Soyfer & Anor. v Earlmaze & Ors.
[2000] NSWSC 1068
Summary updated 11 November 2026
Overview
Soyfer & Anor. v. Earlmaze & Ors. [2000] NSWSC 1068 is a decision of Hodgson CJ in Eq, sitting alone in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, given on 22 November 2000. The plaintiffs, Mr and Mrs Soyfer, had lent $500,000 to Mr Matar and sued Earlmaze Pty Limited, the owner of the development site, for specific performance of an option to buy a unit for $1,000 [1]-[5]. Hodgson CJ in Eq found that the director's signature on the option, purportedly Mr Lopatinsky's, was forged, but held that the plaintiffs could rely on the statutory assumptions in ss 128 and 129 of the Corporations Law, so that Earlmaze was precluded from asserting that the option was not duly executed [23], [55], [84]. He held the plaintiffs entitled to specific performance but treated the option as security for Mr Matar's debt, gave judgment against Mr Matar for the debt and interest with protection against double recovery, and held Earlmaze entitled to its costs from Mr Matar and Mr Elcham and to an indemnity from them and R & M, a company associated with them [6], [117]–[120], [123].
Facts
Earlmaze was incorporated in 1997, and its shareholders were Paul and Adel Lopatinsky, Mr Matar and Mr Elcham, with one share each [8]. On 27 October 1997 Earlmaze bought the property at 55-57 Brighton Boulevarde, apparently as trustee of a unit trust whose units were owned equally by Aquagold Pty Limited, a company associated with Mr Lopatinsky, and by R & M, a company associated with Mr Matar and Mr Elcham [6], [9]. Mr Lopatinsky and Mr Elcham were initially Earlmaze's directors and secretaries, but in May 1998 Mr Elcham resigned both offices and was replaced by Mr Matar [8], [11].
In September 1998 Mr Soyfer asked Mr Lopatinsky about Mr Matar's reliability in repaying money, and Mr Lopatinsky said that Mr Matar had repaid amounts due to him so far but that he could not "guarantee him" [14]. According to the plaintiffs' uncontradicted evidence, Mr Matar asked them for a loan of $500,000 for the Brighton Boulevarde development, offering to pay them $625,000 after twelve months and saying they could have one of the units as security [15]. The National Australia Bank approved a loan of $500,000 to the plaintiffs on the security of their home [16]. A company extract obtained by the plaintiffs' solicitor, Ms Sokol, on 12 October 1998 showed Mr Lopatinsky and Mr Matar as Earlmaze's directors and secretaries [17].
On 20 October 1998 Ms Sokol faxed Mr Baron, the solicitor acting for Earlmaze, setting out that the plaintiffs would lend $500,000 towards the development, to be repaid with $625,000 plus interest and bank charges, and would take as security an option to buy unit 10 at a nominal price of $1,000, which would not be exercised if the loan were repaid [18]. Mr Baron sent a copy of the fax to Mr Matar, but his file held no transmission report for a copy prepared for Mr and Mrs Lopatinsky, who denied receiving one [19], [20]. Mr Baron prepared an option agreement, and the counterpart executed by the plaintiffs was returned to him under cover of a letter dated 23 October 1998 [21]. Annexed to the option was a contract for the sale of Unit 10 to the plaintiffs for $1,000, whose date was shown as "1998" with the rest left blank, followed by the contract form's words "if not stated, the date this contract was made" [22].
On Earlmaze's counterpart, the signature purporting to be the secretary's was Mr Elcham's, and the signature purporting to be a director's had some similarity to Mr Lopatinsky's, though he denied that it was his and denied executing the document at all [23]. Mr Baron also sent Ms Sokol a loan agreement signed by Mr Matar on R & M letterhead, which described the loan as for the Brighton Boulevarde development but made no reference to security [25]. Mr Lopatinsky's evidence was that he signed a two-page document in a car without reading it, after Mr Elcham told him it was an option for $1,000 with a purchase price of $625,000, and that Earlmaze's common seal was kept by Mr Matar and Mr Elcham at their offices [26]. The plaintiffs gave Mr Matar a cheque for $480,000, leaving $20,000 of the bank facility undrawn at his request; he endorsed the cheque to R & M, and the evidence did not show that the cheque or its proceeds were used in the development [27]. The $1,000 consideration stated in the option was not paid until 23 December 1999 [24].
