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Sio v The Queen

(2016) 259 CLR 47 · [2016] HCA 32 · (2016) 334 ALR 57 · (2016) 90 ALJR 963

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Sio v The Queen [2016] HCA 32 is a criminal appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales, decided by the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Gordon JJ) on 24 August 2016. Mr Sio drove Mr Filihia to a brothel where Mr Filihia robbed and fatally stabbed Mr Gaudry, and a jury acquitted Mr Sio of murder but convicted him of armed robbery with wounding [1], [3], [7]. The Crown accepted that the jury had been misdirected on the armed robbery with wounding charge [37]. The Court held that Mr Filihia's hearsay statement that Mr Sio gave him the knife should not have been admitted under s 65(2)(d) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) [5], [73], [83]. The Court granted special leave on that issue, allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction for armed robbery with wounding and ordered a new trial for the offence of armed robbery [83]–[84].

Facts

On 24 October 2012 Mr Sio drove Mr Filihia to a brothel in Clyde in New South Wales, with a Ms Coffison also in the front seat of the vehicle [1]. Mr Filihia entered alone, armed with a knife and intending to commit robbery, and during an altercation he stabbed Mr Gaudry, who worked in the brothel and later died from his wounds [1]. Mr Filihia took a pencil case containing cash from Mr Gaudry's back pocket and ran past Mr Sio's car, and Mr Sio caught up with and collected him and accelerated away [1]. At trial there were formal admissions on Mr Sio's behalf that Mr Filihia robbed Mr Gaudry while armed with a knife, that Mr Filihia stabbed and wounded him, and that Mr Gaudry died as a result [7].

Ms Gaudiosi, an employee of the operator of the brothel, gave evidence that Mr Sio asked her to help him commit a robbery at the brothel and that she told him a weapon would not be required [8]. The knife belonged to Mr O'Hare, a friend of Ms Coffison, who gave evidence that he heard Mr Sio and Ms Coffison discussing plans to rob a brothel and noticed the knife missing from Ms Coffison's lounge room about two weeks before the robbery [9]. Ms Coffison gave evidence that on the morning of the robbery Mr Filihia asked if he could come with them and if he could commit the robbery [10].

Police recognised Mr Filihia from CCTV footage and arrested him when he reported to the police station at Hurstville that evening under a bail condition for an unrelated offence, and in an Electronically Recorded Interview of a Suspected Person (ERISP) he said that only he and another man were in the car, which later emerged to be untrue [11]–[12]. Asked where he got the knife, he said that Mr Sio already had it in his car [12]. On 25 October 2012 he identified Mr Sio from a photo array as the driver and prepared two supplementary statements, saying that Danny or Dan put him up to robbing the brothel, gave him the knife and drove him there [13]–[14].

Procedural history

Mr Sio was charged on indictment with murder contrary to s 18(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and armed robbery with wounding contrary to s 98 of that Act [2]. As left to the jury, the murder case was one of constructive murder by way of a joint criminal enterprise to commit armed robbery, with foresight by Mr Sio of the possibility of a wounding by Mr Filihia's use of the knife, and the armed robbery with wounding case was put on the basis of a joint criminal enterprise to commit armed robbery, with foresight by Mr Sio of the possibility of the use of the knife [6].

At the trial before Adamson J and a jury in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Mr Filihia was called on a voir dire but refused to answer any questions, and the Crown tendered his two ERISPs and two statements over an objection that they were hearsay and inadmissible under s 59 of the Evidence Act [3], [15]. In R v Sio (2013) 234 A Crim R 508, Adamson J held that Mr Filihia was not available to give evidence and that the representations were made against his interests, and those conclusions were not challenged in the Court of Criminal Appeal or the High Court [18]-[19]. Her Honour also concluded that the representations were made in circumstances that made it likely they were reliable, noting among other things that they were made on the same day as the incident, that his answers were in the main forthcoming, and that she detected no indication that he had rehearsed [20], [22].

