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Spies v The Queen

(2000) 201 CLR 603 · [2000] HCA 43 · (2000) 173 ALR 529 · (2000) 74 ALJR 1263 · (2000) 113 A Crim R 448 · (2000) 18 ACLC 727 · (2000) 35 ACSR 500

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

Spies v The Queen [2000] HCA 43 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ), given on 3 August 2000, on appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales. A company director's conviction for defrauding the company's creditors was set aside by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, which then used s 7(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) to convict him of an alternative charge of improper use of his position [1], [3]–[5]. The High Court allowed his appeal, set aside the Court of Criminal Appeal's orders, ordered an acquittal on the defrauding charge and ordered a new trial of the alternative charge [105]. Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ gave joint reasons and Callinan J concurred in separate reasons; no judge dissented [1], [105]–[106], [137].

Facts

The appellant, Peter Mannery Spies, was one of two directors of Sterling Nicholas Duty Free Pty Ltd ("Sterling Nicholas"), which sold duty free items to overseas travellers, and he held 33,750 of its 50,000 issued shares [3], [7]. He and the other director, Mr McPherson, were also directors of Sterling Nicholas Holdings Pty Ltd ("Holdings"), in which the appellant owned 9,999 of the 10,000 issued shares [3], [7]. Holdings had minimal trading activities, and its only asset was a design copyright in relation to two signet rings [7].

Sterling Nicholas operated at a loss at all material times: for the year ended 30 June 1989 its trading loss was $1,014,472 and its liabilities exceeded its assets by $1,776,446 [8]. The appellant knew the state of its finances and that they were getting worse, and his efforts to sell its business to outsiders failed [10]. As at 22 March 1990 he had borrowed $176,354.80 from it, and he had guaranteed its bank overdraft and given a mortgage over his home as security [9].

A minute dated 17 October 1989 records a resolution that Sterling Nicholas buy all the issued shares of Holdings for $500,000, although it had no capacity to pay that or any sum [11]. A minute of 30 March 1990 records a resolution to buy the appellant's and Mr McPherson's shares, with an equitable charge over all the assets of Sterling Nicholas until the appellant was paid, and his loan account was credited with $500,000 [11]. In the words of the joint reasons, the appellant "had sold shares in an apparently worthless company for $500,000 and had gone from a substantial debtor of Sterling Nicholas to a secured creditor of that company who was owed $323,645.20" [11].

Sterling Nicholas had operated for years from premises in Oxford Street, Sydney; its lease expired in 1987 and it held over while the appellant negotiated with the owner on its behalf [14]–[15], [109]. In 1990 he agreed on its behalf to a fresh lease, and correspondence assumed it would be the lessee, but on or about 27 March 1990 he told the lessor's solicitor that the lessee was to be Holdings [16]. The lease to Holdings was dated 24 May 1990, its rent was below the market rate, and real estate agents gave the appellant an opinion that subletting could yield a profit of about $700,000 over the term and option period [16]–[17]. The prosecution contended that Holdings was worthless when the purchase was resolved on in October 1989, and that the lease was diverted from Sterling Nicholas to give Holdings a valuable asset [17].

Sterling Nicholas resolved to go into voluntary liquidation on 24 August 1990, when its debts exceeded its assets by over $2,000,000 [113]. That month it sold the Holdings shares to a third party for $450,000, which was applied in part reduction of its overdraft and in reduction of its secured debt to the appellant [113].

Procedural history

The indictment dated 24 September 1997 charged that, between about 17 October 1989 and 9 May 1990, the appellant as a director defrauded the creditors of Sterling Nicholas in their dealings with it by causing it to buy his Holdings shares for $500,000, under s 176A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) [3]. In the alternative it charged that, as an officer, he made improper use of his position to gain directly an advantage for himself by causing that purchase, under s 229(4) of the Companies (New South Wales) Code [4].

