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The Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory

(2013) 250 CLR 441 · [2013] HCA 55

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

The Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory [2013] HCA 55 is a decision of the High Court of Australia given on 12 December 2013. The reasons are one joint judgment of French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ [1]. The Court held that the federal Parliament has power under s 51(xxi) of the Constitution to make a law providing for same sex marriage [10], [38]. It also held that the Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013 (ACT) could not operate concurrently with the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), so that the whole of the ACT Act was of no effect [4]–[5], [61]. The Court answered the questions reserved by giving judgment for the Commonwealth for a declaration that the whole of the ACT Act is inconsistent with the Marriage Act and of no effect, and ordered the Territory to pay the Commonwealth's costs [62].

Facts

The Legislative Assembly for the Australian Capital Territory enacted the Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013, a majority of the Assembly having decided that same sex marriage should be provided for by law [1]. As its title indicates, the ACT Act's object was to provide for marriage equality for same sex couples, not for some form of legally recognised relationship relevantly different from marriage [3]. The ACT Act defined marriage under that Act as "the union of 2 people of the same sex to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life", excluding a marriage within the meaning of the Marriage Act [39]. It provided for who was eligible to marry, how marriages were solemnised, which marriages were void, how marriages could be ended, who could solemnise them, and which marriages from other jurisdictions would be recognised [40]. Section 5(1) of the Marriage Act defined marriage as "the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life" [42]. The Marriage Act provided that a marriage can be solemnised in Australia only between a man and a woman, and that a same sex union solemnised in a foreign country must not be recognised as a marriage in Australia [3]. That definition was introduced into the Marriage Act by amendments in 2004, which also inserted s 88EA dealing with foreign same sex unions [57]–[58].

Procedural history

The Commonwealth, as plaintiff, brought proceedings in the High Court against the Australian Capital Territory, as defendant. The Chief Justice reserved questions for determination by the Full Court [62]. The questions asked whether the ACT Act was inconsistent with the Marriage Act or the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) within the meaning of s 28(1) of the Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth), or repugnant to either Act, to what extent it was of no effect or void, and what orders and costs orders should be made [62]. Australian Marriage Equality Inc took part as amicus curiae [2]. The Commonwealth, the Territory and the amicus all submitted that the federal Parliament has power to provide for marriage between persons of the same sex [2].

Issues

The Court said that the only issue it could decide was a legal issue: whether the ACT Act was inconsistent with either or both of the Marriage Act and the Family Law Act [1]. The Court had to decide whether s 51(xxi) permits the federal Parliament to make a law with respect to same sex marriage, because if it did not, the ACT Act would probably operate concurrently with the Marriage Act [9]. The further issue was whether the ACT Act, as an enactment, could operate to any extent concurrently with the Marriage Act and the Family Law Act under s 28 of the Self-Government Act [49].

Held

French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ

The marriage power. The parties' agreement that s 51(xxi) supports a law for same sex marriage did not settle the question, because parties cannot determine the proper construction of the Constitution by agreement or concession [8]. The marriage and divorce powers were included in the Constitution to avoid what the framers saw as a great defect in the United States Constitution, and their object was to enable the federal Parliament to provide uniform laws on marriage and divorce [7]. Arguments against the power relied on a settled understanding of "marriage" at federation drawn from nineteenth century English cases, treating s 51(xxi) as a legal term of art whose content was fixed in 1900 [11]. Those cases included In re Bethell; Bethell v Hildyard, relied on by Quick and Garran, and Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee, in which Lord Penzance defined marriage as "the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others" [12].

The Court said the case did not require it to examine theories of constitutional interpretation, and that debates cast in terms like "originalism" or "original intent" were not to the point [14]. The determinative question was whether s 51(xxi) refers only to the legal status of marriage that could be formed at federation, or uses "marriage" in the sense of a "topic of juristic classification" (Windeyer J's phrase in the Marriage Act Case), and the Court adopted the latter construction [14]. Agreeing with Windeyer J in Attorney-General (Vict) v The Commonwealth (the Marriage Act Case), the Court said the scope of the constitutional powers is not to be found by merely analytical and a priori reasoning from the abstract meaning of words [15]. The power with respect to "marriage" is a power with respect to "a status, reflective of a social institution, to which legal consequences attach and from which legal consequences follow" [15]. The status of marriage, the institution it reflects and the rights and obligations attached to it "never have been, and are not now, immutable", so s 51(xxi) does not confer power only over marriage as it stood at federation [16].

