Re Gallagher
[2018] HCA 17
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Re Gallagher [2018] HCA 17 is a decision of the High Court of Australia, given on 9 May 2018, on questions the Senate referred to the Court of Disputed Returns under s 376 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth). The questions arose because Senator Katy Gallagher was still a British citizen when she nominated for the Senate in 2016, although she had already applied to renounce that citizenship [1], [4], [17]. All seven Justices gave the same answers, in joint reasons by Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ and separate reasons by Gageler J and Edelman J: there was a vacancy under s 44(i) of the Constitution in the place for which she was returned, and it should be filled by a special count of the ballot papers [1], [40], [41], [51], [69].
Facts
Senator Gallagher acquired the status of a Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies by descent at birth under s 5 of the British Nationality Act 1948 (UK), her father having been born in England and being a British subject [13]. She acquired a right of abode in the United Kingdom when the Immigration Act 1971 (UK) commenced, and in 1983 persons who held that status with a right of abode were reclassified as British citizens under s 11(1) of the British Nationality Act 1981 (UK) [13].
Under s 12 of the British Nationality Act 1981, if a citizen makes a declaration of renunciation in the prescribed manner the Secretary of State shall, subject to further provisions the joint reasons treated as not presently relevant, cause it to be registered, and the person ceases to be a British citizen on registration [14]. The regulations required the declaration to be made to the Secretary of State at the Home Office and to contain information showing that the declarant was a British citizen, and a fee was payable when applying for registration [15]. At the relevant time the period between lodgement and registration varied and could exceed six months, although it could be expedited if good reason was shown; Senator Gallagher did not know these matters and made no enquiry about them [16].
On 20 April 2016 she completed a Form RN declaration of renunciation and gave it, with certified copies of her birth certificate and Australian passport and her credit card details, to the Vetting Team of the Australian Labor Party [17]. The Home Office received these on 26 April 2016, and her credit card was debited with the fee on 6 May 2016 [17]. The Prime Minister announced on 8 May 2016 that the Governor-General had accepted his request to dissolve both Houses and call a double dissolution election for 2 July 2016, and on 16 May 2016 the Governor-General issued the writ for the election of senators for the Australian Capital Territory, with nominations closing on 9 June 2016 [47]. She lodged her nomination on 31 May 2016, having served as a senator from 26 March 2015 after filling a vacancy left by the resignation of a senator [1].
On 20 July 2016 she received a Home Office letter dated 1 July 2016 requiring further documents, and she replied the same day with a certified copy of her father's birth certificate, her parents' original marriage certificate and her original birth certificate [18]. She was returned as a duly elected senator for the Australian Capital Territory on 2 August 2016 [1]. It was not in dispute that she was a British citizen on and after the date of her nomination, and she kept that status until the Home Office registered her declaration on 16 August 2016 [4].
Procedural history
On 6 December 2017 the Senate resolved to refer questions about a vacancy in the representation of the Australian Capital Territory to the Court of Disputed Returns, and on 7 December 2017 the President of the Senate transmitted them under s 377 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) [5]. The Commonwealth Attorney-General and Senator Gallagher were each deemed to be a party under orders made by Kiefel CJ, and both made submissions [6]. Each called a witness on British citizenship law, and the witnesses disagreed: Senator Gallagher's witness said the Secretary of State came under a duty to register the declaration when it and the accompanying information were received, while the Attorney-General's witness said the Secretary of State had to be satisfied of her British citizenship and could refuse to register until so satisfied [20].
Issues
The Senate asked (a) whether, by reason of s 44(i), there was a vacancy for the place for which Katy Gallagher was returned, (b) if so, by what means and in what manner it should be filled, (c) what directions and other orders the Court should make to hear and finally dispose of the reference, and (d) what orders should be made as to costs [5]. The joint reasons said the questions turned on one issue: whether British law operated to irremediably prevent an Australian citizen applying for renunciation of British citizenship from ever achieving it [39].
Senator Gallagher argued that by 20 April 2016, or at the latest 6 May 2016, she had taken every step required by s 12(1) that was within her power, and that the Secretary of State's ability to choose the time and manner of performing the duty was an irremediable impediment engaging the constitutional imperative referred to in Re Canavan [19]. The Attorney-General argued principally that, unless the foreign law imposes an irremediable impediment to an effective renunciation, a candidate must actually have divested himself or herself of the foreign citizenship before the process of being chosen begins, and that British law imposes no such impediment, and in the alternative that, if taking all steps reasonably required by British law were enough, she had not taken them [21]–[22].
Held
Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ (joint reasons)
The joint reasons said s 44(i) applies on and after the date of nomination until the electoral process is complete, because the words of s 44 "shall be incapable of being chosen" refer to the process of being chosen, of which nomination is an essential part, citing Re Canavan (2017) 91 ALJR 1209 and Sykes v Cleary (1992) 176 CLR 77 [3]. It followed from her undisputed British citizenship on and after that date that she was a citizen of a foreign power within s 44(i) [4]. In Re Canavan the Court held that, subject only to an implicit qualification, s 44(i) disqualifies a person who has the status of a foreign citizen, regardless of the extent of the person's knowledge of that status or intention to act on the associated duty of allegiance [8]. Whether a person is a foreign citizen is necessarily determined by the law of the relevant country, which is the only possible source of the status, and that law may also enable the person to renounce it [9].
