casewise

Spence v Queensland

(2019) 268 CLR 355 · [2019] HCA 15 · (2019) 367 ALR 587 · (2019) 93 ALJR 643

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Spence v Queensland [2019] HCA 15 is a decision of the High Court of Australia on a special case in its original jurisdiction about the validity and operation of State and Commonwealth electoral laws dealing with gifts to political parties [1]. Queensland had prohibited property developers from making gifts to political parties, and the Commonwealth later enacted s 302CA of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) to permit such gifts despite State electoral laws where the gift is required to be, or might be, used for federal electoral purposes [3]–[4]. By majority (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ), the Court answered the questions on the basis that s 302CA is wholly invalid as beyond Commonwealth legislative power and incapable of severance, and that the Queensland laws are valid and operative [5], [112]. Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ dissented, concluding that s 302CA is valid and that the Queensland prohibitions are inoperative to the extent of their inconsistency with it [145], [151], [156], [283]. The plaintiff was ordered to pay the costs of the special case [112].

Facts

The plaintiff was formerly the president of the Liberal National Party of Queensland, an unincorporated association registered as a political party under both the Queensland Electoral Act and the Commonwealth Electoral Act [7]. The joint reasons noted that political parties in Australia are typically unincorporated associations organised by State and Territory, whose objects typically include promoting candidates for election to the Commonwealth Parliament, State Parliaments and local government councils [2]. The Local Government Electoral (Implementing Stage 1 of Belcarra) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2018 (Qld) was enacted on 21 May 2018, and its Pts 3 and 5 commenced on 2 October 2018 [16]. Part 3 inserted Subdiv 4 of Div 8 of Pt 11 into the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld), and Pt 5 inserted Div 1A into Pt 6 of the Local Government Electoral Act 2011 (Qld) [16]. The centrally relevant operation of those provisions is to prohibit the making and receipt of a gift by a "property developer" to or for the benefit of a political party, and they also prohibit such gifts to elected members, councillors and candidates [19], [21]. Subdivision 4 substantially replicates Div 4A of Pt 6 of the Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Act 1981 (NSW), which was considered in McCloy v New South Wales [18]. Section 275 of the Queensland Electoral Act makes it unlawful for a prohibited donor to make, or for a person to accept, a political donation, and s 113B of the Queensland Local Government Electoral Act is in the same terms [243], [257]. Gordon J noted that the Explanatory Notes stated that the Bill implemented the government's response to the Crime and Corruption Commission's Operation Belcarra report, including recommendation 20 to ban donations from property developers [259]–[260].

The Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Funding and Disclosure Reform) Act 2018 (Cth) was enacted on 30 November 2018 and inserted s 302CA into Div 3A of Pt XX of the Commonwealth Electoral Act [4], [22], [27]. Division 3A prohibits a political entity or political campaigner from receiving a gift of at least $1,000 from a foreign donor [26]. Section 302CA(1) provides that, despite any State or Territory electoral law, a person may give, and a political entity may receive and retain, a gift not prohibited by Div 3A if the gift or part of it "is required to be, or may be, used" for incurring electoral expenditure or creating or communicating electoral matter [29], [31]. Under s 302CA(2), a gift meets that description if the donor's terms require or allow that use, or if the donor sets no terms about its use [29]. Section 302CA(3) displaces that authority where the donor's terms require use only for a State or Territory electoral purpose, where a State or Territory electoral law requires the gift to be kept or identified separately for such a purpose, or where the recipient keeps or identifies it separately for such a purpose [32]. As agreed in the special case, the five parties holding 92 of the 93 seats in the Legislative Assembly of Queensland are each also represented in the federal Parliament, directly or through an affiliated or related party [287].

Procedural history

The plaintiff sued Queensland by writ and statement of claim filed after the enactment but before the commencement of the relevant parts of the Queensland Amending Act [8]. He sought declarations that the amendments to the Queensland Electoral Act were invalid as infringing the implied freedom of political communication, and that the amendments to both the Queensland Electoral Act and the Queensland Local Government Electoral Act were invalid as purporting to exercise power exclusively vested in the Commonwealth Parliament or infringing the doctrine of inter-governmental immunities or, in the alternative, inoperative for inconsistency with the Commonwealth Electoral Act as it then stood [8]. After the Commonwealth Amending Act was enacted, the plaintiff added a claim of inconsistency with s 302CA, and Queensland amended its defence to assert that s 302CA was invalid [9]. The Attorney-General of the Commonwealth intervened under s 78A of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), supported the validity of s 302CA and supported some aspects of the plaintiff's challenge to the Queensland laws [10]. The Attorneys-General of the other States and of the Australian Capital Territory also intervened, each giving a measure of support to Queensland's position [10]. The special case was agreed between the plaintiff and Queensland with the active participation of the Commonwealth [11].

