Stewart v Atco Controls Pty Ltd (in Liquidation)
(2014) 252 CLR 307 · [2014] HCA 15 · (2014) 307 ALR 562
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Stewart v Atco Controls Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) [2014] HCA 15 is a High Court appeal about whether a liquidator was entitled to an equitable lien over a fund created by litigation he pursued, for the costs and expenses of that litigation, where part of the litigation was an unsuccessful challenge to the security of the creditor now claiming the fund [6], [11], [24]. In one joint judgment, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ held that the principle stated by Dixon J in In re Universal Distributing Co Ltd (In Liq) applied and that there was no basis for excepting the case from it [1], [11], [65]. The Court allowed the appeal with costs, set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria and in their place ordered that Atco's appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs [66].
Facts
The second appellant, Newtronics Pty Ltd, designed, manufactured and supplied electronic components and was a wholly owned subsidiary of the respondent, Atco Controls Pty Ltd, a lighting manufacturer [1]. Atco gave Newtronics financial support from its inception in 1993, later took a fixed and floating charge over its assets, and by December 2001 was owed in the order of $19 million [1]. Atco had also given Newtronics' auditors letters of support, promising to provide funds so that Newtronics could meet its trading obligations and not to call up its debt within the relevant period to the detriment of unsecured creditors [2].
In January 2002 Atco appointed receivers to Newtronics after Newtronics was ordered to pay damages of $8.9 million, with interest and costs, to a former customer, Seeley International Pty Ltd (Seeley) [3]. The receivers sold Newtronics' business to another Atco subsidiary for $13 million, credited by book entries against Newtronics' debt to Atco [3]. Newtronics was wound up in February 2002 on Seeley's application and the first appellant, Mr James Stewart, was appointed liquidator [3].
Because Newtronics had no funds or realisable assets, Seeley, its largest unsecured creditor, funded the liquidator's work under a series of indemnity agreements, including one of 27 March 2006 covering the costs of an action against Atco to enforce an agreement evidenced by a letter of support, and any adverse costs orders [4].
In April 2006 Newtronics sued Atco, alleging that because of its promises Atco was entitled neither to repayment of its advances nor to enforce its security, and claiming damages of more than $13 million [5]. In December 2006 Newtronics joined the receivers, alleging that their appointment was void and claiming damages for trespass and conversion arising from their sale of its assets, and Seeley's indemnity was extended to that action [5]. The critical issue in both actions was the validity of Atco's security [5].
Newtronics succeeded at trial against Atco but not against the receivers [6]. On 3 September 2009, the day the appeals were to be heard, the receivers settled with Newtronics by agreeing to pay it $1.25 million (the settlement sum) [6]. Atco's appeal then succeeded, its security was held valid and Newtronics was ordered to pay Atco's costs of the appeal [6]. The Court called it "an unusual feature of this matter" that Newtronics' appeal against the receivers was unlikely to have succeeded, but the settlement sum was still paid as a result of the proceedings against the receivers and created a fund [6].
On or about 22 September 2009 the liquidator received the settlement sum and shortly afterwards paid it to Seeley as reimbursement of the costs and expenses Seeley had paid under the indemnity [7]. After the decision on its appeal was handed down on 21 October 2009, Atco demanded the settlement sum under its charge [7]. Newtronics refused on the basis that the liquidator had an equitable lien over the sum, and the liquidator estimated that the costs and expenses of the litigation exceeded it, a matter yet to be finalised [8].
Procedural history
Atco brought proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria, by way of appeal under s 1321 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), from the liquidator's decision to refuse to pay it the settlement sum and to pay that sum to Seeley instead [9]. Efthim AsJ upheld Atco's claim and ordered that the sum be paid to Atco [10].
On an appeal by way of hearing de novo, Davies J found for Newtronics and the liquidator [10]. Her Honour held that the circumstances identified by Dixon J in Universal Distributing applied and that the fund should bear the cost of its realisation, in her words, "in the ordinary way" [26]. She held that the liquidator was entitled to all the costs and expenses of the litigation, subject to verification, and rejected Atco's argument that he could recover only for the claim against the receivers, finding that the claim against Atco was necessary as the foundation for the claim about the receivers' appointment [27].
The Court of Appeal (Warren CJ, Redlich JA and Cavanough AJA) allowed Atco's appeal [10]. Each member considered that features of the case meant the Universal Distributing test either did not apply or did not apply directly and without qualification, and that it was not enough that the expenses were properly incurred [28]. The principal considerations were that the action against Atco challenged its security, was not pursued in Atco's interests or to its benefit, and was taken in Seeley's interests, and Cavanough AJA went so far as to say that it was in substance an action between Seeley and Atco [29]. The Court of Appeal instead asked whether Atco would be acting unconscientiously if it asserted priority without the relevant costs, expenses and remuneration being discharged, a test said to be consistent with Deane J's judgment in Hewett v Court [30]. It also upheld Atco's submission that Falcke v Scottish Imperial Insurance Co applied, so that the liquidator could not claim the costs and expenses of realisation [46].
