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The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 10]

[2009] WASC 107

Supreme Court of Western Australia · WA

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

The Bell Group Ltd (In Liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 10] [2009] WASC 107 is a decision of Owen J, sitting alone in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, delivered on 30 April 2009. It settles the precise form of relief that he left open in his earlier reasons in The Bell Group Ltd (In Liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation [No 9] [2008] WASC 239, where the plaintiffs established that the banks received trust property knowing that it arose from a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties [1], [3]. Owen J ordered that the Transactions be rescinded ab initio in so far as they purported to bind the plaintiff companies concerned, and that the banks repay the primary monetary relief of about $350 million with compound interest calculated on the full amount [70], [73], [160]. He refused the plaintiffs' proposed relief against the banks' rights under Transactions of Bell companies that were not parties to the action [122]. He also refused to stop the banks relying on the BGNV Subordination Deed against Bell Group NV, the sixth plaintiff, declaring instead that as between that company and the defendants the deed is valid and effectual [138], [160]. By consent, the defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiffs' costs, fixed at $82.5 million [160].

Facts

The plaintiffs were The Bell Group Ltd (In Liq) (TBGL) and other Bell group companies, their liquidators, and The Law Debenture Trust Corporation plc as trustee of the BGNV trusts. The defendants were Westpac Banking Corporation and a number of other banks, together with a fifth defendant, Equity Trust (Curacao) NV. Bell group companies entered into the impugned Transactions with the banks from 26 January 1990, among them facilities agreements dated 26 January 1990, guarantees, mortgages and the Principal Subordination Deed, which was executed as part of the 1990 refinancing [105], [160]. In Bell [No 9] the plaintiffs established a cause of action on the first limb of Barnes v Addy, but failed to establish a cause of action based on equitable fraud [3]. There is, Owen J said, no such thing as a 'group' Barnes v Addy claim, which, with the failure of the equitable fraud claim, meant that relief had to attach to individual companies and individual transactions [3]. The primary monetary relief was the disgorgement by the banks of the proceeds of assets realised or obtained through rights arising from the Transactions, which fell into five categories, and Bell [No 9] had decided that compensatory relief would be measured by an award of interest, not an account of profits [3]. The banks established that the on-loans from the three BGNV bond issues were subordinated, and the plaintiffs failed to establish that the BGNV Subordination Deed was procured by a breach of fiduciary duty by BGNV's director [3]. The publishing assets were sold under an instrument dated 5 September 1991 between the receivers and managers of BGF and BPG appointed by the banks and WANH, by a transfer of the shares in Harlesden Investments [123]. A condition of that sale was that the banks accept a discharge amount in full satisfaction of the Harlesden group companies' liabilities and release those companies, and on 31 December 1991 Westpac executed a deed of release and discharge [124], [129]. Not all of the Bell group companies that entered into Transactions were plaintiffs, and which companies were plaintiffs had been the subject of deliberate and considered forensic decisions [3], [77]. The liquidators had litigation funding arrangements, and one funder, SGIC, had acquired the domestic bonds, but Owen J regarded those arrangements as of no relevance to relief between the parties [3], [48].

Procedural history

The action was begun in 1995, with TBGL, BGF, BGUK, BPG and BGNV among the original parties, and six more Bell companies were later added as seventh plaintiffs [77]. After a trial of about three years, Owen J handed down Bell [No 9] on 28 October 2008, making findings of fact and stating conclusions of law on relief but leaving open the precise form of relief [1], [19]. Both sides then filed draft orders, the plaintiffs' sent under cover of a letter of 23 December 2008 and the banks' dated 23 January 2009, which were amended into final drafts dated 25 March 2009 [4]. The relief hearings took place on 6 and 20 February and 23 to 25 and 30 March 2009. The reasons, with a schedule of proposed orders, were released to the parties on 27 April 2009 so that they could suggest changes within the slip rule (Order 21 r 10) [152].

