Unions NSW v New South Wales
(2013) 252 CLR 530 · [2013] HCA 58 · (2013) 88 ALJR 227
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Unions NSW v New South Wales [2013] HCA 58 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ), given on 18 December 2013, on a special case challenging two provisions of the Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Act 1981 (NSW) ("the EFED Act"). Section 96D prohibited the acceptance of a political donation unless the donor was an individual enrolled as an elector, and s 95G(6) counted the electoral communication expenditure of a party's affiliated organisations towards the party's expenditure cap [10]–[12]. The Court answered that both provisions are invalid because they impermissibly burden the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters, held it unnecessary to answer the other questions, and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiffs' costs [66], [170]. French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ, in joint reasons, held that neither provision could be given a purpose connected to the EFED Act's anti-corruption purposes [60], [64]–[65]. Keane J, in separate concurring reasons, held that each provision discriminates between sources of political communication and so distorts its flow [140], [167]–[168].
Facts
Division 2 of Pt 6 of the EFED Act requires the annual disclosure to the Election Funding Authority of New South Wales of political donations received and electoral expenditure incurred by or on behalf of a party, an elected member, a group or a candidate [1]. Division 2A of Pt 6 caps political donations in a financial year at $5,000 to a registered party or group and $2,000 to an unregistered party, an elected member, a candidate or a third-party campaigner [3]. Division 2B caps electoral communication expenditure for State election campaigns; for example, the cap for a party endorsing candidates in a Legislative Assembly general election is $111,200 multiplied by the number of electoral districts in which it endorses a candidate [4]. Part 5 provides public funding of State election campaigns from an Election Campaigns Fund [5], and Keane J described its evident purpose as reducing the dependence of political parties on funding from private sources [94].
The defendant described the purpose of these provisions as securing and promoting the actual and perceived integrity of the Parliament of New South Wales, the New South Wales government and local government bodies against undue, corrupt or hidden influences [8]. The plaintiffs accepted that the EFED Act's general objects are legitimate, but not that the two provisions in issue further them [9]. Both provisions were inserted by the Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Amendment Act 2012 (NSW) and commenced in March 2012 [9].
Section 96D(1) made it unlawful for a political donation to a party, elected member, group, candidate or third-party campaigner to be accepted unless the donor was an individual enrolled on the roll of electors for State, federal or local government elections [10]. It therefore prohibited donations by individuals not qualified or not enrolled to vote and by any corporation, organisation or other entity [11]. Under s 96D(4), payment by an industrial organisation of an affiliation subscription to a party was unlawful [84]. Section 95G(6) treated a party's electoral communication expenditure as exceeding its cap if that expenditure and the electoral communication expenditure of an affiliated organisation of the party together exceeded the cap [12]. Section 95G(7) defined an affiliated organisation as a body authorised under the party's rules to appoint delegates to its governing body or to participate in preselection of its candidates [13].
The second, third and sixth plaintiffs were authorised to appoint delegates to the annual conference of the Australian Labor Party (NSW Branch) and to participate in its preselections, and each plaintiff intended to make donations and to incur electoral communication expenditure to the extent permitted by law [14]. Section 83 confines Pt 6 to State and local government elections and elected members [15]. Section 95B(2) exempts from the donations cap a donation paid into an account kept exclusively for a federal or local government election campaign, and cl 34A of the Election Funding, Expenditure and Disclosures Regulation 2009 (NSW), introduced by an amendment shortly before the hearing, extends that exemption to all political donations made for a federal election campaign [15]. Division 4A of Pt 6 separately prohibits donations by "prohibited donors", namely property developers and tobacco, liquor or gambling industry business entities, but its validity was not in issue [57]–[58]. Keane J recorded the plaintiffs' point that the agreed facts showed that the greater part of donations to the major political parties from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2011 were not from individuals [117].
Procedural history
The material facts were agreed in a special case, and the questions were reserved for the determination of the Full Court by order of the Chief Justice under s 18 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) [69]. The special case was dated 12 August 2013 and was later amended. The Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth, Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia intervened. The Solicitor-General for Victoria intervened in support of the defendant [32].
Issues
The principal questions were whether s 96D and s 95G(6) are invalid because they impermissibly burden the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters [66]. Further questions asked whether ss 7A and 7B of the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) entrench a similar freedom that the provisions infringe, whether s 96D is invalid under s 109 of the Constitution for inconsistency with s 327 or Pt XX of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), whether s 96D burdens a constitutional freedom of association, and who should pay the costs [66]. Underlying the principal questions were whether the freedom applies to State electoral laws and communication at a State level [18], [31], whether the provisions effectively burden the freedom [35], and whether they are reasonably appropriate and adapted, or proportionate, to a legitimate end [44].
