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R v Katarzynski

[2002] NSWSC 613

Supreme Court of NSW · NSW

Summary updated 3 November 2026

Overview

R v Katarzynski [2002] NSWSC 613 is a judgment of Howie J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Criminal Division, dated 9 July 2002. It gives his Honour's reasons for how he directed the jury, during the accused's trial for murder, on whether the accused's intoxication is relevant to self-defence under s 418 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). [1], [5], [28] Howie J accepted the Crown's submission on that question. [21] He directed the jury that they must take the accused's intoxication into account when considering whether he might have believed it was necessary to act as he did in defence of himself and when considering the circumstances as he perceived them, but not when assessing whether his response to those circumstances was reasonable. [28]

Facts

The cover names the accused as Kirstain William Katarzynski. The accused was indicted for murder and was standing trial before a jury. [1] The accused shot the deceased following a number of altercations between them in a hotel in Liverpool, in the early hours of the morning of 6 April 2001. [1] There was ample evidence before the jury that the accused was intoxicated at the time of the shooting as a result of his voluntary consumption of alcohol. [1] It was not in issue that the accused committed the act that caused the death. [1] It was for the jury to decide whether that act was voluntary and whether, when he fired the gun, the accused had the necessary mental state for murder. [1] The evidence appeared to raise whether there was a reasonable possibility that the accused believed that firing a hand gun three times toward the deceased was necessary to defend himself. [4] A bullet from the hand gun passed through the deceased's heart. [5] The judgment does not describe the altercations further.

Procedural history

This was a trial at first instance, and the cover marks the lower court details as not applicable. The cover gives the hearing dates as 24 June 2002 to present. The Crown conceded that on the evidence it was open to the jury to find a real possibility that the accused was acting in his own self-defence when he shot the deceased. [2] The Crown also conceded that the applicable law on that issue was Part 11 Division 3 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), with Howie J referring to R v Michael James Taylor [2002] NSWSC 610. [2] At the close of the Crown case, Howie J raised with counsel the interpretation of s 418(2). [5]

Issues

The main issue was whether the accused's intoxication was relevant to determining the reasonableness of his response, under s 418(2), to what he perceived to be the threat from the deceased. [5] Related to that was whether the common law as stated by Hunt CJ at CL in Conlon should be maintained in interpreting s 418, as the accused argued, or whether s 418 was not intended to codify the common law, as the Crown argued. [18], [19]

Held

Howie J

Howie J sat alone and gave the only reasons.

Under s 418(2), a person carries out conduct in self-defence if, and only if, the person believes the conduct is necessary for a stated purpose, including to defend himself or herself or another person, and the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she perceives them. [3] Section 419 places on the prosecution the onus of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the person did not carry out the conduct in self-defence. [3] Section 421 applies where a person uses force involving the intentional or reckless infliction of death and the conduct is not a reasonable response in the circumstances as perceived, but the person believes the conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another person, or to prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of liberty. [3] In that case the person is not criminally responsible for murder but, on a trial for murder, is to be found guilty of manslaughter if otherwise criminally responsible for manslaughter. [3]

Howie J said the evidence appeared to raise for the jury whether there was a reasonable possibility that the accused believed firing the hand gun was necessary to defend himself and whether that conduct was a reasonable response in the circumstances as he perceived them. [4] Depending on that decision, it might be open to the jury to find the accused guilty of manslaughter under the excessive force provision in s 421. [4] Howie J then referred briefly to the most recent history of the law of self-defence in New South Wales in order to explain the point. [5]

At common law, at least since Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) [1987] HCA 26; (1987) 162 CLR 645, the jury asked on a trial of murder whether there was a real possibility that the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. [6] If the Crown did not prove beyond reasonable doubt either that the accused did not hold such a belief or that he had no reasonable grounds for it, he was to be acquitted, as Howie J noted citing Dziduch (1990) 47 A Crim R 378 at 379-380. [6] It was the accused's belief, based on the circumstances as he perceived them, that had to be reasonable, and not the belief of the reasonable man, as Howie J noted citing R v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294 at 306. [6]