Issues

The special case asked whether the amendments to the Queensland Electoral Act were invalid because they impermissibly burden the implied freedom of political communication (question (a)) [112]. It asked whether the amendments to the Queensland Electoral Act and to the Queensland Local Government Electoral Act were invalid on the basis of an implied doctrine of inter-governmental immunities or as intruding into an area of exclusive Commonwealth legislative power (questions (b) and (c)) [112]. It asked whether s 302CA was invalid as beyond Commonwealth legislative power, as contrary to the principle derived from the Melbourne Corporation Case, or as contrary to the principle derived from University of Wollongong v Metwally (questions (d) to (f)) [112]. It also asked whether the Queensland amendments were invalid under s 109 of the Constitution for inconsistency with the Commonwealth Electoral Act (questions (g) and (h)), and who should pay the costs (question (i)) [112].

Held

The Court divided four to three on whether s 302CA was valid [91], [145], [156], [283]. Every judge rejected the implied freedom challenge, although Nettle J did so only because the majority decision in McCloy required that result [97], [113]–[114], [264], [326].

Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ

The joint reasons described their analysis as the outworking of the conception of federalism that has prevailed since the Engineers' Case [6]. The Commonwealth and the plaintiff argued that the Queensland amendments trenched upon an exclusive Commonwealth power to regulate federal elections, said to arise by structural implication, relying on Smith v Oldham [37]–[38]. Their Honours said that the statements in Smith v Oldham supporting exclusivity were made in the pre-Engineers era and used a mode of reasoning which did not survive the Engineers' Case [41]. At least since the Engineers' Case, those statements cannot be treated as necessary to the conclusion in Smith v Oldham [42]. In R v Brisbane Licensing Court; Ex parte Daniell, the State law was held invalid not because it intruded into an area of exclusive Commonwealth power but because it was inconsistent with a Commonwealth law within the meaning of s 109 [43]-[44]. The Commonwealth's power to regulate federal elections is found in s 51(xxxvi) in its application to ss 10 and 31 of the Constitution, supplemented by s 51(xxxix) [45]. The claimed structural implication of exclusive Commonwealth power "can be justified neither textually nor structurally", because the s 51 powers are concurrent with State legislative power and conflicts are resolved through s 109 and the Melbourne Corporation doctrine [46]. State legislative power to regulate State elections is not transgressed by a State law that merely touches and concerns federal elections more than incidentally [48]. The Queensland amendments are laws regulating State elections and do not travel beyond State legislative competence [50].

On the scope of Commonwealth power, their Honours held that s 302CA is within s 51(xxxvi) to the extent that it protects the giving, receipt and retention of a gift earmarked from the outset for federal electoral matter, and the gift's later use [55]. The difficulty lay in the section's breadth in protecting gifts whose use for federal electoral purposes, when given and received, is nothing more than a bare possibility [56]. Their Honours said that the sufficiency of a law's connection with a head of power can turn on questions of degree, and that the law's purpose can assist in deciding whether it is incidental to the subject matter [59]–[60]. Just as the subject matter of the taxation power is "federal taxation", the subject matter of s 51(xxxvi) in its application to ss 10 and 31 is "federal elections", not "elections" [70]. Not everything done by a federally registered political party forms part of or is incidental to federal elections, and the choice to permit registration of an association only one of whose objects need concern federal elections acknowledges that it may pursue unrelated activities [72]. The mere circumstance that a registered political party is the object of a Commonwealth authority is therefore insufficient to bring a law within s 51(xxxvi) [73]. A sufficient connection could not be found in the recipient's identity as a political entity or in its subjection to the Pt XX disclosure regime, and could only be found, if at all, by relating the section's operation to its purpose [75]–[76]. Their Honours illustrated that a party receiving an unconditional gift protected by s 302CA could use it for other purposes, such as defraying overheads, funding policy development or holding an annual conference [36]. The section thus conferred immunity from State electoral laws for a range of activities having no connection with federal elections, including activities within the heartland of State legislative power [80]. Their Honours inferred that its purpose was to let political entities receive donations, other than those earmarked for State, Territory or local campaigns, to fund any activities from donors whom State or Territory laws would prohibit; ensuring funding for participation in federal elections, they said, "appears to be at most an adventitious consequence" of that purpose [81]. Adapting an example used by Dixon CJ in the Second Uniform Tax Case, they said the connection was no closer than that between telephonic services and a law exempting telephone users from all State taxes [82]. Section 302CA was therefore beyond s 51(xxxvi) to the extent that it authorises the giving, receipt and retention of a gift that might never be used for any federal electoral purpose [83]. That conclusion meant that the arguments that s 302CA infringed the Melbourne Corporation doctrine or intruded into exclusive State power did not arise [84].

