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Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia

(2010) 241 CLR 118 · [2010] HCA 28 · (2010) 269 ALR 233 · (2010) 84 ALJR 612

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), given on 1 September 2010, about summary dismissal under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the Federal Court Act). A New South Wales farm owner's claim that native vegetation laws acquired his property other than on just terms, in furtherance of agreements between the State and the Commonwealth, had been summarily dismissed in the Federal Court [1]–[2]. The Court granted special leave, allowed the appeal with costs, set aside the Full Court's orders and ordered that the Commonwealth's motion be dismissed with costs [35]. All seven judges agreed in the orders and none dissented, in three sets of reasons: French CJ and Gummow J; Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; and Heydon J [35]–[36], [62]–[63].

Facts

Peter Spencer owned a farm at Shannons Flat in New South Wales, on which restrictions on clearing vegetation had been imposed by reason of the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW) and the Native Vegetation Act 2003 (NSW) (the NV Act 2003), together the State Acts [1]. He claimed that the restrictions were an acquisition of property from him other than on just terms, made in furtherance of agreements between New South Wales and the Commonwealth [1]. He alleged that the Commonwealth laws authorising those agreements, the Natural Resources Management (Financial Assistance) Act 1992 (Cth) and the Natural Heritage Trust of Australia Act 1997 (Cth) (the Commonwealth Acts), were made for the purpose of acquiring property other than on just terms and were invalid by reason of s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution [1]. He also claimed declarations that certain intergovernmental agreements were invalid [37]. The property said to have been acquired included carbon sequestration rights, which the judgment notes are defined by s 87A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) and deemed by s 88AB of that Act to be a profit à prendre [6]. The agreements included one of 31 October 1997 under which New South Wales undertook to enact native vegetation conservation legislation, with Commonwealth funding from the Natural Heritage Trust subject to agreed objectives being progressively met [5].

Mr Spencer pleaded that he had been prevented and restricted from clearing native vegetation by reason of the State Acts and the State's refusal of permission, and that his property had been rendered commercially unviable [8]–[9]. A letter of 5 July 2007, exhibited to his affidavit before Emmett J, stated the finding of the New South Wales Rural Assistance Authority that his farming enterprise was not commercially viable because he could not clear native vegetation under the NV Act 2003 [9]. His amended statement of claim alleged that the legislative provisions formed part of, in the pleading's words, "a scheme or device designed to avoid or overreach the restrictions on the exercise of law making powers by the Respondent under Constitution section 51(xxxi)" [7]. The Commonwealth did not admit any scheme or device, any relevant arrangement or understanding beyond the intergovernmental agreements and applicable legislation, or any partnership or joint venture with the State [46].

Procedural history

Mr Spencer began the proceedings against the Commonwealth in the Federal Court on 12 June 2007 [1]. On 28 August 2008, in Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2008] FCA 1256, Emmett J, on the Commonwealth's motion, dismissed them under s 31A on the basis that Mr Spencer had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting them, and also dismissed his motion for interlocutory injunctive relief [2]. Emmett J found a serious question to be tried as to whether the detriment from the restrictions in the State Acts was an acquisition in respect of the farm, but also found that neither Commonwealth Act, by its direct, legal and practical operation, affected any vested proprietary right of Mr Spencer, that neither authorised an agreement requiring a State to acquire property on unjust terms as a condition of a grant, and that those Acts were not laws with respect to the acquisition of property under s 51(xxxi) [11]. Deciding the matter on what appeared on the face of the Acts and agreements, he concluded that there was no serious question to be tried, or no reasonable prospect, that Mr Spencer would obtain the final relief he claimed [10], [13].

