Selig v Wealthsure Pty Ltd
(2015) 255 CLR 661 · [2015] HCA 18
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Selig v Wealthsure Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 18 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ), given on 13 May 2015 on appeal from the Federal Court of Australia. French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ, with whom Gageler J concurred, held that an apportionable claim under the proportionate liability provisions in Div 2A of Pt 7.10 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) is, relevantly, a claim based on a contravention of s 1041H, and does not extend to claims based on conduct of a different kind [37], [50]. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court, varied the trial judge's judgment sum from $1,760,512 to $1,716,680, and ordered Wealthsure's professional indemnity insurer, QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd, which was not a party, to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal to the Full Court and of the appeal to the High Court [39], [49].
Facts
Mr and Mrs Selig invested in Neovest Limited on the advice of David Bertram, an authorised representative of Wealthsure Pty Ltd, which held an Australian Financial Services Licence [1]. The joint reasons describe the scheme proposed in Neovest's prospectus as, in effect, a "Ponzi scheme" [1]. Neovest became insolvent, and the Seligs lost their investment and suffered consequential losses [1]. Wealthsure and Mr Bertram, through their insurer, defended the Seligs' proceedings in the Federal Court and claimed, in the alternative, declarations as to the extent of their liability having regard to the comparative responsibility of Neovest, Norton Capital Pty Ltd, Neovest's directors Mr Mark Norton and Mr Peter Townley, and two other Neovest directors [2]. The Seligs' claims against Wealthsure, Mr Bertram, Mr Townley and Mr Norton were based on contraventions of the Corporations Act 2001 and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (the ASIC Act), including s 1041H of the Corporations Act and its ASIC Act analogue, s 12DA [4]. Section 1041H(1) prohibits conduct, in relation to a financial product or service, that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive [4]. The Seligs also alleged that Wealthsure and Mr Bertram breached their retainer and the duty of care they owed as providers of financial advice [4]. Each of those four respondents claimed that any liability should be limited to a proportion of the Seligs' loss under Div 2A and the corresponding provisions of the ASIC Act [5].
Procedural history
At trial the Seligs succeeded against Wealthsure, Mr Bertram, Mr Townley and Mr Norton, and the primary judge (Lander J) made findings against Neovest, Norton Capital and the two other directors but did not enter judgment against them because of their liquidation and bankruptcy [3]. Lander J entered judgment for $1,760,512 against each of the four respondents on the basis that each was liable for the whole of the damage, holding that Div 2A applies only where there has been a contravention of s 1041H and has no application where a plaintiff succeeds on other statutory and common law causes of action [6]. The trial judgment is reported as Selig v Wealthsure Pty Ltd (2013) 94 ACSR 308 [6]. His Honour nevertheless made findings of apportionment and contributory negligence, under which, if Div 2A applied, the liability of Wealthsure and Mr Bertram would be reduced to 60 per cent of the judgment sum [6], [45]. The insurer had the conduct of the defence at trial and made the decision to appeal [40]. Mr Bertram was declared bankrupt shortly after the notice of appeal was filed [40]; his trustee in bankruptcy later elected to discontinue the appeal, the insurer then asserted an entitlement to conduct the appeal on behalf of both Wealthsure and Mr Bertram, and the Full Court accepted that the policy gave it that right, though it made no formal order [42]. A majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court (Mansfield and Besanko JJ, White J dissenting on this issue) allowed the appeal, on which the only presently relevant issue was the applicability of Div 2A, in Wealthsure Pty Ltd v Selig (2014) 221 FCR 1 [7]. The majority focused on s 1041L(2), treating as critical that the loss under the causes of action be the same and that there may be more than one cause of action of different kinds [27]. Shortly afterwards, a differently constituted Full Court, in ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council (2014) 224 FCR 1, expressed the contrary view of Div 2A that Lander J and White J had adopted [7].
Issues
The loss the Seligs claimed under each statutory contravention, breach of contract or breach of duty was the same, and the question was whether Div 2A apportions that loss between the respondents across all those claims or is limited to the claims based on contraventions of s 1041H, which depended on the meaning of the statutory term "apportionable claim" [22]. The joint reasons treated the ASIC Act provisions as raising no relevant distinction, so their reasoning on Div 2A applies equally to those provisions [8]. Although the Seligs' notice of appeal challenged the Full Court's giving effect to a finding of contributory negligence against them under s 1041I(1B), argument in the High Court was not directed to it as a separate issue, the parties being content that success on apportionability would restore the primary judge's judgment in full [14]. A second issue was whether the insurer, a non-party, should pay the Seligs' costs of the High Court appeal and of the appeal to the Full Court [39].
