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Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd

(2004) 216 CLR 515 · [2004] HCA 16 · (2004) 205 ALR 522 · (2004) 78 ALJR 628

High Court of Australia · Federal

Summary updated 3 November 2026

Overview

Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 16 is a decision of the High Court of Australia (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ), given on 1 April 2004 on appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland. The question was whether consulting engineers who designed the foundations of a warehouse and office building owed a later purchaser of the building a duty of care to avoid pure economic loss [1]–[2], [20]. The Court dismissed the appeal with costs, which left in place the Queensland Court of Appeal's answer "No" to the question whether the purchaser's pleading disclosed a cause of action in negligence [8], [36]. Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ wrote joint reasons, McHugh J and Callinan J each wrote separate reasons reaching the same order, and Kirby J dissented and would have allowed the appeal [36], [117], [192], [234].

Facts

In 1987 the first respondent, a company of consulting engineers, designed foundations for a warehouse and offices in Townsville, on land owned by the trustee of a property trust [1]. McHugh J records that the building has no dwellings, that the first respondent also provided supervision services for its construction, and that the second respondent was a civil engineer employed by the first respondent who acted as project manager [39], [41].

The first respondent obtained a quotation for investigating the sub-soil, which would have required digging auger holes and testing soil samples [41]. It was agreed in the Case Stated that the original owner of the land, by its manager, refused to pay for those investigations [25]. The other judges describe the party who refused in different words: McHugh J as the company undertaking the development of the site for the owner [41], Kirby J as the original developer [131] and Callinan J as one of two joint venturers who undertook the construction [194]. The respondents also say that the then owner instructed them to proceed without soil tests and to use structural footing sizes provided by the builder [2]. Construction proceeded without testing the suitability of the sub-soil and was substantially completed by late 1987 [39], [41].

In September 1992 the appellant bought the building from a company that was the successor trustee of the property trust [39]. The contract contained no warranty that the building was free from defect and no assignment of any rights the vendor may have had against others in respect of defects [1]. Before completing its purchase, the appellant obtained from the local authority a certificate that the building complied with the Building Act 1975 (Q) and some subordinate legislation [32]. Callinan J records that the council's report, made after a physical inspection, did not identify any unsafe or dilapidated structures or hint at any matters of structural concern [197]–[198]. McHugh J records that the appellant did not retain an expert to inspect the building and did not ask the tenants or their agents about structural defects [39].

Substantial structural distress became apparent in 1994, and it is agreed that it was due to settlement of the foundations, the material below them, or both [2], [40]. The appellant alleged that each respondent owed it a duty to take reasonable care in designing the foundations, and the respondents denied any duty and any breach [2].

Procedural history

The appellant sued the respondents in the Supreme Court of Queensland, claiming damages for economic loss caused by negligent design or negligent supervision during construction [42]. With the parties' consent a case was stated for the opinion of the Court of Appeal, and McHugh J records that Atkinson J stated it [3], [42]. The question asked in the Case Stated was: "On the agreed facts, does the further amended statement of claim delivered on 11 April 2000 disclose a cause of action in negligence against the defendants?" [3]. In both the Court of Appeal and the High Court, argument proceeded on the basis that the duty question could be resolved having regard only to the facts in the Case Stated, inferences reasonably drawn from them, and the facts alleged in the statement of claim [6].

The Court of Appeal (McMurdo P, Thomas JA and Douglas J) answered "No", in a decision reported at (2002) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-660 [8], [43]. Those judges concluded that Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609 established that the builder of a dwelling may owe a duty of care to a remote purchaser, but that those who built or designed commercial buildings did not owe any duty of care to subsequent purchasers [8]. Thomas JA, with whose reasons Douglas J agreed, said (as quoted in the joint reasons) "there is no good reason, in terms of principle or policy, to extend the decision in Bryan v Maloney to cases other than residential dwellings" [8]. Callinan J records that Thomas JA saw Bryan v Maloney as resting heavily on a special vulnerability of members of the public who buy single dwelling houses, and was also influenced by the view that allowing the claim would grant all purchasers in a line of purchases a transmissible warranty of quality of indefinite duration [200]. The High Court then gave the appellant special leave to appeal [44].

