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R v XY

(2013) 84 NSWLR 363 · [2013] NSWCCA 121

NSW Court of Criminal Appeal · NSW

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

R v XY [2013] NSWCCA 121 is a five judge decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal on an appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions, under s 5F(3A) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), against a District Court ruling that excluded recordings of two telephone calls between the complainant and the accused in a child sexual offence trial. [1], [97] The appeal also brought up the conflict between R v Shamouil [2006] NSWCCA 112 and Dupas v The Queen [2012] VSCA 328 on whether credibility, reliability or weight has any part in assessing probative value under s 137 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). [2], [97] The appeal was dismissed by three judges to two: Hoeben CJ at CL, Blanch J and Price J would dismiss it, and Basten JA and Simpson J would have allowed it. [3], [93], [179], [208], [226]

Facts

The respondent was charged with five counts of indecent assault under s 61L of the Crimes Act 1900 and one count of aggravated sexual intercourse without consent under s 61J, the circumstance of aggravation being that the complainant was under 16. [99] All the offences were alleged to have been committed against the same complainant between 1 February and 31 October 2002, when she was eight years old. [100] At that time she lived with her mother, her mother's de facto partner and two siblings, and the respondent, a close friend of the partner, spent much time at the home. [4]

The complainant's statement was made on 7 June 2011, when she was 17, and hers is the only direct evidence of the offences. [104], [127] Her mother's statement gave accounts of two occasions when the respondent was for a time alone with the complainant at the house, and of the complainant saying at 14 that the respondent had molested her. [108] According to the mother, the family moved away in 2002 and had no further contact with the respondent apart from one brief occasion about four years later. [109] The complainant said she remembered noticing a mole or sore on the respondent's penis, and police photographs appeared to show a small red lesion there, but the forensic physician could not determine whether it was recent or longstanding. [6], [106], [113]

On 25 August 2011, under the supervision of police and with the calls recorded under a warrant issued under the Surveillance Devices Act 2007, the complainant telephoned the respondent for the express purpose of engaging him in conversation about her allegations. [103] In the first call, after she identified herself by reference to her mother and her mother's partner, the respondent gave an indication that he remembered her. [116] As Basten JA sets out the transcript, the complainant then asked "Yeah do you remember what you used to do to me?" and the respondent answered "Yeah fuckin' oath and I wouldn't mind doing it again ... ha ha." [8] When she said this was when she was eight years old, the respondent said "When you were in high school man not eight years old" and spoke of remembering her from high school wearing "the maroon jackets". [9] A school administrator's statement gave the girls' uniform at the complainant's primary school as including a burgundy jumper. [112] The call disconnected, the complainant rang back almost at once, and in the second call the respondent denied any memory of the events when she put express complaints to him. [10], [103]

Procedural history

The respondent was arraigned in the District Court on 5 November 2012 and pleaded not guilty, and before a jury was empanelled a voir dire was held on the admissibility of prosecution evidence. [99], [101] The trial judge, Quirk DCJ, rejected the defence objection under s 85 of the Evidence Act because the respondent did not know that police were facilitating and recording the conversation. [1], [12] She gave her judgment the following morning and excluded the recordings under ss 90 and 137 of the Evidence Act. [1], [137]

On s 90, she was not satisfied that the respondent was aware of who he was speaking to in the first call, relying on background noise, the change in the complainant's voice over nine years and the vagueness of what was put to him, and she thought his reference to a high school student suggested he may have had someone else in mind. [17] She held that the truth of the alleged admission may have been adversely affected, so that it would be unfair to admit it. [17]

On s 137, Basten JA records that she treated the prospect of the respondent being forced to give evidence, and the risk of the jury reasoning from sexual activity with a high school student to the alleged offences, as revealing a danger of unfair prejudice, without considering how far directions could remove or mitigate those risks. [19] She held that the circumstances leading to the alleged admission substantially reduced its probative value, and that the probative value of the calls was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. [20]