Held
French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ
The defendant relied on the statement in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation that the freedom is limited to what is necessary for the effective operation of the constitutional system of government, submitting that State election communication might not affect federal choices [18]. Their Honours said that statement must be understood in context, as explaining that the freedom is not absolute [19]. The significant interaction between levels of government, issues common to State and federal government, and national political parties operating at every level require that a wide view be taken of the freedom [25]. Political communication generally cannot be compartmentalised into State or federal issues, and a free flow of communication between all interested persons is necessary to representative government [27]. Persons and entities who are not electors may have a legitimate interest in governmental action and may seek to influence the people's choice, although the freedom is not a personal right [30].
The defendant and Victoria argued, drawing on the Melbourne Corporation principle and on Gaudron J's approach in Muldowney v South Australia, that State electoral laws should be unaffected by the freedom or tested more leniently [31]–[33]. Their Honours noted that neither Gaudron J's approach nor a legislative margin of appreciation has been accepted by a majority of the Court, and they said the latter is a large question not seriously debated since Lange [34]. More fundamentally, "There is no constitutional principle which accepts that the States can legislate to affect the Commonwealth Constitution, including its implications" [34]. The EFED Act does affect the freedom, despite the attempt of s 83 and cl 34A to quarantine it [34].
What the Constitution protects is not a personal right, so the central question is how the impugned law affects the freedom [36]. Section 96D restricts the funds available to parties and candidates to meet the costs of political communication by restricting the sources of those funds, and public funding does not fill the gap, so the freedom is effectively burdened [38]. The extent of the burden is not relevant at this first stage; it arises later under the second limb [40]. Section 83 and cl 34A cannot effectively prevent the burden, and that they may ameliorate it to some extent is not an answer [42].
The second limb asks whether a provision is reasonably appropriate and adapted, or proportionate, to serve a legitimate end compatibly with the system of representative government [44]. Their Honours did not reach the defendant's argument that legislatures have a margin of choice, because a legitimate statutory purpose must first be identified before proportionality can be considered [45]–[46]. Statutory purpose is identified by ordinary statutory construction, as Hayne J observed in Monis v The Queen, and s 96D had to be shown to be connected to and to further the EFED Act's general purposes [50]. Their Honours accepted the plaintiffs' submission that s 96D does nothing calculated to promote the EFED Act's legitimate purposes and is simply a burden on the freedom without a justifying purpose [51]. Unlike the caps, which are directed to large-scale donations and so to possible corruption, s 96D is selective, and the basis for its selection was not identified and is not apparent [53].
The defendant could point only to corporations as a justifiable target of s 96D, but the section is not directed to corporations alone and general concerns about corporate activities cannot explain its purpose [54]–[55]. Their Honours said it is "not evident, even by a process approaching speculation, what s 96D seeks to achieve" by preventing donations from all non-electors, corporations and other entities [56]. Nothing in the EFED Act identifies corporations, industrial organisations or unenrolled persons as having interests requiring prohibition, as it does for the prohibited donors in Div 4A [57]. A complete prohibition on donations might share the anti-corruption purposes, although it would then have to be defended as proportionate; s 96D's wide but incomplete prohibition is, by contrast, "inexplicable" [59]. Because no purpose connected to and in furtherance of the anti-corruption purposes could be attributed to s 96D, the second limb could not be satisfied and s 96D is invalid [60].
Section 95G(6) also burdens the freedom, by deeming the electoral communication expenditure of organisations affiliated with a party, such as industrial organisations, to be the party's for the purposes of the cap, and the party affected is the Australian Labor Party (NSW Branch) [61]. The defendant said its purpose was to render the expenditure cap efficacious by preventing its circumvention, which implies a concern with expenditure that in fact comes from a single source although made by two legally distinct entities [62]. Their Honours doubted that affiliation logically identifies a single source of funds, but put that to one side [63]. The purpose that may be inferred is to reduce what a party affiliated with industrial organisations, and those organisations, may spend on electoral communication, but its connection to the anti-corruption purposes cannot be deduced, industrial organisations are not prohibited donors, and nothing in the provision connects it to those purposes [64]. Absent a purpose conformable with those of the EFED Act, s 95G(6) is invalid [65].