The trial was before Judge Armitage and a jury, who were told to consider the second charge only if they found the appellant not guilty of the first [3], [19]. His answer, as the trial judge put it to the jury, was that the transaction was entered into in good faith, that he had no obligation to renew the lease in the name of Sterling Nicholas, that the Holdings shares were not valueless and that Sterling Nicholas received value for money [18]. He did not give evidence or call any oral evidence [65]. The jury convicted him on the s 176A charge, no verdict was taken on the alternative charge, and he was sentenced to imprisonment by way of periodic detention for 18 months [3]–[4], [115].

In the Court of Criminal Appeal, Spigelman CJ (Sully and Hidden JJ concurring) said that the jury "could have been left with a belief that as long as they were satisfied as a fact that the shares were not worth anything, the charge could have been made out, even if the accused believed that there was real value in the shares after the transaction", and held that the failure to correct this was a misdirection so serious as to require the s 176A conviction to be quashed [20]. Instead of ordering a new trial of both charges, that court used s 7(2) to enter a conviction on the s 229(4) charge, Spigelman CJ reasoning that the finding on the fraud charge must have encompassed a finding of improper use of position [5], [51]. It sentenced the appellant to 12 months to be served by way of periodic detention, and he had served that sentence by the time of the High Court's decision [103], [121]. A footnote to Callinan J's reasons records that special leave to appeal to the High Court was granted by Gaudron and Hayne JJ on 10 December 1999 [122].

Issues

  1. Whether the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in using s 7(2) to convict the appellant on the s 229(4) charge after holding that the s 176A conviction should be set aside [1].
  2. What the statutory words "must have been satisfied of facts" in s 7(2) require, and the standard to which that must appear to the court [27], [49].
  3. What facts the jury must have found, and how far any such finding may have been influenced by the misdirection [56].
  4. What s 176A requires where a director is charged with defrauding a company's creditors, including what defrauding means and who is a person in his or her dealings with the company, in the words of the section [68]–[70], [76]–[81].
  5. Whether directors, by reason of their position, owe an independent duty to, and enforceable by, creditors [95].
  6. Whether there should be a new trial [102]–[104].

Held

Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ (joint reasons)

Their Honours held that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred because it was not open to it to hold that the jury must have been satisfied of facts proving the appellant guilty of the s 229(4) offence [6].

They said the power in s 7(2) is most likely to be exercisable where the other offence is wholly within the ultimate facts of the offence of conviction, as where common assault replaces assault occasioning grievous bodily harm, but that it can be applied in any case meeting the statutory condition [23]–[24]. The other offence must be one open on the indictment [25]. There would seem to be few, if any, cases where s 7(2) would authorise substituting a greater offence for a lesser one, and they held that R v Welker was wrongly decided on this point [26]. The words "must have been satisfied of facts", from s 7(2), indicate that it must appear to the court that, having regard to the evidence, the quashed conviction necessarily meant that the accused was guilty of acts or omissions which, as a matter of law, constitute another offence [27]. Regard may be had to the evidence and what was common ground, but the court must be able to say that the verdict "demonstrates that the jury were affirmatively satisfied of those facts which constitute the other offence" [27].

They reviewed English authority beginning with R v Hopper, saying it was difficult to escape the conclusion that a "rather cavalier approach" to the English provision was influenced by the absence at that time of any power to order a new trial [28]–[30]. Those decisions proved influential in New South Wales, even though the 1912 Act allowed a new trial, and also influenced cases in South Australia [31], [36]. In their opinion the English decisions should not have been followed in construing the New South Wales and South Australian statutes, and with the exception of R v Howe those States' cases "were wrongly decided, as were the cases on misdirection or non-direction that apply them" [38]–[39]. They said Pemble v The Queen, a decision of the High Court, "arguably was wrongly decided", and that the approach of McTiernan and Windeyer JJ in that case was wrong [40], [42].

