The Queen v Tang
(2008) 237 CLR 1 · [2008] HCA 39
Summary updated 11 November 2026
Overview
The Queen v Tang [2008] HCA 39 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), given on 28 August 2008 on appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria. It concerned the convictions of the owner of a licensed brothel for intentionally possessing and using five Thai women as slaves, contrary to s 270.3(1)(a) of the Criminal Code (Cth) [1], [6]. By majority, the High Court allowed the prosecution's appeal and ordered that the appeal to the Court of Appeal against conviction be dismissed, which restored the convictions, and it remitted the application for leave to appeal against sentence [57], [59], [64]. Gleeson CJ and Hayne J, with Gummow, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ agreeing with both, held that the prosecution did not have to prove that the respondent had any knowledge or belief about the source of the powers she exercised over the complainants [51], [60], [133], [169]–[171]. Kirby J, dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal and left in place the Court of Appeal's order for a new trial [70], [131]. No judge accepted the challenges to the validity and reach of s 270.3(1)(a), so the cross-appeal on those grounds was dismissed, and special leave to cross-appeal on a third ground was refused [57], [84], [130], [132].
Facts
The respondent, Wei Tang, owned a licensed brothel at 417 Brunswick Street, Fitzroy, known as Club 417 [6], [61]. The five complainants were Thai nationals who had previously worked in the sex industry and who came to Australia voluntarily to work as prostitutes [6]. There was no written contract, but there were agreed conditions, and the women became what were called contract workers [6]. All five consented to come on the understanding that, once they had paid off their debt, they would have the opportunity to earn money on their own account as prostitutes [11]. Before coming they were not always aware of the precise terms of the debt or of the living conditions in Australia [10]. On arrival they had very little, if any, money, spoke little, if any, English and knew no-one [11].
Gleeson CJ quoted Chernov JA's description, in an earlier appeal by a former co-accused, DS, of the practice followed: a visa was arranged for each woman, no doubt on false information, she was flown from Bangkok to Sydney with escorts, usually an elderly couple, and she was then kept in Sydney until a decision was made about the brothel at which she would work [7]. DS gave evidence at the respondent's trial [8]. For four of the complainants the respondent had a share in a syndicate that, according to DS, purchased the woman for $20,000 [12]. In the case DS described in detail, the respondent agreed to accept the complainant as a contract worker and to take a 70% interest in the syndicate, with DS and her associates taking the other 30% [8]. DS described the $20,000, which was sent to Thailand, as "the amount of money we purchased this woman" [8].
Customers were charged $110 for that complainant's services, of which the respondent kept $43 as brothel owner, and the remaining $67 was divided between the syndicate members, 70% to the respondent and 30% to DS and her associates [9]. The complainant acknowledged a debt to the syndicate of $45,000, in her case negotiated down to $42,000 or $43,000, and the debt fell by $50 for each customer serviced [10]. The trial judge said in his sentencing remarks that the sum took account of the $20,000 paid to the recruiters, travel costs and the complainant's living expenses during the contract, and that it included a profit margin that was not the subject of any calculation [12]. Gleeson CJ described the debt as "a notional liability by reference to which aspects of the complainant's obligations were regulated" [12]. Hayne J said there was no satisfactory explanation in the evidence of how the debt of any complainant was calculated, or of what had been or was to be provided in return [160]. The fifth complainant first worked for others at a different brothel, the respondent paid nothing to the recruiters for her, and the arrangements were otherwise the same except that she had different so-called owners [13].
While under contract, each complainant was to work in the respondent's brothel six days a week, serving up to 900 customers over four to six months [14]. They earned nothing in cash while under contract, except that by working on the seventh, free, day each week they could keep the $50 per customer [14]. The trial judge said he was satisfied that the complainants were financially deprived and vulnerable on arrival, and found that they had entered Australia on visas obtained illegally [15]. The respondent kept their passports and return airfares, so that the passports could be produced to immigration authorities if necessary and so that the complainants could not run away [16]. They lived in premises arranged by the respondent, where they were lodged and fed and their medical requirements attended to, and the evidence was that they were well provisioned [16]. They were not kept under lock and key, but the trial judge said that in the totality of the circumstances they were effectively restricted to the premises, and on rare occasions they went out with consent or under supervision [16]. Those circumstances included the hours of work, fear of detection by immigration authorities and instructions not to leave their accommodation without the respondent, DS or the brothel manager [16]. For some of the women the regime became more relaxed as the contract went on [16]. Two complainants worked off their debts, after which they were paid for their prostitution, the restrictions were lifted, their passports were returned and they were free to choose their hours of work and accommodation [12], [17]. Kirby J recorded that there was no evidence that the complainants were subjected to rape, violence or other such offences [79]. The prosecution conceded at the outset that each complainant came to Australia voluntarily [160].