The joint reasons recalled that in Sykes v Cleary the joint judgment identified the possibility that foreign citizenship might continue involuntarily by operation of foreign law despite reasonable steps to renounce it, and Dawson J agreed that s 44(i) should not be given a construction that would unreasonably result in some Australian citizens being irremediably incapable of being elected [10]. Re Canavan accepted that the qualification arises from a constitutional imperative, stated there to be "that an Australian citizen not be irremediably prevented by foreign law from participation in representative government" [11].
They held that the Attorney-General's primary submission was "clearly correct" and reflected the law stated in Sykes v Cleary and Re Canavan, and said it was not necessary to resolve the issues arising from the alternative submission [22]. Properly understood, the concern of the imperative is that an Australian citizen might forever be unable to participate in elections because a foreign law prevents the person from freeing himself or herself of the foreign citizenship [23]. The qualification can extend only so far as is necessary to give effect to the textual and structural features that support it, and there is "no warrant" for reading it more widely [24].
From the passage in Re Canavan that they set out, the joint reasons drew two circumstances that must both be present: a foreign law operates irremediably to prevent an Australian citizen from participating, and the person has taken all steps reasonably required by the foreign law that are within his or her power to be free of the foreign nationality [25]–[26], [31]. A foreign law does not irremediably prevent renunciation simply by requiring that particular steps be taken; it "must present something of an insurmountable obstacle, such as a requirement with which compliance is not possible", and the operation of the foreign law and its effect are viewed objectively [27]. Their example, drawn from Re Canavan, was a law requiring the acts of renunciation to be carried out in the foreign power's territory, where compliance was not possible because it put the person at risk [28]. They contrasted a law requiring a citizen to apply for the favourable exercise of a discretion to permit renunciation, which is a step reasonably open that must be taken, and said this was why Mr Kardamitsis in Sykes v Cleary could not be said to have taken reasonable steps [29].
Contrary to Senator Gallagher's submission, the second sentence of the Re Canavan passage does not contain the test: it is not sufficient that a person has taken all steps reasonably required and within his or her power, because the exception also requires a foreign law to operate in the way described [30]. All steps must be taken even if the foreign law would in any event prevent renunciation, a requirement the joint reasons explained by the concerns of s 44(i) about a person's duty or allegiance to the foreign power [32].
Senator Gallagher's approach rested on an imperative "different from or wider in its operation than" the one in Re Canavan, under which matters beyond a candidate's control, such as a snap election, would be taken into account [33]. The imperative in Re Canavan does not demand that s 44(i) be read so that its effects are more generally ameliorated to ensure foreign citizens can nominate: "Its command is much more limited" [34]. The joint reasons also rejected the submission that the imperative cannot depend on the actions of foreign officials or exercises of discretion, because a citizenship law may give officials powers and discretions, and ignoring them "would be to distort the reality of the foreign law and its effect" [35]–[36].
Applying this, they said Senator Gallagher did not identify any aspect of British law that operated to prevent her irremediably from nominating, no requirement could be described as onerous, the procedure was simple, "[t]here was never any doubt that a decision to register would be made", and the issue for her was only ever the timing of registration [37]. Reasonable efforts to renounce are not enough, and Re Canavan had explicitly said that the majority in Sykes v Cleary did not suggest a candidate making a reasonable effort to comply with s 44(i) was thereby exempt from it [38]. An affirmative answer on the one issue could not be given merely because a decision might not be provided in time for a person's nomination, and the exception "is not engaged by a foreign law which presents an obstacle to a particular individual being able to nominate for a particular election" [39].
Gageler J (concurring)
Gageler J agreed with the answers proposed in the joint reasons, for his own reasons in addition to those in the joint reasons [41]. For his Honour, the disqualification serves to prevent a senator or member from being conflicted in performing duties to the Commonwealth by allegiance and other duties attendant under foreign law on being a citizen of another country [42]. The centrally informing notion of the implied exception is that an Australian citizen who meets the qualifications for election is not to be permanently disabled by a disqualification in s 44, with the possible exception only of one who "is attainted of treason" within s 44(ii), complemented for s 44(i) by the notion that an arbitrary or intransigent operation of foreign law cannot be permitted to frustrate participation [43].
The exception is engaged where an Australian citizen irremediably retains foreign citizenship despite having taken all steps reasonably within his or her power to renounce it [44]. It is not engaged merely because those steps have been taken: the person stays within the disqualification for so long as a process of renunciation under the foreign law simply remains incomplete, and, in Gageler J's words, "[r]etention of foreign citizenship can hardly be said to be irremediable while it remains in the process of being remedied" [45]. The exception cannot be engaged until the foreign process can be characterised for practical purposes as one that will not permit renunciation by reasonable steps, "requiring if not that an impasse has actually occurred then at least that an impasse can be confidently predicted" [45].
