casewise

Roach v The Queen

(2011) 242 CLR 610 · [2011] HCA 12 · (2011) 276 ALR 406 · (2011) 85 ALJR 558 · (2011) 210 A Crim R 300

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 11 November 2026

Overview

Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), given on 4 May 2011 on an appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland. The appellant, convicted of assaulting the complainant, argued that evidence of his earlier assaults on her, admitted under s 132B of the Evidence Act 1977 (Q), had to satisfy the rule in Pfennig v The Queen, and alternatively that the jury should have been directed to be satisfied of that evidence beyond reasonable doubt [4]–[6]. The High Court dismissed the appeal [50], [67]. All five judges held that the Pfennig rule does not apply under s 132B or s 130 of the Act [38], [57], [65]. The alternative ground failed on different reasoning: French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ held that no direction on the standard of proof was necessary or appropriate [49], while Heydon J, assuming without deciding that one was required, held that the summing up conformed with that duty [66].

Facts

The appellant and the complainant had been in an intermittent sexual relationship for some two and a half years before the alleged assault, and for part of that period he was her carer [1]. In April 2006 the complainant lived alone in a unit in New Farm, Brisbane, and the appellant was visiting her when the alleged offence occurred [2].

On the complainant's account, as summarised by Holmes JA in the Court of Appeal, the appellant telephoned at 12.45 am on 13 April, arrived and went straight to the refrigerator for a drink, and when she remonstrated he reacted angrily, punching her face and arms and pulling on her left arm, which he had previously injured [3]. She said he then punched her another eight times and that he was intoxicated, and she called the police after he left [3]. A police officer observed bruises on her arms and swelling to her left eye, and a general practitioner who examined her some four days later recorded bruises on her arm and face and a haematoma around the left eye [3].

The complainant also gave evidence of earlier assaults [42]. Shortly after the relationship began in early 2004, the appellant became angry and threw a handful of silver at her, hitting her on the forehead and causing her to bleed [20]. In the following months he would frequently punch her, causing bruises or marks, and would repeat the assaults as those injuries were nearly healed [20]. About nine months into the relationship, when they were living together and he was intoxicated, he punched her in the face many times and hit her in the back, and she fell and injured her left arm, and she required surgery including reconstruction of her shoulder [20]. The complainant said that in 2005 the appellant assaulted her many times by punching her in the face and arms [20].

Procedural history

The appellant was convicted by a jury of one count of assault occasioning bodily harm after a trial in the District Court of Queensland [1]. At the start of the trial, Howell DCJ admitted the evidence of other assaults [4]. The prosecution disavowed any reliance on that evidence as evidence of the appellant's propensity to injure the complainant, and the trial judge ruled it admissible on the basis that without it the jury would be faced with a seemingly inexplicable or fanciful incident [19].

In the Court of Appeal the appellant argued that the trial judge had to apply the rule in Pfennig in deciding whether the evidence would be unfair to him and, alternatively, that the jury should have been directed not to rely on the evidence unless satisfied of its truth beyond reasonable doubt [5]. The Court of Appeal (Keane and Holmes JJA and A Lyons J) rejected both arguments and dismissed the appeal [5]. Holmes JA, with whom Keane JA and A Lyons J agreed, held that the sole test for admissibility under s 132B is relevance and that the Pfennig test has no application [21].

Holmes JA characterised the evidence as propensity evidence, admissible as such under s 132B, and rejected its characterisation as relationship evidence [22]. Her Honour considered that it showed a proclivity on the appellant's part, when intoxicated, to assault the complainant in the same way as alleged in the incident charged, and that it made his conduct on that occasion intelligible [24]. Under s 130, she held that the evidence had strong probative value and that a recognition of its true function would have resulted in its admission [25]. On the standard of proof, she concluded that the evidence fell far short of being essential to the jury's reasoning, since the jury could have convicted simply on the complainant's account of the charged assault, and that, applying Shepherd v The Queen, it was not an indispensable link in the chain of proof requiring a direction that it be proved beyond reasonable doubt [26].

In the High Court the appellant advanced the same arguments, and he did not challenge Holmes JA's characterisation of the evidence as relevant to establish his propensity [6], [27].

Issues

The first issue was whether evidence can be admitted under s 132B(2) of the Evidence Act 1977 (Q) only if it complies with the rule in Pfennig v The Queen [54]. The second was whether a court considering unfairness under s 130 must apply the Pfennig test [29], [59]. The third was whether, if the evidence was admitted, the jury should have been directed that they could not rely on it unless satisfied of its truth beyond reasonable doubt [5], [52].