In March 1999, after Mr Matar said he had a buyer for Unit 10 at $630,000, Mr and Mrs Lopatinsky and the plaintiffs agreed to change the option from Unit 10 to Unit 9 [28]. Mr Baron drew up a Variation of Option Agreement dated 31 March 1999, and Earlmaze's counterpart bore its common seal and the signatures of Mr Lopatinsky as director and Mr Elcham as secretary [29]. The variation substituted Lot 9 for Lot 10 in the option and in the annexed contract, and confirmed the option's other terms [29]. Earlmaze's counterpart was sent to Ms Sokol by way of exchange under cover of a letter dated 1 April 1999 [30]. Mr Lopatinsky said that when he signed the variation he believed the plaintiffs would have an option to buy Unit 9 for $625,000 [31].
Mr and Mrs Lopatinsky said they first learned, at a meeting with Mr Baron in early April 1999, that Unit 9 had been sold to the plaintiffs for $1,000 if Mr Matar did not repay the loan [33]. The judge inferred that this meeting took place on 1 April 1999, or possibly a day or two earlier [34]. Later in April 1999 Mr Baron prepared a Development Agreement, purportedly made on 23 April 1999, between Aquagold, Mr and Mrs Lopatinsky, R & M, Mr Elcham and Mr Matar [35]. In November 1999 Mr Matar told Mr Soyfer that he did not have the money to repay [36]. On 23 December 1999 the plaintiffs' solicitors sent Mr Baron's firm a $1,000 cheque in favour of Earlmaze, and on 24 December 1999 a notice of exercise of the option and an executed contract for Lot 9 [37]. The same day, Mr Baron's firm returned the cheque and sent a notice of rescission, and Earlmaze denied any obligation to sell Unit 9 for $1,000 [37].
Procedural history
In June 2000 the plaintiffs sued Earlmaze for specific performance of an agreement to sell them Unit 9 for $1,000, or alternatively for relief under the Trade Practices Act, and also sued Mr Matar for $625,000 plus interest [5]. Earlmaze defended, among other things on the basis that it had not executed the option, and cross-claimed for damages against Mr Matar, Mr Elcham and R & M [6]. Mr Matar filed defences but no evidence, Mr Elcham filed neither, and the hearing proceeded in their absence [7]. The case was heard on 25 and 26 October 2000. Mr Baron was not called to give evidence, and Earlmaze's solicitors had by then alleged that he was negligent in failing to advise Earlmaze about the option's terms, which he denied [20], [39]. After judgment, the judge delivered an addendum on 24 November 2000 dealing with further points raised by counsel for Earlmaze and making orders [120]–[124].
Issues
Hodgson CJ in Eq identified these issues:
- Factual questions about what Mr and Mrs Lopatinsky knew of the option and its execution, what the plaintiffs knew of how the loan money was applied, and what Mr Lopatinsky knew when he entered into the variation [40].
- Whether, if Mr Lopatinsky did not sign the option, it was signed with his or Earlmaze's authority, and the effect of the statutory presumptions in ss 128 and 129 of the Corporations Law [41].
- Whether, if Earlmaze was not bound by the option, it was liable under the Trade Practices Act for representations made by Mr Matar and Mr Baron, which turned on their authority and the plaintiffs' reliance [42].
- Whether the variation agreement was validly executed, whether it ratified the option, and whether it operated as an agreement of its own, supported by consideration, giving an option over Unit 9 for $1,000 [43].
- Whether non-payment of the $1,000 before 23 December 1999 meant that the option failed for want of consideration or that Earlmaze could terminate it [44].
- Whether the option was validly exercised, since the contract served with the notice of exercise did not have its date filled in [45].
- What relief should be given against Earlmaze, in particular whether a condition should ensure that the plaintiffs got no greater benefit than full satisfaction of Mr Matar's loan obligations [46].
- The plaintiffs' remedy against Mr Matar, who pleaded that if they exercised the option they should not have judgment against him for the loan [47].
- Earlmaze's remedy against Mr Matar, Mr Elcham and R & M if the plaintiffs succeeded against it [48].
