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R v Iby

[2005] NSWCCA 178

NSW Court of Criminal Appeal · NSW

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

R v David John IBY [2005] NSWCCA 178 is a decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal (Spigelman CJ, Grove J and Bell J), given on 9 May 2005 on an appeal from Ellis DCJ in the District Court, about what the common law "born alive" rule requires. The appellant was convicted of the manslaughter of a baby delivered by emergency caesarean after the stolen car he was driving collided head-on with the car of the baby's mother, who was 38 weeks pregnant [1], [2]. The baby never breathed unassisted, but the trial judge found that he breathed with the assistance of a respirator and had a heartbeat for almost two hours, and he was pronounced dead two hours after delivery [1], [9], [15]. Spigelman CJ, with whom Grove J and Bell J agreed, held that any sign of life after birth, such as a heartbeat, satisfies the rule, that unassisted breathing is not required, and that the statutory definition of death in s33 of the Human Tissue Act 1983 does not change what counts as life for the rule [62], [64], [72], [78], [80], [81]. The Court dismissed the appeal [79]–[81].

Facts

On 4 April 2002 the appellant was driving a stolen vehicle in Fairfield, Sydney, at excessive speed and in an erratic manner [1]. After colliding with a car travelling in the same direction, his vehicle crossed the double white lines and collided head-on with a car driven by Mrs My Nghi Vongratsavai, who was 38 weeks pregnant [1]. At Liverpool Hospital an emergency caesarean was performed and a male infant in poor condition, later named Mathew Joseph Vongratsavai, was delivered at 11.48am [1]. Mathew was pronounced dead exactly two hours later [1].

A heartbeat was audible immediately after birth; manual cardiac massage ran from less than one minute to 10 minutes; no heart rate was detected at five or seven minutes; and a heart rate of 100 was detected at 10, 12 and 20 minutes, and later one of 112 [15]. Blood pressure was low but recordable, indicating blood circulation [15]. Mathew was intubated immediately after birth, moved to a machine ventilator 12 minutes after birth, and never breathed unassisted [15]. About an hour after birth an electroencephalogram (EEG) showed a flat trace, although the EEG did not measure subcortical structures or the brain stem [15], [22]. Mathew died from injuries suffered in utero, arising from the partial abruption of the placenta suffered by his mother [14].

Procedural history

The appellant was charged with offences including manslaughter and an alternative count of dangerous driving causing death, pleaded not guilty, and elected trial by judge alone under s132 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 [2]. Ellis DCJ found him guilty of manslaughter, and he was also convicted of aggravated dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm to the mother [2], [8].

The medical evidence conflicted: Dr Jacqueline Stack, a neonatologist and paediatrician who cared for Mathew after delivery, considered that life existed whenever there was a heart rate and circulation, while Professor John Hilton, called for the accused, proposed a test of what he called "independent existence", which in this case required independently functioning breathing [16]–[18]. Ellis DCJ found that Mathew "did breathe, albeit with the assistance of a respirator", that his lungs oxygenated his blood, and that he had a heartbeat for almost two hours after delivery [9]. His Honour held that a newborn is born alive when it is fully extruded from its mother and living by the functioning of its own organs, with or without medical assistance, as shown by breathing with or without assistance or by any other evidence of life such as a heartbeat [12]. On that analysis, either the heartbeat or the assisted respiration was enough to show that the baby was born alive [13]. Accepting Dr Stack's opinion, Ellis DCJ concluded that Mathew lived independently of his mother for about two hours [14], [19].

The Crown sought to appeal against the sentence on the dangerous driving charge only if the manslaughter appeal were allowed, and indicated that it would otherwise abandon that appeal [8].

Issues

The issue was what is meant by the words "born alive" in the long-established common law rule that, where the killing or death of a newly born child is an element of a criminal offence, the element cannot be established unless the baby was born alive [3]. Given the trial judge's factual finding, Spigelman CJ treated the issue as a legal one: whether the rule requires an infant to live independently in some sense other than the one Ellis DCJ held sufficient [10].

