casewise

The Queen v GW

(2016) 258 CLR 108 · [2016] HCA 6 · (2016) 90 ALJR 407

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 4 November 2026

Overview

The Queen v GW [2016] HCA 6 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ), delivered on 2 March 2016, on an appeal by the Crown from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. The case concerned whether the evidence of the complainant, the respondent's young daughter R, had been rightly received unsworn, and whether the trial judge had to direct the jury about the significance of that evidence being unsworn [1], [3]. In one joint judgment the Court held that the Court of Appeal was wrong on both points [31], [56]. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside orders 1 to 3 of the Court of Appeal and remitted the proceeding to the Court of Appeal, at the appellant's request, for consequential orders with respect to sentence [58].

Facts

The respondent was convicted after a trial in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory of committing an act of indecency in the presence of R, his daughter, who was under the age of 10 years [1]. The offence was alleged to have occurred between 29 March 2012 and 2 April 2012, when R was five years old [1]. The indictment charged six counts under s 61(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), three involving R and three involving his other daughter H; he was acquitted of counts five and six and the jury could not agree on counts one, two and four [1].

R was interviewed by officers of the Australian Federal Police on 13 September 2012, and the recording of the interview was tendered as her evidence in chief at a pre-trial hearing [8]. R's evidence was taken at a pre-trial hearing before Burns J on 6 August 2013, when she was six years and five months old [2], [15].

There was no issue about R's competence to give evidence, but there was an issue about her competence to give sworn evidence, which the prosecutor raised by telling the court that the prosecutor did not believe R could give sworn evidence, as she did not understand what a Bible or affirmation is [15]. Defence counsel did not object to taking R's evidence unsworn under s 13(5), but Burns J said he needed to go through the process in s 13(3) first, and he questioned R [16]. Among other things, R agreed when asked whether she understood that in giving evidence she had to tell only the truth [16]. At the end of the examination Burns J said that, because of the difficulty in gauging her understanding and her age, he was "not satisfied that she has the capacity to understand that in giving evidence today she has an obligation to give truthful evidence", and proposed to proceed under s 13(5) [17]. Defence counsel did not wish to be heard, and Burns J told R the matters set out in s 13(5) and took her evidence unsworn [17], [18].

The respondent did not seek leave to appeal from that ruling, and at a directions hearing before Murrell CJ he agreed to be bound by Burns J's pre-trial rulings [19]. At the trial, which began before Penfold J and a jury on 21 March 2014, defence counsel objected to R's evidence on the basis that Burns J had merely been left unsatisfied that R had the requisite capacity, so that s 21 required her to take an oath or make an affirmation [2], [20]. Penfold J held the parties to their agreement not to challenge the pre-trial ruling, and the recording of R's unsworn evidence, which did not include the voir dire or the s 13(5) instructions, was played to the jury [21].

Defence counsel twice asked Penfold J to direct the jury that R's evidence was unsworn because she lacked the capacity to understand the obligation to give truthful evidence, and the judge declined both times [37], [38]. The High Court noted that the renewed application did not amount to a request under s 165(2) for a warning that R's evidence may be unreliable [38]. On 14 July 2014 the respondent was sentenced to two years' imprisonment, to be served by three months' periodic detention with the balance suspended on a two-year good behaviour order, and on 23 July 2014 Refshauge J stayed execution of the sentence pending his appeal [58].

Procedural history

The respondent appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal (Murrell CJ, Refshauge and Ross JJ) on seven grounds [3]. His third ground was that Burns J did not apply the presumption of competence to give sworn evidence, and his fourth was that the trial judge failed to direct the jury about the significance of R's evidence being unsworn [3]. The Court of Appeal, in GW v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 15, upheld both grounds, dismissed the other five, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial [4].

On the third ground, the Court of Appeal concluded that Burns J had reversed the statutory test by saying he was not satisfied R had the requisite capacity, when s 13(3) required satisfaction that she did not have it [22]. The Court of Appeal inferred that Burns J had wrongly treated competence to give unsworn evidence as the "default" position, and concluded that the trial had not been conducted according to law [22]. The Court of Appeal also said that compliance with s 13 in determining competence to give unsworn evidence cannot be waived [23].