In Conlon (1993) 69 A Crim R 92, Hunt CJ at CL, sitting as a trial judge without a jury, determined that intoxication by alcohol and cannabis was relevant both to whether the accused had reasonable grounds for his belief that it was necessary to act to defend himself and to the reasonableness of his response to his perceived need to defend himself. [7] In the passage Howie J set out, Hunt CJ at CL rejected the Crown's submission that the decision whether there were reasonable grounds for the belief was completely objective. [8] Hunt CJ at CL said the assessment was of a mixed objective and subjective nature, so that account must be taken of personal characteristics that might affect the accused's appreciation of the gravity of the threat and the reasonableness of his response. [8] The Crown's alternative argument in Conlon was that voluntarily induced intoxication should not count as such a characteristic, because otherwise those whose perceptions are mistaken by reason only of intoxication would be entitled to kill with impunity. [8] Howie J recorded that Hunt CJ at CL refused to follow English cases and McCullough v R [1982] TASRp 7; [1982] Tas R 43, in which intoxication had been viewed as irrelevant to the reasonableness of the response, in light of statements by members of the High Court in Zecevic v DPP. [9] Hunt CJ at CL concluded that he should take the accused's voluntarily induced intoxication into account, so far as it may have affected his appreciation of the gravity of the threat or the reasonableness of his response. [9] Howie J summed up the common law as providing that self-defence existed where the accused believed that he was called upon to defend himself, believed that his conduct was necessary to do so, and had reasonable grounds for each of those beliefs, with intoxication relevant to each of those matters. [10]

The Home Invasion (Occupants Protection) Act 1998 came into operation on 1 December 1998, and under it an occupant of a dwelling house could act in self-defence against an intruder if the occupant believed on reasonable grounds that it was necessary. [11] Section 9 of that Act said whether grounds were reasonable was to be determined having regard to the occupant's belief, based on the circumstances as the occupant perceived them. [11] In R v Munro [2001] NSWCCA 187, in dismissing an appeal from a trial by judge alone before Badgery-Parker AJ, Stein JA, with whom the other members of the Court agreed, upheld the trial judge's rejection of a submission that s 9 required the occupant's belief to be taken into account in determining whether the grounds for that belief were reasonable. [12] Stein JA noted that the trial judge's conclusion was consistent with the second reading speech, which repeatedly emphasised that the purpose of that Act was to declare and codify the common law. [12]

On 22 February 2002 that Act was repealed by s 4 of the Crimes Amendment (Self Defence) Act 2001, which inserted the current Part 11 Division 3 into the Crimes Act. [13] The Minister's Second Reading Speech indicated that the provisions were based, with two exceptions, on the recommendations of the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee (MCCOC). [13] The Minister said the model removed the objective element of the test as to what the defendant perceived the danger to be, while the person's actions on the basis of their belief still had to be reasonable. [13] The two exceptions were the re-introduction of excessive self-defence in relation to murder and the extent of the right to defend property, neither of which Howie J regarded as relevant to the present issue. [14] The Minister also said the Bill would effectively abolish the current common law on self-defence, although the common law was not made irrelevant because the provisions were firmly grounded in common law principles. [14]

MCCOC's Final Report of December 1992 proposed a self-defence provision in almost identical terms to s 418. [15] The report explained that the test as to necessity is subjective and the test as to proportion is objective, requiring the response to be objectively proportionate to the situation the accused subjectively believed she or he faced. [16] The report said this approach was consistent with s 46 of the Tasmanian Code. [16] Howie J pointed out that McCullough, which he said Hunt CJ at CL distinguished in Conlon, concerned the interpretation of s 46 of the Tasmanian Code. [17] In McCullough the Court of Criminal Appeal said that intoxication may be taken into account in considering whether a person held the apprehension and belief referred to in s 46(2), but not in respect of whether they were reasonable or held on reasonable grounds. [17]

The Crown contended that, even if Conlon represented the common law on reasonable grounds for the accused's belief, it did not represent the position on a reasonable response under s 418, a provision it submitted did not, and was not intended to, codify the common law. [18] The Crown submitted that intoxication is relevant to the accused's belief as to what conduct was necessary and to the circumstances he perceived, but not to the reasonableness of his response to those circumstances. [18] Mr Cusack QC for the accused argued that the common law as stated by Hunt CJ at CL should be maintained, because the terms of s 418 do not manifest a clear intention by Parliament to displace the common law requirement that intoxication be considered both on the accused's belief and on the reasonableness of his conduct. [19] He also pointed out that Parliament could easily have reached the Crown's result by using the term a reasonable person, which would have picked up s 428F of the Crimes Act, under which a comparison with a reasonable person is with one who is not intoxicated. [19] Howie J noted in response that s 418(2) is concerned not with the state of mind of a reasonable person but with the reasonableness of the accused's conduct having regard to his or her state of mind. [20]