Held
Hodgson CJ in Eq
Findings of fact. In the absence of Mr Matar and Mr Elcham, he inferred on the balance of probabilities that they wanted money for a purpose other than a purpose of Earlmaze, and obtained it by Mr Matar falsely representing to the plaintiffs that all the money was for the Brighton Boulevarde project [55]. He also inferred that Mr Lopatinsky's purported signature on the option was forged [55]. He was not satisfied that Mr or Mrs Lopatinsky knew the terms of the option or received the fax of 20 October 1998, but found that Mr Lopatinsky at least knew that Mr Baron was preparing an option for execution by Earlmaze [56]. Nor was he satisfied that Mr Lopatinsky knew the terms of the option before he signed the variation or gave instructions to exchange it, and he drew no adverse inference from Mr Lopatinsky's failure to take Mr Baron to task, because his priority in April 1999 was to separate his and his wife's affairs from those of Mr Matar and Mr Elcham [57]. He found that Mr Soyfer reasonably understood Mr Lopatinsky's remark about not guaranteeing Mr Matar as meaning only that Mr Lopatinsky could not give an unqualified assurance that Mr Matar would repay his debts [58]. He accepted that the plaintiffs did not suspect that anything was amiss, observing that a structure which might have aroused suspicion in persons knowledgeable in company law had been accepted by two solicitors [59].
Execution of the option. He held that the s 129 assumptions can be made only in relation to dealings with a company by the person seeking to rely on them [67]. In his opinion Mr Matar, although a director, had no actual or ostensible authority to negotiate an option disposing of Earlmaze property worth about $625,000 for $1,000, but by 23 October 1998 the plaintiffs were dealing, through Ms Sokol, with Mr Baron, a solicitor Earlmaze had engaged to act on an option over its property [68]. He found that Mr Baron had instructions from both directors, that Mr Lopatinsky's mistake about the nature of the proposed option did not negative Mr Baron's authority, and that the plaintiffs were therefore entitled to make the s 129 assumptions in their dealings with Earlmaze through Mr Baron [68].
He held that the onus under s 128(4) lies on whoever challenges a person's entitlement to make an assumption [69]. In his view the entitlement is lost under s 128(4) only if the person actually knew or actually suspected that the assumption was incorrect, and not where circumstances would merely put a reasonable person upon enquiry [70]. He saw a possible internal conflict in the explanatory memorandum to the Company Law Review Bill 1997, which described the test as objective while saying that the common law put upon enquiry test had no application, and he regarded the reference to an objective test as the potentially misleading part [70], [71]. He disagreed with a suggestion in (1998) 16 Company & Securities Law Journal at 562-5 and agreed in general terms with the contrary suggestion in (2000) 18 Company & Securities Law Journal at 50-61 [71]. He disagreed with that article's suggestion that knowledge also embraces wilful blindness, adding that it probably makes no difference because wilful blindness almost inevitably involves actual suspicion [71]. He had held that the plaintiffs had no relevant knowledge or suspicion [72].
On s 129(6), the option bore two illegible signatures above the words "director" and "secretary" without the signatories' names, one actual signatory, Mr Elcham, was not shown or held out as a director or secretary, and it was obvious from the loan document that Mr Matar, whose signature the ASIC information showed was necessary, had not signed the option [73]. He accepted that it is sufficient for the s 129(6) assumption that the signatures appear to be those of persons shown in information provided through ASIC or otherwise held out by the company, and asked whether that is necessary [74]. He noted that the contrary was assumed in (2000) 18 Company & Securities Law Journal at 52, and that under the former s 164(3) the assumption had depended on the witnesses being persons who, in that provision's words, "may be assumed to be" the relevant officers, wording absent from s 129 [75]. He considered, but did not regard as strong, an argument from the last sentence of s 129(6) said to support the view that a seal with signatures above the office descriptions is enough [76], [77].
He said that the question is ultimately what the words of s 129(6) mean in context, and that it seems the appearance in question is not appearance to the person dealing with the company, who need not actually make any of the assumptions, referring to the second sentence of s 128(1) and comparing Lyford v. Media Portfolio Ltd. (1989) 7 ACLC 271 [78]. In his view the question is whether the company's seal objectively appears to have been fixed and witnessed in accordance with s 127(2) [78]. "With some hesitation", he concluded that a document bearing a company seal with signatures respectively above the words "director" and "secretary" does objectively appear to be so witnessed [78]. Other material available to the person dealing with the company, such as Mr Matar's signature appearing on the loan agreement but not on the option, does not negative that appearance unless it gives rise to the knowledge or suspicion referred to in s 128(4) [79].