Assuming Senator Gallagher had done everything reasonably within her power by 6 May 2016, the later registration showed that her retention of British citizenship was remediable, so the exception was not at any time engaged and she was incapable of being chosen [46]. His Honour said nothing turned on any uncertainty about the timing of the election, because such uncertainty is part of the practical context in which s 44 operates and the disqualification always operates on and from nomination [47]–[49]. Avoiding the disqualification "demands a degree of vigilance" on the part of a potential candidate about the timing, as well as the taking, of available remedial action [50]. Just as it was Mr Cleary's responsibility in Sykes v Cleary to ensure that his resignation took effect before his nomination if he was to escape s 44(iv), it was Senator Gallagher's responsibility to ensure that her renunciation took effect before hers [50].
Edelman J (concurring)
Edelman J would answer the questions as in the joint judgment, for his own reasons "as well as generally those in the joint judgment" [69]. He identified two constraints on the application of foreign law under s 44(i): non-recognition of the foreign law in some circumstances, and the constitutional implication described in Re Canavan as a "constitutional imperative", the reference concerning only the second although the two are not wholly independent [51]. He said Brennan J in Sykes v Cleary effectively treated recognition as an anterior question, and that exorbitant foreign laws are not recognised, Brennan J's extreme example being a foreign power "mischievously" conferring its nationality on members of the Parliament to disqualify them all [53]–[54]. Senator Gallagher's submissions correctly assumed that none of the existing, limited exceptions prevented recognition of the foreign law, and she relied instead on the implied constitutional qualification [55].
He said the rationale of the implication is to maintain the political institution of representative government, but it cannot displace or ignore all significant limitations or burdens imposed by a recognised foreign law [57]. Because the Constitution itself contains significant limits on participation, including ss 16, 34, 43, 44 and 45 and any valid law under s 51(xxxvi), there is no absolute right to participate, and the implication is "narrowly tailored" to ensure that a foreign law does not stultify a person's qualified ability to participate [58]. Irremediable prevention includes a foreign law that makes participation permanently impossible, one potential application, "on the perhaps contestable assumption" that Australian law would recognise it, being a foreign citizenship law with no legal mechanism for renunciation [59].
Accepting a submission of Senator Gallagher on this point, Edelman J said irremediable prevention is not limited to permanent impossibility, and the imperative also applies to a foreign citizenship law whose legal or practical effect imposes unreasonable obstacles to renunciation, his example, from Re Canavan, being a law requiring renunciation in the foreign power's territory where the citizen's presence could involve risks to their person or property [60]. He did not accept her submission that the imperative meant no operation should be given to s 12(2) of the British Nationality Act because that sub-section involves the action of a foreign official, saying that the further one departs from impossibility, the more vague and uncertain the implication becomes and the more unpredictable its operation, which undermines the implication itself [63]–[64].
He said some actions of foreign officials might still engage the imperative: arguably a law requiring certification by an official that military service has been served where the country is engaged in active combat [65]. Without expressing a concluded opinion, he also mentioned an example from oral submissions of a law under which, in practice, processing by an official had not taken place after three years, and arguably an official's unreasonable refusal to exercise a discretion to allow renunciation when all steps had otherwise been taken [67]. He left unresolved whether, in a case like the active combat example, the person must still take the futile steps of submitting a form and paying a fee, noting two views [66]. For Edelman J, "perhaps the most fundamental difficulty" was that her submission about foreign officials "shears the constitutional implication from its rationale" by treating as an unreasonable obstacle a foreign law that does not irremediably prevent participation but might have an arbitrary or discriminatory effect, which would require a different implication lacking any textual or structural constitutional foundation [68].
Orders. The Court answered the questions referred as follows: (a), whether there is a vacancy by reason of s 44(i), yes; (b), how the vacancy should be filled, by a special count of the ballot papers, with any direction necessary to give effect to the conduct of the special count to be made by a single Justice; and (c) on directions and other orders and (d) on costs, unnecessary to answer [40].
Why it matters
The case matters because the joint reasons confine the exception to s 44(i) stated in Re Canavan: a candidate who has taken all steps reasonably required and within his or her power is still disqualified unless a foreign law also operates irremediably to prevent participation [30]–[31], [39]. The joint reasons and Gageler J each said that a process of renunciation not finished in time for nomination does not of itself engage the exception [39], [45], and on Gageler J's reasons it is the candidate's responsibility to ensure that renunciation takes effect before nomination [50]. The three sets of reasons use different words for how far the exception reaches: the joint reasons speak of "something of an insurmountable obstacle" [27], Gageler J of an impasse that has occurred or can be confidently predicted [45], and Edelman J of unreasonable obstacles short of permanent impossibility [60].
Cited in 1 later caseRelies on 14 casesSee every one in casewise