The appellant argued that a heartbeat was not enough and that unassisted breathing was also required, so that Ellis DCJ had misdirected himself or the verdict was unreasonable [5], [20]. In oral argument he relied on the proposition that a person cannot in law be both alive and dead at the same time, and on s33 of the Human Tissue Act 1983, under which a person has died when there has been irreversible cessation of all function of the person's brain or irreversible cessation of circulation of blood in the person's body [21]. For the first time on appeal, he relied on the absence of adequate evidence of brain activity and argued that the statutory definition of death should be adapted to the born alive rule, making evidence of brain function an essential part of the Crown case [22], [24]. The Crown's case was that Mathew had fully issued forth from his mother and lived independently of her for two hours, albeit supported by mechanical respiration [4].

Held

Spigelman CJ (with whom Grove J and Bell J agreed)

Spigelman CJ traced the rule to the 17th century, citing Regina v Sims (1601) Goulds 174 [25]. The rule has two components: the foetus must have completely left its mother's body, and the child must be alive at or after birth; this appeal concerned the second limb [27]. The rule was stated in Australia by Barry J in his charge to the jury in R v Hutty [1953] VLR 338, and it remains the law in Australia, having been applied in the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v F (1996) 40 NSWLR 245 per Grove J [28], [29].

In his Honour's view the rule rests on two "anachronistic, indeed antiquated" factors: the primitive state of medical knowledge when it was adopted, and the risk of birth, which made it highly probable that a stillbirth had natural causes [32]. He said "The position is now totally transformed", as information about the vitality of the foetus is now readily available [36]. In England stillbirths were about 4 percent of all births in the late 1920s but only 0.5 percent in recent decades [39].

His Honour said that the case law does not suggest a common law definition of what constitutes life for the rule: the issue is one of fact for the tribunal of fact, which in serious crime is the jury, and medical evidence has usually been central [40]. Because each reported case turned on its own constellation of evidence, the judges' observations and jury directions must be understood in that context and are not necessarily reconcilable [45]. Live birth can be proved by many overt acts, including crying, breathing and heartbeat, and the case law does not support the appellant's contention that unassisted breathing must exist before a baby can be said to have been born alive [46].

He observed that the test stated by Brett J in R v Handley, of breathing "through its own lungs alone", was given in a case where the medical evidence was directed only to breathing [48]. In C v S, on which Brooke J drew in Rance v Mid Downs Health Authority, the foetus could never breathe either naturally or with a ventilator, whereas in this case breathing did occur with assistance [49]. His Honour agreed with Girvan J in R v McDonald (Crown Court of Northern Ireland), who read the references to breathing through the lungs alone as distinguishing a foetus still connected to its mother from a baby whose breathing, whether assisted or not, is through its lungs [50]. He also referred to People v Hall, in which the Supreme Court of New York rejected a submission that a baby placed on a respirator was not born alive, saying in that court's words that "Illness is not equivalent to the absence of life" [51].

Post-mortem evidence that a dead child must have breathed is not accepted as determinative, and Glanville Williams accepted that proof of breathing was not essential [52]. Section 20 of the Crimes Act 1900, under which a child is taken to have been born alive if it has breathed and has been wholly born into the world, is confined to a trial for murder of the child, and his Honour saw no warrant for applying it to other crimes [53]. The rule has never included a requirement of viability, in the sense of a newborn's physiological ability to survive as a functioning being [54]. Older cases requiring an "independent circulation" may have related to the first limb of the rule and reflected deficient medical knowledge, but insofar as circulation was a test of life, they suggest that circulation of the blood was sufficient [55].