Keane J
Keane J accepted the plaintiffs' submission that ss 96D and 95G(6) impermissibly burden political communication contrary to the Constitution, and found it unnecessary to decide the arguments based on the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) and s 109 [70]-[71]. His Honour rejected the plaintiffs' argument, for which they cited United States decisions, that a political donation is itself a form of political communication, because the First Amendment confers a personal right while the Australian freedom does not [98], [100]–[101], [109]. The Constitution does not guarantee that supporters may express support by making a donation; the relevant question is whether the flow of pertinent information to and from the people of the Commonwealth might be diminished by a restriction on donations [110], [112].
On the first limb of the Lange test, Keane J held that the defendant's argument that s 96D does not restrict those it affects from voicing support for or opposition to any party or candidate confused a personal right of expression with the free flow of political communication [118]–[119]. Given that the evident purpose of s 96D is to limit the funds available to political campaigns, there was "an air of unreality" about the contention that it imposes no burden or no substantial burden [120]. A restriction on the availability of donations will substantially diminish the extent of political communication [121].
On the second limb, his Honour rejected the defendant's argument that s 96D was a step towards a comprehensive prohibition, saying "One must deal with the law as it is, not as it might be" [127]. Keane J observed that the second limb is not without difficulty, partly because of its indefinite and highly abstract language, and that, to the extent it might be seen to contemplate striking down a measure because a less burdensome one might have been available, it would seem to countenance decision-making having more in common with legislative than judicial power [129]. His Honour noted that it might be said that, where a State law is impugned, the question can only be whether the law can reasonably be said to be compatible with the free flow of political communication within the federation [133]. No party or intervener argued this, so the second limb of the Lange test was applied, but on either approach, subject to the quarantine question, the prohibitions in s 96D could not be sustained [134].
The general caps in ss 95A and 95I operate across the board and may reasonably be seen to enhance the prospects of a level electoral playing field, and it was not suggested that they failed the second limb [136]. Section 96D, by contrast, proscribes donations from some sources and so favours others, and this discrimination is apt to distort the flow of political communication [137], [140]. The legislation in Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth was held invalid on the basis of the discriminatory character of its proscription of some sources of political communication relating to electoral campaigning [137]. Protecting the integrity of the electoral process from secret or undue influence is a legitimate end [138], but s 96D's proscriptions are very broad and not calibrated to target the vices the defendant identified, which may equally attend the favoured sources [141]. Disfavouring funds from individuals solely because they are not enrolled fails to appreciate that they may be among the governed and that the freedom is "not an adjunct of an individual's right to vote" [144].
On the quarantine question, Keane J rejected the defendant's argument that ss 83 and 95AA(2) ensure that s 96D does not restrict political communication protected by the Constitution [150], [155]. Those sections confine s 96D to New South Wales State and local government elections, but they cannot ensure that political communications are of exclusively local significance [155]. Some communications may be of exclusively local concern, but s 96D targets donations funding campaigns directed at electors who are among the people of the Commonwealth [157]. No practical example was given of a communication relating only to a New South Wales election with no bearing on federal choices [159].
On s 95G(6), his Honour held that aggregation will reduce the total flow of political communication from a party and its affiliates, which is a burden under the first limb [163]. It also treats sources differently: third-party campaigners are not aggregated, so affiliated organisations are disfavoured relative to supporters who are not affiliated even if they promulgate the same messages, which distorts the flow of political communication [167]. That distortion is not appropriate and adapted, since s 95G(6) is not calibrated to target only sources affected by factors inimical to the free flow of political communication [168]. For the reasons given on s 96D, s 83 does not quarantine s 95G(6) [169].
Orders. The Court answered the questions in the special case, as amended: question 1, yes, s 96D is invalid because it impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters; question 2, yes, s 95G(6) is invalid on the same ground [66]. Questions 3 to 8, concerning the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW), s 109 inconsistency and freedom of association, were unnecessary to answer [66]. On question 9, the defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiffs' costs of the special case [66]. Keane J gave the same answers [170].
Why it matters
The joint reasons treat the identification of a legitimate statutory purpose as the first enquiry under the second limb of the Lange test, so that proportionality cannot be considered until that purpose is identified [46]. The joint reasons state that the freedom operates as a restraint on the legislative power of the States as well as the Commonwealth [31]. Both sets of reasons accept that communication in a State or local context may bear on the choices required of the people of the Commonwealth [25], [155]. The joint reasons left open whether a complete prohibition on donations, or a prohibition aimed at corporations alone, could be justified [55], [59]. Keane J questioned aspects of the second limb of the Lange test but applied it because no party argued otherwise [129], [134].
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