Williams v Commonwealth of Australia
(2014) 252 CLR 416 · [2014] HCA 23 · (2014) 88 ALJR 701
Summary updated 4 November 2026
Overview
Williams v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] HCA 23 is a decision of the High Court of Australia given on 19 June 2014 by French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ. Ronald Williams brought a second challenge to Commonwealth funding of chaplaincy services at the state school his four children attend, and the parties stated questions for the Full Court in a special case. [4], [7], [14] The Court answered that, in their operation on the funding agreement and payments in issue, the provisions enacted after his first challenge are not valid laws of the Commonwealth, that the agreement and expenditure under it were not supported by the executive power of the Commonwealth, and that the payments were unlawful. [6], [90], [92], [94] The Court also refused the Commonwealth parties' application to reopen Williams v The Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156; [2012] HCA 23 ("Williams (No 1)"). [1], [66] French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ wrote joint reasons, and Crennan J agreed with them and with the answers, subject to a reservation about s 51(xxiiiA) of the Constitution. [1], [99]
Facts
In December 2010 Mr Williams challenged the payment of money by the Commonwealth to Scripture Union Queensland ("SUQ") for SUQ to provide chaplaincy services at the Queensland state school his four children attended. [4]
In Williams (No 1), answered in June 2012, he failed on s 116 of the Constitution but succeeded in his claims that the funding agreement and the payments under it were not supported by the executive power of the Commonwealth. [5]
Within days the Parliament enacted the Financial Framework Legislation Amendment Act (No 3) 2012 (Cth) ("the FFLA Act"), which amended the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) ("the FMA Act") and the Financial Management and Accountability Regulations 1997 (Cth) ("the FMA Regulations"). [6] The joint reasons describe those amendments as evidently intended to give legislative support to agreements and payments of the kind in Williams (No 1) and to many other arrangements and grants. [6]
Section 32B(1) of the FMA Act provides that, if apart from that subsection the Commonwealth does not have power to make, vary or administer an arrangement under which public money is or may become payable, or a grant of financial assistance, it has that power where the arrangement or grant is specified in the regulations, is in a specified class, or is for the purposes of a program specified in the regulations. [15] Item 407.013 in Pt 4 of Sched 1AA to the FMA Regulations specifies the National School Chaplaincy and Student Welfare Program, whose stated objective is to assist school communities to support the wellbeing of their students, including by strengthening values, providing pastoral care and enhancing engagement with the broader community. [16] Item 9 of Sched 1 to the FFLA Act gave certain arrangements made or purportedly made before its commencement effect as if made under s 32B(1). [17]
The funding agreement now challenged is dated 21 December 2011 and was varied up to a Fourteenth Variation Deed dated 23 January 2014, with payments purportedly made under it in January 2012, June 2012, January 2013 and February 2014. [32] The agreement and payments are said to be made under that program, which was one of many administered items in the relevant Appropriation Acts. [8]
Procedural history
Mr Williams brought a fresh proceeding in the High Court against the Commonwealth, the relevant Minister and SUQ, challenging the provisions inserted by the FFLA Act both generally and in their operation on the payments to SUQ. [7] The reasons call the Commonwealth and the Minister "the Commonwealth parties". [11] The parties agreed to state questions in a special case for the opinion of the Full Court. [14] The Attorneys-General of New South Wales, Tasmania, South Australia, Victoria, Western Australia and Queensland intervened.