Procedural history
At a first trial of the respondent and a co-accused, the brothel's manager Mr Paul Pick, the jury acquitted him on eight counts and could not agree on two further counts against him or on any count against her, and he later successfully applied for a nolle prosequi [73]. At the second trial, in the County Court of Victoria before Judge McInerney and a jury, the respondent was convicted of five offences of intentionally possessing a slave and five of intentionally exercising over a slave a power attaching to the right of ownership, namely the power to use [1], [65]. She was sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment [1]. Eames JA, quoted by Kirby J, put the total effective sentence at 10 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years [118].
The trial judge told the jury that, to convict, they had to find that the complainants were slaves under the statutory definition as he explained it, that the respondent knew the facts bringing them within it (although not that she was aware of the legislation or the legal definition), and that she intended to possess or use persons in the condition those facts disclosed [37]. After very extensive directions, the jury returned twice to seek clarification about the requirements of intention [73].
The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Eames JA, with whom Maxwell P and Buchanan JA agreed) upheld an appeal against each conviction, quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial on all counts [1], [36]. Footnote 1 of the judgment cites its decision as R v Wei Tang (2007) 16 VR 454 [1]. It rejected grounds that would have produced an acquittal and upheld one ground, that the directions to the jury were inadequate [2]. It held that the provisions were supported by the external affairs power, that s 270.3(1)(a) was not confined to chattel slavery and that the facts alleged were capable of falling within it [20]. It also accepted that the evidence could support the verdicts, which it held were not unreasonable, applying M v The Queen [18], [54].
On the directions, Eames JA said that the critical element missing was "[the respondent's] appreciation of the character of her own actions" [38]. He said the accused "must be shown to have regarded the worker as though she was mere property, a thing", and that a conviction would not be justified if she possessed the worker in the knowledge or belief that she was exercising some different right or entitlement, such as that of an employer, contractor or manager [38]. The Court of Appeal left open for further argument whether there should be a new trial, and after that argument it ordered one [55]. Because it allowed the appeal against conviction, it did not deal with the application for leave to appeal against sentence [59].
The prosecution appealed to the High Court by special leave, and the respondent sought special leave to cross-appeal on three grounds [1], [2]. The Attorney-General of the Commonwealth and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission intervened.
Issues
The first issue was whether the offences in s 270.3(1)(a) extended to the conduct alleged, or were confined to situations akin to chattel slavery or in which the complainant is notionally owned by the accused or another [19]. The second was whether ss 270.1 and 270.3(1)(a) were within the legislative power of the Commonwealth [19]. The third, which Hayne J called the central issue in the appeal, was what directions should have been given to the jury about the mental element of the offences, and in particular whether the prosecution had to prove any knowledge or belief about the source of the powers exercised [133]. The fourth was whether the verdicts were unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence [53]. Kirby J also listed as an issue the Court of Appeal's decision not to apply the proviso in s 568(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) [84].
Held
Gleeson CJ
Gleeson CJ proposed the orders that were made [57]–[59]. He dealt first with the meaning and validity of s 270.3(1)(a), and held that the Court of Appeal's decision on those issues should be upheld [2], [20]. He said the word slave takes its meaning from the definition of slavery in s 270.1 [21]. That definition is the condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, including where the condition results from a debt or contract made by the person [3]. It derives from, although it is not identical to, the definition in Art 1 of the 1926 International Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery [21].
In 1926 legal ownership of one person by another was impossible in many of the parties to that Convention, including Australia, and he reasoned that the evident purpose of the reference to condition was to cover slavery de facto as well as de jure [25]. He said the definition turns on the exercise of power over a person, and that "[t]he antithesis of slavery is freedom" [25]. In its application to the de facto condition, the definition addresses powers of the kind that attached to the right of ownership when the legal status was possible, not necessarily all of them but any or all [26].