The trial did not proceed further, so that the Director could test the ruling, and the Director appealed under s 5F(3A), which allows an appeal against a ruling on admissibility only if it eliminates or substantially weakens the prosecution's case. [1], [101] The appeal concerned only the recordings, not other evidence excluded at the same time. [102], [111]

Issues

The first issue was jurisdiction: whether excluding the calls substantially weakened the prosecution case, since the Director did not suggest that it eliminated that case. [95], [118] The second was whether the exclusion under s 90 could stand, the Director arguing that the trial judge's findings of fact could not be sustained. [141] The third was whether, under s 137, the trial judge impermissibly took into account credibility, reliability and weight, contrary to the principle stated in Shamouil. [141] That raised the conflict with Dupas, in which a five judge Victorian Court of Appeal held the approach in this Court to be, in that court's words, "manifestly wrong". [97], [141] Basten JA also identified a question of precedent: whether this Court was obliged to follow Dupas or should follow its own decision in Shamouil. [26]

Held

Basten JA (dissenting)

Basten JA would have allowed the appeal. [3] He doubted the trial judge's view that the complainant was an agent of the state, but noted that she did not treat the point as decisive. [15], [17]

On precedent, he said courts follow their own decisions unless they are found clearly wrong or there is a compelling reason, and that the Victorian Court of Appeal, at least when exercising State jurisdiction, does not stand in the same hierarchy as this Court. [30], [31] He said that without knowing the legal basis for the principle stated by the High Court in Marlborough Gold Mines, and applied to non-statutory law in Farah Constructions, it was not possible to say whether it applied to uniform legislation that is not national in its operation. [32], [33] He could not properly explore the constitutional context because no party addressed it and no notice was given to the Attorneys under s 78 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). [31] He gave two reasons for not following the approach in Patrick Stevedores: it implied that Farah Constructions was the High Court's final statement despite Walker Corporation, and it "is not conducive to the orderly administration of justice" for intermediate courts of appeal to characterise, or routinely consider characterising, each other's judgments as plainly wrong. [37], [38] He concluded that, uncertain though authority was, this Court should determine the correct approach to the statute for itself, giving proper consideration to the earlier authorities in both this Court and the Victorian Court of Appeal. [40]

He read Shamouil as not intended to exclude all consideration of credibility and reliability, and as not denying the need to assess the probative value of the evidence, taken at its highest, for the weighing exercise. [44], [46] In his words, the prosecution is entitled to have its evidence assessed according to its capacity to support its case, "which is not to say that the reliability of the evidence may not be a factor, at least in some cases". [48] He said Dupas erroneously treated Shamouil as concluding, inflexibly and without qualification, that the weight of the evidence was irrelevant. [62] He found only one point of departure in the Dupas principles, that the judge need not assume the reliability of the evidence will be accepted, and said that, if it was an introduction to the exercise in the next principle, it was by no means clear that even this was a significant difference. [51] He also said it was far from clear that Dupas in fact adopted a different approach from the one this Court would adopt, given that the Victorian court found no error in the retrial judge's approach. [64] He criticised Dupas for beginning with the common law rather than the terms of s 137, and said the authorities it cited establish only that express language is needed to abrogate or curtail a fundamental right, freedom or immunity. [57], [58] Because it was doubtful how far Dupas departed from Shamouil read in context, and because this case was not about identification evidence, he found "no compelling reason to depart from the general approach accepted in Shamouil". [65]

He stated the Shamouil principle in three elements: the judge assesses the evidence by its capacity to advance the prosecution case, deals with it on the basis of any inference or direct support available to a reasonable jury without speculating whether the jury would accept it, and makes no finding of his or her own on whether to accept the inference or give the evidence particular weight. [66]