Held
French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ
Section 1041L(1) provides that Div 2A applies to a claim for damages made under s 1041I for economic loss or damage to property caused by conduct done in contravention of s 1041H [9]. Section 1041I(1) creates a cause of action for contraventions of ss 1041E, 1041F, 1041G and 1041H, but s 1041L(1) nominates only claims for conduct in contravention of s 1041H as apportionable claims [11]. The contributory negligence reduction in s 1041I(1B) is confined in relevantly identical terms and was inserted at the same time as Div 2A [13]. Division 2A was inserted by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth), and relevantly identical provisions were added at the same time to the ASIC Act and the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) [18].
Drawing on Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd (2013) 247 CLR 613, their Honours noted that the background to the inquiry which led to the earlier State and Territory proportionate liability legislation was a perceived crisis regarding the cost of liability insurance [19]. Professor Davis, in the Davis Report, considered that proportionate liability should extend to claims for contraventions of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and s 995 of the Corporations Law [20]. Their Honours said that, if anything, the difference between those claims and negligence makes the policy argument for apportionment more readily applicable to misleading or deceptive conduct, because such claims do not require a duty of care, breach or foreseeability [20]. As was also observed in Hunt & Hunt, a plaintiff must sue all the wrongdoers to recover the total loss [21]. Their Honours added that proportionate liability applies regardless of whether a concurrent wrongdoer is insolvent or being wound up (citing s 1041L(5)), and that the risk of failing to recover from a particular wrongdoer shifts entirely to the plaintiff [21].
The approach for which Wealthsure and Mr Bertram contended would, contrary to the express terms of s 1041L(1), make claims for contraventions of ss 1041E, 1041F and 1041G apportionable, and conduct excluded from s 1041H(1) by s 1041H(3) might also found apportionable claims [25]. Confining apportionable claims to s 1041H does not give Div 2A an unduly limited application, because misleading and deceptive conduct may take many forms, may involve a number of persons, and several instances may combine to cause the loss [26]. Wealthsure and Mr Bertram submitted that s 1041L(2) disregards the legal basis of the claim, so that each cause of action pleaded for the same loss is an apportionable claim [28]. Applying well-settled rules of construction, their Honours held that the word "claim" must have the same meaning in s 1041L(1) and (2), and that the respondents' construction produced an inconsistency between them [29]. The submission that s 1041L(1) is only a partial definition, completed by s 1041L(2), is directly contradicted by s 1041L(4), which states that apportionable claims are limited to those specified in sub-s (1) [30]. The function of s 1041L(2) is not to complete the definition but to explain that, however many ways a plaintiff seeks to substantiate a claim for damages based on a contravention of s 1041H, apportionment is made on the basis of a single claim so long as the loss claimed is the same [31]. Section 1041N(2) shows that Div 2A accepts that claims for the same loss may be assessed differently, and there would be no need for that provision if the respondents were correct [32].
Their Honours said that it may be that the generality of the words "under any relevant law" in s 1041N(3)(a) is explained by their being template provisions for use in more than one statute [34]. Those words assume a law providing for contributory negligence in respect of an apportionable claim, and in Div 2A they may be taken to refer to s 1041I(1B) [34]. The respondents' construction assumed an overarching legislative policy that all claims to which the Corporations Act applies should be apportioned, but no such intention can be discerned from Div 2A or s 1041L [35]. Referring to the Full Court's observation in ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council that contraventions of the other provisions in s 1041I involve a higher level of moral culpability, their Honours noted that, unlike s 1041H, a contravention of any of ss 1041E to 1041G is an offence with an element of knowledge or recklessness [36]. Their Honours said that the fact that apportionment benefits wrongdoers "may have weighed" in the decision to limit apportionable claims [36]. It was not necessary, however, to resort to legislative purpose, because the terms of Div 2A are clear: an apportionable claim is, relevantly, a claim based on a contravention of s 1041H, and the term does not extend to claims based on conduct of a different kind [37]. The appeal should therefore be allowed [38].