Their test is that, where a conviction is set aside for lack of evidence, wrongful admission of evidence, misdirection or failure to direct on an issue, s 7(2) applies only where the jury must have been satisfied of some fact or facts underlying the conviction which are unaffected by that error and which constitute another offence independently of the offence of conviction [43]. It is not enough that the court thinks that, properly directed, the jury would or might have found the appellant guilty of the other offence, or that the appellant lost the chance of being found guilty on the lesser offence [43]. In cases of wrongful rejection of evidence, unreasonable verdicts or other miscarriages of justice arising in the course of proceedings, "there would seem little scope for the operation of s 7(2)" [43].

The power is "a very useful one", but it is one "which must be exercised with great caution", lest trial by judge be substituted for trial by jury [47]. They added that there is "a real question" whether, given s 80 of the Constitution, s 7(2) and its Australian counterparts apply to the trial on indictment of Commonwealth offences, without deciding that question [47]. Once the court finds that the jury must have been satisfied of the facts, there is no reason to use the power sparingly, as the need for caution is directed to whether it really does appear that they were so satisfied, although it would be proper not to substitute a verdict if the legal error may have put the appellant at some forensic disadvantage [48].

On the standard, s 7(2) does not operate unless it appears to the court "to the point of certitude" that the jury did find certain acts or omissions and that those acts or omissions, as a matter of law, made the accused guilty of the other offence [49]. Any outstanding issue of fact or opinion not covered by the facts so found prevents the use of the power, because the court's function "is not to find facts, but to give legal effect to the findings of fact that the jury have expressly made or which are necessarily involved in the verdict of guilty which they have returned" [49]. If any of the facts is the product of evidence wrongly admitted, or has or may have been influenced by a misdirection, non-direction or other error of the trial judge, s 7(2) cannot operate [50].

Turning to this case, the respondent identified three facts the jury must have found: that the appellant was a director, that he caused the purchase of the shares, and that his purpose was to advantage himself by becoming a secured creditor instead of a debtor when Sterling Nicholas was at risk of liquidation [52]. Their Honours said it "seems certain" that the jury found those facts, but the jury made no finding that he made improper use of his position or so used it to gain directly an advantage for himself [54]–[55].

They had difficulty accepting that the trial judge erred in the way Spigelman CJ suggested, as that issue seemed to have little, if any, relevance to the way the defence was conducted [58]. The relevant date for the appellant's actions and intention was the date he sold the shares, which was before the lease was executed, so his knowledge or belief that the transaction had given value to the shares was not a relevant issue [59]. To hold that he believed at the time of sale that the shares would be valuable "seems to enter the realm of speculation" [65]. They found it difficult to escape the conclusion that the summing-up was highly favourable to him, and said that he "seems fortunate" to have had the s 176A conviction quashed on the ground the Court of Criminal Appeal upheld [66]. But they said "there is a good deal more to the case", which suggested that he should never have been charged under s 176A in the way he was [67].

The prosecution relied on the first part of the second limb of s 176A, which concerns defrauding any person in his or her dealings with the company [69]–[70]. On the natural construction of the section, those words apply to the person defrauded, a creditor is not within them merely by being a creditor, and the offence must be committed in respect of that person's actual dealings with the company [70]. They noted the Court of Criminal Appeal's statement in R v Negline that the possibility of loss is sufficient under s 176A, but said that case does not address whether a creditor falls within s 176A where the defrauding is not alleged to arise out of the dealing that created the debtor-creditor relationship [72].

On the meaning of defrauding, they reasoned from R v Scott that a person may be defrauded without being deceived, so that deceit is not a necessary element, and statements to the contrary in Balcombe v De Simoni "can no longer be regarded as authoritative" [77]–[78]. The prosecution must nevertheless establish that the accused used dishonest means, the requirement they drew from Peters v The Queen, where all members of the Court except Kirby J held that dishonest means must be proved to constitute a conspiracy to defraud [77]–[78]. Here the prosecution therefore had to prove that the appellant used dishonest means to prejudice the rights of a person in his or her dealings with Sterling Nicholas [81]. They added that a charge of defrauding, as opposed to committing an act with intent to defraud, requires an actual obtaining of property or a depriving of the person defrauded of something regarded as belonging to that person [91].

