SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
(2006) 228 CLR 152 · [2006] HCA 63 · (2006) 231 ALR 592
Summary updated 3 November 2026
Overview
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63 is a decision of the High Court of Australia, given on 15 December 2006 on appeal from the Federal Court of Australia. Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ gave one set of joint reasons [1]. The Court held that the Refugee Review Tribunal did not accord the appellant, a seaman seeking a protection visa, procedural fairness, in that it did not give him a sufficient opportunity to give evidence or make submissions about what turned out to be two of the three determinative issues [1], [44]. The Court allowed the appeal with costs, set aside the orders below, and ordered writs of certiorari and mandamus, quashing the Tribunal's decision and requiring the review application to be determined according to law [51].
Facts
In 2001 the appellant, a seaman on a ship of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, jumped ship in Port Kembla on 7 April and applied for a protection visa 10 days later [1]. In a statutory declaration submitted on 2 May 2001, he said a Filipino seaman on his ship invited him in 1996 to a Christian service at Dubai, that he returned to that church over the next four years when the ship docked there, and that he made every effort to attend Christian churches in other countries where the ship stopped [7]. He described being seen by crew members in December 2000 coming out of a Christian church in an Argentinian port, being confronted and taken back to the ship, and being berated by the senior Iranian officer, and he said he was allowed to leave with a warning that any display of interest in Christianity would lead to the termination of his employment [8].
The High Court identified three elements of his account of the events before he jumped ship as of present importance, because these were the elements the Tribunal later found implausible [10]. First, he said he returned home for medical treatment in February 2001 and told four named friends what he had learned about Christianity, that they urged him, in his words, "to renounce this heresy, and to embrace Islam", and that a few days later he began to receive threatening telephone calls accusing him of apostasy [10]. Second, he said that some weeks after the ship sailed on 11 March 2001 he was called before the captain, who had heard about rumours circulating in his home town, asked if he was a Christian, did not believe his denial, and told him he would be dealt with when the ship returned to Iran [11]. Third, he said he was allowed off the ship on 6 April 2001 to visit a doctor in Port Kembla, and he believed the captain allowed this only out of fear that he might die on board [12].
Procedural history
A delegate of the first respondent Minister refused to grant the visa, and the appellant sought review by the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal), the second respondent in the High Court [1], [51]. The delegate was not satisfied that the appellant was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the Refugees Convention, and concluded, in the delegate's words, that he was not satisfied the appellant "has a genuine commitment to Christianity" [13]. The delegate's reasons dealt directly with only one of the three elements, saying that the appellant's decision to return to the vessel on 6 April 2001 was not consistent with the actions of a person who feared being seriously mistreated or even killed by the crew, and they did not mention the conversation with friends or the interview with the captain [13].
In support of his application to the Tribunal, made on 5 June 2001, the appellant supplied a further statutory declaration, which the High Court said was, unsurprisingly given the basis of the delegate's refusal, directed wholly to demonstrating his commitment to Christianity [14], [51]. The Tribunal wrote telling him it was unable to make a decision in his favour on the information he had supplied, and invited him to appear to give evidence and present arguments [3]. He appeared in February 2003, the Tribunal member began by telling him she was not able to be satisfied that he qualified for a protection visa, and he gave evidence on affirmation and called witnesses about his commitment to Christianity [3], [15]. The Tribunal asked about the friends, the captain and the trip ashore, and his answers in substance repeated his first declaration, with two additions: one of the men on the ship was from his own town, and he was sent to the doctor with someone accompanying him and then returned to the ship [16]. At no stage did the Tribunal challenge what he said, express any reaction to it, or invite him to amplify the three aspects, and the first he knew that they were said to be implausible was when the Tribunal published its decision [3].
The catchwords record that the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision on the basis that the appellant's claims were not credible. The Tribunal identified three separate aspects of his claim, which it called "key aspects", as lacking credibility [18]. First, it said the basis on which the captain came to believe he was involved in Christianity was "so tenuous as to be implausible", considering it implausible that a personal conversation during ten days in port would attract the attention or interest of the Hezbollah and become public knowledge such that a crew member from the same town knew of it [19]. Second, it considered it implausible that the captain would accuse him of apostasy or even involvement in Christianity on the strength of a crew member's comments about personal conversations in port, particularly as on his own evidence he had not spoken of or engaged in Christian activities on board [19]. Third, it said his freedom of movement when the ship was in dock "belies" his claims that the crew considered him a criminal and that the captain intended to hand him to the authorities when the ship returned to Iran, and that had the captain so intended and told him, more stringent measures would have been set in place [19]. Together these points led the Tribunal to reject the claim that the captain intended to hand him over to the Iranian authorities, and it did not accept that those authorities considered him an apostate or actively involved in Christianity before he arrived in Australia [20].