Held

French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ

Their Honours wrote joint reasons and said that the correct starting point was the provisions of the Evidence Act 1977, not Pfennig [7]. Section 132B(2) makes relevant evidence of the history of the domestic relationship between the defendant and the person against whom the offence was committed admissible in a proceeding for an offence in Chs 28 to 30 of the Criminal Code, and assault occasioning bodily harm appears in Ch 30 [7]. Section 130 provides that nothing in the Act derogates from the court's power in a criminal proceeding to exclude evidence if satisfied that it would be unfair to the person charged to admit it [10].

They distinguished the rule in Pfennig, an exclusionary rule for similar fact evidence tendered for a particular purpose, from the separate common law discretion to exclude relevant evidence whose prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value [11]. Under the Pfennig rule, a trial judge deciding whether to admit propensity evidence applies the standard the jury must eventually apply, asking whether there is a rational view of that evidence, seen in the setting of the prosecution case, consistent with the accused's innocence, and if there is, the evidence ought not to be admitted [35].

Their Honours accepted that, were it not for ss 130 and 132B, the Pfennig rule would apply if the evidence was to be used in proof of propensity [28]. They observed that the text of those sections does not contain any suggestion that the Pfennig test is to be applied [30]. Evidence within s 132B may be tendered as proof of propensity, but may also be relevant to a person's state of mind or as part of the res gestae, and where the recipient of domestic violence is accused of an offence against the perpetrator it may be relevant to a plea of provocation or self-defence [30]. The section's purpose is to ensure that evidence of the history of domestic violence is put before the jury or other arbiter of fact so long as it is relevant to an issue [31]. Relevance is the only requirement stated for admissibility, and it may be assumed that this legislative choice was made with knowledge of Pfennig, so the rule did not need to be expressly excluded [31].

Section 132B must be read with s 130, so evidence admissible under s 132B may still be rejected if the trial judge considers that it will produce unfairness in the trial [32]. The question of unfairness would ordinarily be resolved by the common law principle that the probative value of the evidence must exceed the potential prejudice to the accused if it is not to be excluded [34]. The Pfennig rule addresses the same factors as that discretion, but the majority in Pfennig stressed that it involved the application of a rule of law and not an exercise of discretion, and it resolves the tension between probative force and prejudicial effect without more [36]. So understood, the rule "cannot be imported into the exercise of the power confirmed by s 130", because it would leave no room for the exercise of any discretion [37].

Their Honours concluded that for the Pfennig rule to apply it would have to be expressed as a qualification of s 132B, and that, absent such a qualification and subject to the s 130 discretion, "evidence of domestic violence in the history of a relationship is admissible so long as it is relevant" [38]. The rule therefore had no application even if the evidence was to be used as evidence of propensity, and the difference between the Court of Appeal and the trial judge about its relevance was not critical to the outcome [39].

They nevertheless considered the assumption that relationship evidence may not be relevant other than as propensity evidence, saying that such a view "may confuse evidence that may show propensity with evidence used in proof of the offence charged" [39]–[40]. Referring to Gleeson CJ's observation in HML v The Queen, they noted that Pfennig was a case about the fact of propensity as circumstantial evidence in proof of the offence charged, not a case of evidence that happened to show propensity [41]. Here the relationship evidence was tendered to explain the circumstance of the offence charged, so that the complainant could give a full account and her statement of the appellant's conduct would not appear out of the blue and inexplicable to the jury [42].

Their Honours said it was "difficult to resist the conclusion" that the insertion of s 132B was intended so that persons suffering from domestic violence not be disadvantaged in giving their evidence and be able to tell their story comprehensively, with unfairness to the accused to be considered under s 130 [43]. They added that a view that the history of a relationship is relevant only to propensity does not accord with Menzies J (with whom McTiernan and Walsh JJ agreed) in Wilson v The Queen, who said that to shut the jury off from any event throwing light on the relationship would require them to decide the issue as if it happened in a vacuum [44]. In this case the evidence, if accepted, was capable of showing a violent relationship, and without that inference the jury would most likely have misunderstood the complainant's account of the alleged offence [45].