A judge of the Federal Court granted leave to appeal, and on 24 March 2009 the Full Court (Black CJ, Jacobson and Jagot JJ) dismissed the appeal with costs in Spencer v Commonwealth (2009) 174 FCR 398 [3], [38]. Jagot J, with whom Black CJ and Jacobson J agreed, held that the case faced three fundamental problems: this Court's decision in Pye v Renshaw (1951) 84 CLR 58 on s 51(xxxi) and s 96 of the Constitution; the New South Wales Court of Appeal's decision in Arnold v Minister Administering the Water Management Act 2000 (2008) 73 NSWLR 196, which was indistinguishable; and Mr Spencer's acceptance of the validity of the State Acts, so that the NV Act 2003 would continue in force as the source of the restrictions even if the Commonwealth Acts and agreements were invalid [14]. Her Honour rejected the submission that the arrangements were a mere device to circumvent s 51(xxxi), saying that it overlooked s 96 and the clear statement in Pye, and found no direct legal link between the Commonwealth and State Acts analogous to that in P J Magennis Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1949) 80 CLR 382 [15].

Mr Spencer's application to the High Court for special leave was adjourned pending this Court's judgment in Arnold, and on 12 March 2010 Gummow, Heydon and Bell JJ referred it to an enlarged Full Court for argument as on appeal [3]. By a proposed further amended statement of claim filed on 26 March 2010 he alleged that New South Wales had expressly or impliedly agreed to make and adopt measures with respect to the acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms in return for Commonwealth money, and that the agreements and payments comprised a joint venture for the acquisition of property other than on just terms [33]. At the hearing on 16 June 2010 the Court invited counsel to address first whether the case had been suitable for s 31A, then adjourned, announcing that it would either decide the application on that argument or list the matter for further hearing [4].

Issues

The issue decided was whether the Federal Court could be satisfied, under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court Act, that Mr Spencer had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding [4], [49]. Related to it was the correct approach to s 31A(2), which both joint judgments addressed and which Heydon J said it was not necessary to consider [16], [36], [62]. The case also raised the effect on Mr Spencer's prospects of ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140 (ICM), which was delivered after the decisions below [4], [40]. As Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ put it, the allegations presented a factual question, whether there is any arrangement or understanding beyond what appears in the agreements and legislation, and a further question, what its constitutional relevance is if there is one [46].

Held

French CJ and Gummow J

French CJ and Gummow J held that the proceedings were not appropriate for summary dismissal under s 31A, as they potentially involved important questions of constitutional law and also involved questions of fact about an arrangement between the Commonwealth and New South Wales that may justify discovery and interrogatories [4]. They said that s 31A, introduced by the Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth) but of general application, drew its criterion from a British precedent, r 24.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules, whose test was "no real prospect" [18], [20]. They set out Lord Hope's discussion in Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1, including his statement that more complex cases are unlikely to be capable of being resolved summarily "without conducting a mini-trial on the documents without discovery and without oral evidence", and said his caution is relevant where a s 31A application requires consideration of apparently complex questions of fact [21], [26].

In the Federal Court and the Queensland Court of Appeal, a reasonable prospect had been understood in analogous statutory settings to mean a real rather than fanciful prospect, but they said that this "adds little to the words of s 31A" [22]. They said the section authorises summary disposition on a variety of bases, including pleadings that disclose no reasonable cause of action where the deficiency is incurable, unanswerable or unanswered evidence of a fact fatal to the pleaded case and any case possible by permissible amendment, and cases that are frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process, and that it is not in terms limited to those categories [22]. They distinguished s 31A, in its application to deficient pleadings, from rules for striking out pleadings such as O 11 r 16 of the Federal Court Rules, adopting Lindgren J's statement in White Industries Aust Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 160 FCR 298 that the existence and the pleading of a reasonable cause of action remain distinct concepts [23].

They said that the exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings "must always be attended with caution", and they quoted a statement from Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552, repeated in Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256, that the verbal formulae for the test are intended to describe "a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way" [24]. They said there "would seem to be little distinction" between those approaches and the requirement of a real as distinct from fanciful prospect under s 31A, while noting that the s 31A criterion may be satisfied on grounds wider than those in earlier Rules of Court [24].