On the submission that s 128(3) applied only to fraud or forgery by an officer or agent of the company and that Mr Elcham was neither, he held that the forgery need not be within the agent's authority in a way that would make the company liable under the principle of Lloyd v. Grace Smith & Co. (1912) AC 716, and that it is sufficient that the person be an agent in the sense of having some legitimate role on behalf of the company in relation to the dealings; it was not suggested that Mr Elcham lacked such a role, for example in conveying documents to Mr Baron [80]. He reasoned that a company should not benefit from discrepancies with its published documents where persons associated with it execute documents honestly but mistakenly on its behalf, and that where they are prepared to forge signatures, requiring the forger to state the correct name of a director or secretary shown in ASIC information gives the company little more protection [81]. In his view some protection is given to the company by the requirement that there be dealings with someone on behalf of the company that the company has authorised, the document being in relation to those authorised dealings [82]. He read Gleeson CJ's suggestion in Story at 733, that having dealings with a company must embrace purported dealings, as meaning that the company's representative need not have authority to commit the company, though the representative must have authority to undertake some negotiation or other steps [82].
He addressed an argument, not advanced at the hearing but put in (1999) 10 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 38-53, that formal and substantive authority must be considered separately [83]. He agreed that it had some support at general law in the judgments of the High Court (apart from Mason CJ) in Northside Developments Pty. Ltd. v. Registrar-General (1990) 170 CLR 146, but did not think the other authorities cited in the article supported it for a person entitled to make the statutory assumptions, and considered that once due execution can be assumed there is no separate question whether it was duly authorised [83]. In any event, the s 129 assumptions are cumulative under s 129(8), so that once due execution can be assumed under s 129(6), compliance with the constitution can also be assumed under s 129(1) [83]. He concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to rely on an assumption that the option was duly executed by Earlmaze, and that s 128 precluded Earlmaze from asserting the contrary [84].
Trade Practices Act. He accepted that Mr Matar was not actually authorised to represent that Earlmaze would enter into such a transaction and was not held out by Earlmaze as having that authority [87]. However, Mr Lopatinsky had authorised Mr Baron to prepare and submit the option, his mistake about its contents did not negative Mr Baron's authority to make representations for Earlmaze in doing that work, and Mr Baron's representation as to what Earlmaze was prepared to do bound Earlmaze [88]. He found that the plaintiffs relied on that representation in advancing the $500,000, and saw no reason to find that their reliance was unreasonable [89]. He noted that this question would arise only if he had held that Earlmaze was not bound by the option [90].
The variation agreement. He accepted that Earlmaze was bound by the execution of the variation despite the participation of Mr Elcham, who was neither a director nor a secretary, on each of the three grounds the plaintiffs advanced: that, both directors having authorised its execution, Mr Elcham should be inferred to have been authorised to witness it under Article 84(2) of Earlmaze's Articles of Association; that execution by one director on the authority of both sufficed for an agreement that did not have to be sealed; and that all the shareholders assented to it [91], [94]. He held that the variation would not have operated as a ratification of the earlier transaction, because ratification requires understanding of what is being ratified and he was not satisfied that Mr Lopatinsky had it, and he did not need to consider whether a forgery can be ratified [95]. In his opinion the variation would nonetheless operate as a new agreement even if the option did not bind Earlmaze, because it "plainly manifests an intention" by Earlmaze that the plaintiffs should have an option to buy Unit 9 for $1,000 [96], [97]. Mr Lopatinsky's unawareness of that intention was irrelevant, and the plaintiffs' bona fide belief that they had the benefit of the earlier option was sufficient consideration, comparing Wigan v. Edwards (1973) 47 ALJR 586 [97]. Since he had decided that the original option bound Earlmaze, there was really no question about the efficacy of the variation [98].
Non-payment of the $1,000. He held that the option was not invalid for want of consideration, because Earlmaze, being bound by the execution of the option with its reference in cl 6 to the loan, was bound to treat the loan as consideration [104]. In any event, he construed the $1,000 provision as giving rise to a promise to pay $1,000, as discussed in Himbleton [104]. There was no fundamental breach entitling rescission, as Earlmaze's entry into the variation despite the non-payment showed, and rescission for non-payment would have required the procedure in cl 7 of the option [105].
