UBS AG v Tyne
(2018) 265 CLR 77 · [2018] HCA 45 · (2018) 360 ALR 184 · (2018) 92 ALJR 968
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
UBS AG v Tyne [2018] HCA 45 is a High Court of Australia decision about the power to permanently stay proceedings as an abuse of process where the factual merits of the claim have never been decided and any delay has not made a fair trial impossible [1]. The Argot Trust's claims had earlier been made, and then withdrawn by an unconditional discontinuance, in New South Wales proceedings brought by Mr Tyne and entities he controlled, and were later brought in the Federal Court by Mr Tyne as the new trustee of the Trust [3], [25], [47]. By majority, the Court allowed UBS's appeal, set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court and in their place dismissed the appeal to the Full Court, so that the primary judge's permanent stay stood [60]–[61]. Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ wrote the joint reasons, Gageler J agreed with them and added reasons of his own, and Nettle and Edelman JJ (jointly) and Gordon J (separately) dissented [1], [61], [83], [124], [170].
Facts
Mr Tyne was at all material times the controlling mind of ACN 074 971 109 Pty Limited, the former trustee of the Argot Trust (a family trust), and of Telesto Investments Limited, a Jersey investment company [2]. The Trust's claimed loss arises from the pledge of its assets to secure Telesto's liabilities under credit facilities extended by UBS [2]. The claims allege that UBS gave negligent advice and/or engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in representations which induced Telesto to acquire and retain bonds issued by financial institutions in Kazakhstan, which proved worthless [10].
After a margin call in September 2008, UBS agreed not to sell the collateral or make further margin calls on terms in a letter of 14 December 2009 (the Standstill Agreement), and the former trustee then executed a letter of undertaking in favour of UBS [11]. On 15 October 2010 UBS purported to terminate the Standstill Agreement and sued Telesto, and Mr Tyne as guarantor, in the High Court of Singapore (the Singapore 801 proceedings) [12]. On 2 November 2010 Telesto, Mr Tyne personally and the former trustee sued UBS in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales [3], [13]. UBS then obtained orders in Singapore restraining those plaintiffs from prosecuting their claims in the New South Wales proceedings, and appeals against those orders were dismissed [14], [16]–[17].
On 7 February 2012 Ward J held that the appropriate relief was a temporary stay of the New South Wales proceedings [19]. After hearing submissions on the form of orders on 21 February 2012, her Honour ordered that the proceedings be stayed pending the final determination of the Singapore 801 proceedings, subject to UBS prosecuting those proceedings expeditiously, but gave leave to file amended pleadings [20], [97]. UBS at first opposed the grant of leave, but did not press its objection after Ward J commented that it was not in UBS's interests to discourage Mr Tyne and the former trustee from discontinuing [49]–[50]. The amended pleadings filed on 6 March 2012 no longer named Mr Tyne or the former trustee as plaintiffs, leaving Telesto as the sole plaintiff [3], [21]. Ward J imposed no conditions on the leave by which the Trust's claim was discontinued [30].
On 27 July 2012 Lai J heard the Singapore 801 proceedings, with no appearance by Telesto or Mr Tyne, and made declarations in UBS's favour [22]. On 9 May 2013 Sackar J held that Lai J's judgment created a res judicata and permanently stayed the New South Wales proceedings, and no appeal was brought [24]. Mr Tyne became trustee of the Trust on 9 January 2014 and four days later, in that capacity, began the present proceedings in the Federal Court, some 23 months after the leave to file the amended pleadings [25]. The Federal Court claims plead essentially the same representations as the New South Wales proceedings and seek damages for misleading or deceptive conduct and negligence, and equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary duty [26].