He referred to a 1953 Memorandum of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which listed such powers as including the capacity to make a person an object of purchase, the capacity to use a person and the person's labour in a substantially unrestricted manner, and an entitlement to the fruits of the person's labour without commensurate compensation [26]. On the evidence it was open to the jury to conclude that each complainant was made an object of purchase (although in one case the purchaser was not the respondent), that for the duration of the contracts the owners could use the complainants and their labour in a substantially unrestricted manner, and that the owners were entitled to the fruits of that labour without commensurate compensation [26].
Reading the definition as limited to chattel slavery would, he said, be inconsistent with its purpose, context and text [27]. Chattel slavery is a legal impossibility in Australia, so if s 270.3(1)(a), in its application to conduct within Australia, were confined to chattel slavery and legal ownership it would have no practical operation [20]. He treated the factors accepted by both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v Kunarac as relevant to s 270.3(1)(a) [28], [35]. Those factors were control of movement, control of physical environment, psychological control, measures to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour [28]. He agreed with the Appeals Chamber that consent is not inconsistent with slavery, and said that consent may be factually relevant but that absence of consent is not a necessary element of the offence [35]. On a point the Appeals Chamber had left open, he concluded that the commodification of a person by treating him or her as an object of sale and purchase, if it exists, is a material factor and may involve the exercise of a power attaching to a right of ownership [35].
He found it unnecessary and unhelpful to draw boundaries between slavery and cognate concepts such as servitude, peonage, forced labour or debt bondage, saying that those who engage in the traffic in human beings "are unlikely to be so obliging as to arrange their practices to conform to some convenient taxonomy" [29]. He said it may be that the facts here would have fallen within the later offence of debt bondage in s 271.8 had it been in force, but that this was immaterial because the two provisions are not mutually exclusive [4]. He noted that in Siliadin v France the European Court of Human Rights had spoken of a genuine right of legal ownership, without referring to the definition's reference to condition, to powers as well as rights, or to the words any or all [30], [31].
He also marked limits: it is important "not to debase the currency of language, or to banalise crimes against humanity", and "harsh and exploitative conditions of labour do not of themselves amount to slavery" [32]. In the context of slavery, he said, powers of control are "powers of the kind and degree that would attach to a right of ownership if such a right were legally possible, not powers of a kind that are no more than an incident of harsh employment" [32]. Because there is no status of slavery under Australian law, he read s 270.1, in its application to conduct within Australia, as concerned with de facto slavery and with powers that are attributes of effective, although not legal, ownership [33]. The closing words of s 270.1 about a debt or contract do not extend the definition: they make plain that a condition resulting from a debt or contract is not on that account alone excluded, provided it would otherwise be covered [33].
He concluded that the definition falls within Art 1 of the 1926 Convention, that the relevant provisions of Div 270 are reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to give effect to Australia's obligations under it, and that they are sustained by the external affairs power and are not limited to chattel slavery [34]. He also held that there was evidence to go to a jury that was capable of sustaining verdicts of guilty [35].
Turning to the prosecution's appeal, he said Eames JA's passages indicated a requirement that the prosecution establish a state of knowledge or belief about the source of the powers the respondent was exercising, in addition to an intention to exercise them [42]. He rejected this, saying "[t]his cannot be accepted" [43]. What the respondent knew or believed about her rights and entitlements as an employer or contractor, as distinct from rights of property, was not something the prosecution had to establish or the jury had to consider [43].
He said it seemed likely that the Court of Appeal was, with good reason, concerned about how a jury is to distinguish slavery from harsh and exploitative labour, at least in a borderline case, and that the answer in a given case may be found in "the nature and extent of the powers exercised over a complainant" [44]. A capacity to deal with a complainant as a commodity may be a powerful indication, as may powers of control over movement extending well beyond those exercised even in the most exploitative employment, and absence or extreme inadequacy of payment [44]. The answer, he said, is not to be found in the need for reflection by an accused on the source of the powers being exercised [44]. Since s 270.1 accepts that a condition of slavery may result from a contract, the Court of Appeal's reasoning appeared to him to construct "a false dichotomy between employment and effective ownership" [45].