The trial judge told the jury that the Crown must prove that the appellant by deceit or deliberate falsehood caused the creditors to be delayed or hindered, but he never identified any deceit or falsehood, nor does there appear to have been any [82]–[83]. The judge directed that the defrauding was constituted by selling the shares for no reason other than to delay or hinder creditors, and this was a misdirection for four reasons [87]. His directions suggested that an intention to delay or hinder is equivalent to prejudicing the creditors' rights or interests; they omitted that dishonest means are essential; they omitted that the dishonest means must have taken place in relation to the creditors' dealings with Sterling Nicholas; and they suggested that an intention to delay or hinder was enough even if the creditors' interests were not prejudiced [87]. Since Sterling Nicholas had no legal right to the lease, the creditors were no worse off after the purchase than if there had been none, even though the appellant breached his duty as a director and profited [87].

They said the prosecution case was "misconceived in a fundamental way", as it concentrated on the appellant's intention regarding the creditors rather than his actions with respect to Sterling Nicholas [89]. It never identified the property, right or interest of which any creditor was deprived, or the dishonest means [88]. The notion of intending to hinder or delay creditors came from the law on acts of bankruptcy and the Statute 13 Eliz c 5, where the hindering or delaying is of the creditors of the person doing it [88]–[89]. The appellant was not the debtor of Sterling Nicholas's creditors, who had no claim on him, and in a liquidation only the liquidator could claim against him [90]. No jury acting reasonably could conclude beyond reasonable doubt that he intended to delay or hinder those creditors, although it was open to find that he intended to protect himself from action by the company or its liquidator [90]. He had no relevant dealings with the creditors, obtained no property of any creditor and did not alter their legal rights, and it is not enough that an accused acted dishonestly or that the dishonest conduct had an effect on creditors [92].

They accepted that statements beginning with Mason J in Walker v Wimborne would suggest that, because of the company's insolvency, the appellant owed a duty to the company to consider the interests of creditors and potential creditors [93]. They placed such statements within Professor Sealy's description of words of censure directed at conduct already within some well-established rule of law, and said that giving some unsecured creditors remedies denied to others "would undermine the basic principle of pari passu participation by creditors" [93]. They quoted Gummow J's earlier statement in Re New World Alliance Pty Ltd; Sycotex Pty Ltd v Baseler that the duty to take creditors' interests into account is merely a restriction on the right of shareholders to ratify breaches of duty owed to the company, and is one which creditors cannot enforce save to the extent that the company acts on its own motion or through a liquidator [94]. In so far as remarks in Grove v Flavel suggest that directors owe an independent duty to, and enforceable by, creditors by reason of their position, their Honours said those remarks are "contrary to principle and later authority" and "do not correctly state the law" [95].

The appellant had no legal relationship with the creditors such that selling the shares constituted a defrauding of them, and the mere fact that a transaction with a company may have adverse consequences for its creditors does not constitute a defrauding of them even if done dishonestly [96]–[97]. If he breached s 176A, it was because he had defrauded Sterling Nicholas, not its creditors, but the prosecution did not put its case that way [98]. They said "it would be a large step to hold that person A has defrauded person B, with whom A has no legal relationship, because A's dishonest conduct towards a third party makes it less likely that that third party will be able to pay B" [99].

They concluded that the s 176A charge, as formulated and left to the jury, "was so misconceived that no factual findings underlying the conviction on that charge could possibly be used to convict the appellant of the s 229(4) offence", and that the directions on defrauding were in any event seriously flawed [101]. That was enough to set aside the s 229(4) conviction, so it was unnecessary to decide whether the same result would follow if the s 176A case had correctly applied the law and the Court of Criminal Appeal's reasons for setting aside that conviction were valid [101].