Issues
Question 1 asked whether the Appropriation Acts for 2011-2012, 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 authorised the funding agreement. [53]
Question 2 asked whether s 32B of the FMA Act, Pt 5AA and Sched 1AA of the FMA Regulations and item 9 of Sched 1 to the FFLA Act are wholly invalid. [32]
Question 3 asked whether those provisions supported the funding agreement, and question 4 whether the executive power of the Commonwealth supported the Commonwealth's entry into, and expenditure under, that agreement. [91], [92]
Question 5 asked about Mr Williams' standing to challenge particular payments, question 6 whether the payments identified were unlawful, and questions 7 and 8 about relief and costs. [27], [94]–[96]
On validity, the Commonwealth parties and SUQ defended the provisions as laws with respect to the provision of benefits to students within s 51(xxiiiA), and SUQ further relied on s 51(xx), trading or financial corporations. [11], [12]
The Commonwealth parties also sought to reopen Williams (No 1), advanced arguments about the ambit of the Executive's power to spend, and relied on the incidental power in s 51(xxxix). [14], [57], [85]
Held
French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ (joint reasons)
The joint reasons say that Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1; [2009] HCA 23 and Williams (No 1) provide the foundations for the decision. [14] In Pape all members of the Court concluded that ss 81 and 83 of the Constitution do not confer a substantive spending power, and agreed that the power to spend appropriated moneys must be found elsewhere in the Constitution or in statutes made under it. [20] In Williams (No 1) six members of the Court held the agreement beyond the executive power under s 61 and the payments under it not supported by that power. [24]
On standing, the Commonwealth parties accepted that the question should be resolved in Mr Williams' favour, and SUQ made no submission to the contrary. [28] The joint reasons qualified the answer for two reasons: the concession was made in light of the position taken by the State Attorneys-General as interveners, and it was not necessary to decide whether s 32B is wholly invalid as an impermissible delegation of legislative power, or whether Mr Williams could challenge other arrangements which do not affect him or his children. [29], [30]
The joint reasons say it may be that, taken literally, s 32B would have a very wide field of application, but that ordinary principles of construction, consistent with s 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), require it to be read as giving power only where it is within the power of the Parliament to authorise the arrangement or grant. [36] Any wider questions raised by Mr Williams' arguments based on Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd and Meakes v Dignan [1931] HCA 34; (1931) 46 CLR 73 were not reached, and it was enough to ask whether the provisions, in their operation on the chaplaincy agreement and payments, are supported by a head of legislative power. [36]
On s 51(xxiiiA), the joint reasons say it is by no means obvious that the department's guidelines can properly be used to construe the provisions or determine their validity, but they did not pursue that issue, observing only that a program extending to the wider school community would appear to point away from characterising it as providing benefits to students. [41] All students may use the services, and it may be accepted that some would derive advantage from them, but in the joint reasons' words: "All may; perhaps some should; none must." [42]
The joint reasons say "benefits" in s 51(xxiiiA) is used more precisely than as a general reference to any and every kind of advantage or good, and note that the majority in British Medical Association v The Commonwealth ("the BMA Case") [1949] HCA 44; (1949) 79 CLR 201 accepted the meaning expressed by McTiernan J: "material aid given pursuant to a scheme to provide for human wants ... under legislation designed to promote social welfare or security". [43] In Alexandra Private Geriatric Hospital Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth ("the Alexandra Hospital Case") [1987] HCA 6; (1987) 162 CLR 271 all five members of the Court accepted that the concept may encompass services, and the joint reasons identify as the central fact in that case that the intended ultimate beneficiary was a particular, identified patient. [44]
The joint reasons decline to give a comprehensive definition of "benefits", but say "benefits to students" cannot be construed piecemeal, as if it presented separate questions about a benefit and about students. [45] They say the word refers to aid to or for individuals for human wants arising as a consequence of the identified occasions, and that in the usual case it will be material aid relieving the person from a cost that person would otherwise incur. [46] For students, they say, the relief would be material aid against the human wants a student has by reason of being a student. [46]
Providing a chaplain or welfare worker at a school for the objective in item 407.013 does not provide material aid for the human wants of students, is not a service rendered to or for any identified or identifiable student, involves no payment for or on behalf of any such student, and is not directed to the consequences of being a student. [47] There is no more than the payment of an amount, here to an intermediary, to be applied in paying the wages of a person to support the wellbeing of the children who attend an identified school. [47] The joint reasons call the objectives "desirable ends", but say that seeking them in the course of the school day does not give the payments the quality of being benefits to students. [47] Providing money to pay persons to provide such services at a school is therefore not a provision of benefits to students within s 51(xxiiiA). [48]