On the fourth ground, the Court of Appeal did not consider it manifest that a s 165 warning had been required, but reasoned that the Evidence Act gives "primacy" to sworn evidence because of the solemnity of an oath or affirmation and the significant sanctions that may follow a failure to adhere to it [40]. It concluded that, because R was the key prosecution witness, it was important for the jury to understand the difference between sworn and unsworn evidence and to take that difference into account in assessing the reliability of R's evidence [4], [41]. As the High Court read it, the Court of Appeal held that the jury had to be told to take into account that R's unsworn evidence lacked the solemnity of sworn evidence and was not subject to penal sanction if intentionally false [48]. In reaching that view the Court of Appeal drew on the discussion of unsworn evidence by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in R v Lomman [44].

On 16 October 2015 Bell and Gageler JJ granted special leave to appeal on grounds challenging both of the respondent's successful grounds [5].

Issues

The first issue was whether the Court of Appeal was right to conclude from Burns J's brief ex tempore remarks that he had not applied s 13, and whether it was open to him to be satisfied that R lacked the capacity required to give sworn evidence [24], [25]. The second issue was whether s 165 of the Evidence Act or the common law required the trial judge to direct the jury to take into account the differences between sworn and unsworn evidence in assessing R's evidence [39], [42].

Held

French CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ

The reasons were given jointly by all five judges [1]. No judge wrote separately.

Competence to give sworn evidence. The Court traced the history: before the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ACT courts could receive the unsworn evidence of a child under 14 without formality, and as first enacted the Commonwealth Act imposed three conditions on unsworn evidence, including that the court be satisfied the person understood the difference between the truth and a lie [9], [10]. Following a joint review by the Australian, New South Wales and Victorian Law Reform Commissions, the 2008 amendments re-enacted s 13 of the Commonwealth Act, and in 2011 s 13 was enacted in almost identical terms in the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) [11], [12].

Under s 13, competence to give evidence about a fact is confined to the capacity to understand a question about the fact and to give an intelligible answer, and only competence to give sworn evidence requires the capacity to understand the obligation to give truthful evidence [13]. The s 13(6) presumption applies to both kinds of competence and is displaced where the court is satisfied of the contrary on the balance of probabilities [14]. Where the presumption of competence to give sworn evidence is displaced, a witness competent to give evidence may give unsworn evidence once the court has told the witness the things in s 13(5) [14].

The Court held that "obligation" in s 13(3) bears its ordinary meaning of the condition of being morally or legally bound, here to give truthful evidence [26]. A child may agree that she understands she is to tell the truth without understanding what it is to give evidence in court, so R's affirmative answer did not necessarily show she had the requisite capacity [26]. R's lack of understanding of the oath or affirmation was "not determinative but it was not irrelevant" to whether she had that capacity, and the suggestion that it may not have been open to Burns J to be satisfied that R, a six-year-old child, lacked it was "unsustainable" [27].

The Court said that it was necessary for Burns J to be affirmatively satisfied that R lacked the requisite capacity before instructing her under s 13(5) and admitting her evidence unsworn [28]. Because no one contested his proposal to proceed under s 13(5), Burns J was not required to give further reasons, and whether he had misapplied the test depended on "the whole of the circumstances", not on his remarks alone [28]. The Court accepted the Court of Appeal's propositions that Burns J's ex tempore reasons may not have been expressed with the felicity of considered reasons and that compliance with s 13 cannot be waived, adding that acceptance of the second does not reduce the force of the first [23].

The Court said that the Court of Appeal's own account of the distinction, which tied unsworn evidence to the importance of telling the truth, harked back to the Commonwealth Act before the 2008 amendments, because s 13 does not condition unsworn evidence on that understanding [29], [30]. The only purpose of Burns J's examination was to assess R's competence to give sworn evidence [30]. Burns J insisted on going through s 13(3) although neither party submitted that R was competent to give sworn evidence, which the Court said "might be thought to allay any concern" that he treated unsworn evidence as the default [31]. His conclusion took account of R's age as well as the difficulty in gauging her understanding, and his failure to express it in the words of the statute did not support a finding that he was not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that R lacked the requisite capacity [31].

Directions about unsworn evidence. Section 165(1) lists categories of evidence that may be unreliable, about which a judge must on request warn the jury under s 165(2) unless there are good reasons not to, but unsworn evidence is not among them [33]. Sections 165(6), 165(7) and 165A of the Evidence Act, and s 70 of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, limit what a judge may tell a jury about the reliability of children's evidence [34]–[36].