On severance under s 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), their Honours applied the two conditions stated by Latham CJ in Pidoto v Victoria [85]–[87]. Section 302CA applies to both State and Territory electoral laws and could not be given a distributive operation treating State laws, which it reaches beyond s 51(xxxvi) to exclude, differently from Territory laws, which s 122 supports it in excluding [88]. Even confined to State laws, bringing the section within power would require deletions in sub-ss (1) and (2), would make sub-s (3) largely redundant and would make sub-ss (5) and (6) redundant [89]. That result could not be achieved as an exercise in statutory interpretation, so s 302CA was incapable of severance and wholly invalid [90]–[91].

On the implied freedom, the plaintiff (but not the Commonwealth) challenged only the Pt 3 amendments, seeking to distinguish rather than reopen McCloy on the basis that Queensland had not had the same recent history of State-level corruption associated with land development applications as New South Wales [92], [94]. Their Honours did not resolve that factual contest, holding that, unlike Unions NSW v New South Wales, this was not a case where an adequate factual foundation for the justification was wanting [95]. The Queensland choice was based on lessons learned from the New South Wales experience, and their Honours quoted Nettle J in McCloy that it is not illogical or unprecedented for Parliament to legislate in response to inferred legislative imperatives [96]. They held that the burden imposed by Subdiv 4 is justified and that it does not infringe the implied freedom [97].

On inter-governmental immunity, their Honours rejected the argument of Queensland and South Australia that the operation of s 109 means the Commonwealth needs no implied protection from interference by State laws [102]–[103]. They held that the reciprocal application of the Melbourne Corporation implication "has been, and should remain, constitutional doctrine" [107]. Applied to a State law, the question is whether it is directed at the Commonwealth so as to impose a special disability or burden that curtails the Commonwealth's capacity to function as a government [108]. The Queensland provisions are not directed to the Commonwealth, impose no special disability or burden on it and do not deny it the capacity to regulate its own elections; at most they deny some federal participants a source of funds [109]. Finally, Div 3A as a whole cannot achieve indirectly what s 302CA fails to achieve directly, and the Pt XX disclosure regime is not impaired by a State law prohibiting a gift to which it would apply [111].

Nettle J (dissenting)

Nettle J accepted that the majority's decision in McCloy dictates rejection of the implied freedom challenge, but said "To acknowledge the inevitability of that result, however, is not to say that I agree with it" [113]–[114]. His Honour had dissented in McCloy and remained of the view that the discriminatory prohibition could not be justified, pointing out that large corporations and trade unions also make political donations to advance their interests [114]–[115]. He considered the prohibition not rationally connected to preventing political bribery and corruption, which are already crimes under the Criminal Code (Qld) [116]. Discriminately prohibiting donations because of the interests donors represent, he said, "materially distorts the level playing field" that is said to be the raison d'être of the implied freedom [119].

Nettle J held that, as first held in Smith v Oldham, the Commonwealth has exclusive, plenary power to make laws in respect of the election of members and senators of the federal Parliament [120]. He rejected the submission that Smith v Oldham was a product of the reserved powers doctrine [122]. In his view, Ex parte Daniell turned on practical overlap and consequent inconsistency at the periphery of the Commonwealth's exclusive power, and was not a holding that the power was concurrent [128]. His Honour held that the Commonwealth's power includes exclusive power to enact a regime for federal election funding, disclosure and political donations, and power to exclude State and Territory laws from that regime's field [134]. He said that, arguably, a Commonwealth law which did no more than exclude State law from gifts that might be used for federal electoral purposes would be beyond power [138]. But, agreeing with Gordon J, he said s 302CA does not stand alone and forms part of the comprehensive regime in Pt XX [140]. Until the donee decides to use a donation made on permissive terms for other purposes, the Commonwealth may regulate its giving and receipt and may exclude State laws from that field [141]. Applying Actors and Announcers Equity Association v Fontana Films Pty Ltd, he held that the possible application of s 302CA to donations not in fact used for federal purposes was not so significant that it could not fairly be described as a law with respect to federal elections [144]–[145]. It was therefore a valid law which prevails over inconsistent State laws by reason of s 109 [145]. He held that Metwally did not apply because s 302CA is not retroactive in its operation, agreeing with Gordon J [147]. He also rejected the Melbourne Corporation argument against s 302CA, noting that it leaves Queensland free to criminalise corrupt donations and otherwise to prohibit property developer donations [149]. As his was a dissenting judgment, he did not address the other issues and agreed in the orders proposed by Gordon J [151].