Issues

The joint reasons put the issue as whether the respondents owed the appellant a duty of care [2]. McHugh J divided the issue in two: whether the ratio decidendi of Bryan v Maloney covers the case and, if not, whether the Court should hold that those involved in building commercial premises owe subsequent purchasers a similar duty [58]. According to the joint reasons, the core of the appellant's contention was that there is no difference in principle between a residential house and a purely commercial development, so that it could recover just as the plaintiff in Bryan v Maloney had [34]. Kirby J records three positions put to the Court: that Bryan v Maloney should be overruled; that it should stand but be confined to its facts or treated as an anomalous exception, which was the primary way the respondents eventually argued the appeal; and that it should be re-expressed more broadly in line with later cases, specifically Perre v Apand Pty Ltd, as the appellant argued [141], [149].

Held

Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ

In joint reasons, their Honours held that on the facts in the Case Stated and alleged in the pleadings neither respondent owed the appellant a duty to take reasonable care to avoid the economic loss alleged [25]. They first cautioned that there may be difficulty in using a procedure of this kind where a court must consider developing, as distinct from applying, common law principles, saying that "[t]he dangers of developing common law principle against an artificially constricted body of fact are self-evident" [7].

They described Bryan v Maloney, decided by Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ with Brennan J dissenting, as deciding that the builder of a dwelling house owed a subsequent purchaser a duty to take reasonable care to avoid the economic loss from the fall in the house's value when its fabric cracked because the footings were inadequate [10]. That conclusion depended on "the anterior step" of concluding that the builder owed the first owner a duty of care to avoid economic loss of that kind [14]. The joint reasons in Bryan v Maloney had said the ordinary relationship between a builder of a house and the first owner is characterised by assumption of responsibility by the builder and known reliance by the owner [12]. At least in terms, the principles engaged in that case did not depend on any distinction between kinds of, or uses for, buildings [15]. Their Honours said it may be doubted that Bryan v Maloney should be understood as depending on a bright line between dwellings and other buildings, and that any such line "would turn out to be far from bright, straight, clearly defined, or even clearly definable", given mixed-use buildings and high-rise apartment blocks [17]. They added that later decisions of the Court reveal that proximity, which Bryan v Maloney had treated as the "conceptual determinant", is no longer seen as such in this area [18].

The damage alleged was pure economic loss, and neither side sought to reopen the debate about whether physical damage to the building made it otherwise [20]. Such damages are not recoverable if all that is shown is that the defendant's negligence was a cause of the loss and the loss was reasonably foreseeable, a point they supported by quoting Brennan J in Bryan v Maloney on the danger to commercial competition and of indeterminate liability [21]. They noted that in Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge "Willemstad" Stephen J isolated a number of "salient features" that combined to give a sufficiently close relationship [22]. Since that case, and most notably in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd, "the vulnerability of the plaintiff has emerged as an important requirement in cases where a duty of care to avoid economic loss has been held to have been owed" [23]. Vulnerability here refers to "the plaintiff's inability to protect itself from the consequences of a defendant's want of reasonable care, either entirely or at least in a way which would cast the consequences of loss on the defendant" [23]. They contrasted the plaintiffs in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd, who could do nothing to protect themselves, with the financier in Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords, who could have made its own inquiries [23]. They held it not necessary to identify or articulate the breadth of any general proposition about the importance of vulnerability [24].

Unlike Bryan v Maloney, it could not be said here that the respondents owed the original owner a duty to avoid economic loss of this kind, and it was not alleged that they breached any obligation to that owner [25]. Because the owner refused to pay for geotechnical investigations, the relationship was not one of entrusting the design to the engineer under a simple contract, but one in which the owner "asserted control over the investigations which the engineer undertook" [25]. The appellant did not plead assumption of responsibility by the respondents and known reliance by the original owner, and the agreed facts "point firmly in the opposite direction" [26]. The anterior step was therefore not made out, so the duty could not be supported by the reasoning in Bryan v Maloney [27].