Procedural history
UBS applied for a permanent stay on grounds of abuse of process, Anshun estoppel, res judicata or issue estoppel, and the primary judge rejected the res judicata and estoppel arguments [27]. His Honour found that the essential allegations were the same as those in the New South Wales proceedings, and that finding was not challenged [27]. He held that there was no juridical disadvantage to bringing the Trust's claims in the New South Wales proceedings, that they could and should have been brought there, and that no "proper explanation" had been given for not doing so [28]. He permanently stayed the proceedings under s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Tyne v UBS AG (No 3) (2016) 236 FCR 1) [4].
On appeal, the Full Court majority (Jagot and Farrell JJ) held that it had not been open to the primary judge to find an abuse of process, taking into account that the Trust's claims had not been decided on their merits (Tyne v UBS AG (No 2) (2017) 250 FCR 341) [5]. The majority reasoned that UBS had the benefit of the permanent stay of Telesto's claims and was now being required to do what it would otherwise have had to do in 2013, namely admit or defend the Trust's claims [30]. Dowsett J, dissenting, inferred that Mr Tyne had identified some forensic advantage in discontinuing the Trust's claims, and considered that allowing the proceedings to continue would inflict manifest unfairness on UBS and bring the administration of justice into disrepute [5]. Bell and Keane JJ granted UBS special leave to appeal on 15 September 2017 [6].
Issues
The central issue was whether the use of the Federal Court's processes was unjustifiably oppressive to UBS or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, where the merits of the claim had not been determined and delay had not made a fair trial impossible [1]. By its first ground, UBS contended that the Full Court majority erred essentially for the reasons given by Dowsett J, relying on the overarching purpose of civil litigation in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act [6]. The Trust stressed that its claims had been discontinued unconditionally and that the rules of both courts provide that discontinuance is no bar to fresh proceedings for the same relief [47]. UBS's second ground challenged the Full Court majority's treatment of the Singapore proceedings [165].
Held
Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ
Their Honours stated that the power to stay is enlivened by either of two conditions: where use of the court's procedures occasions unjustifiable oppression to a party, or where it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute [1]. Adopting Lord Bingham of Cornhill's description in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co, they said the question calls for a broad, merits-based judgment taking account of the public and private interests involved and all the facts [7]. Whether proceedings are an abuse must take into account the procedural law of the court whose processes are engaged, here including s 37M [34]. Following the joint reasons in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University, the just resolution of a dispute is to be understood in light of provisions such as s 37M, and the minimisation of delay and expense is integral to it [38].
Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) showed that a permanent stay may be the just resolution even though the plaintiff is not at fault and the merits are undecided [40]. That case turned on very great delay which made a fair trial impossible, which was not this case; the claimed abuse here lay in litigating claims that could and should have been litigated in the New South Wales proceedings [41]. Their Honours accepted that the mere fact that a claim could have been raised earlier does not make raising it later an abuse, but held that bringing a claim which should have been litigated earlier may be an abuse even where no estoppel arises, as Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd makes plain [43]. That the Trust's claim had not been heard on its merits, and that a fair trial could still be had, "cannot be determinative" of whether there was an abuse [44].
Their Honours said the courts should not indulge parties who engage in "tactical manoeuvring" that impedes the resolution of litigation, and that requiring inexcusable delay as a precondition to a stay fails to appreciate that any substantial delay is apt to increase the cost and decrease the quality of justice [45]. Nor, they said, is there any reason to tolerate the use, by a single directing mind and will, of different entities under common control to manipulate other parties and the courts [45]. In their view, the pursuit of substantially the same claim by serial proceedings conducted by different entities under common control "is no less obviously an abuse of process" than serial proceedings discontinued before judgment [46].
On the discontinuance, their Honours noted that the New South Wales proceedings did not end with it, but were prosecuted to a final determination by a plaintiff controlled by Mr Tyne to recover the loss the Trust now claims [52]. They found that Mr Tyne perceived a forensic advantage in holding back the Trust's claim, and that hiving it off for another court was "the antithesis" of the parties' duty to conduct proceedings consistently with the overriding or overarching purpose [55]. Although a discontinuance under r 12.3(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) does not release the claims, it is not irrelevant, and "[a]n abuse of process is no less an abuse because the party adversely affected might have, by greater diligence in its own interests, prevented the abuse" [56]. The whole dispute had been before the Supreme Court of New South Wales, and the time to try the factual allegations underlying Telesto's and the Trust's claims was in those proceedings [57].