Gordon J (dissenting)

Gordon J would have held that s 302CA is valid and that, while the Queensland amendments are not invalidated by the implied freedom, any notion of exclusive Commonwealth power or inter-governmental immunities, they are inoperative to the extent of their inconsistency with s 302CA [156]. Her Honour held s 302CA supported by s 51(xxxvi), read with ss 10 and 31 of the Constitution, and said it must be read in the context of the positive rules in Pt XX rather than robbed of that context [159]–[160], [196]. She said notions of "immunity" are "at best distracting and may even mislead the constitutional analysis", because s 109 prescribes the result where State and Commonwealth laws are inconsistent [161]. The Commonwealth had decided that its partial ban on foreign donors is to be the only restriction on donations, and regulating how federal elections may be funded is "at the core of the relevant legislative power" [162], [166]. Where only part of a gift may be used for federal electoral purposes, the permission operates only in relation to that part [182]. It is not a bare possibility of federal use that attracts s 302CA, and an unearmarked gift to a federal participant is treated as for federal use unless and until it is earmarked in a way that attracts one of the exclusions [189]. Her Honour found it unnecessary to decide the extent to which the power may properly be described as "exclusive" [200].

Gordon J identified four interrelated aspects of s 302CA that establish a sufficient connection: it regulates only participants in federal elections; it concerns gifts required to be or that may be used for federal electoral expenditure or matter; it excludes only State and Territory electoral laws; and s 302CA(3) leaves room for those laws to operate [203]–[204], [209], [212]–[213]. Gifts allocated to non-electoral purposes, such as a party's administrative expenses or issue-related advertising between elections, are not regulated [210]. Section 302CA does not exclude State or Territory laws on defamation, bribery or other criminal conduct [212]. Adopting the Commonwealth's submission, she described the provision as operating like a funnel that starts wide and then narrows [213]. The carve-outs in s 302CA(3), together with the confinement to electoral laws, significantly undermine any contention that s 302CA intrudes into a "heartland" of State legislative power [215]. Her Honour held that the extension to gifts that may be used for federal electoral purposes was not an insubstantial, tenuous or distant connection [218]. Alternatively, she said s 302CA would be supported by the implied incidental power or the express incidental power in s 51(xxxix) [223]. She referred to decisions upholding Commonwealth laws that exclude or override State laws, including Work Choices, Wenn v Attorney-General (Vict), Australian Coastal Shipping Commission v O'Reilly, the Native Title Act Case, Botany Municipal Council v Federal Airports Corporation and Bayside City Council v Telstra Corporation Ltd [225]–[230].

Gordon J rejected the Melbourne Corporation argument against s 302CA because it does not single out the States, is permissive, makes no provision for how State elections are conducted and leaves money earmarked for State elections subject only to State law [233]–[235]. She held that no Metwally issue arose because the permission in s 302CA(1) is subject to a condition subsequent rather than a retrospective removal of inconsistency, and that even if it were retrospective the result would be only to remove that retrospective operation [237]. As to the Queensland laws, she held the implied freedom challenge readily disposed of because the law is indistinguishable from that upheld in McCloy [264]. She found it unnecessary to decide whether a reverse Melbourne Corporation principle exists beyond that identified in The Commonwealth v Cigamatic Pty Ltd (In liq), because prohibiting a limited class of political donations would not infringe it [266]. Describing Commonwealth power over federal elections as "exclusive" merely observes an absence of State power over that subject, and the Queensland laws are laws about State elections [267]. Queensland conceded that if s 302CA was valid there was s 109 inconsistency, and Gordon J held s 275(1)-(3) and s 113B(1)-(3) directly inconsistent with the permission in s 302CA(1) [269]–[270]. She held that the soliciting prohibitions in s 275(4)-(5) and s 113B(4)-(5) are also directly inconsistent with s 302CA(1) [271]. The Queensland laws are not inconsistent with the wider Commonwealth Electoral Act, as the laws are cumulative, s 302CA does not cover the field and there is no indirect inconsistency [272]–[274].