Exercise of the option. He treated the option as an irrevocable offer, so that a purported acceptance not complying with the prescribed time and manner is a counter-offer, citing Gilbert J. McCaul Australia Pty. Limited v. Pitt Club Limited (1959) SR(NSW) 122 [107]. A literal but immaterial difference still leaves a true acceptance, citing Harrison v. Battye, Quadling v. Robinson and Domb v. Isoz, though a court should not be too ready to treat a difference as immaterial when an option is exercised, and exercise even one day late would be a material difference [108]. He held that there was in fact literal compliance: cl 2(3) made the contract's date the date of actual exercise, and the absence of any date apart from the year brought in the form's parenthesised words, so the contract was to be considered dated on the day it was made, 24 December 1999 [109]. Even if that analysis was wrong, any discrepancy was entirely immaterial and did not prevent the formation of a contract [110].
Relief. Counsel for Earlmaze did not contest that the plaintiffs were entitled to specific performance if they otherwise succeeded, but sought a condition preventing them from benefiting beyond the amount Mr Matar owed them [111]. Hodgson CJ in Eq characterised the transaction as not an outright option to purchase but an option to acquire title to the unit as security for Mr Matar's debt, so that Earlmaze had an equity of redemption and the plaintiffs did not acquire outright ownership [112]. On that analysis the unit could be released to Earlmaze at an agreed value or the plaintiffs could sell it in effect as mortgagees, and because the approach had not been explicitly argued he offered to hear further submissions [112]. Because the option was a security, the plaintiffs could have both the security and a judgment against Mr Matar for the debt, but could not obtain more than the amount payable by Mr Matar and costs [113], [114].
Earlmaze's cross-claim. He held that any liability of Earlmaze to the plaintiffs had been caused by breaches of obligations Mr Matar and Mr Elcham owed Earlmaze as officers or employees, "and perhaps also by their fraud", on which he did not need to reach a final decision, and that Earlmaze was entitled to be indemnified by them [115]. Earlmaze was also entitled to similar relief against Mr Matar, Mr Elcham and R & M under the Development Agreement of 23 April 1999 [116].
Addendum. In the addendum he accepted that counsel for Earlmaze had in fact submitted that Ms Sokol had relevant knowledge or suspicion, and that he had responded in argument that she would have been unlikely, with that knowledge or suspicion, to settle the transaction and advise her client to hand over $500,000 [121]. He held that this consideration meant the inference should not be drawn, and noted that the point would not in any event have affected his decision on the variation agreement or the Trade Practices claim [122]. He rejected Earlmaze's submission that the order should give the plaintiffs a charge over the unit, holding that the security contemplated was a legal transfer subject to an equity of redemption [123].
Orders. In the addendum, Hodgson CJ in Eq made orders in accordance with Short Minutes of Order that he initialled and dated [124]. The reasons do not set out those minutes. In his reasons he held the plaintiffs entitled to specific performance of the option and, subject to further submissions, proposed to declare that they would hold the unit as security for Mr Matar's debt, with liberty to apply for further relief [117]. He said he would give judgment against Mr Matar for the debt and interest, with an order to prevent double recovery [118]. He held the plaintiffs entitled to their costs from Earlmaze and Mr Matar [119]. He held Earlmaze entitled to have its own costs, and the costs it had to pay the plaintiffs, paid by Mr Matar and Mr Elcham, and proposed to declare that Mr Matar, Mr Elcham and R & M must indemnify Earlmaze against loss caused by the option and its exercise, reserving liberty to apply [120]. The orders were to give effect to the security as a legal transfer subject to an equity of redemption, not a charge [123]. He directed the plaintiffs to stamp the contract within seven days of receiving the vendor's signed counterpart, gave them liberty to apply on three days' notice about any application that Earlmaze account for rents received for the property, and allowed the exhibits to be returned after 28 days if there was no appeal [125]–[127].
Why it matters
The decision construes the statutory assumptions in ss 128 and 129 of the Corporations Law where a company's seal is accompanied by a forged signature [55], [78], [84]. Hodgson CJ in Eq held that the assumptions depend on dealings with the company through someone the company authorised to undertake some negotiation or other steps, which he saw as giving the company some protection [68], [82]. He read s 128(4) as requiring actual knowledge or actual suspicion, displacing the common law put upon enquiry test [70], [71]. He treated the appearance required by s 129(6) as objective, though he reached the view that a seal with signatures above the words "director" and "secretary" is enough only "with some hesitation" [78]. The case also applies the rule that an option must be exercised in the prescribed manner while holding that an immaterial difference does not prevent acceptance [107]–[110], and treats an option given to secure a loan as a security leaving the grantor an equity of redemption [112], [123].
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