casewise

The Queen v Getachew

(2012) 248 CLR 22 · [2012] HCA 10

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 11 November 2026

Overview

The Queen v Getachew [2012] HCA 10 is a decision of the High Court of Australia, given on 28 March 2012 on appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria, about the mental element of rape under the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) and when a trial judge must direct a jury about an accused's belief in consent. French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ gave one joint judgment. The Court held that, because no evidence was led and no assertion was made at the trial that the accused believed the complainant was consenting, there was no occasion to give the direction about his state of mind that the Court of Appeal had held should have been given [34]–[36]. It allowed the prosecution's appeal, set aside orders 2, 3 and 4 of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria made on 2 June 2011 and, in their place, ordered that the appeal to that Court be dismissed [9], [37].

Facts

The respondent, called "the accused" in the reasons, was presented in the County Court of Victoria on one count of rape [1]. The presentment alleged that he had intentionally sexually penetrated the complainant without her consent while being aware that she was not consenting or might not be consenting [1].

The complainant gave evidence that, after a night of drinking in the City of Melbourne with three others, one of whom was the accused, she was, in her words, "getting very drunk" [2]. In the early hours of the morning the four went to a house in the suburbs, where she and the accused lay on a mattress on the floor and the other two shared a bed in the same room [2].

She said that as she was going to sleep the accused started touching her leg and she told him to go away, and that when he touched her again she told him she would sleep in the car if he did not stop [3]. According to her, he offered to sleep elsewhere, but she told him not to worry about it, just not to touch her and to let her sleep, and she then went to sleep [3]. Her evidence was that she awoke with the accused lying behind her, her clothing disarranged and the accused penetrating her anus with his penis [3].

The accused gave no evidence at his trial, and his case was that he had not penetrated the complainant [4].

Procedural history

The trial judge told the jury that the element of awareness that the complainant was not or might not be consenting "will be satisfied if ... [the accused] was aware that [the complainant] was either asleep, or unconscious, or so affected by alcohol as to be incapable of freely agreeing, or aware that she might be in one of these states" [4]. The trial judge added that the element would also be satisfied if the prosecution proved, on any other basis arising from the evidence, that the accused was aware that the complainant was not or might not be consenting or freely agreeing [4]. The trial judge also told the jury that the accused had not raised, as an issue at the trial, that he had thought or believed that the complainant was consenting, and it was not disputed in the High Court that this was right [5].

The accused was convicted and sought leave to appeal against his conviction to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria [6]. The Court of Appeal (Buchanan and Bongiorno JJA and Lasry AJA), in Getachew v The Queen [2011] VSCA 164, accepted the accused's submission that the trial judge's directions had "conflated the complainant's lack of consent with mens rea" [7]. It also accepted that the jury should have been directed that the prosecution might fail to prove the mental element of rape even though a belief in consent on the part of the accused was unreasonable because he was aware that the complainant might be asleep [7].

All members of the Court of Appeal decided that the trial judge should have directed the jury to consider that possibility [8]. A majority (Buchanan and Bongiorno JJA) concluded that leave to appeal should be granted, the appeal allowed, the conviction set aside and a new trial had [8]. Lasry AJA would have dismissed the appeal, on the footing that no substantial miscarriage of justice had actually occurred, because, in words the High Court quotes from Lasry AJA, "a correct direction from the trial judge would have made no difference to the verdict" [8].

By special leave, the prosecution appealed to the High Court [9].

Issues

The determinative issue, in both the Court of Appeal and the High Court, was whether any question of law was wrongly decided, or a miscarriage of justice occasioned on any other ground, because the trial judge did not tell the jury that the prosecution had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused held no belief (even an unreasonable belief) that the complainant consented to penetration [6]. The High Court said that whether there was a misdirection of the kind the Court of Appeal found turned on two considerations: the proper construction of the general provisions on sexual offences in subdiv (8) of Div 1 of Pt I (ss 35-37B) of the Crimes Act in their application to s 38, and what the real issues were at the trial [10]. The catchwords frame the questions as whether it was open on the evidence for the jury to conclude that the accused may have believed the complainant to be awake, and whether a trial judge is permitted or required to direct a jury about an accused's belief in consent if there is no evidence or assertion that the accused believed in consent.

Held

French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ

These five judges wrote one joint judgment; there were no separate reasons and no dissent.

