercise of judicial power" [64]. They said the doctrinal basis of freezing orders was first considered by the High Court in Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd, a case focused on the power in s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the content of which they said is not different for present purposes from the inherent power of a superior court to protect its processes [65]. Deane J in Jackson, with whom Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ agreed, explained that the purpose of a freezing order is not to create security for the plaintiff but to prevent a defendant from disposing of actual assets so as to frustrate the process of the court [65].

Bayan fixed on the phrase "once set in motion", used in CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345 and in Cardile, to contend that the protective power arises only for proceedings which have been commenced, or at least proceedings imminent in respect of a complete cause of action [68]-[69]. Keane and Nettle JJ noted that the statement of principle in Cardile, given by Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ, contemplates a freezing order against a person against whom proceedings in the court are not pending [70], [72]. They also noted that Cardile described the general power as a broad one while stating, in words they quoted, that orders "must be capable of properly being seen as appropriate to the case in hand", and they said this contemplates a judgment by a court rather than the mechanical application of a hard and fast rule [71], [73]–[74].

They said the phrase "once set in motion" in Cigna and Cardile "cannot fairly be regarded as a statement of a necessary condition of the exercise of the inherent power to freeze an asset of an alleged debtor who is shown on the evidence to be moving to defeat the anticipated processes of the court" [75]. The pendency of proceedings in the court may be a positive indication that exercising the power is appropriate, but they said those passages cannot fairly be taken to mean that a sufficient connection with that court's processes of enforcement cannot be shown in ways other than the pendency or imminent pendency of proceedings there [75]. Whether a sufficient connection is shown depends on a judgment by the court, and they said it is better that the limits of the power be set by a determination based on a full appreciation of the circumstances than by a hard and fast rule apt to permit the likely evasion of the court's processes in some cases for no good reason [76].

They said the power is to be exercised judicially: a freezing order is not a mode of converting a would-be creditor into a secured creditor before a dispute is determined, but a person likely to become a debtor ought not be allowed to dispose of assets so as to defeat a court's capacity to enforce a just claim [77]. The unchallenged concurrent findings of the primary judge and the Court of Appeal as to the likelihood of registration of a Singaporean judgment in BCBC's favour established, in their view, a sufficient connection with the administration of justice by the Supreme Court to engage the power proleptically to ensure that its processes will not be frustrated by action on the part of Bayan directed to that end [78].

Keane and Nettle JJ said Official Receiver of State of Israel v Raveh (2001) 24 WAR 53, in which Murray J dismissed an application for a Mareva injunction by a plaintiff who intended to have any final judgment of the District Court of Israel registered in Australia and enforced in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, is the only Australian decision supporting the distinction Bayan insisted on between proceedings likely to be instituted and proceedings actually commenced [79]-[80]. They said Murray J's reasoning treated a Mareva injunction as an adjunct to a cause of action pending in the court making the order, and reflected a narrower view of the inherent power than the principle informing the power warrants [80]. They also said that, once attention is on the court's processes of enforcement, it is difficult to discern any material distinction between the foundation of the power exercised in Construction Engineering, where a "Scott v Avery" clause precluded court proceedings until an arbitral award was made, and the foundation of the power BCBC invoked [81].

Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs [56], [83].

Why it matters

The decision's significance lies in its answer to the question in the appeal: the inherent power of the Supreme Court of Western Australia extends to a freezing order in relation to an anticipated foreign judgment which, when made, would be registrable by order of that Court under the Foreign Judgments Act [50]. It rejects the limit Bayan proposed, that the power exists only where a substantive proceeding in the court has commenced or is imminent, by identifying the process protected as a prospective enforcement process [44]–[46]. It separates the existence of the power from its exercise: rules of court may regulate but not expand the range of orders, and issues of principle or degree under O 52A r 5 go to the exercise of the power [40], [50]. Keane and Nettle JJ's observations add that the limits of the power are to be set by judicial determination, and that Raveh reflected a narrower view of the power than the principle warrants [76], [80].

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