Their Honours held that UBS's being a large commercial corporation did not deny that it would suffer unjustifiable oppression, found in delay and increased costs and, at its core, in the vexation of being required to deal again with claims that should have been resolved in the New South Wales proceedings [58]. After those proceedings ended, it was reasonable for UBS to order its affairs on the understanding that its dispute with Mr Tyne and his entities was at an end [58]. Allowing the staged conduct of what was factually one dispute was, as Dowsett J found, likely to create a perception that the administration of justice is inefficient, careless of costs and profligate with public money [59]. The primary judge was right to stay the proceedings, and it was unnecessary to address UBS's second ground [8], [59].
Gageler J
Gageler J agreed that the appeal should be allowed and the stay reinstated for the reasons of Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ, adding his own reasons because of the close division of opinion on an important question of practice and procedure [61]. He took as the framework the joint judgment in Tomlinson, under which the doctrine of abuse of process is informed by considerations of finality and fairness but is broader and more flexible than estoppel [62]. Drawing on Lord Bingham's reasoning in Johnson, he noted that Lord Bingham rejected as "too dogmatic" the equation of what should have been done in earlier proceedings with what could have been done [68]. In his Honour's words, "[t]he ultimate judgment to be made is in each case normative", and it must take account of the public interest in the timely and efficient administration of civil justice [69]–[70].
Gageler J preferred, when weighing the interests involved in successive proceedings, to avoid the extremes of private "oppression" and public "disrepute", and to identify the relevant public interest, ordinarily, as the timely and efficient administration of civil justice [72]. He held that the Full Court majority took too narrow an approach: UBS's private interest was sufficiently engaged by its being compelled to respond to a claim which should have been brought in the New South Wales proceedings, weighed with the public interest in the timely and efficient resolution of claims within the "integrated Australian legal system" [75]. Unlike in Johnson, there had been no intimation to UBS that later proceedings were likely [76]. The primary judge's first three considerations (Mr Tyne's control of both entities, the common substratum of facts, and the absence of juridical disadvantage) were sufficient in the absence of an explanation justifying Mr Tyne's conduct [73], [77].
His Honour said that the contention that discontinuance was no bar to fresh proceedings was "plainly correct, but beside the point", because the primary judge's conclusion did not rest on the discontinuance [78]. Judged solely by the Trust's interests, Mr Tyne's explanation was not unreasonable, but having regard to UBS's interests and the public interest it did not explain why the claims were held in abeyance; if it was efficient for Telesto's claims to be pursued first, that could have been achieved by case management orders [80]. It was not reasonable for Mr Tyne to hold the Trust's claims in abeyance with a view to suing separately if Telesto failed [81]. The primary judge's conclusion that no proper explanation had been given was "not only open but correct" [82].
Nettle and Edelman JJ (dissenting)
Nettle and Edelman JJ disagreed with the majority's conclusion [83]. They emphasised that under rr 12.1, 12.3 and 12.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) a discontinuance may be made on terms, does not prevent the plaintiff claiming the same relief in fresh proceedings, and permits a stay of fresh proceedings only until costs are paid [88]–[90]. UBS did not object to the discontinuance or seek any condition preventing fresh proceedings [91]. In their view UBS had not been vexed with the Trust's claims before, and as its counsel acknowledged, the Federal Court proceedings would be the first occasion on which it had to deal with them [94]. They distinguished Walton v Gardiner and Batistatos as cases turning on long and prejudicial delay, whereas here the delay was relatively insignificant [95].