Since the Crimes (Rape) Act 1991 (Vic), the elements of rape, including the absence of consent, have been statutorily defined, so that consideration of any question about the law of rape in Victoria must "begin and end in consideration of the relevant statutory provisions" [11]. Decisions about the common law of rape, whether made before or after the 1991 Act, are useful only if they assist in construing the applicable provisions [11]. Contrary to a central submission of the accused, the Court held that the 1991 Act did not codify the common law of rape, and that to the extent the Court of Appeal held otherwise in Worsnop v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 187, Worsnop should not be followed [12]. The 1991 Act was enacted to give effect to recommendations in the Victorian Law Reform Commission's report Rape: Reform of Law and Procedure and, whatever the uncertain state of the common law about lack of consent, it "sought to prescribe the law that governed this question" [12]–[13]. It defined rape in a new s 38 as intentional penetration without the complainant's consent while being aware that the complainant is not consenting or might not be consenting, and defined consent in a new s 36 as free agreement, identifying circumstances that negative free agreement, including the complainant being asleep [14].

Following a further report by the Victorian Law Reform Commission in 2004, the Crimes Amendment (Rape) Act 2007 (Vic) amended the fault element, so that s 38(2)(a) covered intentional sexual penetration without consent either while being aware that the person is not consenting or might not be consenting, or while not giving any thought to whether the person is not consenting or might not be consenting [16]. It was therefore no longer necessary for the prosecution to show awareness, because showing that an accused did not give thought to the matter would suffice if the other elements were demonstrated [16]. Neither the 2007 Act nor the earlier amendments gave effect to the 2004 report's recommendation that what it called the defence of honest belief in consent not be available where a s 36 circumstance existed and the accused was aware of it [17]. Instead, the accused's awareness of such a circumstance became a matter on which the judge had to direct the jury, for the jury to consider in deciding whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was aware that the complainant was not or might not be consenting [17].

The 2007 Act inserted a new s 37 and ss 37AAA and 37AA about jury directions [18]. Section 37(1) required the judge to direct the jury on the matters in ss 37AAA and 37AA if relevant to the facts in issue, and s 37(2) said a judge must not give such a direction if it was not relevant to the facts in issue [19]. Section 37AAA included a direction that, if the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a s 36 circumstance exists in relation to the complainant, the jury must find that the complainant was not consenting [19]. In the words of s 37AA, its directions were to be given "if evidence is led or an assertion is made that the accused believed that the complainant was consenting to the sexual act" [20]. The jury then had to consider any evidence of that belief and whether it was reasonable in all the relevant circumstances, having regard to the accused's awareness of any s 36 circumstance found to exist, any steps the accused took to ascertain consent and any other relevant matters [20].

The Court made two "critical observations" about s 37AA: its directions depended on evidence being led or an assertion being made that the accused believed the complainant was consenting, and it was expressed to be for the purposes of s 37, so that s 37(1) required the directions when that criterion was met and s 37(2) prohibited them when it was not [21]. It followed that an accused's belief in consent is relevant at a trial for rape only if evidence is led or an assertion is made that the accused did believe that the complainant was consenting [22]. An assertion would encompass an accused's out of court statement, commonly in a record of interview with police, tendered in evidence and containing an assertion of that belief, and there are other ways in which the issue may be enlivened at trial [22].

The Court stressed that s 38(2) prescribed the mental element as awareness that the complainant was not or might not be consenting or, after the 2007 Act, not giving any thought to that question [23]. "Belief in consent is not the controlling concept", and it is relevant only so far as it sheds light on the accused's awareness that the complainant was not or might not be consenting [23]. Where evidence or an assertion of belief was raised, s 37AA obliged the jury to consider whether the belief was reasonable, but no relevant provision of the Crimes Act said that an accused must be taken to be aware that the complainant might not be consenting unless the accused reasonably believed that the complainant was consenting [24]. Rather, whether the belief was reasonable would bear upon whether the accused in fact held it [24]. That did not mean the judge had to direct the jury, in a case with no such evidence or assertion, that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had no belief in consent [25]. Read with s 37, s 37AA meant that directions about an accused's belief in consent are to be given only if the possibility that the accused held such a belief has been raised at the trial, by evidence or by assertion [25].

The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill for the 2007 Act said that "belief in consent and awareness of the possibility of an absence of consent are not mutually exclusive", and the Court said this may be accepted if belief in consent is treated as encompassing a state of mind where the accused accepts that it is possible that the complainant might not be consenting [26]. The Court said that whether such a state of mind is properly described as a belief in consent "need not be explored" [26]. On the face of it, the Court said, evidence of a state of mind that did not exclude that possibility appears not to engage at all with, let alone negate, the central statutory requirement of awareness [26]. If an accused asserted or gave evidence of a belief in consent, the prosecution may yet demonstrate to the requisite standard either that the accused was aware that the complainant might not be consenting or that the asserted belief was not held [27]. "An accused's belief that the complainant may have been consenting, even probably was consenting, is no answer to a charge of rape", because each of those forms of belief shows that the accused was aware that the complainant might not be consenting or, at least, did not turn his or her mind to that question [27].