The Court held that the s 13(6) presumption is the only respect in which the Evidence Act may be said to give "primacy" to sworn evidence, and that ss 12, 13(3), (4) and (6) and 21 do not support primacy for sworn evidence as a bolster to reliability [43]. Whether or not a witness is sworn, the witness's evidence is before the court and the assessment of its reliability is for the trier of fact [43]. R v Lomman concerned s 9(4) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), which requires the judge to explain to the jury why evidence is unsworn and, on request, to warn of the need for caution, and the Full Court there was not discussing a common law requirement [45]. The choice not to enact a provision like s 9(4) in the Uniform Evidence legislation, and not to list unsworn evidence in s 165(1), told against the Court of Appeal's view, and the Court accepted the appellant's submission that the Evidence Act is "neutral in its treatment of the weight that may be accorded to evidence whether it is sworn or unsworn" [46].

The Court noted that the direction concerns the fact that evidence is unsworn rather than that the witness is a child, although most witnesses competent to give only unsworn evidence will be children [48]. Assuming that the direction was not contrary to a statutory prohibition, the Court asked why its omission involved legal error [48]. The respondent relied on Bromley v The Queen, Crofts v The Queen and Longman v The Queen, and proposed a direction telling the jury that an unsworn witness makes no formal promise to tell the truth, may give unsworn evidence only if lacking the requisite capacity, and is not subject to the sanction for failing to adhere to an oath or affirmation [49]. The Court observed that the proposal did not say how the jury was to take that information into account [50].

Explaining Bromley, Crofts and Longman, the Court said the common law requirement "is to warn the jury whenever a warning is necessary in order to avoid a perceptible risk of a miscarriage of justice", a risk that arises when a feature of the evidence may adversely affect its reliability and may not be evident to a lay jury [50]. Subject to any statutory prohibition, the judge must then draw the feature to the jury's attention, explain how it may affect reliability and warn of the need for caution [50]. The jury saw other witnesses take an oath or affirmation and did not see R do so, and the Court said it "strains credulity" that a direction about the absence of solemnity or sanction was needed to avoid a miscarriage of justice [51].

As to telling the jury why R's evidence was unsworn, any materiality would come from the factual finding that R lacked the capacity, and Penfold J could not have erred by failing to tell the jury of a finding made in its absence [52], [53]. The Court did not decide whether a witness lacking that capacity is or may be less reliable, saying the correctness of that contention "does not call for consideration" [53]. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that assessing the reliability of R's evidence was the jury's most difficult task, but held that, as a matter of practical reality, the absence of an oath and of sanctions was not material to whether her evidence was truthful and reliable [54]. The jury had been directed to examine R's evidence very carefully before acting on it, that instruction was repeated in a Murray direction, and the further direction was likely to have been understood as telling the jury to give her evidence less weight than sworn evidence even if satisfied of its truthfulness and reliability to the criminal standard [55].

The Court concluded that the Evidence Act does not treat unsworn evidence as of a kind that may be unreliable, so that even on a request under s 165(2) there was no requirement to warn that R's evidence may be unreliable because it was unsworn [56]. Nor did the common law require a warning of the need for caution because the evidence was unsworn, or a direction, falling short of such a warning, to take into account the differences between sworn and unsworn evidence in assessing it [56]. The Court said it is possible that different considerations would apply to a witness other than a young child who can give evidence but lacks the capacity to give sworn evidence, but that question need not be decided [57].

Orders. The Court ordered that the appeal be allowed, set aside orders 1 to 3 of the Court of Appeal made on 24 April 2015, and remitted the proceeding to the Court of Appeal [58]. The Court said that it would ordinarily also have dismissed the appeal to the Court of Appeal, so restoring the conviction, but the appellant had submitted that the matter should be remitted for consequential orders with respect to sentence [58].

Why it matters

The decision explains that under s 13 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), which follows the 2008 amendments to the Commonwealth Act, the admission of unsworn evidence is not conditioned on an understanding of the importance of telling the truth [12], [30]. It also shows that Burns J's ruling was to be judged on the whole of the circumstances, not on analysis of his brief remarks alone [28], [31]. It holds that the Evidence Act is neutral as to the weight of sworn and unsworn evidence, and that neither s 165 nor the common law required a direction about the differences between them for R's unsworn evidence, while leaving open the position of a witness other than a young child [46], [56], [57].

Cited in 56 later casesRelies on 8 casesSee every one in casewise

All case summaries