Under Ch 2 of the Code, he held, the physical element of possessing or using a slave was conduct, which includes a state of affairs, and the fault element was intention, so s 5.2(1) was the relevant provision: a person has intention with respect to conduct if he or she means to engage in that conduct [46], [47]. He found Eames JA's statement that all of s 5.2(1), (2) and (3) were relevant not easy to understand, because sub-s (2) applies to a circumstance and sub-s (3) to a result [46]. Knowledge or belief is often relevant to intention, but it was agreed on all sides that the prosecution did not have to prove that the respondent knew or believed that the complainant was a slave, or even knew what a slave was [47], [48]. If an accused knows that a person has the qualities that under s 270.1 make that person a slave, then intention may be established whether or not the accused appreciates the legal significance of those qualities, and "[a]n accused does not have to know anything about the law in order to contravene s 270.3(1)(a)" [48].
So far as knowledge or belief is factually relevant to intention, he said, it is knowledge or belief about the facts relevant to possession or using and the facts that determine the condition in s 270.1, and whether the powers exercised answer the statutory description is for the jury in the light of the judge's directions [49]. The critical powers here were the power to make the complainants an object of purchase, the capacity to use them and their labour in a substantially unrestricted manner for the duration of the contracts, the power to control and restrict their movements, and the power to use their services without commensurate compensation [50]. The first of these was capable of being regarded by a jury as "the key to an understanding of the condition of the complainants" [50]. He held that the prosecution did not have to establish any knowledge or belief concerning the source of the powers, and that the ground on which the Court of Appeal found the directions inadequate was not sustained [51], [52].
On the third ground of cross-appeal he said that, subject to the jury's assessment of DS and the complainants, there was cogent evidence of the intentional exercise of powers of such a nature and extent that they could reasonably be regarded as resulting in the condition of slavery [56]. He found no error of principle by the Court of Appeal and held that the interests of justice did not require special leave on that ground [56].
Gummow, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ
Gummow J agreed with the orders proposed by Gleeson CJ and with his reasons, and also with the reasons of Hayne J [60]. Heydon J and Kiefel J each agreed with both Gleeson CJ and Hayne J [169], [171]. Crennan J agreed with the orders proposed by Gleeson CJ for the reasons he gave, and also with Hayne J's reasons for concurring in those orders [170].
Hayne J
Hayne J agreed with Gleeson CJ, for the reasons he gave, that the appeal should be allowed and that special leave to cross-appeal should be limited to the first two grounds with the cross-appeal dismissed, and he agreed with the consequential orders [132]. He agreed that, contrary to the Court of Appeal's holding, the prosecution did not have to prove any knowledge or belief about the source of the powers the respondent exercised [133]. What had to be proved was the intentional possession and use of each complainant as a slave [133]. It was necessary to show that the respondent meant to engage, in respect of each complainant, in the conduct of exercising powers attaching to the right of ownership [134]. The rest of his reasons addressed the meaning and application of the terms slavery and slave [135].
He distinguished the status of slavery in the 1926 Convention, a legal status, from the condition of slavery, a factual state of affairs [136]. The Convention did not use ownership, or the powers attaching to the right of ownership, with a legal meaning anchored in any particular legal system, so those terms must be understood as ordinary English expressions [137], [138]. He read ownership in s 270.1 as conveying the ordinary meaning captured by the expression "dominion over" the subject matter [139]. Since Australian law does not recognise, and never has recognised, that one person may own another, the provisions do not invite attention to what legal rights an owner has [140], [141]. They invite attention instead to what the alleged offender has done, measured against a factual construct: "the powers that an owner would have over a person if, contrary to the fact, the law recognised the right to own another person" [141]. Those powers, taken together, would constitute "the complete subjection of that other person to the will of the first", and their exercise would not depend on that person's assent [142].
The offences appear to present two questions, whether the accused exercised the power and whether the complainant was a slave, but he said the two merge, so that "proof of the intentional exercise of any of the relevant powers over a person suffices to establish both that the victim is a slave and that the accused has done what the legislation prohibits" [144], [145]. On possession he referred to He Kaw Teh v The Queen, where Brennan J said that possession implies a state of mind with respect to the thing possessed and Dawson J spoke of the intentional exercise of physical custody or control [147]. One person possessing another, he said, connotes dominion and, like ownership, refers to a state of affairs of complete subjection [148].