He listed the inferences available from the respondent's key answer, those for the prosecution being that he knew who she was, realised she meant sexual activities between them and accepted that they occurred, and others being that he had not identified her, gave a jocular response, or made an admission too general to support any count. [67] Deciding which should be accepted was, he said, "quintessentially a function for the jury". [68] He held that the trial judge erred in law because no particular element of unfair prejudice was identified, so that she never assessed the risk that a jury would not appreciate the problem after a proper direction. [68] Doing the analysis himself, as the parties accepted was the proper course, he said the jury could readily be directed that, if they preferred the view that the respondent meant a sexual liaison with another girl then in high school, no inference could be drawn about whether the complainant's allegations were true. [69], [72] He described any risk of unfair prejudice on this account as "fanciful", so that there was no basis for excluding the evidence under s 137. [72] Because no real risk of unfair prejudice arose, he said there was no occasion to assess probative value and, in this case, no choice to make between Shamouil and Dupas. [73] He added that the trial judge may need to consider the weight to be given to each possible set of inferences, without accepting or rejecting either. [73]

On s 90, he said it cannot be unfair to put the prosecution case to the jury if the evidence is capable of supporting a conviction, unless some other factor is at play. [74] He rejected reliance on the right to silence for three reasons: an accused has no right to silence in the sense that evidence demanding an explanation cannot be admitted; it was inconsistent to call the evidence weak yet say it needed an answer; and any compulsion to testify would come from the need to reject the complainant's direct evidence. [75], [76]

On jurisdiction, he said that if the jury accepted the remark as an admission it would significantly bolster the complainant's credibility, and that its removal "would clearly weaken the prosecution case to a substantial extent". [81]

Hoeben CJ at CL

Hoeben CJ at CL agreed with Simpson J that the Court assumes the interpretation of the evidence most favourable to the prosecution, and that the excluded evidence met the test of "substantially weaken" in s 5F(3A). [84] He expressed no opinion on the application of s 294AA of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. [84] He agreed, for the reasons of Basten JA and Simpson J, that the trial judge erred in applying s 90, because nothing in the circumstances of the calls made their admission unfair. [85]

Subject to his own observations, he agreed with them that in assessing probative value under s 137 the Court should not consider credibility, reliability or weight, adopted what Basten JA said at [66]–[67], and agreed that the courts of New South Wales should follow Shamouil. [86], [87] He differed in holding that, in assessing capacity to support the prosecution case, a court can take into account the fact of competing inferences, as distinct from deciding which inference should be or is most likely to be preferred. [88] He said alternative inferences inconsistent with the prosecution case and objectively plausible were available here, and could properly be taken into account in the s 137 balancing. [89]

He concluded that the probative value was outweighed, there being a significant risk that the jury would give the evidence more weight than it deserved and that its content might, in the words of McHugh J in Festa, "inflame the jury or divert the jurors from their task". [90] Adopting Blanch J's description of the prejudice, he found a real danger of tendency reasoning that a direction could not adequately meet. [91] He held the evidence correctly rejected and would dismiss the appeal. [92], [93]

Simpson J (dissenting)

Simpson J would have allowed the appeal, agreeing with the orders proposed by Basten JA. [179]

On jurisdiction, she said the question calls for examining the whole of the evidence in the prosecution case and the relative importance of the evidence in question. [118] She said a variety of inferences were available and the value of the evidence could not be definitively assessed, but the Court's task under s 5F(3A) is to assume the interpretation most favourable to the prosecution, namely that the respondent acknowledged some sexual engagement with the complainant. [122], [126] On that interpretation she said the evidence has considerable "cogency or force", a phrase she took from Shamouil. [126] She noted that a direction in terms of R v Murray may be given because the complainant's was the only direct evidence, while saying that whether s 294AA of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 impinges on that direction in sexual offence cases "remains to be seen". [127], [130], [131] If such a direction were given, she said, an acknowledgment by the respondent would go a significant way to supporting the complainant, and she held that excluding it would substantially weaken the prosecution case, so that the Court had jurisdiction. [132], [133]