No relevant provision of the Crimes Act required that an accused who asserted a belief in consent must be taken to have been aware that the complainant was not or might not be consenting because the accused was aware that a s 36 circumstance, here the complainant being asleep, did or might exist [28]. So if evidence was led or an assertion made of belief in consent, showing that the accused knew the complainant was or might be asleep did not require the conclusion that the accused was aware that the complainant was not or might not be consenting, and s 37AA required the judge to direct the jury to take account of the asserted belief [28].

Turning to this trial, the Court said directions are to be moulded in the light of the proper construction of the Crimes Act and, no less importantly, the real issues in the trial [29]. As it said it had repeatedly pointed out, citing Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437 at 466 among other cases, the judge in a criminal trial must accept the responsibility of deciding what are the real issues, must tell the jury what they are, and must instruct the jury on so much of the law as the jury need to know to decide them [29]. Where s 37AA is engaged its directions must be given, and where it is not engaged they must not be given [30].

The Court of Appeal had found that, because the complainant had not protested while her clothing was disarranged, it would have been open to the jury to conclude that there was a reasonable possibility that the accused believed she had finally consented [31]. The High Court answered that the accused had never sought to make such a case: he never asserted that he thought or believed she was consenting, and he did not submit at his trial, in the Court of Appeal or in the High Court that a s 37AA direction should have been given [31]. The Court of Appeal's reasoning depended on it being open on the evidence to conclude that the accused may have believed the complainant was woken by her clothes being removed, or was sufficiently alert to realise what was happening, since only if he believed she was aware when these things were done could he have thought she was consenting [32].

But the complainant's evidence was that she was asleep until awoken by the penetration, it was not suggested to her that she had been woken by her clothing being disarranged, and the accused did not assert that he thought he had woken her [33]. There was therefore "no basis on which the jury, or the Court of Appeal, could have concluded that the complainant was awake when her clothing was disarranged", and the Court of Appeal was wrong to conclude that the evidence it pointed to raised any question about the accused's belief in consent [33].

The complainant did not consent if, as she asserted, she was asleep when penetrated [34]. Because no evidence was led and no assertion made of a belief in consent, proof beyond reasonable doubt that she was asleep at the time of penetration, and that the accused was aware that she was then asleep or might then have been asleep, would without more demonstrate in this case that he was aware that she was not or might not be consenting [34]. Only if it had been asserted, or evidence had been led, that the accused believed the complainant consented to the penetration would any further question about his belief arise [35]. Absent that, showing that he knew she was or might be asleep "necessarily demonstrated that he was aware that she might not be consenting", and the jury were not required to exclude the possibility that he positively believed she was in fact consenting before returning a verdict of guilt [35]. There was therefore no occasion to give the direction the Court of Appeal held should have been given [36].

Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be allowed [37]. It set aside orders 2, 3 and 4 of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria made on 2 June 2011 and, in their place, ordered that the appeal to that Court be dismissed [37]. The reasons do not list orders 2, 3 and 4 one by one, but they describe the Court of Appeal majority's conclusion as leave to appeal granted, the appeal allowed, the conviction set aside and a new trial had [8].

Why it matters

Under the Victorian provisions it construed, the decision ties directions on an accused's belief in consent to what was raised at the trial: they are given only if evidence was led or an assertion made of that belief, and s 37AA directions must not be given where that section is not engaged [25], [30]. It treats awareness or, after the 2007 Act, not giving any thought as the mental element, with belief in consent relevant only so far as it sheds light on awareness [23]. It separates two situations where the accused knew the complainant was or might be asleep: if belief in consent was raised, that knowledge did not require the conclusion that the accused was aware that the complainant was not or might not be consenting, and if it was not raised, that knowledge necessarily demonstrated awareness that the complainant might not be consenting [28], [35]. It also states that a belief that the complainant may have been, or probably was, consenting is no answer to a charge of rape [27]. It holds that the 1991 Act did not codify the common law of rape and that Worsnop v The Queen should not be followed to the extent it held otherwise [12].

Cited in 4 later casesRelies on 34 casesSee every one in casewise

All case summaries