Even before federation, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 (UK) and equivalent colonial legislation had made marriage dissoluble by judicial decree, so that it became a voluntary union entered into for life rather than a union for life [17]. By federation the law of marriage, the result of a long and tangled development, was largely statutory [18]. Tying the power to the state of the law at federation would fail to recognise that, as Higgins J said in the Union Label Case, the Constitution is "a mechanism under which laws are to be made, and not a mere Act which declares what the law is to be" [19]. The Hyde v Hyde definition answered a question about the nature of marriage as understood in Christendom, and that cannot be the answer to the question of the nature of the subject matter of the marriage power [19]. The Court accepted that the monogamous marriage of Christianity would have been the central type of marriage at federation, but, following Higgins J, held that usage in 1900 may give the centre of a power but not its circumference [20]. Higgins J had said that under the marriage power the Parliament "could prescribe what unions are to be regarded as marriages", and the Court held that his reasons for rejecting the argument that the trade marks power was fixed by the state of the law in 1900 apply equally to the marriage power [21]. The Court adopted Windeyer J's description of the topic as laws of a kind "generally considered, for comparative law and private international law, as being the subjects of a country's marriage laws" [22]. That description recognises that marriage is a personal status of differing content in different systems of law, and does not fix the concept according to the law at federation [23].

The nineteenth century cases. The cases said to define marriage must be read in light of what they decided, which concerned succession to property or the jurisdiction of English courts to dissolve marriages contracted under foreign law [25]. Bethell v Hildyard held that a marriage between an Englishman and a Baralong woman under Baralong custom, which permitted polygamy, was not valid in English law, so the child was not entitled to succeed to her father's property [26]. Hyde v Hyde concerned the construction of the statute giving jurisdiction to dissolve marriages, where the marriage was formed in the Territory of Utah under a law permitting the husband to take a second wife [27]. Those cases governed which foreign marriages English law would treat as yielding the same or similar rights and consequences as a marriage contracted in England, and they necessarily accepted that other kinds of relationship could properly be described as marriage [28]. They reflect no more than the then state of judge-made law and do not define the limit of the marriage power [30]. Later law showed this: Brinkley v Attorney-General (1890) held valid a monogamous marriage solemnised under the law of Japan though it was not a Christian marriage, and the law in England and Australia now recognises polygamous marriages for many purposes [31]–[32].

The meaning of "marriage". Once marriage can include polygamous marriages, the juristic concept cannot be confined to a union with the characteristics described in Hyde v Hyde [33]. The Court held that "marriage" in s 51(xxi) refers to "a consensual union formed between natural persons in accordance with legally prescribed requirements which is not only a union the law recognises as intended to endure and be terminable only in accordance with law but also a union to which the law accords a status affecting and defining mutual rights and obligations" [33]. Some jurisdictions outside Australia permit polygamy and some now permit marriage between same sex couples [35]. The Court said that nineteenth century terms of approval or disapproval, such as references to Christendom or to infidel nations, "served only to obscure circularity of reasoning" [36]. It was not useful or relevant to examine how or why other legal systems came to provide for same sex marriage; what mattered was that the juristic concept of marriage to which s 51(xxi) refers embraces such unions [37]. The Court concluded that, as used in s 51(xxi), "marriage" "is a term which includes a marriage between persons of the same sex" [38]. The Parliament's power under s 122 of the Constitution need not be considered [56].

The ACT Act. Most provisions of the ACT Act are very similar to provisions of the Marriage Act or the Family Law Act [41]. Both the ACT Act and the Marriage Act are directed to creating a legal status from the agreement of natural persons to form an enduring personal union that can be dissolved only according to law and entails legal consequences for mutual support [42]. The only difference in eligibility was that the Marriage Act allows persons aged between 16 and 18 to marry with consents or judicial authorisation, while the ACT Act allowed an adult to marry [43]. Because a marriage under the ACT Act was void if the parties were ineligible, and eligibility required that they be unable to marry under the Marriage Act, a marriage solemnised under the ACT Act after the federal definition was amended to permit same sex marriage would be void [45]. The ACT Act provided for dissolution by the ACT Supreme Court after 12 months' separation, in terms like s 48 of the Family Law Act, and for automatic dissolution if a party married another person under a Commonwealth law or a substantially corresponding law of another jurisdiction [46]. The fundamental observation was that the ACT Act creates a legal status, defined as the union of two natural persons to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life [47].