SUQ's reliance on s 51(xx) was also rejected: even assuming that the other party to an agreement under the program can, or must, be a trading or financial corporation, the law makes no provision regulating or permitting any act by or on behalf of a corporation and does not provide the corporation's capacity to make the agreement and receive and apply the payments. [49], [50] The joint reasons contrast the law in New South Wales v The Commonwealth (Work Choices Case) (2006) 229 CLR 1; [2006] HCA 52, and say it is not necessary to consider whether SUQ is a trading or financial corporation or the larger questions left open in that case. [50], [51]
In this proceeding, though not in Williams (No 1), the Commonwealth parties submitted that the Appropriation Acts authorised the funding agreement, and Mr Williams submitted that they were precluded from relying on this argument. [53], [54] The joint reasons left the preclusion arguments for a case in which it is necessary to deal with them, because if the Appropriation Acts gave that authority the same validity questions would arise and the conclusions on the impugned provisions would apply equally, so question 1 was unnecessary to answer. [55], [56]
The Commonwealth parties put four main reasons for reopening Williams (No 1): it was said not to rest on a principle carefully worked out in a significant succession of cases, the Court was said not to have received sufficient argument or constitutional fact, the reasons of what they called the four Justices constituting the majority were said to contain no single answer, and the decision was said to have caused considerable inconvenience with no significant corresponding benefits. [58], [59] The joint reasons say that, even if the first point were right, it would show only that the decision was not one the Court should be especially reluctant to reopen, and would give no necessary reason to reopen what six Justices had so recently decided. [60] The Commonwealth parties had a complete opportunity to advance their arguments in Williams (No 1), and it is greatly to be doubted that Senate practice and inter-governmental consultations about the program are relevant constitutional facts; if they are, it was well open to the Commonwealth parties to raise them then. [61], [62] Williams (No 1) decided the issues tendered for decision, and it was not, and could not be, explained how the absence of an answer to every question about Commonwealth expenditure powers, or of any consideration of State expenditure powers, pointed to a need to reopen it. [64] On inconvenience, the joint reasons find "no greater content than that the Commonwealth parties wish that the decision in Williams (No 1) had been different and seek a further opportunity to persuade the Court to their view", and say the only inconvenience identified was the need to enact the impugned provisions. [65] The application to reopen was refused. [66]
The joint reasons still record the executive power arguments and why they were rightly rejected, having said of the additional arguments generally that "[t]heir repetition does not demonstrate their validity", and that it is not necessary to decide whether the Commonwealth or the Minister may, or should be permitted to, advance them. [13], [67] The Commonwealth parties submitted that there were only seven limitations on the Executive's power to spend and contract, which the joint reasons treat as in substance a repetition of the "broad basis" submissions that six Justices rejected in Williams (No 1). [68], [69] If a limit by subject matter was considered necessary, the Commonwealth parties proposed that the power under s 61 extends to all matters reasonably capable of being seen as of national benefit or concern, that is, matters that befit the national government of the federation as discerned from the text and structure of the Constitution. [70] The joint reasons say this proposition is of great width, may commit to the Parliament the judgment of what is within the spending power, and is but another way of putting the submission that the Executive has unlimited power to spend appropriated moneys for the purposes identified by the appropriation. [71] They also say consultation with the States, coupled with silent or even expressed acquiescence, does not supply otherwise absent constitutional power, and that neither s 51(xxxvii) nor s 96 was engaged. [74]
More fundamental defects lay in an assumption: the premises that a polity must possess all the powers it needs in order to function as a polity, and that executive power is all power of a polity that is not legislative or judicial, could be accepted, but the conclusion needed a third premise, that Commonwealth executive power should be assumed to be no less than that of the British Executive, and in the joint reasons' words "[t]his third premise is false". [75], [77], [78] Why the executive power of the new federal entity should be assumed to have the same ambit as that of the Executive of a unitary state having no written constitution was not demonstrated, and they say that assumption begs the question for decision. [79] British constitutional history will assist and illuminates provisions such as ss 81-83, but the ambit of the power to spend must be decided in light of all the relevant provisions of the Constitution. [80], [81] The assumption denies what the joint reasons, citing Dixon J in the Pharmaceutical Benefits Case [1945] HCA 30; (1945) 71 CLR 237, call the "basal consideration" that the Constitution effects a distribution of powers and functions between the Commonwealth and the States. [83]
