Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority
(2008) 235 CLR 286 · [2008] HCA 31 · (2008) 248 ALR 390 · (2008) 82 ALJR 1147 · (2008) 103 ALD 467
Summary updated 11 November 2026
Overview
Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Kirby, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), given on 30 July 2008 on appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. It concerned the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's review of the Migration Agents Registration Authority's decision to cancel the appellant's registration as a migration agent, and raised two questions: whether the Tribunal was to decide the matter as at the time of the Authority's decision or as at the time of its own decision, and whether it could impose conditions about the appellant's future conduct when it cautioned him [81]. By majority (Kirby J, Hayne and Heydon JJ, and Crennan J), the Court allowed the appeal and restored the Tribunal's decision to caution the appellant on conditions [4], [91], [118]. Kiefel J dissented, holding that the conditions were beyond the power in s 304A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and would have dismissed the appeal [155], [157]–[158].
Facts
The appellant, Mr Nelson Guang Lai Shi, was first registered as a migration agent in December 1995 [5]. Section 303(1) of the Migration Act allows the Authority to cancel or suspend an agent's registration, or to caution the agent, if it becomes satisfied of matters that include that the agent is not a person of integrity or is otherwise not a fit and proper person to give immigration assistance, or has not complied with the prescribed Code of Conduct [7]. On 14 July 2003 the Authority cancelled the appellant's registration after finding breaches of the Code of Conduct and that he was not a person of integrity or otherwise not a fit and proper person to give immigration assistance [121]. Many of the breaches the Authority found concerned his assistance to people applying for protection visas [12]. On 31 July 2003 the Tribunal stayed the cancellation on conditions that the appellant be supervised by another migration agent and undertake not to engage in any business relating to protection visas [125].
Section 304A, which allows the Authority to set one or more conditions for the lifting of a caution it gives to a registered migration agent, was inserted into the Migration Act from 1 July 2004, after the Authority's decision but before the Tribunal's [62], [102]. On 6 April 2005 the Tribunal published findings of 51 breaches of the Code of Conduct, against the 98 the Authority had found, all arising from conduct before the cancellation decision [84]. On 2 September 2005 the Tribunal said it was not satisfied that the appellant was not a person of integrity or was not otherwise a fit and proper person to give immigration assistance [85]. It set aside the cancellation and substituted a decision to caution him, with the caution to be lifted on 1 September 2008 if in the meantime he gave no assistance with protection visa applications and his work was supervised by another registered migration agent [85]. In reaching that view the Tribunal took into account evidence of the appellant's conduct between July 2003, when his registration was cancelled, and September 2005 [86]. That evidence included that he had been supervised for over two years by a knowledgeable and experienced agent who held him in high regard, and that there was no evidence of breaches since 2003 [16].
Procedural history
The Authority appealed to the Federal Court under s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act), an appeal confined to a question of law [87]. The primary judge, Edmonds J, allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's decision and remitted the matter to the Tribunal [88]. He held that the question for the Tribunal was whether, at the date of the Authority's decision, the appellant was not a person of integrity or otherwise not a fit and proper person, so that the Tribunal erred by considering his later conduct [88]. Edmonds J treated this as settled by what he called a "clear line of authority" in the Federal Court, beginning with Freeman v Secretary, Department of Social Security [128]. He also held that neither the Authority nor the Tribunal could set conditions for lifting a caution that could not be imposed as conditions of registration, so the Tribunal's conditions were beyond power [89].
The Full Court of the Federal Court, by majority (Nicholson and Tracey JJ; Downes J dissenting), dismissed the appellant's appeal [90]. The majority upheld the primary judge on both issues, while Downes J would have found for the appellant on each ground [23]. The appellant appealed to the High Court by special leave [91].
Issues
The first issue was whether the Tribunal was limited to the facts and circumstances as they existed when the Authority made its decision, or was to consider them as they existed when the Tribunal made its own decision [24]. The second was whether the Tribunal had power under s 304A to impose the conditions it did on the caution given to the appellant [24]. Kiefel J described the first as the principal question on the appeal [119].
Held
Kirby J
Kirby J held for the appellant on both issues, agreeing with the dissenting opinion of Downes J in the Full Court [4]. He said a court must give close attention to the enabling legislation, and observed that s 43 of the AAT Act does not say whether the Tribunal looks to the facts when the decision under review was made or when it makes its own decision [25]–[26]. He found it unnecessary to decide whether a general presumption, drawn by the Authority from a dictum of McHugh JA in Strange-Muir v Corrective Services Commission of New South Wales, confines an appeal to the materials existing at the time of the decision appealed from [27]–[28]. He gave five factors for his conclusion [29].