Issues

The main question was the precise form of the relief the parties should have after Bell [No 9] [1]. Owen J first had to deal with smaller matters on the draft orders, including declarations on the statutory claims, Westpac's alleged agency, the JNTH share mortgage, an unpleaded receipt by the banks of $641,000 of publishing asset proceeds, repayable to BPG, and bank interest paid before 26 January 1990 [9]-[18]. He had to settle the rate, rests, end date and tax treatment of compensatory interest [22]–[27]. He had to decide the banks' windfall argument, that relief should be limited to the difference between what the banks received and what they would have received in a notional liquidation shortly after 26 January 1990 [6], [42]-[46]. He had to decide whether the plaintiffs could have declarations and injunctions stopping the banks from enforcing Transactions of Bell companies that were not plaintiffs [79], [83], [86]. He had to decide whether the banks' release of the Harlesden securities meant that relief could not extend to the proceeds of the publishing assets [125]–[127]. He also had to decide the relief on the BGNV Subordination Deed and the terms of the banks' right to prove in the liquidations of BGF, TBGL and BGUK [134]–[135], [143]–[144].

Held

Owen J

Owen J held that statements that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment and that the counterclaim should be dismissed were unnecessary [10]. He agreed with the banks that, if the Transactions were rescinded ab initio as part of the Barnes v Addy relief, there would be nothing on which s 120 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 could operate [11]. As he had not accepted the notional liquidation scenario or the windfall argument, he held that the declarations on the statutory claims were not needed, although the plaintiffs' position was on record [13]. He did not think Westpac received the funds in a true agency capacity such as to make it liable to repay the full amount and then look to the other banks for an indemnity [14]. He made the order sought on the JNTH share mortgage, although it had been omitted from the list of Transactions the plaintiffs sought to set aside [15]. He ordered repayment to BPG of $641,000 that Westpac distributed to the banks on 23 July 1992 from the proceeds of the publishing assets, although it was not pleaded, because the banks did not dispute the receipt and he could see no prejudice to them in mounting a defence [16]. He declined to order repayment of bank interest paid before 26 January 1990, which affected Westpac ($568,700) and HKBA ($443,956) [17]–[18].

On interest, Owen J said he had been '(perhaps inexplicably) unsympathetic' to the banks' complaint that they had not been properly heard on it, after a three year trial with about 37,000 pages of written closing submissions [19]. He gave the banks leave to rely on an affidavit applying their proposed rate, based on the 90-day bank bill swap rate, only to illustrate the windfall argument, and noted that their method would reduce the interest by about $550 million [20]–[21]. He confirmed his decisions in Bell [No 9] to deny the plaintiffs an election for an account of profits, to direct that compensation take the form of interest and to direct that interest be compound rather than simple [22]. He held that from 25 January 2008 the rate would change from the Westpac business indicator rate less 1 per cent to the Westpac Reference Lending Rate plus 0.75 per cent less 1 per cent [23]. He accepted the plaintiffs' submission that interest be compounded at monthly rests [24]. He did not accept that compounding should continue until the banks repaid, holding that the calculation be made as at the date of judgment, after which s 8 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA) would apply [25].

The banks argued that interest should be compounded only on what the plaintiffs could have kept after tax [26]–[27]. Owen J did not resolve whether that was right in principle, and accepted it only for the purpose of these supplementary reasons [29]. He held that the plaintiffs bore the onus on the tax position, because 'the plaintiffs want the money so they have to establish their entitlement to it' [29]. He adopted the approach of Phillips J in Deeny v Gooda Walker Ltd (No 4) [1995] STC 696, which he said accorded with the approach in Atlas Tiles Ltd v Briers [1978] HCA 37; (1978) 144 CLR 202, and took a 'broad brush approach' to potential outcomes rather than making precise findings on tax [28], [30]-[31]. He drew a reasonable inference from BGF's accounts, which noted an unrecognised future tax benefit of $591.2 million, that BGF's available tax losses would cover any tax on compensatory interest, and that BPG and the seven BRL shareholders could use those losses through group relief [34], [38]. He said his limited knowledge of tax suggested difficulties in applying group relief across borders, and that whether BGUK's own losses could offset tax on its interest was problematic, but because BGUK's share was small he held that the risk of an unjustified windfall to BGUK did not require different treatment [39]–[40].