On costs, the insurer had the conduct of the defence and decided to appeal, and it was not disputed that Wealthsure could not have paid the trial judgment sum [40]. The policy capped cover at $3 million on, in the policy's words, "any one Claim inclusive of Costs & Expenses", and the insurer's costs were about $1.35 million when the notice of appeal was filed [41]. Their Honours considered it reasonable to assume that a considerable part of the balance had since been spent and that the Seligs were likely to face a significant shortfall in what they could recover [41]. Their Honours recalled that in Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 the High Court held that its discretionary power to make orders against non-parties extends to the circumstance "where the party to the litigation is an insolvent person or man of straw, where the non-party has played an active part in the conduct of the litigation and where the non-party ... has an interest in the subject of the litigation" [43]. No rule makes such an order follow; as Mason CJ and Deane J said in Knight, an order should be made "if the interests of justice require that it be made" [43]. Their Honours noted that it might be suggested the appeal was not entirely unreasonable, given its success in the Full Court, and referred to Chapman Ltd v Christopher [1998] 1 WLR 12, where the Court of Appeal of England and Wales upheld a costs order against a non-party insurer and rejected the contention that such an order should be made only where the insurer acted unreasonably [44]. When the insurer decided to appeal, Wealthsure and Mr Bertram could not be said to have a continuing interest in the outcome, and the insurer acted for itself, taking a chance that their liability would be reduced to 60 per cent [45]. Their Honours asked: "why should it be regarded as immune from the risk of an order for costs?" [45]. The appeal diverted money the insurer would otherwise have had to pay the Seligs to its own legal costs, put the Seligs to further significant expense, and would obviously reduce the amount available to meet the existing costs order in their favour and any later one [46]. The insurer ought to pay the Seligs' costs of the High Court appeal and of the appeal to the Full Court [48].
Gageler J (concurring)
Gageler J concurred and added brief observations on the limited operation of s 1041I(1B) and Div 2A within Pt 7.10 [50]. His Honour said that each operates solely to reduce the civil liability imposed by s 1041I(1) for contravention of s 1041H, and neither reduces liability for contravention of ss 1041E, 1041F or 1041G, or liability under any other Commonwealth law, any State or Territory law or the common law [51]. He set that limited operation against the agreement of the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments in 2003 for a nationally consistent model of proportionate liability for economic loss or property damage, to be implemented by complementary legislation in each jurisdiction [52]. Nothing in the extrinsic material for the 2004 Amendment Act suggested an intention to alter any liability other than that imposed by the three Commonwealth Acts amended, and any reduction of State, Territory and common law liability was left to State and Territory legislation [52]. Sections 1041I(3) and 1041N(2) make clear that the contributory negligence reduction and the apportionment under s 1041N(1) and (3) have no operation on any other liability the defendant may have [53], [54]. Adopting the description given in Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd (1984) 154 CLR 234, he read the reference to a "cause of action" in s 1041L(2) as a reference to a "fact or combination of facts which gives rise to a right to sue" [54]. Only claims that are themselves apportionable claims under s 1041L(1) are aggregated by s 1041L(2) into a single apportionable claim [54]. The word "claim" does not mean simply the loss claimed, or a mere assertion that the loss results from conduct having the character of a s 1041H contravention [55]. Rather, his Honour held that "claim" in s 1041I(1B)(a) and s 1041L(1) refers "specifically and exclusively" to a claimant's assertion that liability for economic loss or property damage has arisen under s 1041I(1) from particular conduct said to contravene s 1041H [56]. An assertion in the same proceeding that the same conduct gives rise to liability for the same loss under another statutory norm or a common law rule is not part of the same claim, and is left untouched by s 1041I(1B) and Div 2A [57].
Orders. The High Court allowed the appeal [49]. It set aside orders 1, 2, 3 and 7 of the Full Court's orders of 30 May 2014 and, in their place, ordered that order 2 of Lander J's orders of 18 April 2013 be varied by substituting "$1,716,680" for "$1,760,512", and that the appeal and cross-appeal to the Full Court be otherwise dismissed [49]. It set aside orders 1 and 2 of the Full Court's orders of 26 June 2014 and ordered QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd to pay the costs of Mr and Mrs Selig of the appeal to the Full Court [49]. It also ordered QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal to the High Court [49]. A footnote to the joint reasons records that the judgment sum was reduced to $1,716,680 on appeal [6].
Why it matters
The case decides that an apportionable claim under Div 2A is, relevantly, a claim based on a contravention of s 1041H, so that liability for the same loss on other statutory, contractual or common law grounds is not apportioned under Div 2A [37], [57]. The High Court's construction is the one Lander J and White J had adopted, and that the Full Court in ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council had expressed, rather than the construction of the Full Court majority in this case [6], [7], [37]. The case also shows that a professional indemnity insurer which conducts an appeal for its own benefit, when its insured no longer has an interest in the outcome, may be ordered as a non-party to pay costs where the interests of justice require it [43], [45], [48].
Cited in 24 later casesRelies on 5 casesSee every one in casewise