The appellant took no issue with the exercise of the s 130 discretion absent the Pfennig rule, and their Honours saw no reason to doubt that its probative value was properly concluded to outweigh its prejudicial effect and that the prejudice could be addressed by directions [46]. They said that where evidence may show propensity, a trial judge must give a clear and comprehensible warning about its misuse for that purpose and explain the purpose for which it is tendered [47]. The judge should identify the inferences open from the evidence or the questions which may have occurred to the jury without it, and the jury should be told that the evidence is to allow the complainant to tell her or his story but that they will need to consider whether it is true [47].

The directions in this case were sufficient: the trial judge told the jury to be very careful about the limited use of the evidence, explained how evidence could be used as evidence of propensity and directed them not to use it in that way, and said it was led so that the incident charged was not considered in isolation or in a vacuum [48]. Given the footing on which the evidence was admitted and those directions, it was "neither necessary nor appropriate" to direct the jury about the standard of proof to be applied to that evidence, and the alternative ground was rejected [49]. Their Honours concluded that the appeal should be dismissed [50].

Heydon J

Heydon J wrote separate reasons and also concluded that the appeal should be dismissed [67]. He held that no part of the express language of s 132B(2), and no implication from it, suggests that it incorporates or assumes the prior application of the Pfennig rule [55]. He also rejected the submission that the rule survives unless abolished by clear words, because it is not one of those fundamental common law rules which cannot be abolished without clear words, and he said that even if clear words were needed they have been used [56]. He said that "[t]here is much to be said for Pfennig v The Queen, but it has proved to be unpopular with legislatures", noting that all Australian legislatures except Queensland, South Australia and the Northern Territory have abolished it apart from the qualification stated in Hoch v The Queen [53], [56]. He said the proposition that the Pfennig principle should be incorporated into s 132B is incompatible with the express language of s 132B(2), as is the proposition that, if the principle exists at common law in the area to which s 132B applies, it has survived [57].

Heydon J preferred the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, which held the evidence admissible simply because it fell within s 132B(2), to that of the trial judge, who held that it was relationship evidence and not propensity evidence, so that the Pfennig test did not apply [58]. He said it was not necessary for this appeal to determine whether the evidence was relevant as establishing propensity, as the Court of Appeal thought, or in another way, as the trial judge thought [58]. He described the appellant's submission that evidence could be admitted under s 132B only if it were propensity evidence as "too extreme a submission" [58].

On s 130, he said the section does not create an exclusionary rule in its own right but merely preserves an existing power, doubtless a common law power, to exclude evidence on grounds of unfairness [60]. He identified common law principles by which evidence may be excluded where its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value, and by which it may be rejected if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused, and said s 130 appears to refer, at least primarily, to the second, but may also preserve the first and perhaps others [60]. Those powers operate only once a strict rule of admissibility has been satisfied [60].

Using Brennan J's phrase in Harriman v The Queen, Heydon J said the rule in Pfennig is "the criterion of admissibility" at common law, a rule of strict admissibility and not in any sense a discretionary power, so it cannot be incorporated into s 130 [61]-[63]. He accepted that underlying the Pfennig test is a desire to avoid receiving evidence whose prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value, but said it does not follow that s 130 incorporates the test [64]. To read it into s 130 "would be bringing in at the second stage of an admissibility inquiry a strict rule which the legislature had been concerned to exclude at the first stage by force of s 132B" [64]. He concluded that "[w]hatever s 130 refers to, it does not incorporate the Pfennig test" [65].

On the standard of proof, Heydon J said it was true that three judges in HML v The Queen held that where evidence of uncharged acts is admitted the jury must be directed of the need to be satisfied of its truth beyond reasonable doubt, and that one judge uttered dicta to that effect [66]. Assuming but not deciding that this is the standard and that the jury must be so directed, he held that the summing up conformed with that duty [66]. The trial judge's references to "every element of the offence" would not suffice, but his direction about a reasonable doubt "about facts that would prove him guilty of the offence" was a direction concerning the need for the relationship evidence to be established beyond reasonable doubt [66].

Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed [50], [67].

Why it matters

The case decides that, for evidence of the kind s 132B covers, the rule in Pfennig does not govern admissibility under s 132B(2) or the exercise of the power preserved by s 130, so that relevance is the test for admissibility, subject to s 130 [38], [57]-[58], [65]. French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ also said that the importance of directions where evidence may show propensity should not be underestimated, and stated what those directions should cover [47]. Those four judges considered that such evidence may be relevant other than as propensity evidence, to explain the offence charged [40], [42], [44], while Heydon J found it unnecessary to determine that question [58].

Cited in 113 later casesRelies on 18 casesSee every one in casewise

All case summaries