In their view, s 31A(2) "requires a practical judgment by the Federal Court as to whether the applicant has more than a 'fanciful' prospect of success", which may be a judgment of law, of fact, or of mixed law and fact [25]. Where factual issues are capable of being disputed and are in dispute, summary dismissal should not be awarded simply because the Court has formed the view that the applicant is unlikely to succeed on them [25]. Where success depends on propositions of law apparently precluded by existing authority, that may not always be the end of the matter, because authority may be overruled, qualified or further explained, and "[s]ummary processes must not be used to stultify the development of the law" [25]. But where success is critically dependent on a proposition of law that would contradict a binding decision of the High Court, the court could justifiably conclude that there was no reasonable prospect of success [25].

They noted that ICM referred to the possibility of s 96 grants supported by informal arrangements between governments, and that an informal arrangement referred to in Gilbert v Western Australia (1962) 107 CLR 494 explained the alteration of a New South Wales statute after Magennis, which decoupled the statute from the Commonwealth/State agreement and resulted in the Commonwealth legislation surviving challenge in Pye [29]. They quoted the joint judgment of French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ in ICM, which found it unnecessary to consider whether an assumption that s 96 conditions may be disclosed informally reflected a correct understanding of s 96 and its relation to s 61, and which observed that the power conferred by ss 96 and 51(xxxvi) does not extend to a grant on terms and conditions requiring a State to acquire property on other than just terms [30].

The question, they said, was whether the pleading left open the possibility, requiring factual exploration and possible amendment, of an informal arrangement conditioning Commonwealth funding on the State acquiring Mr Spencer's property rights on other than just terms, and on the face of the pleading that possibility was open, even if not fully formulated or adequately particularised [31]. They considered it likely that there were negotiations and communications between the two governments, and said that records of them may be amenable to discovery and ancillary processes [31]. They said it was not necessary to determine whether a law providing for s 96 grants might be characterised, by reference to informal arrangements, as a law with respect to the acquisition of property, a possibility raising complex and difficult questions of law and fact [32]. Acknowledging that the decisions below came before ICM, they held that in the light of ICM, and even on what they called "the current rather stunted version" of the scheme or device pleading, it could not be said that Mr Spencer had no reasonable prospect of success [34]. They did not say he had a strong case, saying only that "it is not fanciful" [34].

Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ

Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ agreed in the orders proposed by French CJ and Gummow J and wrote separately principally because of the issues presented by s 31A [36]. They noted that a critical step in the reasoning below was that no Commonwealth law required or permitted a term or condition of a s 96 grant binding a State to acquire property otherwise than on just terms, and said that whether that proposition is right "need not be, and is not, examined in these reasons" [39]. Having regard to ICM, they said, it cannot now be held that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of success, and whether or how ss 51(xxxi), 61 and 96 intersect where there is an informal arrangement or understanding falling short of an intergovernmental agreement was expressly left open by three members of the majority in ICM [40]. They said the pleading, in all its forms, lacks precision and specificity, but the Commonwealth's motion was not directed to its adequacy, and whether it is embarrassing was not considered [41].

They saw the applicant's case as having two principal elements: some arrangement or understanding between the Commonwealth and New South Wales beyond the relevant Acts and agreements, and through it some relevant connection between s 96 grants to the State and the State's exercise of its powers in the way complained of [45]. The courts below had proceeded from the premise that such an arrangement was constitutionally irrelevant, but that question had been expressly reserved by three members of the majority in ICM and, they said, could not be regarded as foreclosed from argument [47]. It was neither necessary nor appropriate to examine the strength of the argument, and neither the factual question nor the constitutional question could or should be answered at this stage [47]. The factual question depends on what evidence is adduced, which may be affected by further interlocutory processes, and the constitutional question, even if not directly affected by the facts found, is not suitable for determination on a summary judgment application [48]. So this was not a case in which the Federal Court could be satisfied that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding [49].

Turning to s 31A, they stressed the word "reasonable", saying that the English rule speaks of "no real prospect" and s 31A of "no reasonable prospect", and that "[t]he two phrases convey very different meanings" [51]. They said that the combined effect of s 31A(2) and (3) is that the enquiry is whether there is a reasonable prospect, not whether a certain and concluded determination could be made that the proceeding would necessarily fail [52]. In this respect, they said, s 31A "departs radically" from the basis on which earlier summary judgment provisions were understood and administered, as illustrated by Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 and General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 [53]. They described Dixon J's test in Dey as "a test requiring certain demonstration of the outcome of the litigation, not an assessment of the prospect of its success" [54]. They described the test in General Steel Industries, where Barwick CJ spoke of a case "so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly succeed", as "one of demonstrated certainty of outcome" [55].