The banks argued that, had the Transactions not occurred and the companies gone into liquidation shortly after 26 January 1990, the banks would have recovered virtually all the moneys owed to them and the subordinated bondholders nothing, so the banks should disgorge only the difference between what they received and what they would have recovered, with interest only on that difference [45]–[46], [55]. Owen J concentrated on that fourth proposition of the banks [47]. On approximate figures, the primary monetary relief was $350 million and compound interest on it $1.2 billion, against a differential of $87 million and compound interest on that of $428 million [50]. He was not sure whether a distribution to subordinated creditors out of the recovered fund should be called a windfall, though anything the bondholders now received might be termed one in a more idiomatic sense, since they were unlikely to have received a return in a liquidation shortly after 26 January 1990 [51]-[52]. He held that the banks attached too great a significance to his 'back of the envelope' calculation in Bell [No 9] at [4287], which had acknowledged limitations and rested largely on the companies' books, when creditors not in the books may emerge in large liquidations [55]–[56]. He held that the notional liquidation scenario assumed that there could be no valid and effective restructure, when the Transactions had cost the companies free and unfettered access to their valuable assets and put the banks in a dominant position, and that there was an insufficient evidentiary base from which to calculate the banks' differential [57].

Owen J held that Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corporation [1986] Ch 246 and Ninety Five Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Banque Nationale de Paris [1988] WAR 132, on which the banks relied, were directed at a different issue and did not stand for the banks' proposition [58]. He accepted that it would sometimes be appropriate to limit interest to prevent a wrongdoer benefiting from its active participation in the breach, as in those cases, but held that the bondholders, creditors of BGNV which was itself a creditor of BGF, did not participate in any breach and were not wrongdoers, so the cases did not support capping interest [64]–[65]. He held that restoring the funds in the five categories could not be called a windfall, while the banks could assert claims for the companies' pre-Transaction obligations, but only on an equal footing with other ordinary, unsecured and unsubordinated creditors [66]–[67]. He said the problem arose from the compensatory interest, whose size was an incident of the passing of time, and held that as a matter of principle the plaintiffs were entitled to have compensation calculated on the full amount of the primary monetary relief [68]–[69]. He refused to replace restoration of about $350 million with payment of about $87 million, and refused to use the smaller figure as the base for interest, because the back of the envelope calculation was an insufficient evidentiary base for a finding that the banks would have been paid in full [70]–[71]. He accepted that it may well be that the interest award forms the bulk of the fund for ordinary creditors and perhaps subordinated creditors and litigation funders, but held that this consequence of the peculiar circumstances of the case did not require withholding primary relief or capping interest [72]. He described the windfall argument as not 'a frivolous flight of fancy' and as deserving close attention, but held that the preferable course was to order repayment of the primary monetary relief with interest calculated on the full amount [73].

On the non-plaintiff Transactions, Owen J restated that as a general proposition relief cannot be granted to an entity that is not a party, especially where its Transactions have not been set aside, and that there are strict limits on monetary relief for transactions not set aside, referring to Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Porteous [2000] WASCA 29; (2000) 22 WAR 198 [74]-[75]. In Bell [No 9] he had said the plaintiffs might be entitled to some relief on non-plaintiff Transactions if that were necessary to preserve the integrity of orders to which they were otherwise entitled, but that any such relief would have to be precise and limited [76]. He was concerned that such relief might become 'a triumph of form over substance', being in substance relief in favour of the non-party [79]. He said the difficulty was not a lack of power but the proper exercise of the discretion to fashion relief, which must be faithful to established principles and must not give vent to 'idiosyncratic notions of fairness' [80]. The plaintiffs sought declarations (pars O to DD) and injunctions (pars 25 to 40) to stop the banks enforcing rights under the Principal Subordination Deed and the BIIL Subordination Deed in relation to distributions by the liquidators to 14 non-plaintiff Bell companies [83], [86]. Relying on a distribution model prepared by Woodings, the plaintiffs said that without that relief external creditors would receive between $119 million and $678 million less and the banks would benefit by those amounts [88]–[89]. In their Group Color example, drawn from one of Woodings' charts, Group Color, a creditor of BGF wholly owned by the plaintiff Belcap Enterprises, would have $134,000 available for Belcap Enterprises, but would hold it on trust for the banks if their entitlements were unpaid, because the Principal Subordination Deed had not been set aside as to Group Color [98]. Owen J accepted the general formulation of the model and the problems it illustrated, but held that an adverse effect on how the fruits of the judgment were distributed was not a reason to override fundamental principles relating to relief in the adversarial system [102]. He assumed, without deciding, that the Principal Subordination Deed caught distributions to shareholders as the model assumed [103].