The arguments on s 51(xxxix) were also rejected. [86] To treat a law authorising expenditure of any moneys lawfully appropriated as incidental to the power to appropriate would be to hold, contrary to Pape, that any and every appropriation brings the expenditure of those moneys within the power of the Commonwealth. [85], [86] To treat s 32B as incidental to the executive power presupposes what both Pape and Williams (No 1) deny: that the executive power extends to any and every form of expenditure of public moneys and the making of any agreement providing for it. [87]
SUQ submitted that no costs order should be made against it because it acted in good faith in reliance on the Commonwealth's legislation, but because it chose to play an active part in defending the provisions, the joint reasons saw no reason why it should not pay with the Commonwealth parties. [97]
Crennan J
Crennan J agreed with the joint reasons and the proposed answers, subject to a reservation confined to the challenge under s 51(xxiiiA). [99] It was enough, Crennan J held, that the provisions do not institute a scheme for the provision of government assistance to, or for, persons (here students) as prescribed and identifiable beneficiaries. [102] Crennan J said McTiernan J's explanation of a benefit in the BMA Case, approved in the Alexandra Hospital Case, shows that the word has a specific meaning when used in social security legislation. [103] In that legislation, Crennan J said, a benefit is government assistance to which a person is entitled, in money, goods or services whose provision is underwritten by the State, and the personal entitlement is predicated invariably on prescribed, hence identifiable, persons as beneficiaries. [104]
Crennan J accepted the Commonwealth parties' submissions that the power should be construed with all the generality its words admit, that it is not constrained by historical conceptions of social security legislation as at 1946, and that benefits are not confined to assistance by way of a service for which a person otherwise must pay. [107] Crennan J rejected their submission that the BMA Case and the Alexandra Hospital Case support reading benefits to include services to undifferentiated persons who cannot be identified as entitled to some benefit. [107] Each of the 11 grants of power in s 51(xxiiiA), Crennan J said, involves an entitlement of persons to money, goods or services provided or underwritten by the federal government. [109] Assistance need not be direct, but indirect assistance to students, such as subsidies paid to universities, must relate to education services provided to real or actual persons as prescribed recipients or beneficiaries entitled to those services. [109]
Under the program no student is required to be identified as a prescribed recipient or beneficiary, and payments to SUQ or other providers are not made in respect of assistance to persons with a personal entitlement, so Crennan J held it is not a scheme for the provision of benefits within s 51(xxiiiA). [110] Crennan J added that it is unnecessary to conclude, or to imply, that the services of student welfare workers or student counsellors could not be the subject of a federal government scheme for the provision of benefits to students. [111]
Orders. The Court answered the questions in the amended special case dated 1 May 2014 as follows.
- Question 1: "Unnecessary to answer." [56], [89]
- Question 2: in their operation with respect to the funding agreement (as varied up to the Fourteenth Variation Deed) and the payments purportedly made under it in January 2012, June 2012, January 2013 and February 2014, none of s 32B of the FMA Act, Pt 5AA and Sched 1AA of the FMA Regulations or item 9 of Sched 1 to the FFLA Act is a valid law of the Commonwealth. [32], [90]
- Question 3: "No." [91]
- Question 4: "No." [92]
- Question 5: "In the circumstances of this case, and to the extent necessary for the determination of this matter, yes." [93]
- Question 6: "Yes." [94]
- Question 7: "The Justice disposing of the proceeding should grant the plaintiff such relief and make such costs orders as appear appropriate in light of the answers given to these questions." [95]
- Question 8: "The defendants should pay the plaintiff's costs of the special case. The costs of the proceeding are otherwise in the discretion of the single Justice who makes final orders disposing of the proceeding." [98]
In result, the provisions were held invalid in their relevant operation, the payments were held unlawful, the defendants should pay Mr Williams' costs of the special case, and final relief was left to a single Justice. [90], [94], [95], [98]
Why it matters
The provisions enacted in response to Williams (No 1) failed here because, in their relevant operation, no head of legislative power relied on supported them. [12], [57], [86], [87] The joint reasons treat as established in Pape the premises that an appropriation under ss 81 and 83 does not itself confer a substantive spending power and that the power to spend appropriated moneys must be found elsewhere in the Constitution or in statutes made under it. [25] They also say the determination of the ambit of the executive power of the Commonwealth cannot begin from a premise that it must be the same as the ambit of British executive power. [81]
On s 51(xxiiiA) the two sets of reasons give the same answer in different terms: the joint reasons speak of material aid directed to the consequences of being a student, and Crennan J of a personal entitlement of prescribed, identifiable beneficiaries. [47], [48], [102], [110] The joint reasons say that in the usual case a benefit relieves a person from a cost that person would otherwise incur, and Crennan J accepts that benefits are not confined to a service for which a person otherwise must pay. [46], [107]
The reasons leave undecided whether s 32B is wholly invalid as a delegation of legislative power, whether SUQ is a trading or financial corporation and whether preclusion applies in constitutional litigation, and they record that no question about State expenditure powers was in issue. [30], [51], [54], [55], [64]
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