Issues
The issue was whether the liquidator was entitled to an equitable lien over the fund constituted by the settlement sum for the costs and expenses incurred in the litigation against both Atco and the receivers, which the liquidator submitted was resolved by what Dixon J said in In re Universal Distributing Co Ltd (In Liq) (1933) 48 CLR 171 [11]. Because the undisputed facts appeared sufficient for that principle to apply, the question was whether some fact or circumstance made it inapplicable [25]. Atco relied on the language of Universal Distributing, the decision in In re MC Bacon Ltd, Falcke's case, the absence of any indebtedness, cl 12 of the indemnity agreement and s 564 of the Corporations Act, and the nature and purpose of the action [32], [43], [46], [49], [51], [57].
Held
Crennan, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ
The Court set out in full Dixon J's passage in Universal Distributing, which says that a secured creditor who comes in and has his rights decided in the winding up is entitled to be paid out of the fund produced by the encumbered assets after deduction of the costs, charges and expenses incidental to their realisation [11]. The Court said that Dixon J was stating a general principle, under which expenses reasonably incurred in the care, preservation and realisation of the company's property, and the liquidator's remuneration for work done to raise the fund, are charged against the fund created by the liquidator's efforts [12]. Referring to Deane J in Hewett v Court, the Court noted that an equitable lien is in truth a form of equitable charge, and that under Universal Distributing the charge securing the liquidator's realisation costs takes priority over a secured creditor's charge [13].
The Court treated the solicitor's particular lien over property recovered by the solicitor's work as more closely analogous, citing Lindley LJ's statement in Guy v Churchill that those who get the benefit of the recovery of money should bear the expense of recovering it [16]. A similar notion underlies Universal Distributing: a secured creditor cannot lay claim to the benefit of realised assets without the costs of their realisation being met [16]. The Court traced the principle to the earlier equity decisions Dixon J cited, In re Marine Mansions Co, In re Oriental Hotels Co; Perry v Oriental Hotels Co, In re Regent's Canal Ironworks Co; Ex parte Grissell and Batten v Wedgwood Coal and Iron Co [17]–[21].
The Court restated the principle more shortly: "a secured creditor may not have the benefit of a fund created by a liquidator's efforts in the winding up without the liquidator's costs and expenses, including remuneration, of creating that fund being first met" [22]. To that end, equity will create a charge over the fund in priority to that of the secured creditor [22]. The principle applies where there is an insolvent company in liquidation, the liquidator has incurred expenses and rendered services in realising an asset, the resulting fund is insufficient to meet both the liquidator's costs and expenses of realisation and the secured debt, and the creditor claims the fund [23]. In those circumstances it is just that the liquidator be recompensed, and although it might be said, in Deane J's language in Hewett v Court, that the secured creditor would be acting unconscientiously in taking the benefit of the liquidator's work without the expenses being met, applying the principle avoids that conclusion [23].
The undisputed facts were that the fund was created by the liquidator's efforts in realising Newtronics' chose in action against the receivers, that he acted with propriety and, on an unchallenged finding, in the course of his duties, and that Atco claimed the fund [24]. These facts would appear sufficient for the principle to apply [25]. The Court observed that Warren CJ's approach, which assessed the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation and its context, suggested a broad-ranging enquiry, whereas Gibbs CJ had cautioned in Hewett v Court against proceeding on general notions of justice without regard to settled principles [31]. The Court said: "A principle should be applied when the circumstances of a case fall within it." [31]
Coming in to the winding up. Atco submitted that it had not "come in" to the liquidation in Dixon J's sense, and Warren CJ had considered that Dixon J meant a secured creditor that had willingly participated in the realisation of assets, which Atco had not [33]. The Court said that the words of a principle stated in a judge's reasons are not to be applied literally but require consideration of what those reasons convey about the principle [32]. Universal Distributing itself involved a liquidator getting in uncalled capital that was subject to the debenture holder's charge, an action the debenture holder could not take itself [36]. In that context, the Court said, Dixon J may be understood to say that a secured creditor comes in to a winding up when it lays claim to, and seeks the benefit of, a fund created by the liquidator in the winding up to satisfy its charge, as distinct from a security holder that acts independently and enforces its security by its own action [37]. Atco did not and could not bring proceedings on Newtronics' chose in action against the receivers, and it claimed the fund and sought orders against the liquidator to disburse it, so it had come in to the winding up [38]. Its argument that it did so unwillingly and was effectively forced to claim the settlement sum did not alter that conclusion [38].
Exclusive purpose. By its Notice of Contention Atco relied on Dixon J's reference to work done for the "exclusive purpose of raising the fund", and on Cavanough AJA's view that the liquidator's principal purpose was to remove Atco's status as a creditor [39]. The Court held that Dixon J's reference was likely intended to convey only that work done in connection with creating the fund was to be reimbursed, and that it "most certainly does not imply that the subjective purpose of the liquidator is a relevant consideration" [40]. The proper question is whether, in a general sense, the costs and expenses could be said to have been incurred in realising the asset that created the fund, while whether they were in fact so incurred is to be decided when the liquidator verifies his accounts [41]. Davies J's unchallenged finding that the two actions were interconnected, because the invalidity of Atco's security was an essential element of the claim against the receivers, stood in the way of Atco's attempt to separate out the costs of the action against it [42].