Inconsistency under s 28. Section 28(1) of the Self-Government Act provides that a provision of an enactment has no effect to the extent that it is inconsistent with a law in force in the Territory, but is taken to be consistent to the extent that it is capable of operating concurrently with that law [48]. The ACT Act is an enactment, and the Marriage Act and the Family Law Act are laws in force in the Territory [49]. The Territory submitted that a Territory law could be consistent with a Commonwealth law intended to be a complete statement of the law to the extent that it could operate concurrently, but the Court said it was not explained how that could happen [51]. The Territory accepted, correctly, that s 28 denies a Territory law effect to the extent of its inconsistency rather than denying power, and the Court held that, if a Commonwealth law is a complete statement of the law governing a relation or thing, a Territory law governing some aspect of it cannot operate concurrently to any extent [52]. Section 28 is a constraint on the operation of the Territory enactment and does not require federal laws to be read down to permit concurrent operation, so the Territory's submissions failed so far as they depended on reading down the federal law [53]–[54]. The starting point is the legal meaning of the federal Act, and only then can concurrent operation be considered [54].

The Court rejected as flawed the argument that, because the Marriage Act defines marriage as between persons of the opposite sex, the ACT Act could operate concurrently with respect to marriage between persons of the same sex [55]. The absence of a federal provision permitting same sex marriage does not mean that the Territory may make one, and there can be no concurrent operation if, properly construed, the Marriage Act provides that the only marriage permitted is one formed or recognised under that Act [56]. The Marriage Act, at least in its present form, is a comprehensive and exhaustive statement of the law with respect to the creation and recognition of the legal status of marriage [57]. The 2004 amendments, which introduced the definition, applied it to solemnisation and to the recognition of foreign marriages, and inserted s 88EA, made that plain [57]–[58]. Read in the context of the whole Act, those provisions contain the implicit negative proposition that the kind of marriage the Act provides for is the only kind that may be formed or recognised in Australia [59]. The ACT Act's provisions for marriage therefore cannot operate concurrently with the Marriage Act and are inoperative, because giving effect to them would alter, impair or detract from the Marriage Act [59]. Under the Marriage Act a person has no legal capacity to attain the status of marriage by entering a union with a person of the same sex [59].

The Court rejected the Territory's submission that the two Acts do not regulate the same status of marriage: the ACT Act provides for a status of marriage, as its short and long titles show, and that status falls within the same topic of juristic classification [60]. The topic within which a status falls is identified by its legal content and consequences, not merely the description given to it [60]. Because the ACT Act's marriage provisions are inoperative, its provisions on the rights of parties to such marriages and on their dissolution can have no valid operation [5], [61]. Whether those provisions could have operated concurrently with the Family Law Act was not reached, and it was not necessary to consider whether the ACT Act was, in some separate sense, repugnant to the Marriage Act [61].

Orders. The Court answered the questions reserved by holding that the whole of the ACT Act is inconsistent with the Marriage Act and is of no effect [62]. Question 3, about the extent to which the ACT Act was void if repugnant, and questions 4 to 6, about the Family Law Act, did not need to be answered [62]. There was judgment for the Commonwealth for a declaration that the whole of the ACT Act is inconsistent with the Marriage Act and of no effect [62]. The Territory was ordered to pay the Commonwealth's costs of the questions reserved and of the proceedings generally [62].

Why it matters

The case holds that s 51(xxi) gives the federal Parliament power to make a national law providing for same sex marriage [38], [56]. The Court said that, under the Constitution and federal law as it then stood, whether same sex marriage should be provided for by law is a matter for the federal Parliament [1]. The ACT Act's marriage provisions remain inoperative so long as the Marriage Act defines marriage as it does and provides, in effect, that only a marriage within that definition may be formed or recognised in Australia [61]. The case treats "marriage" in s 51(xxi) as a topic of juristic classification rather than a term tied to the law at federation [14], [19]. It also holds that under s 28 of the Self-Government Act a Territory law cannot operate concurrently to any extent with a Commonwealth law that is a complete statement of the law on the subject [52].

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