Edelman J (dissenting)

Edelman J said "The point that ultimately divides the Court in this case concerns the limit of the Commonwealth's power to make its legislative regimes exclusive of the States" [276]. Untied donations that could be used for either State or federal electoral purposes were described by the plaintiff as the "unallocated middle", and his Honour said the Commonwealth regime leaves the New South Wales, Victorian and South Australian regimes unaffected in relevant respects but is inconsistent with the much broader Queensland regime [277]. He rejected the submission that Commonwealth power over federal elections is exclusive, saying Smith v Oldham "has no precedential weight" because the statements about State power were neither argued nor necessary for the decision [294], [305]. A structural implication of exclusivity was not logically or practically necessary, and s 51(xxxvi) sits in a section concerned primarily with concurrent powers, followed by s 52 setting out exclusive powers [298]. He said that if the s 52 approach were applied, State laws concerning assault, defamation, bribery, fraud or trespass would be invalid to the extent that they had any real connection with federal elections [299]. He also rejected the reverse Melbourne Corporation argument, holding that although the implication operates symmetrically, the burden of the Queensland laws on the Commonwealth was neither deep nor wide [308]–[310], [317]–[318], [320]. On the implied freedom, he held that the plaintiff's attempt to distinguish McCloy should not be accepted, noting facts in the special case including Crime and Corruption Commission findings and corruption investigations in Queensland [322], [326]. Different underlying circumstances did not affect the burden, the legitimacy of the purpose, suitability or necessity, and there was no gross or manifest lack of balance [324]–[325].

On s 302CA, Edelman J said "the weight of precedent is too heavy, and the stream of legal development has been too clear, to conclude now that Commonwealth exclusivity provisions, tailored closely to Commonwealth interests, are invalid" [282]. He held that ss 302CA and 314B aim to make the Pt XX regime a single regime regulating donations for federal electoral purposes, with carve-outs for State electoral purposes that were added after the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters recommended them and the Government accepted that recommendation [327], [333]. Distinguishing purpose from effect, he found no basis to infer a purpose to impair the States' ability to regulate their own elections: "That impairment was an effect of regulating the unallocated middle. But it was not a legislative purpose" [337]–[338]. Provisions in Div 3A and Div 4 already regulate funds that may be used, but are not required to be used, for federal electoral expenditure, and their validity was not disputed [345]–[346]. Distinguishing the Second Uniform Tax Case, he held that an exclusivity provision will almost by definition be incidental to the head of power supporting the regime, and that s 302CA is closely tailored to that regime and within power [353], [355], [357]. He left for another case whether a doctrine of extraneous purpose could invalidate a Commonwealth law [361]. He said it may be that a Commonwealth law occupying the whole area with a significant detrimental effect on the States would be invalid, but three reasons combined to save s 302CA: it is not targeted at the States, the carve-outs leave the States a significant margin, and the law is significant to the Commonwealth's own capacity to govern [364]–[367]. He found it unnecessary to resolve the Commonwealth's challenge to Metwally, because s 302CA(3)(b)(ii) imposes a condition precedent that creates no retroactive inconsistency [372], [374]. He would have answered the questions as proposed by Gordon J [375].

Orders. The orders were made on 17 April 2019 and the reasons were published on 15 May 2019. The Court answered questions (a), (b) and (c) "No", question (d) "The section is wholly invalid", question (e) "Does not arise", question (f) "Unnecessary to decide", questions (g) and (h) "No", and question (i) that the plaintiff should pay the costs of the special case [112]. Gordon J would have answered questions (a) to (f) "No", answered questions (g) and (h) that s 275 and s 113B are invalid to the extent that they apply to gifts permitted by s 302CA(1), and ordered the defendant to pay the costs, and Nettle and Edelman JJ would have answered the questions in the same way [151], [155], [375].

Why it matters

The majority rejected an implied exclusive Commonwealth power over federal elections, treating the power in s 51(xxxvi) as concurrent with State legislative power and leaving conflicts to s 109 and the Melbourne Corporation doctrine [46]. Their reasons hold that a Commonwealth law protecting political entities from State laws needs a sufficient connection with federal elections, which the recipient's identity as a registered party does not by itself supply [73], [75]. The majority also confirmed that the Melbourne Corporation implication operates reciprocally, protecting the Commonwealth from State laws as well as the States from Commonwealth laws [107]. The case applied McCloy to uphold a Queensland ban on property developer donations against an implied freedom challenge [97]. As Edelman J identified, the point dividing the Court was the limit of the Commonwealth's power to make its regimes exclusive of the States [276].

Cited in 62 later casesRelies on 148 casesSee every one in casewise

All case summaries