On murder, the jury were directed that the Crown had to prove that Mr Sio participated with Mr Filihia in a joint criminal enterprise of armed robbery while foreseeing the possibility that the victim might be wounded by the use of the knife [24]. On armed robbery with wounding, the written directions required proof of participation in the joint criminal enterprise, but neither they nor the oral directions referred to foresight of wounding, and no objection was taken at trial nor any ground raised on the point in the Court of Criminal Appeal [26]–[28]. Mr Sio was acquitted of murder, convicted of armed robbery with wounding and sentenced by Adamson J to 10 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of seven years and six months [3].

The Court of Criminal Appeal (Leeming JA, Johnson and Schmidt JJ agreeing), in Sio v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 42, granted leave to appeal on the s 65 ground and the unreasonable verdict ground but dismissed the appeal [3], [29]-[30]. Leeming JA held that the circumstances pointing towards likely reliability were that Mr Filihia did not appreciate until well into the interview that Mr Gaudry had died, that his answers appeared unrehearsed, sincere and forthcoming, and that the interview was conducted within 24 hours of the events [31]. His Honour also held that it was not relevant to distinguish between representations exclusively against Mr Filihia's own interest and representations relevant to Mr Sio, and that possible animosity towards Mr Sio did not preclude the conclusion that the circumstances made it likely that the evidence was reliable [32]. The joint reasons in this Court record that the Court of Criminal Appeal approached the second ground as if it were a submission that the jury were wrong to find armed robbery rather than robbery simpliciter, and did not address whether the conviction of armed robbery with wounding was unreasonable [33]. Leeming JA concluded that it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of Mr Sio's guilt in participating in a joint criminal enterprise of armed robbery [35].

The matter came to the High Court as an appeal and as an application for special leave referred to the Full Court by orders made on 11 March 2016, and the application was heard at the same time as the appeal [3], [5].

Issues

The first issue was whether the conviction for armed robbery with wounding was unreasonable because it was inconsistent with the acquittal of murder [4]. If that issue was resolved in Mr Sio's favour, a further issue arose as to disposal: Mr Sio argued for a verdict of acquittal, and the Crown argued for either a substituted verdict of guilty of armed robbery under s 7 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) or a new trial of that offence under s 8 [4]. By his special leave application Mr Sio also raised whether the trial judge and the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in concluding that the conditions in s 65(2)(d) of the Evidence Act were satisfied for Mr Filihia's representation to the effect that Mr Sio gave him the knife [5].

Held

French CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Gordon JJ

All five judges joined in one set of reasons, and no judge wrote separately or dissented [1].

The Crown acknowledged that the directions failed to refer to foresight of the possibility of wounding with the knife as a necessary element of armed robbery with wounding, and accepted that this misdirection, uncorrected in the Court of Criminal Appeal, meant that the appeal must be allowed and the conviction quashed [37]. The joint reasons said that the miscarriage of justice was occasioned by the failure to direct the jury on all of the elements of that offence [79]. They noted that, had the direction been given, there would have been "a complete coincidence of the elements in issue" on both charges [27].

Mr Sio argued that the acquittal meant the jury were not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he foresaw the possibility of wounding with the knife, so that the only reasonable verdict on armed robbery with wounding was not guilty [38]. The Crown submitted that the basis of the acquittal was unknown and that it may have been a merciful verdict, but the joint reasons accepted Mr Sio's response that the verdict cannot be explained on the basis that the jury were satisfied of murder but decided to be merciful [40]. They said that a merciful verdict may be available as a reasonable explanation for inconsistent verdicts where the jury can be taken to have ignored the directions, and that there was no reason to think that occurred here [41]. In light of the directions given, they said, "there is no inconsistency between the verdicts which the jury returned", because foresight of the use of the knife was identified as an element in issue on murder but the jury were not directed that it was an element of armed robbery with wounding [41]. They quoted Gleeson CJ and Gummow J in Gilbert v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 414 on the assumption that, as a general rule, juries understand and follow the directions they are given [41].

The joint reasons said that Calabria v The Queen (1983) 151 CLR 670 and Spies v The Queen (2000) 201 CLR 603 establish that the power under s 7(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act is not confined to offences actually alleged on the indictment, and applies where the elements were necessarily subsumed within the offence of conviction, as with armed robbery with wounding and armed robbery [44]. They noted that the evidence of Ms Gaudiosi, if accepted, tends to support the inference that Mr Sio would not have needed to include the knife in his plans, and that Ms Coffison's evidence, if accepted, supports the inference that Mr Filihia became a participant in the robbery only after the plans had been made [46]. They said the Court could not conclude, as s 7(2) requires, that the jury must have been satisfied of Mr Sio's guilt of armed robbery if Mr Filihia's representation were excluded, so it was necessary to determine the s 65(2)(d) issue [43], [46]–[47].