She said each determination under ss 90 and 137 is to be reviewed on the principles in House v The King, noting that the High Court found it unnecessary to decide that question in relation to s 90 in EM v The Queen. [140] She held that the trial judge's error on s 90 was to go beyond reliability, in the sense used in EM, and consider what motivated the respondent's answer and what he intended to convey, which is a question for the jury. [152] She accepted that different interpretations of the answer were open, that it was not a confession to any individual count, and that admitting it might require a forensic decision about giving evidence. [153] She did not accept that this last matter was relevant, saying that a person's feeling forced to give evidence is not ordinarily a relevant consideration and that "[t]he objective of Crown evidence in a criminal trial is to call for an answer, if an answer is available". [154] She explained her decision in Cook as resting on the fact that the only explanation the appellant could give for flight evidence would have exposed a history of the very kind of offence charged, not on the right to silence. [155] She agreed with Basten JA that nothing in the circumstances rendered the admission unfair and held that the trial judge erred in relying on s 90. [157]

On s 137, she agreed with Basten JA's conclusion at [40] that this Court should determine the correct approach for itself, paying due regard to the Victorian court's views. [159] She adhered to her views in Cook and Mundine and her concurrence with Spigelman CJ in Shamouil. [162] She said probative value in these provisions means the potential of the evidence to have the relevant quality, and that the exercise is "predictive and evaluative", a phrase she took from her own judgment in Fletcher. [164], [167] She treated credibility, reliability and weight as conveying essentially the same concept for present purposes. [168] She rejected the partial assessment of weight she saw in the Dupas principles because, in her opinion, it could be "potentially productive of real injustice" and no boundaries for it are discernible in the provisions. [171] She said nothing obvious in the language of the statute suggests that probative value is determined by weight, and that the Victorian court reached its conclusion by examining historical precepts rather than the language of s 137. [173] She concluded that "questions of credibility, reliability and weight play no part in the assessment of probative value with respect to s 137". [175] Although it did not call for present determination, it seemed to her that the same must apply wherever admissibility depends on such an assessment. [175]

Because the trial judge took those matters into account, she found error in the House sense, and noted that the trial judge had made no assessment of probative value, on the assumption that the jury drew the prosecution's inferences, or of unfair prejudice having regard to available directions. [176], [177] She held the evidence admissible, what is to be made of it being a matter for the jury when fully instructed. [178]

Blanch J

Blanch J held the conversations to be "highly prejudicial to the respondent and unfairly so". [185] He said the first call indicated the character of the respondent as someone prepared to engage in opportunistic casual sexual encounters, and that the later part of it indicated an interest in a girl he remembered at high school. [185] He noted that there was no claim that the evidence should be admitted under an exception such as tendency or coincidence evidence. [188] He said the s 137 weighing must take into account any directions that could minimise the prejudice. [192] In his words, "in the emotionally charged atmosphere of a child sexual assault trial", the evidence would create a highly significant and unfair prejudice and introduce a real danger of tendency reasoning. [193]

He said courts in this State have been guided by Spigelman CJ in Shamouil, but that the evidence here raised no question of credibility or reliability, because it "is known and can be evaluated". [194], [198] He read the statement in Sood, that competing explanations have no part in assessing probative value, as referring to the credibility issue that arose in that case. [199], [200] Drawing on DSJ v R, he said an alternative explanation must amount to a real possibility or be such as to rob the evidence of its otherwise cogent capacity, phrases he took from Bathurst CJ and Whealy JA in that case. [201], [202], [204]

He said the Crown's contention that the comments amounted to a confession was open to question, other interpretations being open, including that the respondent was not aware of the complainant's real identity. [205] He said the matters the trial judge noted, namely that the voice could not be expected to be recognised, the background noise, the lack of clarity and the respondent's denial once he understood her claim related to when she was eight, were all relevant to the capacity of the evidence to establish the fact in issue. [206], [207] He found that capacity compromised by the competing inferences, and the prejudice highly significant, not correctable by directions and greater than the probative value. [207] He held the trial judge correct and would dismiss the appeal. [208]