MC Bacon. The Court distinguished In re MC Bacon Ltd because it did not involve an equitable lien arising from a liquidator's realisation of assets, but a liquidator's claim for reimbursement, out of a fund held by a secured creditor, of costs that included those he had been ordered to pay that creditor after his voidable preference action was dismissed [43]. Millett J's remark that it would be "difficult to imagine anything more unjust" than the order sought was, the Court said, perhaps best understood as addressed to that odd situation [44].
Falcke. The Court held that Falcke has no bearing on work undertaken by a liquidator in a winding up, because it stands for the proposition that a stranger who confers a benefit without an actual or implied request is not entitled to payment [47]. That proposition, and the similar statement in Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (In Liq), have no application to work done in realising assets as part of a liquidator's statutory duties [47]–[48]. Atco's mistaken reliance on them came from its wrong assumption that, as secured creditor, it must have requested the litigation [48].
No indebtedness. Atco argued, as Warren CJ had accepted, that when the settlement sum was received there was no indebtedness to support a lien because Seeley had already paid the liquidator's costs and expenses under the indemnity [49]. The Court held that the argument ignored Seeley's right to reimbursement and the liquidator's obligation to provide it out of the settlement sum [49]. An indemnifier has a right to reimbursement of all monies paid under the indemnity and a right of subrogation, so the liquidator was obliged to reimburse Seeley and the equitable lien attached to the settlement sum as a charge to permit that indebtedness to be met [50].
Clause 12 and s 564. Clause 12 of the indemnity agreement, headed "Section 564", required the liquidator to apply to the Court for orders giving Seeley priority over other creditors for its costs and debt if assets or damages were recovered from the work [51]. Section 564 of the Corporations Act empowers a court to order that property recovered under an indemnity for the costs of litigation be distributed so as to give the indemnifying creditors an advantage over others, in consideration of the risk they assumed [51]. In the Court of Appeal, Warren CJ considered that the requirement to seek an order displaced any implied obligation of the liquidator to account to Seeley, and Redlich JA considered that the clause modified Seeley's right of subrogation [52]. The High Court held that cl 12, in its terms, does not restrict the liquidator's right to claim an equitable lien, and agreed with Cavanough AJA that Atco, not being a party to the agreement, could not rely on it to preclude a lien [53]. The purpose of cl 12 was overtaken by events, because a question about how far Seeley should be preferred under s 564 would have arisen if Atco's security had been held invalid [55]. Once the security was held valid, the issue became whether the liquidator had priority over Atco to the fund, and since s 564 does not affect the rights of secured creditors, that issue could not be decided on a s 564 application [56].
Nature and purpose of the action. On Atco's principal argument, the Court held that it is no part of a liquidator's duty to ensure that litigation conducted in realising assets benefits a secured creditor or any particular creditor, because the duty is owed to the body of creditors as a whole and to the court, and the relevant benefit is the augmentation of the assets available for distribution [58]. The liquidator had a duty to realise assets and power to bring proceedings, had received counsel's advice, was not suggested to have been reckless or to have brought actions with no prospects, and acted with propriety [59]. It is also part of a liquidator's duties to scrutinise charges over company property carefully and, in some circumstances, to attack them, and such challenges are not uncommon [60]. The Court accepted that the action was in Seeley's interests but held that this did not affect whether an equitable lien arose [61]. The true purpose of the proceedings that produced the fund was the realisation of Newtronics' assets, and the challenge to Atco's security was "a fundamental plank" of them [62]. There is nothing unusual about an unsecured creditor indemnifying a liquidator to sue a secured creditor, and s 564 both acknowledges and encourages such funding through the preferential distribution it allows [63]. As in Universal Distributing, the purpose of the proceedings was the realisation of assets, and there was no basis for excepting the case from the principle [64]–[65].
Orders. The High Court allowed the appeal with costs [66]. It set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal and in their place ordered that Atco's appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs [66]. The formal order on the judgment's cover identifies the order set aside as the order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria made on 25 June 2013. The liquidator's costs remain to be verified under the directions made by Davies J [66].
Why it matters
The case restates the Universal Distributing principle in a short form and lists the circumstances in which it applies [22]–[23]. It holds that a secured creditor comes in to the winding up, for the purposes of that principle, when it claims a fund created by the liquidator in the winding up, even if it does so unwillingly [37]–[38]. It also holds that the liquidator's subjective purpose is not relevant, that the litigation need not benefit the secured creditor, and that the principle applies even though the litigation that produced the fund included an unsuccessful challenge to the claiming creditor's own security [40], [58], [62], [65]. Where the circumstances fall within the principle, the Court applied it rather than a broad enquiry into whether the secured creditor would be acting unconscientiously [23], [31].
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