Under s 65(1) and (2)(d), where the maker of a previous representation is not available to give evidence in a criminal proceeding, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of the representation given by a person who perceived it being made, if it was against the maker's interests when made and was made in circumstances that make it likely to be reliable [16]. Answering the Crown's submission that there was no difference in the circumstances in which all of Mr Filihia's statements were made, the joint reasons held that s 65(2)(d) does not permit a compendious approach to the admissibility of those statements without focusing on the representation of the particular fact sought to be proved [51]. They reasoned that s 65(2) assumes a party is seeking to prove a particular fact relevant to an issue, requires identification of the particular representation to be adduced as proof of that fact, and then allows the circumstances in which it was made to be considered, a process to be observed for each relevant fact [57]. Neither the trial judge nor the Court of Criminal Appeal did this: they formed an overall impression of the general reliability of Mr Filihia's statements and held all of them admissible against Mr Sio, an approach that "does not conform to the requirements of the Act" [58]. The Court of Criminal Appeal seems to have regarded earlier authority, including R v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182, as allowing or requiring a compendious inquiry, but the joint reasons said that Suteski, while rightly considering representations in context to determine whether together they constitute an admission or answer against interest, does not support a compendious approach to the reliability of the whole of a hearsay statement inculpatory of the accused [59]. "It is no light thing to admit a hearsay statement inculpating an accused", they said, because where s 65 is successfully invoked by the prosecution the accused will have no opportunity to cross-examine the maker [60].

The compendious approach contributed to a further error, because the likely reliability of Mr Filihia's assertions that Mr Sio gave him the knife had to be evaluated having regard to the circumstance that they were those of an accomplice in the crimes [62]. Section 65(2)(d)(ii) requires a trial judge to be positively satisfied that the representation was made in circumstances that make it likely to be reliable notwithstanding its hearsay character, and one category recognised as warranting a relaxation of the hearsay rule, identified in Wigmore on Evidence, is circumstances that of themselves tend to negative the declarant's motive and opportunity to lie [64]. The joint reasons said that accomplice evidence has long been recognised as less than inherently reliable because of the perceived risk of falsification, given the obvious interest of one co-offender in shifting blame onto another, and that s 165(1)(d) of the Evidence Act recognises this [65]. The best that could be said here was that near contemporaneity meant the risk of an honestly mistaken recollection was slight, which did not answer the question mark over reliability arising because the assertion was made by an accomplice [66]. Leeming JA had identified contemporaneity and being against interest as circumstances enhancing reliability, but the joint reasons said that circumstances satisfying s 65(2)(d)(i) may in some circumstances also tend to satisfy s 65(2)(d)(ii) and that this will not necessarily be so [67]. Generally speaking Mr Filihia's statements were against his own interest, but his statement that Mr Sio gave him the knife and put him up to the robbery was "plainly apt to minimise his culpability by maximising that of Mr Sio", and while it may be accepted that s 65(2)(d)(i) was satisfied for that statement, it did not follow that it was likely to be reliable as evidence against Mr Sio [68].

The joint reasons said that an observation of Mason P in R v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603, made about s 65(2)(c), that evidence of other events can throw light on the circumstances of making a representation may be accepted [69]-[70]. They said that s 65(2)(d)(ii) directs attention not to the apparent truthfulness of the person making the representation but to the objective circumstances in which it was made [70]. Those circumstances may include other representations: a representation may be demonstrably unreliable because of a specific later retraction, and demonstrably or inherently incredible, fanciful or preposterous statements may tend against likely reliability [71]. But the joint reasons said it was unnecessary to gloss the statutory language further, the true concern of the provision being the identification of circumstances which of themselves warrant the conclusion that the representation is reliable notwithstanding its hearsay character [71]. They emphasised that where the circumstances are likely to ensure, as a practical matter, that the asserted fact truly occurred, the fairness of the trial does not require a positive judgment by the tribunal of fact about the reliability of the maker, and that the assessment is of the circumstances rather than of whether the maker is a reliable witness, precisely because the maker will not be a witness at the trial [72].