His reasons record that the Crown relied on s 5F(3A) and that the trial judge relied on s 90, but they do not separately resolve either point, and they do not mention Dupas. [183]

Price J

Price J agreed with Hoeben CJ at CL and Blanch J that the appeal should be dismissed, giving his own reasons. [209] He said the Court has no jurisdiction unless the Crown discharges the onus of establishing that excluding the calls substantially weakens its case. [211]

He accepted that the question is asked on the assumption that the jury accepted the evidence, with questions of weight irrelevant, but said assessing the conversation at its highest does not mean ignoring its context. [215], [216] He said the drawing of inferences "requires more than optimistic leaps of instinct or imagination". [216] He held that the highest inference the evidence could support was that the respondent acknowledged sexual misconduct with the complainant when she was in high school, and that it was not a general admission of sexual misconduct with her. [218] Because all the charges related to when she was eight, he did not consider that the probative value would be significant even if the jury drew that inference. [219] He said the maroon jackets remark did not enhance the Crown's contention, despite the evidence of the burgundy primary school uniform, because the respondent made it very clear that whatever he meant was confined in his mind to when the person was in high school. [220]

He rejected the submission that the complainant was left without significant support, pointing to her mother's evidence, the photographs of the lesion and the evidence of a friend of the complainant. [221] So, in his words, the Crown's challenge "fails to clear the first hurdle", because it had not established that its case was substantially weakened. [222]

On s 137, he agreed with Blanch J's identification of the unfair prejudice, and held that the evidence at its highest was weak and substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice to the respondent that jury directions could not correct, so that s 137 mandated its rejection. [223] He said that on his analysis it was unnecessary to consider the conflict over s 137, but that it seemed to him that enabling the trial judge to consider credibility, reliability or weight is likely to enhance the fundamental principle that an accused is to receive a fair trial. [224] Answering the practical difficulties Simpson J raised, he said it is not uncommon for a witness to be cross-examined on a voir dire, and that more often than not probative value may be assessed from witness statements. [224] In his opinion the approach in Dupas "does much to avoid evidence being before a jury" which in reality has little probative value and is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused. [225] He would dismiss the appeal. [226]

His reasons deal with s 5F(3A) and s 137 and do not address s 90.

Orders. The appeal was dismissed, as the decision line on the cover of the judgment records, with Hoeben CJ at CL, Blanch J and Price J each saying he would dismiss it. [93], [208], [226] Basten JA proposed orders, with which Simpson J agreed, setting aside the District Court decision of 6 November 2012 and declaring that records of the two conversations were not rendered inadmissible by s 90 or s 137, but those two judges were in the minority and the orders were not made. [82], [179] The effect was that the trial judge's ruling excluding the two calls was not disturbed. [92], [208], [223]

Why it matters

Simpson J said the issue mattered because earlier decisions of this Court and Dupas were in sharp conflict, and that the perceived need to resolve that conflict led to a five judge bench being convened. [97] The five sets of reasons do not give one answer to the conflict: Basten JA, Hoeben CJ at CL and Simpson J favoured staying with Shamouil while differing on what it allows, Blanch J said courts in this State have been guided by it and also drew on DSJ v R, and Price J, while finding it unnecessary to decide, spoke in favour of the approach in Dupas. [65], [87], [88], [162], [194], [201], [224], [225] The three judges who would dismiss the appeal shared the conclusion that s 137 required exclusion, although Hoeben CJ at CL found jurisdiction and error under s 90, and Price J held that the Crown had not established the basis for jurisdiction. [84], [85], [90], [207], [222], [223] Basten JA said an accused has no right to silence in the sense that evidence demanding an explanation cannot be admitted, and Simpson J said that a person's feeling forced to give evidence is not ordinarily a relevant consideration in deciding admissibility. [75], [154] Basten JA's discussion of how an intermediate appellate court should treat another such court's finding that its authority was plainly wrong ended in the view, with which Simpson J agreed, that this Court should decide the approach for itself. [35], [40], [159]

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