The appellant applied to the Federal Magistrates Court for relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), alleging among other things that the Tribunal denied him procedural fairness by not putting to him, in the words of his amended application, "the critical factors upon which its decision was likely to turn" [22]. Raphael FM dismissed the application by orders made on 23 February 2005, saying on this ground that the three particulars did "no more than articulate the Tribunal's reasoning processes by which it came to the conclusion that it did about the [appellant's] credit" and that, conformably with the Full Court of the Federal Court in Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 (Alphaone), those processes need not be revealed to the appellant [23], [51]. On appeal, Graham J, a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia exercising its appellate jurisdiction, dismissed the appeal by orders made on 9 February 2006, saying (in SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 59) that a decision-maker such as the Tribunal was obliged to advise of "any adverse conclusion which would not obviously be open on the known material" but was not otherwise obliged to expose mental processes or provisional views to comment before deciding [24], [51].
Issues
The issue was whether the courts below erred in holding that the Tribunal had not denied the appellant procedural fairness [4]. The Court put the question as whether the issues to which the Tribunal's reasoning processes were directed had been adequately notified to the appellant [21]. Particular attention in argument went to whether the Tribunal's conclusion that the three elements were not plausible was one, in the Full Court's words in Alphaone, "which would not obviously be open on the known material", or no more than part of the "mental processes" by which it reached its decision [29]–[30].
Held
Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ (joint reasons)
All five judges joined in these reasons, and there was no separate concurrence or dissent [1]. They accepted as correct the submission of counsel for the Minister that, in counsel's words, "what is required by procedural fairness is a fair hearing, not a fair outcome", and they quoted Brennan J in Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-36 that the merits of administrative action, so far as they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power [25]. It was therefore not to the point to ask whether the Tribunal's factual conclusions were right, because "The relevant question is about the Tribunal's processes, not its actual decision" [25].
The judges said the statutory framework is of critical importance when considering what procedural fairness requires, and the particular content of the requirement depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, and they quoted Kitto J in Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475 at 503-504 on allowing full effect in every case to the particular statutory framework [26]. Section 425(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), in the form the Act took at the time of the Tribunal's decision, obliged the Tribunal to invite an applicant to appear to give evidence and present arguments relating to, in the section's words, "the issues arising in relation to the decision under review", unless under s 425(2)(a) it considered it should decide the review in the applicant's favour on the material before it (footnotes 1, 12 and 13) [1], [27]. The Act also empowered the Tribunal to seek additional information (s 424(1)) and obliged it to give an applicant particulars of certain information it considered would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision (s 424A(1)), and neither party submitted that any provision of the Act directly affected the existence or content of the obligation to accord procedural fairness [28]–[29].
Argument instead proceeded for the most part by reference to Alphaone, where the Full Court (Northrop, Miles and French JJ) said a decision-maker must identify any critical issue not apparent from the nature of the decision or the terms of the statute, and must advise of any adverse conclusion which would not obviously be open on the known material, but subject to these qualifications is not obliged to expose mental processes or provisional views to comment [29]. The judges said there were two reasons for considerable care in approaching the problem as a dichotomy: it is "far from clear" that the two categories cover all possible kinds of case, and there is "a very real risk" that focusing on them will distract attention from the fundamental principles engaged [31]. They said the Full Court in Alphaone had rightly stated the fundamental principle that a party liable to be directly affected by a decision is to be given the opportunity of being heard, which would ordinarily require the opportunity of ascertaining the relevant issues and of being informed of the nature and content of adverse material [32].
The Act, they said, defines the nature of the opportunity to be heard, and its reference to "the issues arising in relation to the decision under review" (the words of s 425(1)) is important [33]. Those issues will not be sufficiently identified in every case by describing them simply as whether the applicant is entitled to a protection visa, and they are to be identified having regard both to the Tribunal's ability to exercise all the powers and discretions of the original decision-maker and to the fact that it is reviewing that particular decision, for which reasons will have been given [34]. The Tribunal is not confined to the issues the delegate considered, and the issues are to be identified by the Tribunal [35]. But if the Tribunal takes no step to identify another issue and does not tell the applicant what it is, "the applicant is entitled to assume that the issues the delegate considered dispositive are" the issues arising in relation to the decision under review [35]. The point at which to begin will therefore usually be the reasons given for the decision, and unless the Tribunal identifies additional issues they would ordinarily be those the original decision-maker identified as determinative against the applicant [35].
Since the invitation to appear need not be extended if the Tribunal considers it should decide in the applicant's favour, the Tribunal will ordinarily begin the interview knowing it is not persuaded by the material before it, but unless it tells the applicant something different, the applicant would be entitled to assume that the delegate's reasons identify the issues [36]. The judges gave an example: if the delegate concluded that the applicant was a national of a particular country (as here, Iran), and the Tribunal invited the applicant to appear, said nothing about any possible doubt about nationality and then decided the review on the basis that the applicant was not a national of that country, there would be no compliance with s 425(1) and no procedural fairness [37]. What was obviously open to the Tribunal can be identified only by having regard to the issues arising on the review: if the only question were whether the applicant was entitled to a protection visa, rejecting some or all of his account would self-evidently be open because every aspect of the claim would be in issue, but if the issues are identified more particularly, other questions arise [38]–[39].