It is therefore dangerous, they said, to explain the statutory expression by reference to those earlier cases, and likewise to apply directly what has been said in the United Kingdom about the different "no real prospect" test or in United States decisions on summary judgment such as Ashcroft v Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly [56]–[57]. In their words, "[n]o paraphrase of the expression can be adopted as a sufficient explanation of its operation, let alone definition of its content", and a judicial lexicon of words or phrases to capture the operation of the statutory phrase is to be avoided [58]. Terms such as frivolous, untenable, groundless or faulty may describe many such proceedings, but none of them provides a sufficient chart of the limits of the power [59]. They accepted that the power to dismiss summarily "is not to be exercised lightly", and said that what amounts to no reasonable prospect can best be worked out through a succession of decided cases, as with the phrase "just and equitable" as a ground for winding up a company [60]. They emphasised that "the evident legislative purpose revealed by the text of the provision will be defeated if its application is read as confined to cases of a kind which fell within earlier, different, procedural regimes" [60].

Heydon J

Heydon J agreed in all of the orders but did not decide how s 31A should be construed [62]–[63]. He said that Pye v Renshaw was thought to be an obstacle to the success of the proceedings when Emmett J dismissed them and when the Full Court dismissed the appeal [61]. But in ICM, decided on 9 December 2009, a majority concluded, he said, that notwithstanding Pye v Renshaw the legislative power conferred by s 96 and s 51(xxxvi) does not extend to a grant of financial assistance to a State on terms and conditions requiring it to acquire property on other than just terms [61]. He said that three members of the Court "placed a question mark over the validity of legislation" relating to an informal arrangement providing for Commonwealth funding to a State if it acquires property on unjust terms, that the applicant had pleaded facts which might attract a favourable conclusion if that question is answered against validity, and that discovery of documents might assist him to establish those facts [61]. Whatever the construction of s 31A(2), he said, had the courts below been aware of what was to be said in ICM they would not have viewed a dismissal order as appropriate, and that was a sufficient reason for orders 1, 2, 3(a) and 3(b)(i) [62]. "Contrary to the opinion of other Justices, it is not necessary to consider the correct approach to s 31A", Heydon J said, and since, apart from some remarks in the applicant's oral reply and two tentative sentences, the parties had advanced no submissions on it, it was "both unnecessary and undesirable to say anything on that subject" [62]. He favoured order 3(b)(ii), the costs order, because it would normally be made, the applicant had consistently sought it, and the respondent never addressed what costs order should be made on the motion if special leave were granted and the appeal allowed [63].

Orders. The Court ordered that special leave to appeal be granted and that the appeal be treated as instituted and heard instanter and allowed with costs [35]. It set aside the Full Court's orders of 24 March 2009 and ordered in their place that the appeal to the Full Court be allowed with costs, that orders 2 and 3 made by Emmett J on 28 August 2008 be set aside, and that in their place the Commonwealth's motion of 26 July 2007 be dismissed and the Commonwealth pay Mr Spencer's costs of the motion [35].

Why it matters

The case concerns the limits of summary dismissal under s 31A where a claim raises an open constitutional question and disputed facts that interlocutory processes may affect [4], [47]–[48]. The joint judgments differ in their language on s 31A: French CJ and Gummow J spoke of a real as distinct from fanciful prospect and said there would seem to be little distinction from the earlier statements of the test they quoted, while Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ said that s 31A departs radically from earlier understandings and that the English rule's "no real prospect" and s 31A's "no reasonable prospect" convey very different meanings [24]–[25], [51], [53]. Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ said that the understanding of the expression can best develop through decided cases [60]. No judge decided whether an informal arrangement between the Commonwealth and a State can make a law providing for s 96 grants a law with respect to the acquisition of property [32], [47], [61].

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