Their Honours found that about two and a half years of delay resulted from UBS preventing the claims being heard in the New South Wales proceedings, and that the most delay the discontinuance caused was the eight months between Sackar J's judgment and the start of the Federal Court proceedings [99]. They described that eight months as "effectively de minimis", and said the costs of the stay application before Sackar J were incurred voluntarily by UBS [104]. They rejected the suggestion that UBS might not have sought a stay had the former trustee stayed in, and agreed with the Full Court majority that UBS was in no worse position [101]. On Mr Tyne's unchallenged affidavit, the former trustee, being short of funds and reasonably expecting Telesto's claims to proceed to judgment, chose to wait and see, which a right-thinking person would think "common sense" [105]–[106]. That course was not inconsistent with s 37M, because the former trustee did not stand back until a final determination [108].
Their Honours read the dictum in Tomlinson as not meaning that a claim which could have been made earlier is for that reason an abuse, citing Lord Bingham in Johnson [110]. The examples given in Tomlinson (Walton, Reichel v Magrath and Coffey v Secretary, Department of Social Security) were very different from this case [111], [116]. They said that Talbot v Berkshire County Council "should not be followed" [119]. Where, as here, there was no inordinate delay, no prior determination, no unjustifiable oppression and no collateral purpose, the only issue was whether it was unreasonable not to prosecute the claims to judgment earlier, in effect an Anshun estoppel question, and as the primary judge held the claims were not barred [122]. Assuming the House v The King standard applied, they concluded that the primary judge's reasoning involved errors of principle, and found it unnecessary to decide whether abuse of process questions attract that restraint [123]. They would have dismissed the appeal with costs [124].
Gordon J (dissenting)
Gordon J held that discontinuing a proceeding and then starting a second one raising the same matters "is not prima facie evidence of abuse of process" [127]. She said the obligation to facilitate the just, quick and efficient resolution of disputes must take into account the facts of the particular proceedings and the identity and conduct of the participants [128]. Her Honour noted, citing earlier authority, that the onus of proving an abuse is heavy and that a permanent stay is granted only in the most exceptional circumstances [136]. In her view there was no duplication: none of the issues had been decided on the merits or even met by a pleaded defence, the trustee had not been a party in Singapore, and the principle of finality was not engaged [143]–[144].
Gordon J agreed with Nettle and Edelman JJ, for their reasons, that UBS's reliance on Walton and Batistatos must be rejected and that cost, vexation and delay did not support a finding of abuse [146], [148]. The eight months between the permanent stay and the Federal Court proceedings was not so long as to be an abuse [149]. Mr Tyne's sworn evidence of his reasons was unchallenged, and the trustee had not unreasonably held its claims in abeyance [155], [158]. UBS, a sophisticated and well-resourced litigant, took no objection and sought no conditions, and the fact that a participant took a wrong view of the claims is not prima facie evidence of abuse: "More is required" [159].
Her Honour rejected UBS's contention that the Full Court majority's approach was contrary to s 37M, relying on recent observations by members of the High Court, about similar Victorian obligations, that such an overarching purpose does not displace the court's need to safeguard the administration of justice when ordering a stay for abuse of process [161]–[162]. She also rejected UBS's second ground, holding that the primary judge's references to the Singapore proceedings were passing references and that there was no factual basis for founding an abuse on them [167], [169]. She would have dismissed the appeal with costs [170].
Orders. The appeal was allowed with costs [60]. The orders made by the Full Court of the Federal Court on 20 January 2017 were set aside, and in their place the appeal to the Full Court was dismissed and the appellants in the Full Court were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of that appeal [60].
Why it matters
The joint reasons hold that a permanent stay for abuse of process does not depend on the claim having been decided on its merits or on delay having made a fair trial impossible [41], [44]–[45]. They treat the pursuit of substantially the same claim through serial proceedings by different entities under common control as an abuse of process, and give weight to the overarching purpose in s 37M [34], [38], [46]. Gageler J wrote separately because the appeal raised an important question of practice and procedure on which opinion was closely divided in the Federal Court and in the High Court [61]. The judgment itself says nothing about later treatment of the case.
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