They found it unnecessary to decide whether disconformity between the contract with the original owner and the duty allegedly owed to a later owner would always deny a duty [28], [30]. They did say that the contract at least defines the task undertaken, and that there "would be evident difficulty" in finding a duty to a later owner if performing it would have required more or different work than the contract required or permitted [28].

The facts alleged and agreed did not show that the appellant was vulnerable, because they did not show that it could not have protected itself against the loss [31]. The absence of a warranty and an assignment described what did happen, and the pleading and the Case Stated were silent about whether the appellant could have obtained such terms [31]. It was not alleged or agreed that the defects could not have been discovered, and the local authority's certificate said nothing about what other investigations might have revealed [32]. Nothing in the Case Stated or the pleading bore on whether the purchase was a very significant investment for the appellant, if that is relevant [33].

Foreseeability being necessary but not sufficient, they said, "the critical question is: what more must be shown?" [34]. The case could be decided without determining whether doubt should be cast on the result in Bryan v Maloney, and they said the actual decision in that case had been "overtaken, at least to a significant extent, by various statutory forms of protection for those who buy dwelling houses which turn out to be defective" [35]. Neither the principles applied in that case nor those principles as later developed supported the duty claimed, and the appeal should be dismissed with costs [35]–[36].

McHugh J

McHugh J wrote separate reasons and concluded that the appeal should be dismissed with costs [117]. He held that "the Australian law of torts imposes no such duty" on those involved in the design or construction of commercial premises to take reasonable care to prevent pure economic loss to subsequent purchasers [37].

He distinguished the holding of a case (the decision on the precise point in issue), the rule of the case (the principle for which it stands) and its ratio decidendi (the general rule of law propounded as the reason for the decision) [59]. In his view the ratio of Bryan v Maloney does not apply to commercial premises and can "be put no higher than" a duty on the builder of a dwelling house to a subsequent purchaser to avoid reasonably foreseeable decreases in its value from latent defects caused by defective construction [71]. He gave as a "conclusive reason" that Bryan v Maloney was decided and reasoned under the doctrine of proximity, and he said the rejection of that doctrine in Sullivan v Moody meant its material facts could not be used, even by analogy, as persuasive [72]–[73].

He then turned to the five matters he had listed in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd: reasonable foreseeability of loss, indeterminacy of liability, autonomy of the individual, vulnerability to risk, and knowledge of the risk and its magnitude [74]–[75]. The loss was clearly foreseeable, but reasonable foreseeability is a necessary and not a sufficient condition [76]. Indeterminacy of liability is not an issue when the first owner or a subsequent purchaser of a commercial building claims damages for pure economic loss [77]. Questions of individual autonomy do not seem relevant in this context [79]. The respondents were fully aware of the risk, as they had asked for the site to be tested [87]. He called the purchaser's vulnerability to economic loss "the critical issue", meaning that by reason of ignorance or social, political or economic constraints the plaintiff was not able to protect itself from the risk of injury [80].

He did not treat these other suggested objections as decisive: control of third parties [89], outflanking the law of contract [92], a flood of claims [97], disproportionate liability [99] and the problem of measuring defective quality [101]. The capacity to protect oneself by contract is, he said, "merely one – although often a decisive – reason" for rejecting a duty of care in cases of pure economic loss [94]. Because damage does not occur until a defect manifests itself, those involved could be sued in tort years after time had expired for suing on the contract, which he said "flies in the face" of the rationales of limitation statutes [103], [105]. The likely unsatisfactory consequences for the administration of justice and the efficiency of commerce were "a powerful reason" against the duty [109].