Howie J held that the Crown's submission should be accepted. [21] He acknowledged that this was "a departure from the common law position as pronounced in Conlon to the possible detriment of an accused person", but said the result flowed from both the words of the section and the history of the legislation. [21]

Howie J said the question now posed for the jury is not the same as it was at common law after Zecevic v DPP and as considered in Conlon. [22] The first question under s 418 is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the accused believed his or her conduct was necessary in order to defend himself or herself. [22] If there is, the second question is whether there is also a reasonable possibility that what the accused did was a reasonable response to the circumstances as he or she perceived them. [22] The first issue is determined from "a completely subjective point of view", considering all the personal characteristics of the accused at the time of the conduct. [23] The second is determined by "an entirely objective assessment of the proportionality of the accused's response to the situation the accused subjectively believed he or she faced". [23] The Crown will negative self-defence if it proves beyond reasonable doubt either that the accused did not genuinely believe it was necessary to act as he or she did in his or her own defence, or that what the accused did was not a reasonable response to the danger as he or she perceived it to be. [23]

Howie J explained that the reasonableness issue is objective in so far as the jury is not concerned with what the accused believed was necessary to respond to the circumstances as he or she perceived them. [24] The current provision is not concerned with whether the accused's belief as to the necessary response was reasonable or held on reasonable grounds. [24] This, Howie J said, is the contrast with the common law, because the accused need not have reasonable grounds for the belief that it was necessary to act in that way and it is sufficient if the accused genuinely holds that belief. [24]

It is for the jury to decide what matters to take into account when determining whether the accused's response was reasonable. [25] The jury is assessing the response of the accused, not that of the ordinary or reasonable person. [25] Howie J said some personal attributes of the accused will be relevant, as will some of the surrounding physical circumstances, so that the jury may regard matters such as age, gender or the state of the accused's health. [25] Whether a particular personal characteristic is to be considered will depend largely on the particular facts of the case. [25]

Howie J's opinion was that "one matter that must be irrelevant to an assessment of the reasonableness of the accused's response is his or her state of sobriety". [26] He relied on McCullough, quoting its words to say it is logically incongruous "to contemplate the proposition that a person's exercise of judgment might be unreasonable if he was sober, but reasonable because he was drunk". [26] He said that, apart from Conlon, he was not aware of any other decision holding that intoxication is relevant to evaluating the reasonableness of a person's conduct or belief. [26] He added that at common law intoxication is not relevant to evaluating the accused's response to provocation, or to the belief of a reasonable person as to the dangerousness of the accused's actions for the offence of manslaughter. [26]

Howie J recorded that Hunt CJ at CL in Conlon was not prepared to introduce the policy applied to s 46 of the Tasmanian Code in McCullough into the interpretation of Zecevic v DPP. [27] Howie J did not believe he was similarly constrained, because s 418 is not, and was not intended to be, a codification of the common law. [27] He added that the legislature's general policy on the relevance of intoxication to the criminal law is contained in Part 11A of the Crimes Act, whose provisions limit the use a court can make of an accused's intoxication when considering criminal responsibility. [27] In his view, not adopting that policy in construing s 418 would create "an illogical and unacceptable inconsistency in the criminal law of this State with regard to the relevance of intoxication to criminal responsibility". [27]

Orders. The judgment records no formal orders, and the decision field on the cover is blank. Howie J's ruling took the form of a direction to the jury to the effect that "they must take into account the accused's intoxication when considering whether he might have believed that it was necessary to act as he did in defence of himself and when considering the circumstances as he perceived them, but not when assessing whether his response to those circumstances was reasonable". [28] The judgment does not state the jury's verdict.

Why it matters

The judgment sets out Howie J's construction of s 418 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), which separates the accused's subjective belief from an objective assessment of the proportionality of the response. [22], [23] On intoxication, Howie J's ruling is that it goes to the accused's belief and the circumstances as he perceived them, and not to whether his response to those circumstances was reasonable. [28] Howie J acknowledged that this departs from the common law position in Conlon. [21] He also contrasted the current provisions with the common law, in that the accused need not have reasonable grounds for the belief. [24] The ruling was given by a single judge during a jury trial.

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