His Honour concluded that "Authority is clearly in favour of a conclusion that the common law 'born alive' rule is satisfied by any indicia of independent life", and that there is no single test of what constitutes life [56]. He described the judgment of Vice Chancellor Stuart in Brock v Kellock (1861) LJ 30 Ch 498, a civil case in which proof of pulsation was held enough to prove the existence of life, as the clearest authoritative statement that the rule can be satisfied by any indication of life [58]. That case is clear authority that the beating of the heart is sufficient evidence of life for the rule, and that evidence of respiration is not necessary [60]. Ellis DCJ was therefore correct to hold that the evidence of heartbeat satisfied the rule, and correct to reject the submission that a person cannot be born alive without having shown an ability to breathe without assistance [62].

His Honour said there is a strong case for abandoning the born alive rule completely, as has occurred by statute in many states of the United States and by judicial decision in Massachusetts, South Carolina and Oklahoma [63]. With current medical technology and the extremely low rate of stillbirths, however, the rule, "if it is to survive at all", should continue to be applied as Ellis DCJ applied it, so that any sign of life after birth is sufficient, which is consistent with the authorities [64]. That approach also conforms best with contemporary conditions, because it is now virtually certain that a newborn baby showing any sign of life would have lived but for the conduct inflicted on it late in the pregnancy [65]. His Honour did not draw on the World Health Organisation definition of live birth relied on by the Crown, because it was based on the need for internationally comparable statistics and could give no assistance in explaining the common law [66], [67].

On the proposed brain death rule, his Honour could not identify any relevant anomaly in a person being classified as dead for virtually all purposes of New South Wales law but alive for the born alive rule, "other than perhaps a semantic one, which should not be determinative" [70]. Invoking Fullagar J's warning in Attorney General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Limited against the temptation "to import a meretricious symmetry into the law", he declined to adopt a similar argument that had succeeded in the United States in State of Wisconsin v Cornelius [71]. Although s33 gives a definition of death of general application, as the Court of Appeal said in Ansett Australia v Dale, the Act's scope and purpose show no legislative intention to alter the concept of life for the born alive rule [69], [72]. The definition, which originated in the Australian Law Reform Commission's 1977 report on human tissue transplants, applies to a person who had been alive and determines the time of death, while the born alive rule identifies life after the baby has been separated from its mother on an artificial and non-scientific standard, so it is not the reciprocal of death as now defined [73], [74].

As to adapting the common law, his Honour noted that there is only a single common law of Australia, that the definition has been adopted in all States and Territories other than Western Australia (with Queensland confining it to the purposes of its own Act), and that there are considerable difficulties in developing the common law by analogy with statute; although the regime here is closer to national uniformity than the one considered in Esso Australia Resources Australia Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, there is no uniformity [75]–[77]. More significantly, the courts should resist introducing a meretricious symmetry between the common law and statute law, and the definition of death does not, other than as a matter of semantic symmetry, require a corresponding definition of life [78].

On the evidence of brain function, his Honour said that, although there was some such evidence after birth, it was not so definitive as to overcome the possibility of a miscarriage of justice, and that "If brain activity had to be established, which I do not believe to be the case, the outcome of this appeal could have been different" [23]. He concluded that the appeal should be dismissed [79].

Grove J

Grove J agreed with Spigelman CJ [80].

Bell J

Bell J agreed with Spigelman CJ [81].

Orders. The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal against the manslaughter conviction [79]–[81]. Because the manslaughter appeal failed, it was unnecessary to deal with the Crown's conditional appeal against sentence on the dangerous driving charge, which the Court was to record as abandoned [8].

Why it matters

The decision holds that any sign of life after birth, such as a heartbeat, satisfies the common law born alive rule, and that a baby need not have breathed without assistance to have been born alive [62], [64]. It also holds that the statutory definition of death in s33 of the Human Tissue Act 1983 neither changes the meaning of life for the rule nor calls for the rule to be adapted to match it [72], [78]. Spigelman CJ also observed that the rule is a product of primitive medical knowledge and that there is a strong case for abandoning it completely [63].

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