But "the most powerful reason" was that first owners and purchasers of commercial buildings are ordinarily in a position to protect themselves from most losses likely to occur from construction defects [110]. Subsequent purchasers can, for example, make contractual arrangements with their vendor, take an assignment of the vendor's rights and obtain expert investigations [111]. The Case Stated did not reveal how far such protection is open, and he said that in the absence of evidence the Court must assume that a first owner can bargain for contractual remedies against the builder and that a subsequent purchaser can bargain for warranties from the vendor [96].

He accepted that a remedy in tort would advance corrective justice and would be desirable where contractual protection turns out to be inadequate [106], [112]. Whether those advantages outweigh the disadvantages was a value judgment for which the data, if it exists at all, was not before the Court, so the better view was that the principle of Bryan v Maloney should not be extended to commercial premises [112]. His stated rule was that, in the absence of a contract between the owner of commercial premises and a person involved in their design or construction, that person owes the current owner no duty to prevent pure economic loss, while where a contract exists, assumption of responsibility and reliance may create a duty in tort as well [112]. In his opinion "the law of negligence is best served by leaving it to the market and the law of contract" to determine who bears the loss from a fall in the value of a commercial building on the discovery of latent defects [115]. He added that nothing in his judgment was intended to suggest that Bryan v Maloney would now be decided differently, a question that "almost certainly depends" on evidence about whether purchasers of dwelling houses are as vulnerable as the Court assumed [116].

Kirby J (dissenting)

Kirby J dissented, holding that the appeal should be allowed and that the appellant should have a trial of its claim [190]–[192]. He called the case "somewhat unsuitable" as a vehicle to expand or confine Bryan v Maloney, and thought that proceeding on unelaborated facts had disadvantaged the party seeking recovery [123]–[124]. Where the law is uncertain or developing it is inappropriate to put a plaintiff out of court if there is a real issue to be tried, and only in a clear case should orders deny a party a trial [138].

He said that, on the face of things, the ratio of Bryan v Maloney is concerned only with the duty of a builder or like person to subsequent purchasers of a dwelling house, and that the decision's reliance on proximity was a defective doctrinal basis [145], [147]. He would nevertheless reject as unnecessary the application to overrule it, while accepting that it does not itself solve the present case [151]. He said the appellant's written concession that its claim was for pure economic loss "may have been an unnecessary and incorrect concession", and that the allegation of actual damage to the building arguably takes the claim outside the common law's resistance to such recovery [153], [156]. He favoured the three-fold test in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman, but accepted that the authority of Sullivan v Moody obliged him to approach the issue as the other members of the Court had in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd [158], [161].

Applying the matters McHugh J identified in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd, he found that the loss was at least arguably reasonably foreseeable and that the risk was actually foreseen, since the respondents had suggested expert ground tests [165]. Liability was not indeterminate, because the class was future owners and users of the building and the appellant disclaimed a duty of unlimited or indefinite duration [166]. A duty would not unduly interfere with commercial freedom, since the respondents were already under a duty of care to the original owner, and ending their liability on a sale of the building would be "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable" [167]. Vulnerability is not confined to poverty, disability, social disadvantage or relative economic power, and he said courts should be reluctant to assume that a commercial entity lacks vulnerability simply because of its commercial character [168]–[169]. The appellant was vulnerable because it "had no reasonable intermediate opportunity of discovering, and protecting itself against, the latent defect", and the suggestion that it should have obtained an express warranty "involves a great deal of wisdom after the event" [173]. He concluded that the preconditions for a duty stated in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd were made good, certainly on the basis of reasonable arguability, and that it could not be said that the appellant was bound to fail [175].

He treated consumer legislation, caveat emptor and the local authority's tests as irrelevant to the claim against the engineers [176]–[179]. Considerations of delay, in his view, can be dealt with in deciding the standard of care and breach, and do not determine whether a duty exists [180]. He said that among the courts of high authority in the Commonwealth the decision "will therefore appear as one that is out of step with majority judicial opinion" [188]. He also adopted, for the views of the majority in this appeal, the description by George CJ in Aas v Superior Court of an "unfortunate misstep in the development of the law" [189].