The judges noted it has been said more than once (citing Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 576 and Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1909 at 1918) that Tribunal proceedings are not adversarial but inquisitorial in their general character, and they said there is no joinder of issues and it is for the applicant to establish the claims, though that does not mean it is useful to speak in terms of onus of proof [40]. Even so, the Act assumes that issues can be identified as arising in relation to the decision under review, and while they may extend to any and every aspect of a claim they need not, because if the Tribunal had been meant to consider afresh, in every case, all possible issues, it would not be apt for the Act to describe its task as conducting a review [40].
The judges said the appellant's complaint could be described as being that the Tribunal acted on unstated assumptions about the nature of Iranian society, such as that matters of religious interest would not ordinarily be the subject of gossip in a town in a way that reached a fellow crew member [41]. But they said the complaint was "more deep-seated": he was not on notice that his account of how the captain came to know of his interest in Christianity, and of the captain's reaction, were issues arising in relation to the decision under review [42]. The delegate had not based his decision on either aspect, nothing in the delegate's reasons indicated they were in issue, the Tribunal did not identify them as important issues, challenge what the appellant said, or say anything that would have revealed them as live issues, and nothing it said or did added to the issues on the review [43]. Based on what the delegate had decided, the judges said, the appellant "would, and should, have understood the central and determinative question on the review to be the nature and extent of his Christian commitment" [43]. They concluded that "The Tribunal did not accord the appellant procedural fairness", because it did not give him a sufficient opportunity to give evidence or make submissions about what turned out to be two of the three determinative issues [44]. That conclusion decided the appeal, though the judges added that the third aspect, his being allowed ashore, was an issue arising on the review, because the delegate had concluded that returning to the ship was not consistent with the fear he claimed [45].
The judges added three general points, the first being that there may well be cases, "perhaps many cases", where the delegate's decision or the Tribunal's statements or questions during a hearing sufficiently indicate to an applicant that everything said in support of the application is in issue [46]–[47]. It is not necessary, and often would be inappropriate, for the Tribunal to put to an applicant in so many words that he or she is lying, may not be accepted as a witness of truth, or may be thought to be embellishing, and the proceedings are not adversarial and the Tribunal is not, and is not to adopt the position of, a contradictor [47]. But, the judges said, "where, as here, there are specific aspects of an applicant's account, that the Tribunal considers may be important to the decision and may be open to doubt, the Tribunal must at least ask the applicant to expand upon those aspects of the account and ask the applicant to explain why the account should be accepted" [47]. Second, after quoting Lord Diplock in F Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295 at 369 that the rules of natural justice do not require a decision maker to disclose what he is minded to decide, the judges said procedural fairness does not require the Tribunal to give an applicant "a running commentary upon what it thinks about the evidence that is given", a course likely to "run a serious risk of conveying an impression of prejudgment" [48]. Third, even if the issues are properly identified to the applicant, there may yet be cases that yield to analysis in the terms identified in Alphaone, and it would "neither be necessary nor appropriate to now foreclose that possibility" [49].
The judges found it unnecessary to consider the larger issues argued about what guidance may be had from decisions of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the United States on plausibility findings in refugee proceedings, which would require close examination of the legislative and regulatory premises of those decisions [50]. They said, however, that nothing in their conclusions "would appear to be inconsistent with the general approach taken in those decisions" and that, to the contrary, "they would appear to conform to the principles we have expressed in the context of the Australian legislation" [50].
Orders. The appeal to the High Court was allowed with costs [51]. The orders of Graham J in the Federal Court made on 9 February 2006 were set aside, and in their place the appeal to that Court was allowed with costs and the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 23 February 2005 were set aside [51]. In place of the Federal Magistrates Court's orders, the High Court ordered that a writ of certiorari issue to quash the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 27 June 2003 [51]. It also ordered that a writ of mandamus issue requiring the second respondent to determine according to law the application made on 5 June 2001 by the appellant for review of the delegate's decision [51]. The formal order on the cover directs both writs to the second respondent.
Why it matters
The reasons tie the hearing the Tribunal must offer to the words of s 425(1): unless the Tribunal identifies other issues or tells the applicant something different, an applicant is entitled to assume that the issues arising on the review are those the delegate considered dispositive [33], [35]–[36]. They also state what the Tribunal must at least do where it considers that specific aspects of an account may be important to the decision and may be open to doubt, namely ask the applicant to expand on those aspects and to explain why the account should be accepted [47]. They state limits as well: the Tribunal is not confined to the delegate's issues, the delegate's decision or the Tribunal's own statements or questions may sufficiently indicate that everything is in issue, and the Tribunal need not give a running commentary on the evidence [35], [47]–[48]. The judges did not reject the Alphaone analysis: they urged considerable care with the dichotomy argued from it and left open that some cases may yield to it [31], [49].
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