To give practical content to these abstract ideas, he said it is relevant to explore the antithesis of slavery by asking whether the person was deprived of freedom of choice in some relevant respect and, if so, what deprived the person of choice [149]. He drew some assistance from United States decisions on involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment, including United States v Shackney, United States v Mussry and United States v Kozminski [149], [152]–[154]. Those cases show that a person may be deprived of choice not only by force or the threat of force but also by threats to invoke the proper application of the law to that person's detriment [150]. He noted that Kozminski identified threatening an immigrant with deportation as one possible form of threatened legal coercion [154]. He also said the cases show why analysis by reference only to freedom of choice, or only to the nature of the coercion, does not determine who is a slave [150], and that whether a person was free or was deprived of freedom of choice is a question of fact and degree [155].
He added three cautions: the question of freedom looks at the alleged slave whereas s 270.1 looks to the exercise of power over that person; what the Code proscribes is the conduct of the accused, with matters such as immigration status or the conduct of third parties being part of the context; and the inquiry must address the particular power alleged, because asking only whether a complainant was free would not address the statutory questions [157]–[159].
He identified two aspects of critical importance: the evidence that each complainant came to Australia following a transaction described as purchase and sale, and the evidence of how each was treated in Australia, in particular her living and working conditions and the debt she was treated as having incurred [160]. He called the debated distinction between buying a contract for services and buying a person necessarily flawed, because buying a person is legally impossible and could not give rise to legal rights and duties [162]. The significance of the transactions depended on what the respondent did, and the evidence of how the women were treated and restrained permitted a jury to conclude that, when she took up a share in four of them, what she did "was to buy them as if they were articles of trade or commerce and thereafter possess and use them" [163].
The fifth woman had been bought by a syndicate of which the respondent was not a member, but the respondent's acceptance of her on terms that payments went to the syndicate members, with the evidence of her working conditions and restraints, was capable of showing that the respondent possessed and used her as if she were an article of trade or commerce that others had bought and sold [161], [164]. He said that her so-called owners could be understood as having carved out of their ownership, and disposed of to the respondent, subsidiary possessory rights over her [164]. It was the combination of the evidence of treatment in Australia with the evidence of sale and purchase in Thailand that permitted that conclusion for each complainant [165].
Accepting that the women came voluntarily did not preclude the conclusion that each was possessed and used as if owned: taking the concession at its highest, the evidence permitted the jury to conclude that "none of the women thereafter retained any freedom to choose what was done with them in Australia" [166]. He added that exploring how the sales came about would very likely have cut down, even eliminated altogether, the notion that the women came voluntarily, but that, even assuming each agreed, "her assent does not deny that the result of the transaction to which each agreed was her subjection to the dominion of her purchasers" [167]. He concluded that it was open to the jury to find that the respondent exercised over each complainant one or more powers attaching to the right of ownership, and that her appeal to the Court of Appeal against her convictions should have been dismissed [168].
Kirby J (dissenting)
Kirby J agreed with most of the other judges' reasons, but disagreed on what Eames JA called the critical issue, on which he in effect concurred with Eames JA, and he described his view as "a minority opinion" [64], [78]. He conceded that there is room for differences of opinion on that issue [66]. He was in general agreement with Gleeson CJ and Hayne J about the meaning of slavery and slave in the Code [84]. He held the provisions valid, as reasonably proportionate to a law giving effect to Australia's obligations under the 1926 Slavery Convention, and regarded the constitutional challenge, following XYZ v The Commonwealth, as "barely arguable" [84].
He set out evidence on both sides, including that the complainants were above the legal age of consent, had earlier worked in the sex industry, came voluntarily, worked in a licensed brothel and were not imprisoned, against their particular vulnerability in Australia, the taking of their passports and return air tickets, and a level of oppression having few analogies in contemporary consensual Australian employment conditions [79], [81]. He said the line between harsh employment and slavery takes account of the normal features of working conditions in Australia, not those that may exist in Thailand or elsewhere [81]. He agreed that there was evidence available to support the guilty verdicts, so that the third ground of cross-appeal and the attempt to obtain orders of acquittal failed [82], [84].
On the directions he reasoned from the structure of s 270.3(1): the word intentionally is placed above the particular offences and so modifies the whole of the paragraphs that follow [93]. The required intention was therefore not only addressed to the physical elements but was also "an intention directed to the underlying entitlement that gives rise to those elements" [95]. It imports "an appreciation, belief or realisation by the accused" of the entitlement to assert the physical elements [97]. He relied on the Explanatory Memorandum's statement that slavery is more than merely the exploitation of another, and said of the exercise of such a power that "[i]t is done out of a sense of power, founded on a sense of entitlement" [98], [99].