Because the rescission orders did not disturb the banks' pre-existing relationships with the companies, Owen J held that the banks were entitled to prove in the liquidations of BGF and BGUK for principal and interest outstanding when those liquidations began, and in the liquidation of TBGL under the negative pledge guarantees, subject to the rules on double distributions in Westpac Banking Corporation v Gollin & Co Ltd (In Liq) [1988] VicRp 48; [1988] VR 397 [104]. He raised, but said he did not have to determine, questions about any entitlement of the banks to post-liquidation interest, under the rule in Re Humber Ironworks and Shipbuilding Co (Warrant Finance Co's Case) (1869) LR 4 Ch App 643 or under s 563B of the Corporations Act 2001 [105]-[107]. He held that the 14 non-plaintiff companies, although Bell Participants whose Transactions were infected by the directors' breaches, were not before the Court, and that what the plaintiffs sought was 'rescission through the back door', which they could not do [108]–[109]. He thought it unlikely that the banks could have raised a defence against any of the 14 companies that was not available against a plaintiff, but treated that possibility as one reason for the general rule against relief for non-parties [110]. He held that once the liquidator of BGF distributed $134,000 to Group Color, that was an end to the legitimate rights and expectations between them, and that Group Color's claim against BGF arose in the ordinary course of intra-group dealings, not from the conduct the subject of the action [114], [116]. He noted the further practical difficulty that most of the 14 companies had been deregistered, so their property had vested in ASIC under s 601AD of the Corporations Act and there was no one to whom the declarations and injunctions could attach [118]–[119]. He noted that the plaintiffs had earlier had five deregistered companies restored to the register and joined as seventh plaintiffs [121]. He therefore declined to depart from the principle that relief generally speaks between the parties, refused pars O to DD and 25 to 40, and acknowledged, taking 'no satisfaction' in it, that the banks may recover more than the debts they could legitimately prove [122].

The banks argued that they could not be restored because they had released the Harlesden companies as a condition of the sale of the publishing assets, so relief could not extend to the sale proceeds [125]–[127]. Owen J accepted that the Harlesden securities could not now be set aside and the sale could not be undone, but held that the banks' propositions were the same as at trial and that the answer was the same, since before 26 January 1990 the banks had no access to the publishing assets and could only prove in a liquidation [128]. He held that the banks, through the receivers and managers they appointed, had by their own actions brought about the situation they complained of, so the inability to restore them to claim under securities they deliberately discharged was no reason to deny relief [129], [131]. He contrasted the non-plaintiff Transactions, where the plaintiffs' inability to obtain effective relief came from the entities not being parties, a situation which, save for the very existence of the instruments, the banks could not be said to have brought about [130].

On the BGNV Subordination Deed, Owen J held that because the directors of TBGL and BGF breached their fiduciary duties in causing those companies to enter into the deed, the first and third plaintiffs were entitled to its rescission ab initio in so far as it affected them [132]. Because he was not persuaded that BGNV's director breached its fiduciary duty, he held that BGNV was not entitled to an order rescinding the deed [132]. He refused the plaintiffs' par EE, which would have stopped the banks relying on the deed against BGNV, as 'rescission (by BGNV) by the back door', a door 'not only shut but deadlocked' by the absence of a finding of breach by BGNV's director [134], [138]. He held that the on-loans were subordinated on the same terms as the bonds, that the liquidators of TBGL and BGF could proceed on that basis, and that what happened between BGNV, the banks and BGNV's other creditors was to be worked out in BGNV's liquidation, expressing no opinion on questions of inconsistent trusts [137], [139]. Save for a declaration that the deed subsists, he refused the relief the banks sought, including an order that BGNV withdraw its proof of debt, which he held would unnecessarily interfere with the orderly and efficient functioning of the liquidations of TBGL and BGF [140]–[141].