Callinan J

Callinan J wrote separate reasons, was unable to accept the appellant's submissions and concluded that the appeal should be dismissed with costs [208], [234]. He pointed out that the joint judgment in Bryan v Maloney repeatedly emphasised that the Court was concerned with a dwelling house and its purchaser [208]. He adopted as more persuasive a passage from Brennan J's dissent in that case, in which Brennan J said such a liability would be tantamount to a transmissible warranty of quality and that extending remedies in that direction is properly a matter for Parliament [209]–[210]. In his view this case is distinguishable from Bryan v Maloney, and allowing the claim "would represent a marked and unwarranted extension of it" [210].

He said there is reason to question the correctness of Bryan v Maloney, and that the better view may be that the decision itself is the anomaly, but he found no need to express any final opinion on its correctness [211], [215], [218]. He questioned the majority's assumption in that case, made without evidence, that buying a dwelling is the most significant investment most people will make [217].

Neither the appellant nor a purchaser of any premises is, he said, especially vulnerable, because a purchaser can insist on a warranty or condition of fitness or soundness, or seek an inspection and report from an expert who will be liable if negligent [212]–[213]. Foundations, though below ground, can be professionally examined and tested [228]. Neither foreseeability nor vulnerability alone is enough to ground liability [223]–[224]. He treated Perre v Apand Pty Ltd as different because its plaintiffs were in a very exceptional and vulnerable position with no opportunity of protecting themselves by a contractual term or condition [222].

He said the appellant's denial of indeterminacy focused selectively on determinacy of class [225]–[226]. He found it unnecessary to decide when any limitation period commenced, but said that even if time ran only from when the defect manifested itself there may still be problems of indeterminacy of time and uncertainty about the correct measure of damages [219]. Commercial freedom may well be put at risk by the duty, because the first owner chose to take the risks of not having a geotechnical investigation and contracting parties are entitled to allocate risks as they choose [227].

Until any statutory intervention, he said, the rule of caveat emptor should apply, and social policy is "a matter for parliament rather than the courts to weigh" [227], [229]. He preferred resolving such cases by closely examining the facts for a sufficiency of relevant factors rather than stating an inflexible principle, and he held that the appellant had failed to point to a sufficiency of those factors [231]. He said this area is better regulated by legislators, and his footnote lists statutory warranties and insurance or guarantee schemes for residential building work [233].

Orders. The order of the Court was: appeal dismissed with costs [36], [117], [234]. Kirby J would have allowed the appeal with costs, set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal, answered the question in the Case Stated "yes", returned the proceedings for trial, and ordered the respondents to pay the appellant's costs in the Supreme Court of proceedings to date [192].

Why it matters

The case matters for how far Bryan v Maloney reaches: six of the seven judges refused to carry it across to a later purchaser's claim against the engineers who designed the foundations of a commercial building [35], [112], [210]. Their reasons differ: the joint reasons relied on the failure of the anterior step and the absence of shown vulnerability [27], [31], McHugh J stated a general rule for commercial premises where there is no contract [112], and Callinan J treated the case as distinguishable and preferred not to state an inflexible principle [210], [231]. The joint reasons stated their conclusion on the facts agreed and alleged, and said it may be doubted that Bryan v Maloney depends on a bright line between dwellings and other buildings [17], [35]. They left open the breadth of any general proposition about vulnerability, whether disconformity with the original contract would always deny a duty, and whether doubt should be cast on the result in Bryan v Maloney [24], [30], [35]. No judge overruled Bryan v Maloney: the joint reasons did not need to decide whether to cast doubt on it, McHugh J said nothing in his judgment was intended to suggest it would now be decided differently, Kirby J would reject overruling as unnecessary, and Callinan J, while questioning it, found no need for a final opinion [35], [116], [151], [218].

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