The prosecution should not be given the opportunity on a new trial to formulate a new case under s 176A [103]. On the s 229(4) charge, they weighed the fact that the appellant had served his sentence, and that it seemed prima facie oppressive to put him to the expense and worry of another trial of about 10 days, against the strength of the case, the fact that refusing a new trial would mean acquittal on all charges, and the vital interest of the commercial community and the public in directors who abuse their office not escaping conviction [103]. Unless the interests of justice require an acquittal, an appellate court should ordinarily order a new trial where a conviction has been set aside but there is evidence to support the charge [104]. It could not be said here that the interests of justice required an acquittal on the s 229(4) charge, and whether there should be a further trial was a matter for the prosecuting authority [104].

Callinan J (concurring in separate reasons)

Callinan J agreed with the analysis of the decided cases, and the identification of the situations in which s 7(2) and its analogues may be applied, in the joint reasons, which his Honour's footnote identifies as [22]–[48] of those reasons [136]. His Honour said that whether s 7(2) applied depended on a comparison of the elements of the two charges [121]. The offences "do not necessarily have identical elements", although as a practical matter they may well be identical in many situations, and it was "difficult however to see how a fraudulent act could ever be other than an improper act also" [127]. Because the sale of the shares and the application of the proceeds were both the means of defrauding the creditors and the means of advantaging himself, there was "a sufficient factual coincidence" between the relevant factual elements [130].

In answer to the appellant's submission that the tests of intention to defraud and improper purpose were too different, Callinan J set out the statement of impropriety in R v Byrnes by Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ and said "any intention to defraud necessarily involved, on either a subjective or an objective test, an improper purpose" [131]–[133]. He rejected the appellant's criticism of the respondent's reliance on the diversion of the lease, saying the evidence was admissible and highly probative and, with other matters, could reasonably have sufficed to prove both the intention to defraud and the improper purpose [134].

But "that is not the end of the matter": the trial judge's directions on the alternative charge would have sufficed, yet because no verdict was required on it, it was not possible to say whether the jury were in fact satisfied of those matters [135]. The verdict on the first charge gave no basis for holding that the jury must have made findings necessarily encompassing the alternative charge, because the elements were not necessarily identical and were not submitted by the Crown to be identical, and because that verdict was the product of an erroneous direction [135]. He would allow the appeal, quash the conviction entered by the Court of Criminal Appeal and order a new trial of the alternative charge "if the Crown is so minded in the circumstances of this case" [137]. His reasons do not discuss whether the creditors could be defrauded under s 176A as charged, or whether directors owe creditors an independent duty, so the views on those matters above are those of the four joint judges only [106]–[137].

Orders. The orders on the cover of the judgment are as follows.

  1. Appeal allowed.
  2. The orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal dated 17 September 1998 are set aside.
  3. In lieu, it is ordered that: (a) the appellant's appeal to that court be allowed; (b) his conviction under s 176A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) be set aside, with a direction that a judgment and verdict of acquittal be entered on that charge; and (c) there be a new trial of the appellant on the charge under s 229(4) of the Companies (New South Wales) Code.

The joint reasons state the same result at [105]. They also say that whether a further trial takes place is a matter for the prosecuting authority [104].

Why it matters

On substituted verdicts, the joint reasons state when s 7(2) can apply and hold a series of New South Wales and South Australian cases wrongly decided, and they refer to equivalent provisions in other Australian jurisdictions [25], [39], [43]. Callinan J's agreement extends to [22]–[48] of the joint reasons, so the statement of the certitude standard and of proper satisfaction at [49]–[50] comes from the joint reasons alone [136]. On fraud, the joint reasons state that deceit is not a necessary element of an offence alleging defrauding but that dishonest means must be established [78]. On company law, the joint reasons state that remarks suggesting that directors owe creditors an independent duty, enforceable by the creditors, by reason of their position as directors do not correctly state the law [95].

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