First, the AAT Act grew out of official reports, the first being the 1971 report of the Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee, which proposed a tribunal to review administrative decisions on their merits, and questions about the Tribunal's powers should be approached with that history and purpose in mind [30]–[32]. Secondly, he endorsed the analysis of Davies J, as President of the Tribunal, in Re Control Investment Pty Ltd and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 2), that the Tribunal must reach its own decision on the relevant material, including new, fresh, additional or different material [33], [37]–[38]. Thirdly, because a substituted decision replaces the primary decision, he considered it would give the Tribunal an artificial function to make the decision that ought to have been made months or years earlier [40]. He said administrative decision-makers "are generally obliged to have regard to the best and most current information available" [41].
Fourthly, he accepted that the nature of a particular decision may sometimes, exceptionally, confine the Tribunal to the evidence at a particular time, as with some pension decisions [44], [46]. But the grounds in s 303 are expressed in the present tense and may be altered by later events such as bankruptcy or a conviction for dishonesty, so the review here was not limited to the time of the Authority's decision [47]–[49]. He added that the object of the power to cancel or suspend is to protect the public who deal with migration agents, not to punish agents, and that this is best served by deciding on the most up to date material [50]. Fifthly, he held that Nicholson J and Tracey J erred by reading s 303(1) without due regard to s 306 and the Tribunal's power to substitute its own decision [53]–[54].
On the second issue, he acknowledged that the Authority's argument had force, having persuaded the primary judge, the Full Court majority and Kiefel J, but held that the Tribunal made no legal error in imposing the conditions [56]–[57]. Having set aside the Authority's decision and chosen to substitute its own, the Tribunal could use all the powers the Authority had when the Tribunal decided, including powers that had accrued in the meantime [59]–[60]. He said the power in s 304A was granted at large without relevant statutory limitations, and there was no reason to read it down [61], [64]. The independence of the Tribunal, whose President must be a Federal Court judge, and the protective purpose of the provisions supported a broad and ample reading of its powers when acting in substitution for the Authority [66]–[67]. He noted that conditional orders to practise are not unusual in other fields of professional discipline, and that temporary conditions as an adjunct to a caution might well be an appropriate response protective of the public [71]–[72]. He concluded that the caution was permitted by s 303(1)(c) and its lifting on the stated conditions by s 304A [76].
Hayne and Heydon JJ
Hayne and Heydon JJ said that questions presented by the application of legislation "can be answered only by first giving close attention to the relevant provisions", here ss 25 and 43 of the AAT Act and ss 303 and 306 of the Migration Act [92]–[93]. They held that the Tribunal had to decide for itself whether either s 303(1) ground relied on was made out and, if so, whether to cancel, suspend or caution [96]. They rejected the Authority's contention that the question was whether cancellation was the correct or preferable decision when the Authority made it, because it had no footing in the provisions and would treat the Tribunal's task as a form of strict appeal confined to correcting error [97]. The Authority had accepted that the Tribunal was not limited to the record before it, and once that is accepted, the material before the Tribunal includes later conduct and events unless the empowering legislation confines it, and nothing in the AAT Act does so [98]–[99]. Because s 303 contains no temporal element, unlike some pension legislation, the question whether the Tribunal is satisfied that a person is not fit and proper to give immigration assistance invites attention to the state of affairs when the Tribunal decides [101].
On s 304A, they noted the tension between the Authority's acceptance that the Tribunal could use that power, which was enacted after the Authority's decision, and its argument that the Tribunal was otherwise confined to the state of affairs at that date [102], [104]. Because s 304A does not identify the kinds of condition that may be set, its limits come from the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the legislation [106]. A caution is more than a formal warning, since its particulars are recorded in the Register of Migration Agents, which is open to inspection by any person [107]. They held that the primary judge's test, whether conditions could be imposed as conditions of registration, gave no useful criterion, because the Act did not provide for conditions in connection with registration except as conditions for lifting a caution [109]–[110]. The Authority rightly accepted that a caution could be given on condition that the agent undertake a prescribed course of training, an example given in the Explanatory Memorandum for the 2004 amending Act [112]. No relevant distinction could be drawn between that condition and conditions requiring supervision or excluding certain kinds of work [112]. Registration does not confer an unfettered capacity to give immigration assistance, because what a registered agent may do is regulated by other provisions, including s 304A [113]. They noted that "a migration agent subject to a caution of the kind now in issue may continue to act as a migration agent", and held the conditions were not inconsistent with the statutory scheme [114].