On proofs of debt, Owen J treated the banks' right to prove as the means by which they were restored, so far as possible, to their former position, a precondition to the equitable relief sought [143]. He held that the amounts of the banks' proofs should be excluded from the declarations unless the plaintiffs' checking of the banks' calculations had been completed [145]. He held that, although strictly the right to prove would arise on the judgment being pronounced, it should be deferred until the judgment sum was paid, saying he was not sure whether it should be deferred further until all appeals were resolved [146]. He did not make the judgment conditional on an undertaking by the liquidators, whom he described as officers of the court, but required them to take reasonable steps to defend any challenge to the admission of the banks' proofs [148]. He refused the banks' proposal that the judgment sum be held in a separate account until they were admitted to proof and repaid, as an unwarranted interference with the insolvency administrations [149]. He said the right to prove in TBGL's liquidation under the guarantees was subject to the rule against double payment of dividends for the same debt [150].

After the reasons were released, Owen J resolved a dispute over whether interest ran to 30 April or 29 May 2009 by holding that, as the monetary orders were to take effect on 29 May 2009, that was the end date for compound interest [153]–[154]. He refused the plaintiffs' proposed order giving liberty to apply for supplementary orders pending any appeal, saying 'There must be finality to this litigation', and said such matters could be dealt with by consent order under Order 43 r 16, possibly under the inherent jurisdiction, or otherwise by the Court of Appeal once an appeal was commenced [155]–[156]. He repeated his grave misgivings about the effect of the conflict between the banks and the liquidators on the insolvency administrations, foresaw further complex disputes, and admitted failure in his hope to minimise the contentious issues between the parties [158]–[159]. He described the parties' agreement on costs, reached with the assistance of the Court's Registrars and avoiding a full taxation, as 'one ray of light in this otherwise gloomy picture' [160].

Orders. The Court declared that specified Transactions, including facilities agreements, guarantees, mortgages, the Principal Subordination Deed and, for the first and third plaintiffs, the BGNV Subordination Deed, are rescinded ab initio in so far as they purport to bind the plaintiff concerned [160]. It declared that as between the sixth plaintiff and the defendants the BGNV Subordination Deed is valid and effectual, and that the sixth plaintiff's loans to the first and third plaintiffs were subordinated on the terms and conditions applying to the bonds issued by the sixth plaintiff [160]. It declared that the banks received bank interest, bank fees, the proceeds of the publishing assets ($222,291,022.22 for the third plaintiff and $641,000 for the fifth plaintiff), the BRL share proceeds ($59,876,063.57 for seven of the seventh plaintiffs), miscellaneous receipts, legal fees and stamp duty as constructive trustees for the relevant plaintiffs and dealt with them contrary to those plaintiffs' interests [160]. It declared the banks entitled to lodge proofs of debt in the liquidations of the first, third and fourth plaintiffs under specified facilities and guarantees, but not until the moneys due from that bank under orders 5, 6 and 7 were paid or provided for, and ordered the eighth and ninth plaintiffs to admit complying proofs and take all reasonable steps to defend any challenge to their admission [160]. It ordered the banks to pay those amounts to the relevant plaintiffs, with interest at the Westpac business indicator rate minus 1 per cent to 24 January 2008 and the Westpac Reference Lending Rate plus 0.75 per cent minus 1 per cent from 25 January 2008, compounded at monthly rests, to the date order 6 takes effect [160]. By consent, and without prejudice to the parties' positions on final relief, it ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs' costs, including reserved costs, fixed at $82.5 million, vacated earlier costs orders except so far as paid, and released the security for costs provided by or for the plaintiffs [160]. At the parties' request, under s 11 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA), orders 5, 6 and 7.2 were dated 29 May 2009 and take effect from that date [151], [160].

Why it matters

The decision shows a court of equity fashioning monetary relief after a finding of knowing receipt, guided by the principle that equity intervenes only to the extent necessary to do practical justice between the parties, through a wide discretion that must be exercised judicially and on a reasonable evidentiary base [3]. It applies the general rule that relief speaks as between the parties to the action, refusing relief that would in substance rescind the Transactions of companies that were not parties [109], [122]. It also holds that the size of a compound interest award, an incident of the passing of time, did not justify capping it where those who might benefit from any surplus were not wrongdoers [65], [68]–[69], [72].

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