He added that penal legislation is conventionally construed strictly, that the Code is written against the background of basic doctrines of criminal law, and that very clear language would be required to make the mere performance of an act criminally blameworthy [100], [101], [103]. This did not, he said, oblige an accused to know the precise terms of the statute or of antecedent treaties [103]. He found it not persuasive to rest the majority's approach on the common exercise of relating the fault element to the physical elements of the offence, a phrase taken from Gleeson CJ's reasons [102]. He compared a person carrying a suitcase containing a prohibited drug over a border, where the prosecution must establish that the accused knew the drug was present and intended to perform the physical acts of importation [107]. Innocent parties, he said, fall outside the offences because the word intentionally imports "a necessity of consciousness of the quality, source and purported basis or justification" of the possession and ownership asserted [108]. He said the Court of Appeal correctly concluded that the absence of this ingredient from the directions was a serious omission [109].
He found further support in the gravity of slavery as a crime against humanity, prohibited as a peremptory norm, which reinforces the need to define it very carefully and precisely [111]. He agreed with Gleeson CJ that, without the clearest statutory authority, it is undesirable to banalise slavery crimes by applying them to what is no more than a seriously exploitative employment relationship [112]. Restricting the intention element to conduct in relation to a person, he said, creates "a serious risk of over-expansion" of the notion of slavery [113]. He also relied on the maximum penalty of 25 years' imprisonment, one of the highest under Australian legislation [115]. He quoted Eames JA's remark that the later offence of debt bondage would arguably have been proved on this evidence and would have carried a maximum of 12 months' imprisonment [118].
He relied as well on the Attorney-General's acknowledgment that no provisions implementing the Convention in similar terms had been identified in the legislation of the United States, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, saying that the more stringent requirement would keep Australian law in broad harmony with similar countries [119], [120]. He said recent law allowing adults to participate lawfully in the sex industry, including the Victorian law under which this brothel was licensed, gave further reasons to confine the offences to cases where the accused has an established belief in a right and entitlement to exert powers of possession or ownership [121], [122].
He treated the jury's two questions, on whether the accused had to know the definition of a slave or know that her actions amounted to slavery, as showing that the Court of Appeal's approach was not esoteric and that the jurors were "obviously puzzled" [123]–[125]. He considered the answers Eames JA suggested to those questions correct, and contrasted them with the very confusing directions actually given [126], [127]. He concluded that "Ms Tang's second trial miscarried" and that there should be a new trial [129]. He said a third trial would be most unfortunate, and that any relief against it would rest in the prosecution's discretion [84]. He agreed that special leave to cross-appeal should be granted on the first and second grounds with that cross-appeal dismissed, and refused on the third ground, but said the appeal should be dismissed [130], [131].
Orders. The High Court ordered that the appeal be allowed [57]. It granted special leave to cross-appeal on the first and second grounds in the proposed notice of cross-appeal, treated the cross-appeal on those grounds as instituted and heard instanter, and dismissed it [57]. It refused special leave to cross-appeal on the third ground [57]. It set aside orders 3, 4 and 5 of the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria made on 29 June 2007 and, in their place, ordered that the appeal to that Court against conviction be dismissed [57]. It ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the application for special leave to appeal and of the appeal to the High Court, consistently with the appellant's undertaking at the hearing of that application [58]. It remitted the matter to the Court of Appeal for that Court's consideration of the application for leave to appeal against sentence [59]. Kirby J agreed with the orders on the cross-appeal but would have dismissed the appeal [130], [131].
Why it matters
Kirby J noted that the convictions were said to be the first in Australia of slavery offences under s 270.3(1)(a), and the Court of Appeal's remark that the trial judge was the first judge in Australia called on to devise directions for them [61], [88]. The reasons of Gleeson CJ and Hayne J, with which four other judges agreed, treat slavery in s 270.1 as a factual condition measured by the powers exercised over a person, not by legal ownership [33], [141]. Gleeson CJ held that absence of consent is not a necessary element, that commodification is a material factor, and that the line between slavery and harsh labour may be found in the nature and extent of the powers exercised [35], [44]. On the fault element, the majority reasons look to intention as to the conduct, with any relevant knowledge or belief going to the facts, and do not require knowledge or belief about the source of the powers [49], [51], [133]. Kirby J said there is a great need not to over-extend slavery offences to seriously oppressive employment relationships, and that the majority's approach is not consistent with that aim [117].
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