It was sufficient for present purposes, they said, that "a question mark necessarily arose" over Mr Filihia's assertion that Mr Sio gave him the knife and put him up to the robbery because Mr Filihia was Mr Sio's accomplice, and that nothing else in the objective circumstances was apt to shift the balance in favour of a positive finding of likely reliability [73]. It was not open to the trial judge to be positively satisfied of the likely reliability of the assertion that Mr Sio gave him the knife, the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in failing to conclude that she had erred, and the evidence should not have been admitted [73].

It followed that the Court could not be satisfied that the jury must have convicted Mr Sio of armed robbery, and it was not open to substitute a verdict of guilty of that offence [74]. The joint reasons quoted Spies v The Queen to the effect that, unless the interests of justice require an acquittal, an appellate court should ordinarily order a new trial where a conviction has been set aside but there is evidence to support the charge [75]. They said it may be accepted that there cannot be a retrial of armed robbery with wounding, which would impermissibly traverse a clear and explicable verdict of acquittal on the charge of murder [76]. Section 8(1) authorises the Court of Criminal Appeal to order a new trial if it considers that a miscarriage of justice has occurred and can be more adequately remedied by that order than by any other it may make [77]. Mr Sio did not contend that s 8(1) does not extend to a new trial confined to a lesser offence, but submitted that discretionary considerations were against it because the prosecution would rely on an alternative count it did not rely upon at trial [78].

The joint reasons accepted that fairness to the accused will often result in a lesser included offence not being left to the jury where the prosecution has chosen not to seek a verdict for it, but said this was not determinative here [79]. "Only on the most formalistic of analyses", they said, could a new trial be said to give the prosecution an opportunity to make a new case, the case left to the jury without demur from either side having been one of armed robbery [79]. The public interest in the prosecution of persons accused of serious crime was not outweighed by Mr Sio's custody since his conviction on 23 September 2013 and an earlier period of some five months [80]. The joint reasons said a new trial for armed robbery would be the most adequate remedy, because Mr Sio could have been found guilty of that offence on the original indictment and would not be confronted with any new evidence [81]. They said such a trial would not traverse the acquittal of murder, and that the fate of the doctrine of extended joint criminal enterprise enunciated in McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108, on which the prosecution cases of murder and armed robbery with wounding each relied and which was under challenge in unrelated proceedings then pending in this Court, would have no effect on the proposed new trial [82].

Orders. In Matter No S241/2015 the Court granted special leave to include, as a further ground of appeal in Matter No S83/2016, ground 2.2 of the Draft Notice of Appeal filed on 20 November 2015. In Matter No S83/2016 the Court allowed the appeal, set aside order 2 of the Court of Criminal Appeal made on 31 March 2015, and in its place ordered that the appeal be allowed, that the appellant's conviction on count 2 of the indictment be quashed, and that a new trial be had for the offence of armed robbery. The joint reasons describe the same result as the conviction for armed robbery with wounding being quashed and an order for a new trial for the offence of armed robbery, with special leave granted on the issue concerning s 65(2)(d)(ii) [83]–[84].

Why it matters

On s 65(2)(d) of the Evidence Act, the reasons require identification of the fact to be proved and of the particular representation tendered to prove it, and reject an overall impression of the general reliability of a person's statements [57]–[58]. They state that the question mark over the reliability of Mr Filihia's assertion, arising because it was made by an accomplice, was not answered by the unlikelihood that his memory had faded, and that the trial judge must be affirmatively satisfied of likely reliability by reference to the objective circumstances in which the representation was made [66], [70]. On inconsistent verdicts, they test the verdicts against the directions the jury were actually given [41]. On remedy, they order a new trial for a lesser offence of which Mr Sio could have been found guilty on the original indictment, where neither a retrial of the offence charged nor a substituted verdict was open, and Mr Sio did not contend that s 8(1) lacked that reach [74], [76], [78], [81].

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