Crennan J
On the first issue, Crennan J agreed with Kiefel J's reasons for concluding that in the circumstances the Tribunal was entitled to take into account the fresh evidence available to it [117]. On the second issue, she agreed, for the reasons given by Kirby J, that the Tribunal had power to impose the conditions, and agreed with Kirby J that the appeal should be allowed with the orders he proposed [118].
Kiefel J (dissenting)
Kiefel J said the answer to the principal question lay in identifying the Tribunal's powers and the specific decision to which they were addressed, since the decision and the statutory question it answers mark the boundaries of the review [119], [133]. She rejected the Authority's argument that the Tribunal's role was limited to finding error, because s 43(1) gives the Tribunal powers to consider for itself what the decision should be [137]. She noted that, as McHugh JA acknowledged, any presumption of the kind he stated in Strange-Muir gives way to contrary statutory indications, and said it had little room to operate where the Tribunal is expressly given the original decision-maker's powers [135]. In her view the Tribunal must address the same question as the original decision-maker, and identifying that question will usually determine what facts may be taken into account [142]. Where the decision contains no temporal element, evidence of later matters may be considered, but it is otherwise where the review is limited to a particular point in time [143].
She held that the finding under s 303(1)(h) that the appellant had breached the Code of Conduct was referable to conduct up to a point in time, so on that ground the Tribunal was confined to events up to that point, as the appellant accepted [146]. She added that the Tribunal lacked the Authority's investigatory powers and could decide only whether the breaches the Authority identified were established, not search for other inculpatory conduct [147]. By contrast, the enquiry under s 303(1)(f) into integrity and fitness is a general one, and the Tribunal could consider the most recent material bearing on it, such as a later conviction for a serious offence [149]. She did not accept that the five-year bar on re-registration after cancellation in s 292, relied on by Tracey J, altered the nature of the question under s 303(1)(f) [150]. The Tribunal was therefore entitled to have regard to the appellant's later conduct in deciding his integrity and fitness, and the weight it gave that evidence was a matter for it [151].
On the second issue, she said a caution is shown on the Register as a warning to the public and an admonition of the agent, and does not itself affect the agent's entitlement to give immigration assistance of any kind [154]. She held that the conditions were not conditions for the lifting of a caution within s 304A, because their fulfilment did not permit the removal of the caution, and were instead "requirements by which it was sought to make the caution effective for other purposes" [155]. She said the Migration Act does not provide for a restricted form of immigration assistance, since "[a] person is either qualified as a registered migration agent, and thereby entitled to continue as such, or they are not" [156]. Because the Tribunal had in effect continued the interim regime set by the stay, it had not addressed which of the disciplinary actions in s 303(1)(a) to (c) should be taken, and its decision was affected by jurisdictional error [153], [156]–[157]. She would have dismissed the appeal with costs, leaving in place Edmonds J's orders setting aside the Tribunal's decision and remitting the matter [158].
Orders. The Court ordered that the appeal be allowed with costs [115]. It set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court and in their place ordered that the appeal to that Court be allowed with costs, that Edmonds J's orders of 15 September 2006 and 27 November 2006 be set aside, and that the appeal to the Federal Court against the Tribunal's decision be dismissed with costs [115]. The result was that the Tribunal's decision cautioning the appellant on conditions was restored [91]. Kiefel J would have dismissed the appeal with costs [158].
Why it matters
All five judges accepted that the Tribunal could take into account the appellant's conduct after the Authority's decision in deciding whether he was a person of integrity and a fit and proper person to give immigration assistance [48], [101], [117], [157]. Kirby J and Hayne and Heydon JJ held that on a review of a decision under s 303 the Tribunal looks to the state of affairs when it makes its own decision [50], [101]. Kiefel J, with whom Crennan J agreed on this issue, drew a distinction: the finding of breaches of the Code of Conduct was confined to events up to a point in time, while the general enquiry into integrity and fitness was not [117], [146], [149]. On s 304A, four judges held that conditions for lifting a caution could require supervision and exclude an area of work, while Kiefel J held that such conditions were not conditions for lifting a caution at all [76], [112], [118], [155]. Kirby J, Hayne and Heydon JJ, and Kiefel J each held that the scope of the Tribunal's review must be found in the terms of the particular statutes [25], [92], [132].
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